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I:HTRODUCTIO!IT 
The .Aim : South Afri cu has experienced an almost revo-
lutionary change in her food position in the last 10 years, 
what was previously a "farm problem" of assisting the pri-
mary producer has now become a "food problem" and this ia a 
study of the· development of those factors leading up .to such 
a change. It is an empirical study attempting to measure 
the production and consumption of certain selected foodstuffs 
and to compare them with changes observed in the population 
and the National Income. 
The Treatment : The study has been divided into three 
sections; Section A, Production and Consumption which ·in 
turn is sub-divided into the five specific commodities in 
which we are interested; Section B, Consumption and Popu1~ 
tion and finally Section C, Consumption and the J:ifational In ... 
come. Th!s has been done with the express purpose of bring-
ing out the relationships between the quantities underpis-
cussion in as clear a ma.nnel' as possible. There can re 
little doubt that any rigid division tends to introduce the 
danger of "missing the wood for the trees 11 , eo the writer 
would stress the importance of the su~n~·ies at the end of 
each chapter and of course the most important se~tion of all 
... the Conclusion in which the threads of the arguments throug}:l 
out the preceding chapters are brought together and shewn in 
their true perspective and importance. 
The Perio·o. The twenty years 1930-49 huve been tuken as 
the period under review in order to trace the development and 
effect of certain factors on the food situation in this coun~ 
try, factors sta:h as the depression years, t he period of the 
Second World War and its aftermath and generally to present 
the change in the supply and demand condi tiona in a precj.se 
and assimilable form without the necessity of becoming too 
involved in a discussion on the history of South African agr~ 
culture. It is a wid.ely held view that late 1920' a was a. 
/period 
,.. 
period of change i n the agricultural scene, the beginnings 
of a commercialized farming community, and it is on this 
point of view that the writer decided t o t ake 1930 as the 
sturting point for the present inquiry. 
The Commodities : The commodities chosen for this study 
are .wheat, maize, <:\airy products, sugar and meat. The first 
two are tbe staple cereals of the population, wheat for the 
Europeans and maize for the Africans and it is as such that 
their importance in the food situation of the country can be 
considered as fundamental. Dairy products are included as 
representing the more expensive group of foodstuffs, highly 
necessary in the diet for their protective qualities, but re ... 
latively costly due to the greater utilization of economic 
resources in their production. The purpose of including su-
gar was mainly in view of the present critical shortage of 
this product while the consideration of meat also one of the 
main foodstuffs at present in restricted supply, wa.s essenti& 
i ·n an attempt to present a. representative & picture of the 
general food situation. 
The Statistics : As an~mpirica.l study the acceptability of 
I 
the arguments rou8t in the end depand on the accuracy of the 
statistics. These have been gleaned from numerous sources 
but no matter how many the sources, the very important and to 
the research worker a very disheartening, fact remains - the 
paucity of statistical data concerning this country is <.:Uarm-
ing. The maj.n sources have been the_ Industrial and Agricul-
turu.l Censuses with many others too numerous to mention, and 
where statistics have not been available, estimates r::£ the 
Division of Economics and Markets have been "put into the 
breach. 11 
To recapitulate, this is an attempt to present the de vel-
e,npn~·,s 
opment of the present "food problem" with necessary on those 
" 
factors most ueserving of it and most important, ulw~ remem-
bering that .Agriculture is but one section of a highly inter-
dependent and complex economic structure. If the vn•iter can 
2. 
succeed in this, he will have fulfilled the primary aim 
of his research. 
3. 
Chapter 1. 
WHEAT 
Generally speaking, wheat is not a crop ideally suited 
to South African climatic conditions. Before 1929 but half 
of the Union's wheat requirements was produced locally, yet (1) 
by 1936 the country was 90% self-sufficient; for a counM 
try which, from an agronomic point of view, is not suited 
for wheat, such a. sudden alteration in the supply situatiSn 
requires some explanation. It is of course, correct that 
between these two dates occured the depression during which 
demand must have fallen off to some extent, but it is defi~ 
nitely not on the consumption aide that the answer to this 
apparent anomaly is to be found. The main reason is the 
agricultural policy that was followed, a policy that was 
designed to assist a certain section of the community only, 
but which produced results probably never foreseen by its 
arch:J. tecta. 
In 1929/30, When a large crop was reaped in the Union, 
the phenomenon was experienced that South African wheat 
prices declined below import parity at the beginning of the 
( 2) 
This fact, coupled with a declining world price season. 
level, led to an increase in the austoms duty on wheat in 
January, 1930, from a minimum of 2/10 and maximum of 3/2, to 
4/- and 4/4 respectively per bag, and only two months later 
to 5/4 and 5/8, while imports of flour and meal were placed 
under permit. Furthermore, special duties on a sliding 
scale were imposed to raise the minimum price a.t which wheat 
and flour could be landed at Union ports to 22/6 and 3?/• 
respectively. It should not be inferred from this that the 
internal price was kept from falling below 22/6 in the case 
of wheat; the lower demand during the depression years was 
not sufficient to maintain such a level in the face of a 
greatly increased supply. What it did mean was that South 
(1) Report of the National Marketing Council on the Market-
ing Boards 1938-46. u. G. 2?-4? 122. 
(2) Report of the Wheat Commission. u.G. 38-41. 
/African 
African consumers had .to pay more for their wheat than the 
price at which it could be obtained on the free world ( 1) 
markets. 
However, it was not only that local wheat prices were 
being artificially maintained at levels far above the world 
markat level; what was as important was the fact that the 
price relationship between different agrictural products was 
--being completely put out of gear. 
"Compa.rati vely speaking, wheat growing was, therefore, 
the most profitable branch of farming during the years 
when the depression was at its height. In addition, 
the psychological effect of a minimum import price ••• 
( 2) 
led to a greater concentration on wheat growing," 
The extent to which the prices of different farm products 
changed during the years 1930-33 can be seen from Table 2 
which shows that in those years the ratio of wheat prices to 
the producer, to prices of maize, oats and wool was consis-
( 3) 
tently higher than in the years immediately prior to 1930. 
The obvious result was that farmers should turn to wheat, the 
crop producing the greatest financial return. 
It is significant that the ma.j ori ty of farmers wllo plant-
ed more wheat were those who had previously grown very little. 
It is true, as Dr. F. R. Tomlinson points in an article ''Pro-
( 4) 
duction and Prices of Wheat in South Africa" , that in the 
wheat belt, farmers tended to rely more and more on specialiw 
zation, at the expense of sheep and mixed-farming in general. 
yet "very little virgin land was ploughed in the established 
wheat areas, but a larger proportion of the cultivated land 
was placed under wheat regularly; in the adjoining areas 
wheat became to be grown extensively; in areas where wheat 
growing had previously almost ceased, fa1•mers again reverted 
~ 1) 
( ~~ 
( 4) 
See Table 1. 
U. G. 38·41. 
See page zg • 
"Farming in South Africa", February, 1936. pp 6?. 
/to it 
to it and the product was also introduced into entirely new 
( 1) 
areas." 
Irrigators put their land, which in normal times would 
have been regarded as being too valuable for that crop, 
under wheat; farmers in drier sections of the country re~ 
sorted to wheat because of the fall in price of commodities, 
like wool and maize, which used to be their main source of 
income, and in an attempt to gain a quick cash retul·n. "It 
was recognised by farmers that wheat production was a risky 
occupation, but notwithstanding the risk, local production 
( 2) 
was probably justified on economic grounds." 
b . 
Tables 3 A,B and C show how this protection of wheat ( 3) 
prices stimulated production in certain areas of the Union. 
Thus, while the production of wheat in the western cape, 
traditionally considered as by far the most suitable for 
this crop, increased almost twofold, production in other 
parts of the country, notably the o.F.s. and Eastern Cape, 
increased enormously. The figures for acerage which more 
adequately illustrate the response on the part of farmers 
to changed price relationships are even more revealing; while 
the increase in the case of the established wheat growing 
areas was regular and approximately 60%, that for the newer 
areas showed considerable variation and a far greater in• 
crease - nearly 350% and over 700% respevtively in the case 
of the two areas of the O.F.s. and about 300% for the East-
ern Cape. There were several years during whi~ production 
in the o.F.S. actually exceeded that in the Western Cape. 
That these areas were far lees suitable for the produc-
tion of wheat is evident from the yields per morgen given 
in Table 3 c. Yields in the newer areas were with few ax-
captions, below those recorded in the western and South-
Western Cape and a further significant fact is revealed 
( 1) U. G. 38- 41 
( ~) Editorial, "Farming in South Africa.", Mtzy, 19 32. ( ..,) See page 29 • 
/in this 
in this table, viz. the far greater variation in the avexage 
yiel4s per morgen in the o.F.S. and Eastern Cape. The \Vheat 
Commission showed that the percentage co-efficient of varia-
tion of wheat yields for the Eastern Cape was 35, for the 
two o.F.s. areas 32 and 38 respectively, compared with fig-
ures of 12 and 19 for the Western and South-Western Cape re@-
( 1) 
ions. Actually the study of th~ average wheat pields pro-
vides an understatement since, under certain drought condi-
tions, farmers do not even sow the wheat and this was more 
likely, and did occur in the drier areas. This no doubt 
largely accounts for the wide variations in acerage sown to 
wheat in the O.F.S. and Eastern Cape, whereas in the western 
Cape the increase was steady~ changing to a slight fall from 
1935 onwards. 
Thus, not only did the artifidal upset in the price re-
lationships, resulting from the protectionist policy of the 
early 1930's, cause a considerable increase in production of 
wheat in the Union; it also introduced the highly significant 
factor of a far more variable output due to the extension of 
wheat farming in areas not suited to it, areas in which wheat 
was grown as a dry-crop, i.e. depending on the moisture re-
tained in the soil from the previous summer season, and ther~ 
fore a far more Eisky occupation than in the winter-rainfall 
region of the South-Western Cape. 
The peak in production was reached in 1935-6 when Euro-
pean output amounted to 1,380,153,000 lbs., a figure never 
since exceeded. In the course of seven years wheat production 
had increased by over 200%. It is not entirely correct to 
mai11ta.in that the only cause was the changed price relation-
ship; there was simultaneously a considerable improvement in 
the machinery available for wheat production and a consequent 
(l) U. G. 38-41. 
/reduction 
reduction in the cost of the various activities relating to 
the growing of wheat, yet there can be no doubt that the in-
crease was largely a result of the 11 di srega.rd of the golden 
rule that an artificial disturbance of the price relation-
ship between the various farm products gives rise to devel-
opments, usually unexpected, which are not in harmony with 
( 1) 
the underlying natural factors. 11 
In 1929 the Union was producing just over 50% of its 
wheat requirements but by 1936 and 1937 the importation had 
practically disappeared ~ less than one percent of total re-
quirements. It was these circumstances which gave rise to 
considerable anxiety in official circles since it was con-
sidered that if the production of wheat was to continue to 
increase at the same rate as it had been doing, there would 
come a time when the Union's requirements would be exceeded. 
As e&·ly as November, 1934 it was said: 11An uneasy time a-
waits South African wheat industry when this normal trend 
in production passes above our domestic consumption level. 
A different protective policy from the present one will have 
to be followed. That policy will undoubtedly be less work-
able, and it will be infinitely more difficult to obtain 
( 2) 
effective results." These fears were by no means isolat-
ed; during the years 1935, 1936 and 193? they continually 
appear in statements by Government officials. 
"The indications are that, with the present rate of ex-
pal1sion of our wheat production, there will very shortly be 
an over- production of this crop which will necessitate the 
disposal of the surp~us at a world price of less than half 
that ruling in this country. With this probability of a 
surplus production confronting us, it is necessary that we 
shoul d consider very seriously the matter of fUrther devel • 
opment in the production of wheat •••••• it is necessary to 
( 1) 
( 2) 
U. G. 38-41. 
11The Trend of our Wheat Production", by Dr. F.R. 
Tomlinson, "Farming in South Africa", November, 1934 . 
/accept 
8. 
accept the favt that there are farmers in the Cape who are 
dependent on wheat for their livelihood •••••• (but) we should 
recommend the greatest caution in extending the area of 
wheat to other areas (where) many crops can be grown in (1) 
addition to wheat 11 • 
It was suggested that more wheat should be used as fod-
9. 
der especially in stock farming where it could form the basis 
of an intensive farming movement, How was it that the facts 
upon which these fears were based, never materialised? It 
was partly a result of imcomplete reasoning and neglect of 
certain important economic factorsJ and partly due to factors 
which in 1935 and 1936 could have been no more than vague 
possibilities, but which quickly became probabilities and 
later unpleasant but absolute facts. 
We have seen how, in the early 1930's, the price of 
wheat was maintained at a comparatively high level by protec-
tive measures, but such a position could not continue in the 
circumstances which followed, circumstances which revealed 
the improvement and strengthening of the economic structure 
after the disasterous depression years. Table 2 shows how 
the ratio of wheat to other prices was far higher immediate-
ly after 1930 than before that date; but from about 1934 
that tendency began to be checked by the improvement in gen-
( 2) 
eral economic conditions. Accompanying this relative im-
provement in the prices of other farm products went the 
"inexorable economic law1 that production of the various 
products will be extended to the point at which the respect-
( 3) 
i ve industries have the same level of profitability, " 
thus providing a strong check to any further expansion of 
wheat production. 
(1) 
Aleo, dul:'ing that period when ·Hbeat pl'i oeo weJ?e ae 
"Should we produce more wheat?" by H.W. Turpin in 
"Farming in South Africa", May, .1935, pp 191. 
See Table 3, page zg • 
u. G. 38·41. 
/Also 
Also, during that period when wheat prices were fav-
curable, it was inevitable that the capitiliza.tion of wheat 
land would be on a higher scale than other land, in which 
case the interest burden adjusted itself to the higher wheat 
prices and wheat farmers found themselves in very much the 
same position as that in which they would have been, had 
there been no protection. In this way, by 1936, the wheat 
industry had reached a new position of equilibrium, a posit-
ion where costs of production were higher due to inferior 
land being put under wneat, a position which did not enoour• 
age any further substitution of wheat for other products. 
However, this new~uj.librium was a. difficult one for many 
farmers who had extended wheat growing on marginal soils, 
entirely unsuited to wheat, and the yield on which is far 
more variable than elsewhere. Thus the Wheat Commission 
/0. 
found that in the favourable season of 1938/39, 56% of the 
Union's crop was produced at a minimum profit of 2/- per bag, (1) 
and 28% at no profit at all. 
The second reason wny over-~roduction never really mat-
{ 2) 
erialised for any length of time was the outbreak of war 
a.nd the great increase in purchasing power that resulted from 
the sudden surge in activity throug.l-J.out the country. In 1935 
there could have been few pointers to the suddeness of this 
movement which was to change the whole nature of the wheat 
picture of this country. 
It has already been pointed out that by setting the min-
imum price at which wheat could be imported, at 22/6 it was 
not possible to stabilize the internal price a.t that partic-
ular level firstly because it depended on the level of con-
sumption which might or might not absorb the whole of the 
local crop at that price, and secondly because of the highly 
seasonal nature of the crop and poor facilities for storage. 
(1) U. G. 38-41. 
(2) In 1935/6 the actual crop was larger than consumption. 
/Therefore 
II 
Therefore, the Wheat Industry Act, passed in 1935, aimed pri-
marily at the storage problem; to even out production in 
"surplus" years to those in which there was a. deficiency, as (1) 
it would be "impossible" to export wheat at the price 
ruling on the world markets, and to even out the seasonal 
production over the whole year in order to prevent. as far 
as possible, the depressed market conditions in the months 
November-February when 80%-9o% of the crop comes on the 
market. The Wheat Industry Control Board, established under 
the Act, was assigned a levy of 1/- per bag of wheat milled, 
which was to be used to p~ compensation on losses sustained 
in storing the crop. 
The record crop of 1935/6 soon tested the efficiency of 
the scheme since it came at a time when there was already in 
storage at the end of August, 1935 some 1,250,000 bags of 
wheat. It was quickly obvious that the resources at the dis-
posal of the Board were far from sufficient if prices to the 
producer were to be stabilised at the agreed level of 1?/6 
and so the Government was approached, the result being that 
(a) the Land Bank was empowered to increase its advances to 
co-operatives from 11/6 to 15/6 on first grade wheat and 
appropriate amounts for other qualities, 
(b) compensatbn be reckoned as the difference between l?/6 
per bag, for first grade, and the price actually realis-
ed as formerly the compensation was merely reckoned at 
2d. per bag per month plus losses due to weevils etc. 
(c) the Government made a grant of £125,000 to the Wheat 
Board to finance the increased compensatory payments. 
The following season provided further difficulties since 
( 2) 
the carry-over from 1935/6 was larger than ever and the 
crop was expected to be another good one. The oo-ops. 
requested to be allowed to sell the stored wheat in order 
(1) 
( 2) 
Annual Report, secretary of Agriculture 1935. "Farming 
in South Africa", 1935 pp 566. 
It was estimated that there was sufficient "old" wheat in 
the hands of millers, co-ops.and producers at the end of 
August, 1936, to meet the requirements until April of the 
following year. Report of the Secretary of Agriculture 
1937. "Farmin~ in South Africa" nn fin1_ 
12. 
tomake room for the new crop but the Board remained determ-
ined that it should not be offloaded and so cause a depressing 
effect on the price level for the new cr op. As it turned out 
however, the 1936/? crop was considerably smaller than expec~ 
ed, so practically all the stored wheat was disposed of at 
1?/6 or more and that level was maintained. when the new crop 
came on to the market. 
The output for 1937/8 was very poor and it was soon clear 
that even including the carry-over from the previous season, 
there \vould not be sufficient for local requirements. Conse• 
quently prices rose all round; stored wheat was sold at 
prices between 19/- and 22/6; in the first few months of 1938 
( 1) 
prices to producers rose as high as 25/6 • The Government, 
not being able to guage the final threshing returns earlier, 
necessarily had to delay the issue of import permits until 
( 2) 
March, 1938. Prices of wheaten products r ose in sympathy 
and, such difficulties being outside the scope of the Wheat 
Board, a conference was held between representatives of the 
Government~ producers, millers, bakers and consumers at Cape 
Town in March of 1938. The agreement which followed was a 
forerunner to the comprehensive scheme introduced. later in tlE 
sante year. Millers: agreed to maximum pl•i ces for meal e.nd 
flour, in return for which the Government was to pay a sub-
sidy of £300,000 for the period April-November; bakers agreed 
to fixed prices for bread, and while importation of flour and 
meal was not permitted, permits for the importation of wheat 
( 3) 
were granted. 
Thus while under the storage scheme, there v~s certain 
protection for the producer although it could never stabilize 
prices completely, it provided no safeguard for the consumer 
when the crop was short. The new scheme introduced for the 
1938/9 crop a ttempted to overcome this major defi ciency by 
(1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
All prices refer to first grade. 
In the Transvaal the price of bakers flour rose from 35/• 
in November, 193? to 41/- in February, 1938. 
On April 27th permits were granted for 250,000 bags and 
on June 16th for a further 550,000. 
/introducing 
fJ. 
introducing sale through one channel, with grading defini-
tions and fixed prices according to class and grade. Control 
was extended over the whole industry from production tothe 
price of bread; mi.llers worked on a given profit margin, be-
ing subsidized for any excess of the price which they had to 
pay for the wheat over the equivalent at which they we1•e per .. 
mitted to dispose of the flour and meal. Registration was 
enforced in order to curtail excessive milling capacity and 
( 1) 
to rationalize the industry in general. 
1940/9 
~~en war broke out the Union was supplying over 90% of 
its requirements of wheat and flour, and it was not really 
unttl the poor crop of 1941/2 that any considerable difficul-
ty was experienced in aati sfying the local demand. The crop 
of 1939/40 was almost 600,000 bags less than that of the 
previous season due mainly to disappointing harvests in the 
South-Western Cape, yet there seems to have been no great 
difficulty in obtaining the 800,000 odd bags required to tide 
the country aver until the next crap was harvested and mark" 
eted. With the introdu ctian of marketing through one channel, 
the importation of wheat was accomplished through the Board 
and not as previously, by issue of import permits to private 
individuals. 
The 1940/l crop, while an improvement compared with the 
previous one, was by no means sufficient for local require-
ments, having regard to the considerable increase in cansum~ 
tion of flour, meal, bread and other wheaten products. It 
was in this year that the subsidization of consumption start-
ed in earnest. It was found by the National. Marketing Counc:ll 
that for the 1940/1 crop production costs had risen by appro~ 
ime.tely Z/- per bag which, j.f passed on to the consumer, 
(E) 
would have amounted to td. per loaf of bread • such a 
(l) 
( 2) 
Registration was extended by an amendment in August, 1941, 
to bakers and other processors of wheaten products. 
'Re~o~ of Secretary for Agriculture, 1941. "Farming in 
South Africa" pp 411. 
/ policy 
policy was possible under the wide powers granted to the 
~llieat Board by the new scheme. Due to the insufficiency 
of the local crop, authorisation was given for the importa-
tion of 1,000,000 bags (i.e. 2001 000,000 lbs.) but lack of 
shipping space to remove supplies from Canada and Australia, 
lit. 
left the·:final figure of imports far below this target. It 
therefore became necessary to take other steps to supplement 
the supplies available in face of the increHsing demand. 
There were three possible courses which might be pur-
sued by the Board in these circumstances bearing in mind th!it 
it had pledged itself to a po~y of subsidization. It could:M 
(a) impose rationing of flour, meal and bread or 
(b) impose a compulsory admixture to all wheaten flour and 
meal of a fixeo. percentage of the other meals e. g. mealie 
meal, rye meal and soyameal or 
(c) prohibit the production of white flour and introduce some (1) 
standard loaf from a meal of higher extraction. 
Rationing would involve considerable administrative ex-
pense and South Africa showed itself very reluctant to accept 
such measures throughout the war due to this economic factor 
and the difficulties wr~ch would arise from the racial com-
position of the population. The second course was discarded 
because of the prejudice against a fortified and "cheap" 
bre~d and so the third was the one adopted. 
From April 23rd, 1941, the milling and sale of all ~·ades 
of meal and flour except No. 1 unsifted meal was prohibited. 
r~imi ted quanti tles of patent flour was available for c onfec-
tionery, and various ~eaten product and macaroni manufac-
turers were provided with. limited. quantities of other grades 
of flour and meal. From the beginning of May provision was 
made for the standard loaf, made from pure No. 1 unsifted 
meal; in addition "rolled or crushed" wheaten bread and a. 
"standard mixed loaf" of wheaten meal with an admixture of 
(1) A bag of 200 lbs of wheat when milled, would produce 
140 lbe of bakers flour or 180-190 lbs of unsifted No. 
1 meal. 
/not 
not more than 5~ of mealie- or rye flour, or ~ of soya 
( l) 
flour, were availa~ to consumers 
"The outcome of (these) measures to conserve wheat wqs 
that consumption of wheat as compared with the last 
pre-war season viz. 1938/9, was reduced by 16% without 
( 2) 
causing the public any undue hards.hip wo:bth mentioning". 
Thus, the amount of wheat required to satisfy the pre-war 
consumption would have dropped by 16% bad the conservation 
measures been in force at that time. 
It was in 1942 that the real difficulties arose in re-
ga.rd to the supply of wheat. The production fi@.lre for the 
1941/2 season was finally estimated at 4,120,000 bags, a 
level mainly resulting from the disastrous failure of the 
crop in the o.F.s. and Eastern Cape. On top of thi~, 
whereas the Wheat Board had purchased 182,631 bags from Bas-
~land in 1940/l, only 22,069 had been received up to the 
( 3) 
end of August, 1942 , furthermore, the difficulty in obtain-
ing fertiliser, very important in the south-Western Cape, 
a shortage of labour, machinery, oil, grain bags and twine 
all combined in various degt·ees to create production 
difficulties. 
Many of the difficulties experienced in this year in 
meeting the requirements of the country were caused by the 
reluctance on the part of South Africa, to accept shipments 
of flour. It is obvious that under conditions of shipping 
scarcity, it is far more economical to ship flour and meal 
thEm wheat since it occupies much less space • . The reason 
t fol· the reluctance was mainly that the sandard loaf had 
II 
only recently been introduced and the public induced to 
accept it. As it turned out however, this gamble on the 
part of the authorities, turned out fatrly well as 
(l) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
Little was produced but the fear of admixture tended to 
bring the "standard loaf" into disrepute so that the 
mixed grades were withdrawn in 1943. 
Report of Secretary for Agriculture, 1942 "Farming in 
South Africa" January, 1943. 
Report of Secretary of Agriculture, 1942 "Farming in 
South Africa" January 1943. 
16. 
importation was effected from Australia, mainly in SARSHIF~ 
the extra 10 ships required to move the remaining cargoes, 
all being allocated by the Ministry of War Transport, and 
so by July, 1942 the Union's full requirements had been 
( 1) 
received. Compared with the previous calendar year, im-
ports of wheat, as such, rose by almost 170,000,000 lba and 
this, together with a large increase in the imports of flour 
and meal which was mixed with lOO% extraction wheat , meant 
that consumption was well maintained, despite the short crop. 
Subsidization. of the final products continued by the 
increased costs of producers, millers and bakers being met 
from the finances of the State and The Wheat Board; but an 
innovation in the marketing policy was fol~ard. pricing ~ 
encourage wheat production, in view of the e·specially small 
crop of 1941/2. The Govermaent as early as March, 1942, 
requested the Wheat Board to fix prices for the 1942/3 crop 
at 30/6 and 30/- for Class A Grade 1 and Class B Grade 1, 
( 2) 
respectively. 
Production during the following two seasons increased 
to a level , which before the war, would have been more than 
adequate for the Union's consumption needs bu~ which now 
was still insufficient even with the measures in force to 
( 3) 
conse~ve wheat supplies. However, the amount required 
f1•om ove1·seas sou1·cee vras reduced to levels which did not 
( 4) 
cause the same difficulty ae was experienced in 1942. 
Wheat producers were able to obtain only 40% of their 
fertilizer requirements and realising the need of those in 
the Cape especially, the Government a.nnomced in .March, 1943 
that prices for the next season would be set at 36/6 and 
( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
For a fuller discussion on the i~ernational planning 
and allocation of foodstuffs during the war yea1•e , see 
Appendix A , page 30 • 
The comparable prices for the 1941/2 season were 26/9 
a.nd 26/3. 
With 16% being saved through the conservation measures, 
while wheat consumption rose by only 10%, consumption of 
flour and meal increased by 33% 
In 1943 tbe consumption of wheat was stimulated by acute 
shortages of maize and rice. 
/36/- for 
''f. 
36/- for Al and Bl wheat respectively. The large increases 
were granted in an effort to prevent any switCh to produc-
tion of other farm products, but subsidization was continued 
in order ·to maintain the price of std. per loaf, delivered 
( 1) 
to the consumer. 
It should be mentioned here that the prices fixed were 
based on the coat of production survey conducted by the Wheat 
Comrndssion in 1941, allowances being made for the increase 
in cost of the constituent items in the total cost. Howeve;-~1 
while the Government adhered fairly strictly to production 
cost.s, an additional inducement was given to producers to 
increase output by means of a "contingency allowance". For 
the 1943/4 season this was set at 2/2 per bag, while fo1· the 
previous year no allowance had been made. 
The crop of 1944/5 was the smallest since the 193?/8 
season; once again it was in those areas not naturally suited 
for the production of wheat, that the greatest failure 
occured. Firat of all the dry autumn over the major part of 
the o.F.S. persuaded many farmers not to sow at all and then 
plant lice caused havoc among the crops. In the Transvaal 
frost during the critical flowering stage was the cause of 
the loss of an appreciable quantity. 
It was realised long before the end of 1944 thatthe 
crop would be very small but just how small was never apprec• 
iated until very much later. In september of 1944, for mn• 
stance, the Union's import requirements as presented to the 
London Food Council, amounted to 54,000 tons (i.e. 120,960,000 
lbs) whereas in June of the following year, as the crop es-
timates dropped and dropped, the application was fo1• 100,000 
tons. Originally it was decided to obtain the requirements 
from Australia, for it was obviously in the interest of the 
(1) To enable this price being maintained, the price of No. 1 
unsj.fted meal was set at 38/1, hence the price of Bl wheat 
to millers had to be 28/6. The subsidy was therefore 7/6 
(i.e. 36/-- 28/6) of which the Wheat Board paid 9d. rater 
it was decided to pay a special subsidy of 1/- per beg to 
bakers on No.1 unsifted meal during p6riod November 1943-
0ctober 1944 for all areas except the Cape Peninsula 
where it was fixed at 2/6, and the Rand where it was 1/lO 
II. 
Allied war effort to reserve the Canadian crop, which before 
the war had been the Union's main source of imports, for the 
United Kingdom, but the Union was advisGd in october, 1944 
that no surplus was available in Australia due to a very 
poor crop. Shipping from Canada was extremely difficult in 
the early months of the year because of the frozen st. Law-
rence and terrific congestion at the Atlantic ports of the (1) 
United States. These shipping difficulties meant that the 
Canadian wheat would not arrive until about June and with 
woeat consumption increased by the short maize crop, there 
was an urgent need for supplies to tide the country over un-
til these imports were received. Fortunately it was possible 
to import some 40,000 tons from the Argentine in SARSHIPS and 
neut1•al vessel e since had it not been for this "conditions 
( 2) 
would have been bad indeed." 
In view of the short . crop and the difficulty experienc-
ed in obtaining shipping space for imports, it was impossi-
ble to relax the measures for husbanding wheat immediately 
after the war ended and, in fact, efforts l:n.d to be made to 
effect further economies. From let January, 1945 the limit-
ed quantities of domestic flour and aelf-raising flour which 
had formerly been supplied to the public was withdrawn and 
only persons suffering from serious stomach ailments were 
entitled to 10 lbs. of flour per month. It was estimated 
that by this measure, about 3,400,000 lbe would be saved per 
( 3) 
annum. 
To encourage the production of wheat instead of other 
winter cereals, which are more important as stock fee~ the 
practice of forv1ard pricing was continued as was that of sub-
sidizing the co nsume1· , although w1 th the increase in the 
( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
The west coast ports were impracticable due to the disw 
tance from the wheatlands and the elevator syetem and 
the lack of shipping on the route to South Africa. 
Report of secretary of Agriculture, 1945 "Farming in 
South Africa", March, 1946. 
Report of Secretary of .Agriculture, 1945 "Farming in 
South Africa", March, 1946. 
/price 
price of bread from otd. to ?d., the amount of the subsidy ( 1) 
naturally fell. 
19. 
The season closed very pessimistically since it was 
expected that the following crop would be small due partly 
to the continued shortage of fertilizer but primarily to the 
unfavourabie climatic conditions, with the o.F.s. and North-
Eastern Gape receiving insufficient rains and the South-
western Cape too much; also the carry-over at the end of 
August, 1945 was the lowest at that date for many years. 
However, there was one bright hope for the future; with the 
war against Germany over, it was to be expected that ehip-
ping.difficulties would be far lese severe than in the pre-
vious two short years (viz. 1941/2 and 1944/5). 
All these fears were realised when the result of the 
crop became known. According to the final official estimate 
it would have amounted to 3,400,000 bags, but the actual 
production was soon revealed by the threshing returns to be 
far lower. It was less than one half the Union's require~ 
mente and created a most serious problem, made ~orse by the 
fact that the car ry-over at the end of September, 1945 was 
( 2) 
enough for only two months consumption. As a result of 
the strict rationing of maize, the demand for bread increas• 
ed enormously especially in those areas carrying a large 
native population who had replaced mealie meal in their 
diet with bread. On the Rand, for example, bread consump-
tion during January, February and March of 1946 whowed in-
creases of 47%, 43% and 31% as compared with the same months 
of the previous year. In the Cape peninsula demand increas-
( 3) 
ed by 9%, ll% and 14% for the same months. "As a result ••• 
( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
It fell from 7/6 per bag in 1943/4 to 5/7 in 1944/5 of 
9d. was again financed by the Board. 
Report of Secretary of Agriculture, 1946 "Farming in 
South Africa", February, 1947. 
Report of Secretary of Agriculture, 1946 "Farming in 
So~h Africa", February, 1947. 
/the 
2.0. 
the Union had to import wheat on a scale unprecedented in its 
(1) 
history." 
Unfortunately the world shortage of fertilizers, the ge~ 
eral dislocation in Europe and rice shortage in the Far East, 
arising from the war, all combined to produce a situation in 
whioh it was impossible that South Africa's full requirements 
could be met by importation. There was once again the diffi-
culty that much of the allocation by the Combined Food Board, 
superceded in 1946 by the Internationa.l Food Board, was in 
the form of flour of 72% extraction. This meant that the 
Union, instead of receiving 100 lbs. of wheat which could be 
milled into 96 lbs of meal received 72 lbe of flour which 
then had to be mixed with 100% wheat, and then remilled. 
( 2) 
once again with the small carry-over from 1944/5, 
and the difficulty of obtaining wheat from Camida before the:fr 
spring, meant that the Union was forced to live from hand to 
mouth, but it was ~ident that fUrther measures were needed in 
order to ensure that the available supplies were equitably 
distributed, Consequently it wao decided that, as from Jan-
uary let, 1946, the use of No. 1 unsifted wheaten meal for 
confectionery and biscuits and the use of t~e flour for cake~ 
be prohibited with the view of rendering more meal and rye 
flour available for bread. Howefer, this measure really only 
scratched the surface of the problem and further measures 
were essential. 
From the beginning of April, the monthly quotas to mill-
ere were reduced by 25% aa compared with the average over the 
previous three months and from the let of May the following 
further measures were instituted:-
(a) The use of bread between 3 p.m. and 4 a.m. and the making 
of toast, was prohibited. 
(b) The use of bread other than for consumption by human be-
ings was prohibited. 
( 1) 
( 2) 
Report of secretary.of .Agriculture, 1946, "Farming in 
South Africa", February, 1947. 
In his report for 1946, the Secre.tary for Agriculture 
states that crop carry-over would only la.st until April, 
1946 
(c) fhe~e of unsifted meal for purpo~es other than the 
making of bread was prohibited. 
(d) The sifting of unsifted meal and the sale of sieves for 
this purpose, was prohibited. 
(e) Any action leading to bread wastage was prphibited. 
(f) The sale of unsifted meal by millers was prohibited 
except under permit issued by the Board, thus extending 
control to ensure the success of the quota system. Pro-
vision was made for reserves out of which areas such as 
those with an increased population, could be supplied. 
(B) The existing quotas of flour and sifted meal to biscuit 
manufacturers was reduced by 50% and those to confec-
· tioners and macaroni manufacturers by 62t%. 
(h) The weight of the standard bread loaf was reduced from 
32 oz. to 29 os. as from May ~h - the price being pro-
portionally reduced from ?d. to 6-}d. 
21. 
An extensive propaganda campaign for the saving of 
bread, opened by the Minister in a radio talk, was initiateQ. 
The press, radio and bioscope were ~played and "thanks to 
general co-operation these measures had the desired effect 
and succeeded in reasonably satisfying the bread requirements (1) 
of !l1.1., in spite of the reduced quantity of wheat." 
It is significant that although the amount of wheat mill-
ed commercially showed a marked decline, the quantity of 
flour and meal available for consumption within the Union 
remained at approximately the same level as for the previous 
season. The reason is obvious when one notices that the pro-
duction of wheaten meal showed an increase of over 
10,000,000 lbs since (a) less wheat was milled into flour 
and (b) of that ground into meal a ~ar greater proportion was 
( 2) 
unsifted. Similarly the production of bread showed no de-
crease, in fact it rose by about 6%, while that of biscuits 
decreased markedly, due to the economy measures designed to 
(1) Report of the Secretary for Agriculture, 1946, 11Ea.rming 
in South Africa", February, 194?, pp. 100. 
( 2) See ~eble. A?p~n<:k~ ~ , 
/discriminate 
discriminate against the more luxury type of wheaten 
( l) 
product .a-. 
The season again closed on a pessimistic note, the Sec-
retary for Agriculture in hie Report stressing the fact that 
the Union, even if the most sanguine expectations as regards 
the 1946/7 crop were realised, would still have to import 
wheat which, bearing in mind the low world stocks and in-
cre~ed requirements resulting from greater purchasing power 
throughout the world, would not be something easily achieved. 
He expressed the warning that "the Union will still have to 
( 2) 
keep a vigilant eye on her wheat supplies". 
In view of the shortages of the past two seasons, the 
price announced for .l946/7 in April, 1946 was 41/- for Aland 
40/6 for Bl wheat, an increase of 3/- per bag, while the mar• 
gin for contingencies ~~s fixed at 2/8. 
Although production did increase considerably in the 
1946/7 season, it was smaller than was first expected mainly 
due to losses in the o.F.S. occasioned by frost and later 
drought and paradoxically, in other areas, by hail. The very 
drastic measures imposed during 1946 were partially withdrawn 
and the quantity of No.1 unsifted meal that could be sold by 
millers was increased by 10% in January, 1947. It was never-
theless realised that production by no means covered the local 
demand and import requirements were set at 2,000,000 bags or 
400,000,000 lbs. However, as a result of the critical grain 
position throughout the world, the Union could not expect the 
full shortfall to be allocated by the International Food 
Council, and in actual fact the level of imports during 1947 
fell considerably from the level attained in the previous 
year. 
The intention had been to increase supplies by 20% 
during the winter months ~i.e. May-September), when a bigger 
(l)See Appendix C. 
(2)Report of secretary for Agriculture, 1946 "Farming in 
South Africa", February, 1947. 
/demand 
23. 
( 1) 
demand for wheat exists, but because of the difficulty in 
obtaining wheat from overseas and the general uncertainty 
the position was left unimproved, but not unchanged since it 
was soon evident that with the stocks on hand plus expected 
imports of wheat and flour, there would not be sufficient to 
meet the demand until the beginning of December, when the 
new crop comes onto the market. As a result, it was announc-
ed that the quantity of meal released monthly would be de-
creased by about 10% as from September, 1947 by which means 
it kas hoped to stretch the supplies until the third week of 
September. The position was made even worse by the early 
summer rains in certaln parte of the country which delayed 
the marketing of the crop and, as it was, had there not been 
a timely arrival of imported wheat and flour in October and 
December, the position wa~ld have been precarious indeed. 
Disappointing results in the o.F.s. was once again the 
( 2) 
cause of the final crop being J. ess than the estimates, 
and the quota system had therefore to be retained by the 
Board. for the first six months of 1948. However, the exce-
llent maize crop left a substantial surplus which could be 
exchanged for wheat, so that the shortfall in supplies could 
be made up by heavy importation in the later months of the 
year. Thi s resulted in supplies adequate to meet all reason-
able demands for meal for bread pu~pose s and the quota system 
was accordingly abolished, but not so all the other conser-
vation measures. Also, for ~e first time since before the 
war, the end-of-season stocks were more than sufficient to 
carryover the country until the following crop. 
This healthy state in the stock position at the end of 
1947/8 plus the production of some 5,320,000 bags and vastly 
improved prospects aa far as importation was concerned, ren• 
de1·ed possible .the end of the eonserva.tion measures first 
(1) 
( 2) 
Report of Secretary for AgricuJ.tul·e, 194?, "Farming in 
South Africa" , December, 194?. 
Estimates were reduced from 6,320,000 bags in September, 
1947 to 5, 229,000 in January of the new year. 
/applied 
applied in April, 1941 and tightened in subsequent years. 
From the let · of November, 1948 the 2 lb white loaf of bread 
(I) 
flour of 80% extraction became available, together with 
the brown loaf of 90% extraction meal. The new types of 
( 2) 
flour and meal also all became in fr.ee supply, the price 
in each case being fixed by the Vlheat Control Board. 
2~. 
There was an immediate rush to buy the new products and 
millers and bakers worked to fullest capacity until April 
( 3) 
when the trade reported normal conditions . The quantity of 
wheat milled in 1949 was far in excess of any previous level, 
although it was to be exceeded during each of the two succee~ 
( 4) 
ing years , the quantity of flour produced increased from 
18,500,000 lbs to 687,700,000 lbs and the amount of bread 
( 5) 
produced commercially by almost 20% in one year I 
SUMMARY 
The period under review can conveniently be divided into 
three phases on the basis of comparative increase in the two 
factors, production and consumption. 
The first is from 1929 to 1935; a period during which 
production increased at a considerable rate due largely to a 
favourable price relative to other farm products resulting 
from the protective tariffs granted to the wheat industry. 
Consumption increased, but far more sedately; actually during 
the years of depression there is evidence that consumption 
of certain wheaten products such as bread and flour ruled at 
lower levels than in 1929. The combined effect was a consid• 
erable fall in importation necessary to make up the deficien~ 
between local production and consumption. Import a fell from 
3?0,000,000 lbs in 1929 to 3,000,000 lbs in 1935. However, 
(1) This is not as refined as the pre-war loaf, made from 
flour of 70% extraction. 
(2) Cake flour - ?o%; bread flour ao%; sifted meal 90% and 
unsifted meal loo%. 
(3) Report of Secretary of Agriculture, 1949, "Farming in 
South Africa", December, 1949. 
(4) Wheat milled in the Union. 
1949/50 1,430,600,000 lbs 
1950/1 1,541,200,000 lbs 
Source: l'lNN U R&... ")?(PO~f.s' oi" w. LC.'b. ( 5) See Appendix c 
/it was 
it was inevitable that this tendency would be checked, for it 
had never been in accord with the natural and basic economic 
factors and further the very nature of the increase in produc-
tion was against a continued steady increase. 
The second phase comprises the four seasons between 1935 
and 1939. Here the rate of increase in production began to 
decline, the dangers of over-production, real in 1935 and 
1936 characterised by a marked increase in the stocks ~eld, 
di aappeared later when with :production droppin.g from t l::e 1936 
level, consumption continued its steady rise. The fears of 
over-production are revealed in the Wheat Industry Control 
Act of 1935,; the disappearance of t11o se fe~u·s by the Wheat 
Scheme under the 1~rketing Act under which a new emphasis was 
placed upon the necessity to check any increase in consumer 
prices in those years of a deficient local crop. 
The war years provided the very antithesis to the story 
of the 1929-35 period. Production was marked not by ar.w in-
crease but by its extreme variability due in some measure to 
the lack of fertilizers, labour and machinery, but mainly to 
the lack of sympathy between wheat and the natural controls, 
s set of circumstances due very largely to the inheritance 
from a past state policy. On the other hand consumption in-
creased by leaps and bounds; the demand for bread, in most 
societies the staple food of the poorer classes, increased 
enormously. This was actually in direct contrast to certain 
oondi tiona in this country since for the moat pa.r.t, the 
source of starch for the native population was mealie meal, 
while that for the Asiatic was rice. However, there was at 
many times a shortage of maize among the Natives who there-
fore, increasingly turned to bread, and in the case of the 
Asiatics, rice was nearly alWS¥S in short supply meaning that 
he too, was forced to change his dietary habits. 
But, bes ides this substitution of wheaten products for 
others, there was an increase in demand from Europeans L~nd in 
no year during this period was production sufficient to meet 
/the 
2.6. 
the consumption requirements. 
More important was the fact that due to wartime condi-
tions, importation of wheat was never an easy matter and so 
faced with a position in which importation was vitally nece& 
ssary but in which at the same time, it was at times imposs-
ible to achieve, the obvious result was a curtailment of con-
sumption by restrictive measures. Hence from April, 1941 to 
November, 1948, the consumption figures are not what they 
would have been, had there been the wheat to consume. The 
consumption no longer remained a function of income since on 
the one hand there was not the physical quantity to meet the 
demand at the ruling prices, and on the other, prices were 
kept down by subsidization throughout this period in an 
( 1) 
attempt to restrict inflationary forces. 
The writer has attempted to show the general trend in 
e production and consumption of wheat during the priod, 
~ 
1929-49, and the development of the present position, on 
Graph/. The figures on which the graph is based are to be 
found in the Appendices to this chapter, but it must be 
stressed that this graph is meant to illustrate nothing more 
than the rou~~ trend in the quantities considered. 
(1) The amounts paid out as subsidies on wheat and wheaten 
products were as follows:-
Government Board's Total 
Expenditure Expenditure 
1939/40 £ 85,799 £ 173,900 £ 259,699 
1940/1 196,777 196,771 393,548 
1941/2 1, 167 J 621 328,130 1,495,751 
1142/3 1, 024,821 187 J 286 1,282,107 
1943/4 1,554,912 171,245 1, 724,157 
1944/5 1,091,646 120,603 1, 212, 249 
J.945/6* 2,642,500 124,500 2,767,000 
j{ estimate 
Source : U.G. 27/47. 
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Graph 1: Production and Consumption of Wheat, 1929-1949 
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Table 1. 
Price of 1Nheat on the world market as compared with South African. 
t 
t 1927 I 1928 t 1929 t 1930 t 1931 t 1932 t 1933 t 1934 t 1935 I 
London "spot" ,• s dt s d ' s d ' s d I S d t s dt s dr 
for Australian• 22 11 t 21 1 t20 2 t15 5 t11 0 t11 lOt 10 a 
f.a..g,_. 
South Africa. t 25 6' 25 3 I 22 3 '20 2 I 21 8 '20 11' 17 7 
Premium 2 7' 4 2 t 2 1 f 4 9 t10 8 t 9 1 t 6 11 
Source Report of the Wheat Commission. U.G. 38/41. 
Table 2. 
Indices of the price-rations of certain products. 1929-1933 
(192? ... 9 = 100) 
Wheat Wheat Wheat 
Maize 'o'ats Wool 
1929-30 91.9 135.2 115.1 
1930-31 159.2 10?.0 146.? 
1931-32 144.6 124.1 209.3 
1932-33 169.4 93.1 159.3 
Table 4. 
Indices of price-ratios of certain products, 1933-39. 
( 19 27-9 • 100) 
Wheat Wheat Wheat 
~-------- Maize Oats Wool --.---~~~--~---- ~--~--~----~ 
1933-34 90.5 89.8 91.9 
1934- 35 118.4 103.6 118.5 
1935-36 99.0 85.1 75.3 
1936-3? 70.6 88.? 64.0 
1937-38 123.0 91.8 108.4 
___ 1_9_3~8_-~3·9~----~1~1~1~-~1 _______ .107~-------1-18~·~4~-
s dl 
10 5 
21 t 
10 a 
Source: Both tables 2 and 4 are compiled from data in 
the Report of the Wheat Commission, U.G. 38/41. 
s d 
10 9 
18 2 
? 5 
TAB IE 3 A 2 B 2 C • 
Ao Production of 71'hea t in certain areas of the Union, 1925-38 (bags 200lb.) 
B .. a.cerage sown to wheat in certain areas of the Union, 1925-38. 
c .. Yields per morgen in certain areas of the Union, 1925-38 (bags) 
Year Western South-western 0 oF oS. Area Eastern North-western O.F.So 
Cape Cape I Cape Cape area II 
.average 
648,866 1925-29 383,664 251,286 159,081 164,390 49,050 
1929-30 790,575 551,211 431,680 320 ,662 264,274 1C7 ,290 
1930-31 682,777 569,202 276,897 232,668 161,042 62,446 
1931-32 871' 502 982,805 566,901 408,323 251,471 124,307 
1932-33 916,431 887,489 147,074 168,889 200,394 22,389 
1933-34 1,126,119 1,222,744 57,262 74,198 234,898 26,029 
1934-35 946,511 963,581 1,278,232 326,184 260,057 239,315 
1935-36 1,267,900 1,468,887 1,054' 513 775 ,oo5 478,355 407,852 
1936-37 948,231 794,735 738,279 401,893 3~2,220 356,368 
1937-38 1,131' 501 745,750 183,021 27,646 2 5 '764 52,594 
Average 
1925-29 118,779 61,773 62,073 25,627 39,128 13,911 
1929-30 123,000 67' 500 104,759 40 '736 49,673 19 '531 
1930-31 136,282 87,754 134,123 44,674 38,081 22,869 
1931-32 145,351 97,124 23 5,855 63,778 ,2,678 55,768 
1932-33 151,136 113,671 136,979 44,761 55,104 33,332 
1933-34 163,899 139,708 43 '270 22,122 58,802 12,510 
1934-35 176,452 161 '523 206,458 67,145 67,431 50,264 
1935-36 173,648 179,833 267,492 102,624 80 '713 98,123 
1936-37 173,878 163,3 56 235,749 75,298 66,146 89,178 
1937-38 172,061 136 '520 101,417 8,321 61 '509 27,168 
Average 
1925-29 5 .. 5 6.2 4 .. 0 6.2 4.2 3.5 
1929-30 6.4 8.2 4.1 7.9 5.3 5.5 
1930-31 5.0 6.5 2.1 5o2 4.2 2 .. 5 
1931-32 6oO 10J. 2o4 6.4 4.8 2.1 
1932-33 6o1 7.8 1 .. 1 3.8 3.6 .6 
1933-34 6o9 8.8 1.3 3.4 4.0 2.1 
1934-35 5.4 6.0 6.2 4.9 3.9 4.8 
1935-36 7.3 8.2 3 .. 9 7.6 5.9 4.2 
1936-37 5.5 4.9 3o1 5.3 5oO 4.0 
1937-38 6.6 5.5 1.8 3.3 4.6 1.9 
Year 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-3B 
1938-39 
1939-40 
1940-41 
1941-42 
1942-43 
1943-44 
1944-45 
1945-46 
1946-47 
1947-4B 
194B-49 
European 
637,532 
557,B04 
B22,791 
637,617 
6B9,49B 
9B2,475 
1,3BO,l53 
935,290 
625,996 
1,017 '742 
91B ,501 
969,BOO 
B24,000 
1,24B,Boo 
1 ,o76 ,Boo 
6B4,BOO 
6oB,693 
964,073 
1,076 ,BB6 
l,065,1BB 
Al>t>e NJ> I)( A. 
PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF VffifuiT IN SOUTH AFRICa , OOOlbs. 
Production 
Native 
B 
16,400 
14,200 
21,200 
16,400 
17,900 
25,400 
35,700 
24 '134 
16,200 
26,300 
19,600 
20 '500 
17,500 
26,200 
22,700 
14,400 
12,962 
20,300 
22,900 
22,600 
Total 
653,932 
572,004 
B43 ,991 
654,017 
707 ,39B 
l,007,B75 
1,415,853 
959,424 
642,196 
1,044,042 
93B,101 
990,300 
B41, 500 
1,275,000 
1,099,500 
699,200 
621,655 
9B4,373 
1,099,7B6 
1,0B7,7B8 
Imports 
c 
114,532 
191,$58 
64,741 
3,718 
53,199 
3 ,c16 
1,940 
1,066 
157 ,074 
10 ,856 
170 ,224 
BB,614 
256,712 
43,117 
22,952 
22B,027 
424,901 
23,170 
316 '106 
449,566 
Opening 
Stock 
D 
102,BOO 
137 ,ooo 
124,000 
221 ,ooo 
268,000 
l8B,6oo 
252,400 
320,600 
316,000 
227,600 
241 ,Boo 
200 ,Boo 
20B,ooo 
324,000 
326,400 
2B4 ,200 
163,200 
55 ,Boo 
232,BOO 
299,BOO 
Exports 
E 
5 
10 
219 
~ 
252 
129 
58,940 
97 
83 
64 
2,121 
57 
29 
82 
28 
72 
252 
1,019 
37 
Closing 
Stocks 
F 
13 7 ,ooo 
124,000 
221,000 
26B ,ooo 
1BB,6oo 
252,400 
320,600 
316,000 
227,600 
24l,BOO 
200 ,Boo 
20B ,ooo 
324,000 
326,400 
2B4,200 
163,200 
55 ,Boo 
232,800 
299 ,Boo 
464,800 
Util ization 
Seed 
G 
24B 
304 
403 
413 
311 
444 
504 
473 
376 
413 
434 
460 
470 Llr80 
4B5 
490 
500 
500 
500 
500 
Consumption 
734,011 
776 , 548 
811,110 
610,317 
839 ,67B 
946,395 
1",34B ,960 
905,677 
8B7,197 
1,040,202 
1,14B,B27 
1,069,133 
9Bl,6B5 
1,315 ,20B 
1,163,687 
1,047' 709 
1,153,384 
B29,791 
1,347,373 
1,37l,Bl7 
Notes : a From the Agricultural Censuses except for years 1931-3 &nd 1940-4 when no census was taken and the final 
estimates of the Division of Economics and i.iarkets are shewn. 
B Native production has been estimated as follows. For the period 1930-9 the 1937 .agricultural Census 
figure for native production has been used as base und it has been as~wned that native production varies 
directly with European. For the period 1940-9 the base year has been taken 3.S 1946 for which ~72?.r the 
Census included a figure for· native production. 
C Refers to calendar years. 
D Refer to stock held at 1st Septembor of first year st:i ted c:v-~8p"t in t'J:"l.'= c:::tse of 1930 and 1931 when they 
are E:.S at the lst January of second year. They .have been obtained from the Office of Census and Statistics 
until 1946 after which the source is the Ylheat l.ndustry Control Board-. 
E Refer to calendar years and include re-exports. 
F Refer to stocks held at 31st August of second year stated except for 1930 and 1931 when they are as at 31st December. Their source is the same as for D. 
G For the period 1930-9 from the Report of the ·,'lheat Commission (U.Go 3B/41), thereafter from the ~Vheat 
Industry Control Board. 
Year 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
1938-39 
1939-40 
1940-41 
1941-42 
1942-43 
1943-44 
1944-45 
1945-46 
1946-47 
1947-48 
1948-49 
Notes 
APPENJ)l)f .B. 
PRODuCTION ill\D CONSUMPTION OF .lHEaTEN PRODUCTS IN SOUTH .tiFRIC~-~., OOOlb so 
Consumption ~:heat l.!a terials produced 
of wheat milled 
Flour Meal 
Imports 
Total 
Exports Ships• Co~s~~ption 
stores 
.d.. T) n 3 .._ ...., 
781,140 7779166 244,002 358,528 
778,270 
847,590 
612,500 760,638 219,602 372,154 
802,980 836,192 230,174 418,372 
982,570 947,824 238,130 419,444 
1,348,910 891,472 266,624 418,238 
Q()t:;' Qo" 929,378 271,666 441,616 ~ _,,v_,v 
886 ,G20 916,814 248,192 451,764 1 ,... .... ., Q--.0 970,462 322,894 431,338 ,v.).L 'v.) 
1,145,750 983,142 434,006 326,260 
l ,053 '700 981,832 361,140 433,252 
992,210 869,598 51,730 757,770 
1,371,610 1,001,948 36,542 912,682 
1,193,610 1,060,636 39,920 964,446 
1,057,810 1,051,986 20,416 971 ,308a 
1,097,380 l,037,5Z8 9,852 981,856a 
954,550 87C ,4311 5,756 844,896a 
1,072,840 969 '108 18 '516 924 ,602a 
1,542,820 1,331,378 687,730 425,278a 
B D 
602 ' 530 40,016 
9,601 
-
1,149 
591,756 1,147 
648,546 2,132 
657,574 1,343 
684,862 1,567 
713,282 910 
699,956 1,154 
754,232 997 
760,266 6,536 
794,392 23 '747 
809,500 35,850 
949,224 14,959 
l ,OCA ,366 17,879 
991,724 17,979 
991,708 18,660 
850 ,652 18,147 
943,118 15,816 
1,113,008 1,577 
E 
12,722 
12,844 
7,462 
7,154 
7,735 
7,000 
7,653 
9,712 
9,469 
9,260 
10,258 
12,180 
12,790 
10,245 
10,121 
13 '937 
13,697 
12,783 
13,468 
15,019 
F 
417 
343 
140 
162 
236 
228 
211 
401 
418 
729 
5,4 78 
3,380 
2,872 
920 
897 
783 
629,407 
585,587 
642,607 
651,689 
678,565 
704,079 
691,229 
745,240 
755,744 
805,159 
831 '760 
953,138 
1,oo6,646 
992,386 
993,779 
855,096 
94L!- ,569 
1,098,783 
A Consumption adjusted for years 1930-40 and 1946-9 to put imports and exports on a seasonal year basis. 
The adjustment has been made from figures in the Monthly ~bstract of T~~dc Statistics. 
B From Industrial Censuses and refer to any· ~nnual period ending in the second year mentioned. 
C Refer to calendar years. 
D Refer to calendar years and include re-exports. 
E Refer to calendar years, figures for 1940-3 not available. 
It is interesting to note how the production of meal was made up during the period 1945-9 a 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
Sifted Unsifted 
24,244 94?,064 
16,862 964,994 
9,154 835,742 
18,526 906,076 
111,676 313,602 
---- - - ---
A 7>P£Nj)t¥ c: 
CONSUMPTION OF 'WHEATEN PRODUCTS IN SOUTH aFRICA, OOOLBS. 
Total consump- Production of wheaten Consumption 
tion of Industrial Consumption Products of flour 
flour and by final 
wheaten meal • Flour Meal Total Bread Biscuits consumers 
A B B B B B 
1929-30 629,407 168,302 34,124 
1930-31 
202,426 243,177 9,536 426,981 
1931-32 
-1932-33 585,587 149,602 36,372 185,974 222,401 7,942 399 '613 
1933-34 642,607 173,430 40 ,508 213 ,938 244,942 9,306 428,669 
1934-35 651,689 174,784 41 '702 219,486 255,026 9,315 432,203 
1935-36 678,565 179,286 47,630 226,856 278,044 10 ,241 451' 709 
1936-37 695,552 187,460 52,310 239 '770 296,961 11,476 455,782 
1937-38 682,451 207,096 56,630 263,726 307,373 11,621 418,725 
1938-39 745,240 198 '536 63,688 262,224 311,372 11,442 483 ,o16 
1939-40 755,744 208,010 73,478 281,488 322,854 17,861 474,256 
1940-41 805,159 137,480 176,466 313,946 367,924 37,683 491,213 
1941-42 831 '760 21,910 320 '704 342,614 420,328 23,466 489 ,146 
1942-43 953,138 16,618 367,978 384,596 485,682 30,132 568 '542 
1943-44 1,006,646 12,628 404,216 416,944 511,358 29,812 589 '702 1944-45 992,386 . 14,806 406,096 420 ,902 521,083 30,299 571,484 
1945-46 993,779 10,132 399,438 409,550 551 '911 22,037 584,229 
1946-47 855,096 7,374 396,692 404,066 578,320 20 '568 451 ,03o 
1947-48 944,569 26,858 372 ,8oo 399,658 572,091 21,411 544,911 
1948-49 1,098,783 353,228 180,746 533,974 686,264 24,333 554,809 
Notes . A From Table II. • B From Industrial Censuseso 
Chapter 2 . 
MAIZE 
An examination of the consumption of maize is made 
an extremely difficult task because it is necessary to 
divide the total consumption into that consumed by hWman 
beings and animals. In the majority of countries maize, 
or corn, is considered more ·impertant as a stock feed 
than as a commodity for human conswDption, but in south 
Africa to the vast number of natives residing in the 
Reserves it is their staple foodstuff. This becomes less 
extraordinary when it is remembered that in any commun-
ity living at a low standard, cereals in some form, 
constitute the major item in the diet and whereas in 
the more developed countries wheaten products supply the 
need for cereals, among the Africans maize, kaffir-corn 
and millet form the foundation of the diet. There is 
however, a noticeable tendency for urbanised natives to 
replace maize (or mealie~meal as this is the form in 
which maize is consumed by location dwellers) by bread 
in conformity with the higher level of civilization with 
wh~~ they have come into contact. 
The difficulty however, remains. The most reliable 
answer to the problem is to employ the estimates of the 
Division of Economics and Markets and so although the 
writer does not wish to place too much emphasis on 
estimates at this stage of the discussion, in the absence 
of other and more reliable data, he has had to use them 
as the best available. 
During the period 1923-7, the average production of 
maize was appuozimately 3,400,000,000lbs of whi~~ about 
1,000,000,000 was exported, mostly to be used as stock 
feed. The review period begun then with approximately 
1/3 {one-third) being exported, and of the quantity 
retained for conswmption within the Union less than 25% 
was fed to animals . The yield per morgen was extremely 
53. 
low (1) the principle rea~ons being the inadequate and 
badly distributed rainfall; the infertile soil, mainly 
due to a deficiency of phosphates and humus; the use of 
poor seed varieties; poor agricultural methods; and pests. 
The wor ld market for maize had been in a depressed 
condition for several years due to over-production in 
the Argentine and countries of the Danube basin. It was 
estimated that the Arge·ntine alone could in favourable 
years, supply sufficient to meet the demands of the 
world, (2) and with South Africa's high unit production 
costs resulting from poor yields, she could not compete 
with foreign countries. It was therefore inevitable 
that in order to maintain the return to maize farmers 
at a stable, and in the prevailing circumstances, a high 
level, the price on the domestic market had to be main-
tained by exporting part of the crop, even at the ur.u~e-
munerative prices which prevailed. 
SUch a policy was necessary because the quantity 
of maize delivered for sale by farmers was greater than 
the level of the demand at a price considered remunera-
tive to the producers. There could be three answers to 
the problem: the state could impose restrictive measures 
upon the production of maize, a step Which was never 
really considered as it was regarded as contrary to the 
independent outlook of the farming community; it could 
persuade the farmers to retain a greater portion of the 
crop on the farms to be used as stock feed which would 
then reduce the quantity to reach the markets; or it 
could export part of the crop which was in effect restricting 
not production, but supply available to meet the local 
consumption level. The actual policy followed was a 
(1) 
( 2) 
In 19 30 it was 5 - 6 bags ( 2oo lb.s ) per mor1en 
compared with Argentina's 16. 
"Farming in south Africa", 19 34. 
/combination 
combination of the latter two but whereas the second 
) 
(i.e. i more to be used as stock feed) could be persued J 
only by means of propaganda by the Department of / 
Agriculture, the third was far more amenable to legis• 
lative action and the introduction of the export quota 
system whe1·eby• on the basis of estimated productionJ a 
certain percentage quota was determined which had to be 
exported. 
Faced with the decreasing prices on the export 
market, it was recognised that the export of maize was 
far from being an economic proposition and the emphasis 
on the need of increased feeding of stock became 
stronger and stronger. The essence of the legislation 
was to stabilize ·prices to the producer yet one of the 
main reasons for the fluctuation in prices was the fact 
that such a large percentage of the crop was exported 
and sold at prices far below the domestic level. It 
was pointed out that "we produce barely sufficient 
maize and other feed to keep our livestock in good 
conditien all the year round •••••• Heavy annual losses 
are sustained by our livestock industry as a result of 
poverty-stricken stook after the winter, lees wool per 
sheep, deterioration in the que..lity of our wool, less 
milk, unsuitability of slaughter stock for market, 
lack of condition in draught animals ani in some cases 
death due to poverty etc." ( 1) ( 2) 
(l) "Overproduction of Maize" by T.F. Cronje, "Farming 
in South Africa", March 1932 , pp 614. 
( 2) During 1925-9 maize to the value of £14,000,000 was 
exported while about 3,000,000 head of cattle and 
19,000,000 sheep died of starvation. Assuming each 
bead of cattle was worth £6 and sheep 15/·, and 
taking 2/3 as the number which could have been 
saved, the loss was about £20,000,000. From 
"Mixed Farming in the Summer Rainfall Area" by 
J. du Toit, "Farming in Sout h Africa", September, 
1933. 
5:i. 
Various reasons as to why it would pay the pro-
ducer to feed more to his stock, were put forward, 
Many were based on the tacit assumption that the in-
creased production of meat which would result from 
such a diversion of supplies, would have to be export• 
ed and stressed the fact that the export of maize in 
the form of beef or mutton would reap a far greater 
financial :r·eturn than the continued export of the 
cereal itself. Representatives of South Africa in 
continental countries pointed to the vast surpluses of 
maize held in the Danube basin, and were adamant that 
"there is not the least prospect of selling their maize 
at a profit on the continent" (l) but on the other hand 
"I have to pay as auch as 2/6 per lb for fresh beef and 
many of the poorer classes cannot afford meat, it 
being regarded practically as a luxury article" (2). 
It was also stressed that European countries tended to 
give preference, in their food policies, to foodstuffs 
rich in protein, fat•, and vitamins and import less 
containing a high percentage of ca.rbohydaates, euch as 
the cereal group. 
The offici.a.l point of view, a.s exemplified by 
publications of the Department of Agriculture was a 
little less emphatic and it was pointed out that there 
were many other economic considerations which ~~d to be 
borne in mind. It ~robably felt that the circumstances 
of the times were abnormal and a sudden change in the 
utilization of maize might be foolhardy in the light of 
circumstances that might prevail when conditions reverted 
(1) Stated by Dr. Heymans, Secretary to the Legation of 
the Union in Rome, and quoted in "Exporting maize 
in the form of Meat" by G.J. Bosman, "Farming in 
South Africa", January, 1933, pp 16. 
( 2) Stated by Mr. B. Piena.ar, the Union' e Minister-
Flenipotentia.ry in Italy, and quoted in same article 
as footnote (1) above. 
/to normal 
to normal. It nevertheless seems that taking the long 
view, "there seems to be no doubt that our policy should 
be directed towards a more extensive utilization of 
maize in the feeding of our livestock...... Broadly the 
Department advocates that at least portion of the crop 
should be utilized on every farm in fostering the live-
stock industry, and that this portion shoud steadily 
increase •••••• So that we are no longer dependant upon 
the export market to any g1•eat extent "• {1) 
On the basis of the estimates of the Division of 
Economics and Markets which appear in Appendix :i:> ( 2), 
the result of this propaganda caapaign cannot be said 
to have been greatly successful. These figures show that 
there seems to have been no tendency for the consumption 
of maize by animals to rise, if anything t l:ere is a 
likelihood that the quantity fell. However ) much we 
emphasize that these figures are estimates and nothing 
more, the fact remains that the export of maize had to 
continue and the quantities that were exported did not 
reveal any tendency to decrease. one of the answers 
to the maize problem then had not been the success in• 
itially hoped for, and the other, the limitation of 
supplies for local consumpt!on through enforced expor-
tation, had therefore, to be pursued with a stronger 
purpose than ever. 
For the marketing years ( 3) 1931-2 and 1932-3 the 
quota percentages declal·ed by the Mealie Control Board 
ll) Editorial "f'arming in S.A." September 1933 pp 32?. 
, · This policy did not take an~ ·· altogether realistic 
view of the situation for the main maize areas did 
not coincide with the most important cattle regions. 
What the Department was in fact trying to do was en-
courage the division of the rearing of slaughter 
cattle into two distinct functions, viz. pure ranc~ 
ing and fattening for the market which would coincide 
with the principle maize areas. 
N.B. Maize farmers and cattle farmers are usually 
different people and located in different parts of 
the country. 
( 2) See page ••• ~7. .tro 
(3) A marketing year starts on let May eo the marketing 
year 1931- 2 is crop year 1930-1 in eo far as produc-
i e ~nnnA,..nA rL 
IJ7. 
quota percentages declared by the Mealie Control Board 
were 3~3and 60 respectively but in the next year the 
very small crop resulted in the machinery designed to 1 
limit supplies on the Union market and thereby maintain 
a higher price to producers (1), being temporarily 
lifted. The conditions essential for the efficacy of 
the quota system could not be countenanced as practical 
policy since the crop estimates were not altogether 
reliable; the quantity of maize which the producers 
would retain for consumption on the farms and the quan• 
tity which they would offer for sal• to the trade for 
local consumption and export, all depended to a very 
large extent on climatic conditions, notoriously 
difficult to forecast in this country. Furthermore as 
the size of the following year's crop was subject to a 
high degree of uncertainty, it was essential to guard 
against over-export and to allow for a considerable 
carry-over into the new season. · Under these circum-
stances, the export quota had necessarily to be determ• 
ined on a conservative basis. 
During these years the quota determined was 
based upon an estimated local consu~ption of between 
2,400,000,000 and 2,600,000,000 lbs (2) so that when 
the crop for 1932•3, to be sold in 1933-4, fell to 
l,ooo,ooo,ooo lbs, it was clear that there would be 
no "surplus" for export. Arrangements were made at the 
beginning of August for 20,000,000 lbs to be placed at 
disposal of drought-stricken farmers under a credit 
(1) During the 2nd half of 1932 the average price for 
grade 2 mealies on the local market was 6/9 as 
compared with an export price of 2/9 per bag. 
(2)Annual report Secretary of Department of Agriculture 
1934 "Farming in South Africa" December 1934. 
;scheme 
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scheme(~). In october, the Government ~ought 16,200tOOO 
lbs of yellow mealies for stock feed, from the Argentine, 
but al~ost immediately the shortage of white mealies 
for human consumption became acute. The Central Agency 
(2), which supplied the requirements of the mines under 
contract, and the millers who had assisted the Govern• 
ment previously, now themselves &pplied for assistance 
and the result was that some 20,000,000 1bs were 1m• 
ported from Kenya, of which 12,000,000 was allocated 
to the Central Agency to enable it to fulfill its mine 
contracts, 6,000,000 lbe to millers, and the remaining 
2,000,000 lbs to farmers. South Africa in this 1933-4 
marketing year was then on balance a net importer of 
maize. 
The quota system introduced initially for the 
1931•2 marketing season, made it compulsory for all 
persons buying maize in quantities of more than 26 lbs, 
(in the case of "bona-fide" farmers making purchases 
from maize farmers the limit was 300 bags), to export 
a certain percentage of the amount purchased. However 
the introduction of export certificates made it possible 
for the merchant who concentrated on the export trade, 
to export in excess of the actual percentage gazetted 
and he would then sell the export certificates for the 
excess to traders who had not wholly fulfilled their 
export requirements. In the early days of this scheme 
there was considerable speculation, and this together 
with the fact that the export quota system could not 
alone ensure a reasonable price to the producer - which 
was of course the main aim of the legislation -
(1)In districts declared "draught- stricken" farmers at-
tained maize on the security of their wool or stock 
itself, but this was later changed to repayment in 
3 equal yearly payments. 
(2) This body was liquidated after this short crop. 
/constitute 
constitute the main disadvantages of the scheme. 
The 1933-4 crop upon which the quota percentage 
for the 1934•5 season was based, was estimated at 
3.9oo,ooo,ooo lba (1) and upon this estimation the 
percentage to be exported was set at 50. The actual 
production as revealed by the Agricultural census was 
approximately l,ooo,ooo,ooo lbs more than estimated 
and this fact combined with a fall in the overseas 
quotations due to the anticipated heavy harvest in 
Argentina, resulted in a considerable fall in the price 
to producers from January, 1936. (2) The reasons ex-
pressed for this vast discrepancy between estimate and 
actual production was the lack of reliable production 
figures because of the absence of the Agricultural 
Census since 1929•30. 
A slight digression on the method of crop fore-
casting would be appropiate in view of its importance 
"' in the whole system of export quotas. The basis was a 
percentage comparison between the previous and the current 
seaeon•a area of cultivation or yield, given in mor@en 
or bags, bales or lbs. As the principle of the "law of 
averages" was relied upon, only sample reports were re-
quired from each district upon which to base the total 
estimate. Each correspondent was asked to report on the 
previous season•a average or actual yield and the current 
season's average or expected yield. Figures for corres-
pondents in the same area were then com~ared and the 
average percentage change applied to all farmers in 
(l) One earlier estimation put the crop at an even 
lower figure. viz. 3,?40,000,000 lbs. 
40. 
(2) Price of Grade 2 Maize per bag Dec.1935- Aug.l936. 
J.l934' Jan.l935'February'March'April' May ' June' July ' August 
/4t 7/Bt 6/?i ' 6/6 ' 6/6 ' ?/6 ' '7/li' 7/ot ' 6/8i 
/that 
that area. This obviously depends on a very reliable 
figure for the previous season's yield and if, as happen• 
ed in 1934·5, the only figures available were themselves 
esttmates, the position is rendered extremely difficult 
to forecaste with any reasonable degtee of accuracy. 
In view of the price decline in January, 1935, and 
"having regard to the fact that maize producers had ex-
perienced an extremely difficult time during the depress• 
ion" (1) the Government considered it necessary to in-
stitute a special measure and accordingly the Minister 
announced that traders would be redeemed to the extent 
of 3/6 per bag on all surplus quota certificates they 
might have on band at the end of the year provided that 
export had been affected before the end of May, 1936. 
The immediate effect was a rise in internal prices but 
it was not sufficient to counteract the effect of the con• 
tinued fall in overseas levels so that in August the 
internal level had fallen almost to that ruling before 
the measures instituted in May. Accordingly the price 
at which the Government agreed to buy up the certifi-
cates was increased to 5/- in order to maintain a domes-
tic level of about 7/- pe1· bag. 
How did this guaranteed purchase price for quota 
\ 
certificates affect the internal price level and there-
fore the incentive to produce ? There were two var• 
iables to be taken into account viz. the export value 
(or c.i.f. quotations on overseas markets less freight 
and other charges,) which was in effect made up of 2 
variables, and the percentage to be exported. Four 
arithmetical examples have been constructed in Appendix 
on page ~o show the effects of these variables. It 
is obvious that an increase in the percentage to be 
(1) Annual report Secretary of Department of Agriculture 
1936. "Farming in South Africa" 1935 pp 494. 
/exported 
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exported with other factors remaining constant will 
cause a fall in the price paid to producers, while eon• 
sumers price will remain the same. A fall in export 
value caused either by lower prices on overseas markets 
or an increase in freight or customs charges will cause 
a decrease in both prices, both to the extent of the fall 
in the export value. A rise in the price at which the 
Government guaranteed to purchase the quota certificates 
'( 
increases the producers price by the increase in the 
price export quota while the consumers price is in· 
creased by the whole amount. 
Hence: Producers price• export value + (guaranteed 
price x export quota) 
Consumers price = export value ~ guaren-
teed price per bag. -! 
It is also clear that the int,roduction of this 
guaranteed price could not stabilize the internal price 
level at any desired level without being constantly 
altered so, when prices began to fall again in August the 
guaranteed price was immediately raised to 5/- thereby 
... 
increasing the price to producers by 9d. and that to 
consumers by 1/6. The need for this increase was caused 
by three main factors viz. the reduation in export parity 
by between 1/· to 1/6 per bag, the rise in freight from 
13/• to 16/· per ton and the fall in overseas prices 
following the realization of expectations regarding the 
Argentine crop ( 1). 
The drought conditions towards the end of 1935 
retarded the planting considerably and the area reape4 
from the 1935-6 crop was 10% lower than the previous 
season (2). The expected short crop resulted in a gen• 
oral rise in maize prices to the levels of 12~t and 
(1) Annual Report of Secretary for Department of Agri-
culture, 1936 "Farming in South Africa" 1935 pp 522 
( 2) See Table I page 
/16/ .. to 
42. 
16/- to producer and consumer respectively and in order 
to afford some protection to the consumer the guarantee 
,, 
was withdrawn on the 25th March. The final estimate of 
2J 920,000,000 1 bs was only slightly above the estimated 
consumption so that once again the quota machinery was 
suspended and market conditions were regulated by the 
free operation of supply and demand functions. However, 
the prospects for the 1936·7 crop appeared excellent and 
prices began to decline to about 8/9 ex elevator for 
grade 2 by May, and despite the fact that an export quota 
of 66~3% was declared~ prices continued to fall slight-
lYt The main reasons for this were once again due to 
the international factors of falling prices and increas-
ing freight charges. (!) In order to assist the pro-
ducers the Government reintroduced the so-called 
\ 
/ guarentee system in respect of surplus quota certificates. 
On the 14th June a guarantee of 3/· was announced 
bringing the local price to 1/- above export parity 
but shortly afterwards it was increased to 4/6 and this 
maintained the internal price to the producer between 
7/- and 8/- . Despite the high export quota percentage 
that was declared, export proceeded very rapidly, so 
much so that by the end of 1937 the Government , fearing 
a poor crop for the 1937-8 selling season, removed the 
-I 
guarantee on the 14th December and export was prohibit-
ed. So ended the reign of the export quota system. 
In 1936 a sub-committee of four members was appoint· 
ed to consider the marketing of maize and in their su~ 
sequent report the following were the main recommendations 
( 2) • 
(1) The 193? Annual Report of the secretary for Agricul~ 
ture states that freight coste rose l~t to 3/31 per 
bag or from 16/3 to 32/lO per ton, during thisperiod. 
(2) "Fixation of Maize Pl~iceen, "Farming in South Africa" 
June 1936 pp 228 . 
/1. That 
1. That each year the Maize Board fix a. minimum price 
at which it is prepared to purchase maize, based on 
crop prospects. 
2. The compulsory export quota be discontinued and ex-
port of the surplus be regulated by the Board. 
3. The diversion of the "surplus" to industrial and 
stock feeding purposes. 
4. Retention of approximately 1,000,000 bags (i.e. 
200,000jooo lbe) as a reserve. 
5. A levy of not more than 4/· per bag to finance the 
subsidy paid on export maize. The minimum price to the 
producer, the exportable surplus and levy to be determ-
ined at the beginning of each season. 
6. Consumers' price would then be -
Minini.Wn price +-storage+ levy and handling 
costs, the latter to be fixed by the Board to 
protect the consumer interests. 
?. A maximum price to the eonsumer which if exceeded 
shall result in immediate discontinuation in export. 
a. Handling and storage chargee not to exceed 2/6 per 
bag. Therefore the maximum difference between produc-
ers' and conswaers price would be levy ~ 2/6. 
The 1938-9 marketing season was marked by an in• 
terim scheme in which the export quota and compensatory 
payments disappeared to be replaced by a levy and sub-
sidy scheme. On each bag purchased a levy of 1/- was 
payable and on each bag exported a subsidy of 2/3 was 
paid eo that the export value was increased from the parity 
level of 8/· at the beginning of the season to 10/3 -
the same price as the consumer had to p~ on the local 
market. SUch a. scheme which like the previous one was 
aimed primarily at stabliaing the internal price at a 
level remunerative to the producer, was how~ver once 
again at the mercy of the world price level. Thus when 
the latter level fell to ?/- and the producers• price 
/to 
to 8/3, the co-operative societies were left storing 
considerable quantities of grain on which advances of 
9/- had been given. Whilst the National Marketing 
Council condemned the reticence on the part of the 
societies to dispose of their stocks at the beginning 
of the season in the hope of an improved price later 
on, it nevertheless recomn1ended that the proposals of 
the Mealie Industry Control Board for incl~ea.se in both 
levy and subsidy to 1/6 and 3/3 respectively, should 
be favourably considered. 
In planning for the disposal of the crop, 3,000,000 
bags had been set aside for export and of this permits 
for ?5o,ooo were taken up on the basis of the subsidy 
of 2/3 per bag and a further 1,530,000 when the subsidy 
was increased. However these plans had been based on 
an estimated production of 3,820,000,000 lbs eo that 
when the figures of the Agricultural Census became 
available the Board proposed that a further issue of 
permits for 120,000,000 lbs be made but the Government 
refused to sanction such a measure so that no more than 
20,000,000 lbs from the reserves of the Board itself 
were exported. Thus the war started in circU3stances 
in which the Union was still exporting a considerable 
portion of ita output, and in circumstances in whioh 
control was practically complete. 
"The new (maize marketing) scheme abolished the 
system of export compensation entirely, and the pro-
ducer receives the world market price instead of a price 
which has been established artif'ially by r.o.eans of a. 
compensation to exporters. To the price, however, 
there is later added a supplementary ~ment derived 
from a levy •••••• on all maize and maize products re· 
ceived.from or delivered by a producer after the 30th 
April, 1939, as a result of a purchase either before 
'or after that date" 
or after that date" (l). (2) In effect the scheme, 
provided that after an amount equal to the levy had 
been refunded to exporters of maize and maize pro• 
ducts. all residual moneys derived from the levy 
was to be paid on a scale to be determined by the 
Board, as a supplementary payment to those who had 
sold maize to a registered trader. The export of 
maize was to be made under permit only. 
However the effect, if not the actual machinery, 
of the new scheme was materially the same as the 
previous one. By means of the levy the internal 
price was raised above that level at which it would 
have settled had there been no control and by means 
pf t)e subsidy an artificial enpouragement was pro-
vided for the export of maize and the consequent 
reduction of supply to the local market; artificial 
in the sense that it was not based upon the existing 
physical conditions. The new scheme in granting the 
Meal£e Industry Control power to limit the exporta-
tion of maize through the permit system, was however, 
expected to be far more suitable to obtain the de-
sired result a. 
There were also embodied in the scheme two pro• 
visions designed to promote increased consumption 
within the Union. Both were however not to effect 
the direct consumption by human beings since the 
first provided for a rebate of 2/- per bag on maize 
purchased on authority of a permit issued by the 
B~ard for stock feeding and the second was a series 
of special concessions including a rebate of 1/-, on 
(l) Annual Report of secretary for Department of Agri-
culture 1939. "Farming in south Africa" December 
1939 pp 496. 
(2) As regards native producers; any person buying maize 
from producers in native areas was to pay a levy of 
2/6 per bag, the balance being paid by the Depart-
ment of Native Affairs to the Board. The supple-
mentary payment was then to be paid to the produc-
ers at the end of the season through the Native 
A~~o~~a nA~a~+.mAn+._ 
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maize purchased in excess of 100,000 bags by the starch 
facto1oy and the National Maize Products co. which manu .. 
factures and alcohol, both of Germiaton. There was 
however one measure by which individual consumption 
benefitted and that was the railway rebate which was 
claimed "to have been instrumental in raising the ex-
port price by 9d. per bag above export parity. •• {1) 
The 1939 crop was a record one and based upon an 
estimate of 3,200,000,000 lbs, the exportable surplus was 
considered as 2,6oo,ooo,ooo lbs. Provisional authoriza-
tion was therefor e granted for the exportation of 
2,000,000,000 lbs but meanwhile the expectation of a large 
crop naturally led to depressed prices and in view of this 
the Government decided to make an advance supplementary 
payment, of 1/6 per bag on the first 500 bags sold by a 
producer. Of this 6d. was contributed by the Government 
being in affect a direct subsidy p~ent. 
It sas been stressed above that insofar as South 
Africa's export markets were concerned, maize was used al-
most exclusively as a stock feed. This fact had a very 
important bearing on the position since the demand for 
maize during wartime is dependant upon the extent to which 
feeding of li vasto ck is continued, extended or curtailed. 
owing to the fact that the whole continent of EUrope was 
soon rendered non-existent as effective markets, Great 
[ "' Britt an was left as the only importer of any magnitude. 
ai 
It was only natural that Brit~n's demand should have dim-
inished appreciably since the feeding of livestock no 
longer played the role which it had in normal times. In 
order to place as little extra weight upon the already 
over- burdened supply line of foodstuffs owing to the short-
age of shipping and the operations of u-boats in tlle 
(1) Annual Report of Secretary for Department of Agricul-
ture 1939. ''Farming in South Africa." December 1939. 
/Atlantic 
Atlantic, it was inevitable that the British policy would be 
to deliberately aim at curtailing supplies of stock feed in 
favour of more essential supplies. Nevertheless for the 
1939-40 crop, from which there was expected to be a surplus 
of l,OOOfOOO,OOO lbs, the British Government undertook to 
purchase all that was available at fixed prices. (l) This 
made the Contl'ol Board's aim of stabilizing prices far ea.s .. 
ier to attain since it was repeatedly proved under the e~ 
port quota scheme that stabilization was extremely difficult 
to achieve while the export value showed great fluctuations. 
In circumstances where south Africa was producing a sur· 
plus the contract with Great Britian was a decided advantage 
but it nevertheless introduced a difficulty in regard to the 
storage of the crop. Under ordinary conditions it was the 
custom of the maize fa1•mer to deliver all his mea.lies to the 
trade or eo-operative society as soon as he had completed 
thl'eshing operations. (2) The trader or co-op would then in 
turn take steps to ensure that the surplus was removed with-
in a few months and for the rest would meet local demand by 
drawing upon stocks. Under wartime conditions however, ex• 
port was a matter of waiting for shipping space and exporta-
tion was expected to extend over the whole season. storage 
facilities in the country were designed for speedy removal 
of the crop and could not accommodate both the surplus await• 
ing shipping space plus the reserve for local requirements; 
(1) The prices fixed for the 1939-40 crop were as follows: 
Mealies in Bulk: 
Grade 2, 4 17/• per 480 lbs f.o.b. 
Grade 6 17/3 per 480 lbs f.o.b. 
Grade 3 and 5 16/9 per 480 lbs f.o.b. 
Grade 7 and 8 16/6 per 480 lbs f.o.b. 
The ~rice for Grade 2 amounted to approximately 5/9 per 
bag (200 lbs) f.olr. sellers' station compared with the 
Boards price of 8/-. 
(2) This was a point which had caused considerable discuss-
ion during the period when the export quota system was 
in force since eapecially in the Native Reserves, where 
the custom described is general, the trader was under 
an obligation to export a certain percentage of a quan-
tity which he was in actual fact storing for the 
producer. 
/therefore 
therefore farmers were urged to store as much of their own 
requirements as possible. 
The most outstanding feature of the first two ye~s of 
the war was the considerable increase in consumption. In his 
Annual Report for 1941, the Secretary for Agriculture attri-
buted this phenomenon to a more feed-conscious farming comm-
unity and other temporary causes such as the shortage of rice 
and wheat both being replaced by mealie meal. The estimates 
of the Division of Economics and Markets (l') confirm the fact 
that a greater quantity was being used for animal consumption) 
rising by 360,000,000 and 300,000,000 lbs in the 1940-1 and 
l94l•2 selling seasons while their figures for consumption 
by human beings do not reveal comparable increases. If one 
examines the consumption of mealie meal it is obvious that the 
claimed increase in consumption by human beings did occur es• 
pecially in the year 1941-2 when the rise was almost as much 
as 20%.(2) Here it should be stressed that the consumption 
figures in regard to mealie meal are far more significant than 
the estimates of the Division of Economics and Markets since 
the former take into account the exportation of mealie meal 
(3) 
which, as can be seen from Appendix B, was faDiy considerable 
up to the beginning of thewar period. 
The 80% increase in annual consmnption of maize needs 
further explanation. It is probable that the rebates on 
maize granted to stock feeders was to some extent responsible, 
but a far more important factor must have been the greater 
profitability in stock-farming relative to pure maize produc• 
tion. In short it seems that what had been attempted in the 
early 30's by means of propaganda and had failed, had now 
come about through the operation of the economic machine by 
( 1) Appendix J3 Page 67 • 
( 2) See Appendix :B Page t7 • 
/mea.na 
means of comparative prices. (1) 
The extent of this increase in local consumption is re-
vealed in the planned disposal of the 1939·40 crop. ( 2) 
Estimated production 
plus carryover 
Consumption +carryover 
Exportable surplus 
4,140,000,000 lbs 
4oo,ooo.ooo lbs 
4,540,000,000 
3, 540, 00,0_, 000 
1,000,000,000 lbs 
In actual fact only 550,000,000 lbs were exported during the 
selling season and the secretary for Agriculture considered 
so. 
that the consumption "must now be put at between 19,000,000 
t.~g>' 
and 20,000,000 litis :per annum" compared with "barely 15,000,000 
during the years immediately preceding the war. tt ( 3) 
With this appreciable increase in consumption, prices 
rose and the Board had to institute special measures to main-
tain the consumers' price at a level approximat,ng to that 
agreed upon at the beginning of the season. The reduction 
in export meant a smaller financial burden in respect of 
export subsidies so that the Board was able to maintain a. 
stable price of 8/- for grade 2 ex-elevator :plus the supple-
mentary payment on the first 500 bags delivered, out its own 
revenue from the 2/8 per bag levy less the rebate of 1/6 on 
maize purchased for stock feed, without Government assistance: 
Although the 1940-l crop was greater than the previous, 
it was at the end of the selling season of this crop that the 
first economy measures were introduced in respect of maize. 
Drought measures resulted in a greater demand for stock feed 
and with prospects for the next yea~ crop very poor, prices 
( 1) Indices of 
1937-8 
1938-9 
1939 .. 40 
1940-1 
1941-2 
wholesale prices (1936/7 - 1938/9 • 100) 
summer cereals Slaughter stock Dairy 
Produce 
86 105 112 
94 106 102 
84 106 105 
107 111 108 
117 135 131 
(2) Annual Report, 1941 of the secretary for Department of 
Agriculture, "Farming in South Africa." December, 1941 
pp 410. 
( 3) Annual Report, 1941 of the Secfeta.ry for Department of 
Agriculture, "Farming in South Africa" December 1941 
~~ A1n ' 
rose steeply, especially the price of white mealies. Conse-
quently the Control Board in consultation with the Department 
of Agriculture introduced:-
1. Prohibition of exportation 
2. Discontinuation of the 1/6 rebate on stock feed 
respect of white mealies. 
3. Fixation of maximum consumer prices. (1) 
4. Prohibition of manufacture of mealie meal from white 
mealies alone but a mixture of white and yellow was 
permitted. 
These proved inadequate to deal with the position as the end 
of the marketing season approached and under war measure No. 
20 of 1942 the powers of the Mealie Industry «ontrol Board 
were extended to:-
1~ Take over all surplus supplies from traders and millers 
at fixed prices. 
2. Prohibit sale of maize other than to the Board at fixed 
prices. 
3. Cancel the rebate on all mealies for stock feed. (Alloca-
tion of stock feed was made on a carefully worked out 
basis aiming at the most profitable utilization of maize). 
St. 
The 1942 crop was the lowest since 1936. A severe drought 
prevailed until mid-summer, the area sown was less than normal 
and many fields were planted so late that they were never 
reaped. (2) In view of the expected low yield, the Food Con-
troller announced in Parliament that a. basic price of 1.57 ... a 
bag for grade 2, 4 and 6 would be assured to growers and that 
8 
: 18 ~ 1~ g f5 % 
21 - 99 bags ' 15 10 15 8 15 6 
6 - 20 bags ' 16 1 15 11 15 9 ' 
2 - 5 bag a ' 16 4 16 2 16 o ' 
1 ba~ ' 16 7 16 5 16 3 t 
After 31.8.42 all prices were increased by ld. per bag. 
Maximum prices of maize products (f.o.r. buyer's station), 
for quantities of 2 - 5 bags. a d 
No. 1 fine granulated mealie meal 19 0 
Unsifted granulated mealie meal 18 6 
UnSifted, ungranulated mealie meal 18 0 
Sifted crushed mealies l8 3 
Unsifted crushed mealies 18 0 
Sa.m:p 24 6 
Mealie rice 24 6 
Germ meal 12 6 
Hominy Chop 11 0 
( 2) See Table , page 64 • 
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the spread would be reduced in v:J.ew of the compulsory admix-
ture of yellow ma.im in 2rs and 6' s. In view of the fact that 
export was negligible the levy was reduced to 3d. per bag on 
delivery to traders and 3d. per bag when delivered to the mill-
er, or where the grain was delivered direct to the nuller, a 
single payment of 6d. per bag. 
To safeguard the supplies and ensure an equitable distriM 
bution until . the next crop, the permit system was instituted 
by proclamation in a Government Gazette Extraordinary on the 
3rd June, 1942. Under this system, bona fide farmers could 
obtain 25 bags of mealie meal or other maize products per 
month without a permit unttl the end of June after which the 
quota was reduced to 10 bags. Any quantity in excess of this 
quota, whether for human consumption or animal feed, could be 
obtained only on production of a permit. No householder was 
allowed to purchase more than 2 bags per month without a per-
mit whether for human consumption or otherwise. 
The figures in Appendix A in respect of this 1941·2 crop 
are very misleading insofar as with imports shown as 2,000 lbs 
It might be construed that no importauion was attempted, an 
assumption very far from the truth. As early as April of 1942 
before the crop was harvested, the Union Government was in 
consultation with the British Authorities, the Ministeries of 
Food and War Transport, regarding the provision of freight for 
the shipment of at least 400,000,000 lbs from the .Argentine 
betwe en June '42 and March, 1943. This amount woulo. have re-
quir ed some 25 sJ1..ips in addition to those required for the 
importation of wheat and rice. 
The British Ministry of war Transport was far from 
happy about using Ar gent ine vessels to convey maize to the 
Union, aa ha.d been sug gested, a. a they would. displace Brit ish 
ships at the already congested Durban harbour and constitute 
a. further drain on bunker coal aup]Pll.iea. The British authori• 
ties therefore offered the Union 100,000,000 lbs of Kenya 
maize the balance to be supplied from the Argentine. r.ater 
/the 
the Ministry for Food suggested that the actual essential re-
quirements of the Union must he,ve been lese than budgeted fol' 
since the report of the Secretary for Agriculture had stated 
that the increase in consumption of maize was due to an in .. 
creased "feed consciousness of farmers" and stressed the fact 
5?>. 
that the provision of shipping space to transport 100,000,000 
lbs from the Argentine could only be made by diverting supplies 
from the United Kingdom whel'e it would be all for human col1M-
sumption. The Union authorities hastened to reply that in-
creased stock feeding was by no means the only cause or:· 
larger requirements and pointed out the difference between 
the grazing qualities of the South African veld and the 
English pastures, following which 3 ships were provided, one 
each for October, November and December to convey 14,000,000 
lbs each from the Argentine. When the South African Governw 
ment heard that the freight charges would amount to £8 per 
ton, it decided that it could not accept the cargoes which 
would be landed at between 20/- and 25/- as compared with the 
local price of 15/- per bag. Subsequently the November and 
Decembel' cargoes were offered at a fre:f.ght charge of lOOj- per 
ton and accepted by the Southern Rhodesian Government but the 
whole matter could not but lead. to umhapp;y;. repercussions 
since a fter such long months of negotiation, apparently finan-
cial and not physical needs were paramount and such a conclu-
eion arrived at in England wae hardly likely to engender a 
spirit of co-operation between the 2 countries. 
To make matters even worse the Kenya crop turned out far 
less than estimated and the total surplus of 4,000,000 lbs 
was allocated to Northern Rhodesia. As the Union had relied 
upSn this to tide it over the early part of 1943 until the 
new crop would be harvested, it was considerably embaraased, 
but good spring rains led the Authorities to take an optimis-
tic view in granting the 2 cargoes to Southern Rhodesia (1). 
(1) The first cargo was finally offered at a freight coat of 
100/- per ton, tho difference to be paid by the British 
Ministry of Food. 
/When 
When the position was reviewed at the end of 1942 the Union 
requested 5,000,000 lbs to cover March and April month~ut 
with shipping positions even worse. nothing was obtained. 
The 1943 crop was a considerable improvement but as there 
was no carryover from the previous season fa1•:mers had to be en-
couraged to market their maize as soon as po ssi bl e and \vi th 
this in mind the prices for the new season were announced and 
came into force on the l?th March instead of as usual on the 
lst of May. It was also decided to accept maize with a mois-
ture content of more tt~n lat% at the beginning of the season 
until supplies reached a level sufficient to meet the ~emand. 
With a marketable crop estimated at 3,000,0001 000 lbs storage 
facilities were far from adequate and it is hightly probable 
that the consumption figure is somewhat overstated since the 
large stacks in the open were exposed to rotting and mould 
as 
especially/much of the grain already contained excessive 
moisture. 
It is significant from Table l (l) the.t the area reaped 
for tide 1942-3 crop was by far the greatest, over 2401 000 
morgen more than in 1940•1. This is probably to be accounted 
for by the incre~se in the price guaranteed to producers after 
the shortage of the previous season. For this crop the prices 
to the producer were increased by l/w per bag with elevator 
maize 9d. less per 200 lbs. 
Early in the year it waa evident that the crop would not 
be very ~od not because less land had been sown to maize but 
mainly due to rains which were too hea~r. Lands were oft en 
too vret to plough, plants were drowned and it was generally 
expected that the final crop would be a small one. To deal 
w'th this situation it was decided that es large a reserve 
as possible should be carried over to the 1944~5 selling 
( l) see Page 64 • 
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seasons and so a slight form of rationing was applied. with a 
result that a reserve of 600,000,000 lbs was maintained at the 
end of the season. 
This abnormal carryover was in fact the cause of diffi-
culties at the beginning of the next season for maize deli v-
eries tended to be earlier than usual and so once again there 
were not adequate storage facilities. Furthermore the crop 
proved to be abno1•ma1 in its distrj.bution (1) which also 
created difficulties in regard to storage and "the biggest 
losses occurred on a branch line in the western o.F.s. where 
congestion was unavoidable and storage inadequate". ( 2) 
In view of the experiences following the similar poor 
crop of 1942, ~.t was evident that more drastic measures than 
those applied ~n the past would be necessary for regulating 
the flow of maize in order to ensure supplies for the whole 
season and to provide for so large a reserve to 1945-6 as 
possible. Previously the Board had regulated distribution 
through the medium of control over elevator maize and part-
ly by arrangement with co-operative societies whereby a cer• 
tain degree of control over the marketing of supplies was 
vested in the Board. Now a new scheme was introduced whereby 
the Union was divided into two areas, one, Area A, comprising 
flit the main producing areas of the Union ( 3} and the other, 
the remainder of the Union. In area B marketing arrangements 
remained as before with only registered traders permitted to 
purchase maize while in A the trade was performed by agents, 
appointed by the Board, who were to sell maize only on the 
Boar d's permit and were to receive commissions in liew of 
profit. ( 4) 
(1) This is revealed by the fact that in normal years about 
2,ooo,ooo,ooo lbs is retained on farms, wherea s in this .. • .... 
year the figure was estimated at 1,400,000,000 lbs. 1945 
Report of the Secretary for Agticulture "Farming in South 
Africa" March, J.946 pp ·151. 
( 2} UG 2? /4? (3) The o.F.s. , Transvaal a nd the districts of Mafeking and 
Vryburg. 
(4) They were able to obtain permission from the Board to deal 
in certain quanti t:i.es on their own behalf. 
/With 
With the abnormal carryover and early deliveries, it was 
essential that stocks be liquidated expeditiously if the 
storage of maize was not to develop into utter chaea. Prices 
of stored maize were therefore fixed at lower levels to en-
courage it a sal·e and permit regulations were temporarily au a-
pended. However the season which atarted with a surplus prob-
lem later developed into one of acute shortage fo1• in De·cembel~ 
the consumption amounted to 300~000,000 lbs, a level which, 
had it been allowed to continue would have meant that suppliea 
would have run out long before the end of the season. Drastic 
action was therefore needed to curtail consumption to ensure 
a carryover since the following crop was also expected to be 
poor. Consequently the first eurtailment in issue of permits 
to consumers vas made in FebruH,ry, j,ni tially in respect of 
stock feed only but later still more drastic curtailment be-
came necessary and permits for consumption by human beings 
were also cut. Nevertheless the carryover to the 1945•6 
marketing season was an extremely small one. 
The expectation regarding the 1945 crop were only too 
well founded and early inquil'ies were made regarding the poas-
:iibili ty of importing maize. The London Food Council informed 
the South African authorities that the Argentine had suffered 
from a very abrt crop but suggested that Angola might be able 
to supply some in addi tj.on to an allocation of 20,000,000 1 be 
from the Kenya crop. Importation from the Argentine was met 
with great difficulties: although even bartering with south 
African coal was tried it came to no avail and finally the 
British Ministry of Food agreed to loan a few cargoes to the 
Union in view of the desperate situation, thus initiating the 
importation of some 5oo,ooo,ooo lba of the most expensive 
maize so far purchased for the South African market. (1) 
In view of the small carryover, concentrated at a few 
(1) The Government subsidized the difference between the 
price a.t which the imported maize could be sold and 
the fixed consumer prices. 
/co .. opera.ti vee 
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co-operatives, and the scattered nature of the cr~ the Board 
offered a premium of 6d. per bag on maize delivered before the 
9th June and also temporarily suspended the maximum moisture 
content of 15% during the early part of the season. Further 
arrangements were made to enable millers to take over the 
maize direct from agents without all the formalities nor-mally 
necessary and these measures enabled the country to obtain 
sufficient supplies until the bulk of the crop came on to the 
market. However, in order to make the supplies last as long 
as possible, the control measures of the previous season were 
retained but f~r more severe rationing was essential. 
A reduction of permit-free purchase in larger urban areas 
where other substitutes are available, was made and the manu-
facture of sifted mealie meal, samp and mealie rice was pro-
hibited. (t) In the case of the latter two products the pro• 
hibition was designed to fall more heavily on the upper income 
groups who were considered to be the main purchases of, and 
hor 
who could afford other cereal foods. The s1ohage of while 
mealies was more acute and j. t was there~ore necessary to impore 
a prohibition on the manufacture of mealie meal exclusively 
fr~a white mealies and the manufa~ture of crushed maize exw 
cept from yellow mealies. (2) The quantity of yellow maize 
which had to be incorporated was initially fixed at 20% but 
later raised to 60%. 
The distribution of maize among the rural natives was 
rendered extremely difficult by the large number of illiot 
sales among traders (3) so that while the total amount made 
available to traders in native areas was considered sufficient 
for their requirements, there was no method of checking the 
(l)The prohibition was partially lifted later in the season 
and the removal of 7t% Bran permitted in the case of maize 
milled for producers. This was necessary because the small· 
e:r· mills which ))ater mainly for producers, were not in a 
position to process the bran in such a way that the unsift-
ed mealie meal could be used for human consumption. 
(2)This shortage of white maize was not telieved by importa-
tion since the majority of imports were of the yellow 
variety. 
(3)1945 Report of the secretary for Agl•iculture. "Farming in 
South Afri ca11 March, 1946 pp 151. 
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actual distribution of that allocation, especially since no 
permit was required from the native purchaser. To overcome 
these difficulties local committiea were appointed in the Re-
serve areas to regulate distribution among the traders and to 
supervise the sale of maize. 
It has been pointed out previously that the Government 
subsidized the importation of maize during the 1945-6 market-
ing season but it shouid be moticed that this subsidization 
was not only confined to importation b¥t applied to the whole 
crop entering the trade. In the early days of the levy-subsicy 
scheme Government assistance was given on the condition that 
a consumer price of approximately 10/w to 10/6 per bag was 
maintained. (1) However when it became essential to increase 
the producers' prices to allow for the increased production 
costs and to offer an incentive towards greater production. 
the Government decided not to allow the inc1·ea.se to be passed 
on to the consumer. Thus for instance in the 1945-6 season 
the price of grade 2 maize was 19/" to the producer but of 
this 2/6 was by way of Government subsidy so that the basis 
on which tb~ consumer price was to be determined was 16/6. (2) 
Despite the fact that the 1946 crop was slightly lees 
than the final estimate of the previous one, the vastly im-
proved conditions with respect to importation meant that 
supplies were, after two years of scraping and saving, very 
nearly adequate to meet the demand. Accordingly while the 
control over the marketing of the crop was retained by the 
Board, the peomit system was repealed in February., 1947. It 
was, however, not possible to suspend the embargo on the 
manufacture of mealie meal and crushed maize exclusively from 
white maize due to the failure of the local white maize crop 
and the fact that once again imports were mainly of the 
(l)This policy was probably partly responsible for the compa-
ratively low maize prices in the years 1939-42. 
(2)Determination of Consumers price (f.o.r. Sellers' station) 
1943-46. 
Selling Season 
1943/4 
1944/5 
1945/6 
Producers' 
Gl•ade 2 
16/-
17/6 
19/-
Price Subsidy 
1/6 
2/6 
Cons~ers' Price 
18/7 
18/7 
19/2 
yellow variety. The position in fact became worse and the 
60% compulsory admixture of yellow was increased to 100% 
later decreased first to 60 then 50 and finally in the 17th 
May, 1948, all provision in this connection were abrogated. 
The ban on the sifting of mealie meal remained in force as 
the supply position had not become so favourable as to per-
mit of its suspension. 
The effect of the suspension of restrictions on the use 
of maize as stock feed is clearly revealed in the estimates 
in Appendix A when in the marketing season 1947-8 the in-
crease amounted to about 35%. The main difficulties during 
the last two seasons under review were related to the 
storage of the crop since consumption was now reckoned as 
about 4,600,000,000 lbs whereas it had in the thirties been 
considered as about 2,800,000,000 lbe. 
The 1948 crop was by far the greatest ever reaped in 
South Africa, almost 800,000,000 lbs more than in 1937 and 
even after a considerab~e proportion of the crop had been 
exported,(l) a carryover of 1,200,000,000 lbs was achieved 
for the following season as it had become evident from the 
unfavourable climatic conditions during the summer planting 
months that tmt crop would be very much less. The enormous 
carryover once again caused considerable difficulties in the 
storage of the crop for with inadequate storage facilities, 
stecking in the open had to be resorted to and weevils and 
mould took a large toll of stocks. It was being painfully 
demonstrated that the effects of the variable climate went 
much further than being the cause of fluctuating crops. 
storage ~d become the main difficulty in the marketing pro• 
cess ... consumption had risen to such a level that the exist-
ing storage facilities designed to meet a epeeqvwithdrawal 
for export could not cope with long storage periods of such 
a large quantity. 
(l) A large amount was exported to the u.s.A. in return for 
wheat (see chapte1· on Wheat - page 23 ) • 
/SUMMARY 
bo. 
SUM11.ARY 
The period under review begins with the export of a.pprox• 
imately l/3 of the total crop while about 25% of the quantity 
retained was used as stock feed. While it is true that in 
most countries, maize is used principally as an a~imal feed, 
the fact that more than 2/3 of the maize retained in the coun-
try was consumed by human beings is not so extraordinary as 
it would first appear, when one remembers that in all primi-
tive societies cereals form the basis of the diet and the 
cereal must obviously be one suited to the natural contro~s 
of production. Thus while the European has for centuries 
found his source of cereals in wheat and the fouhdation of the 
Indian's diet is rice, the African has traditionally developed 
on a diet in which maize, kaffircorn and millet are of suprexne 
importance. 
The period also begins with the international position 
characterised by an over-supply of ~aize with large stocks 
being carried in the Argentine and Danube valley. In these 
circumstances it was inevitable that the world price level 
should decline and in an attempt to insulate the South African 
farmer from the effects of this falling price level, the Gov-
ernment introduced the quota system whereby on the estimates 
of the coming crop, a certain percentage was dete1•m1ned which. 
had to be exported. At the same time however, it was recogn-
ised that this was not a policy which could be pursued in-
definitely since prices continued to vary greatly with the 
quantity and world price levels, and eo the authorities went 
to considerable lengths to encourage the feeding of maize to 
livestock as it was felt that the Union possessed all the 
natural requirements of a ranching country. The export of 
maize "on the hoof" became a watch-word during the depression 
years but the available statistics do not reveal any marked 
success in this propaganda campaign and apart from the 1933-4 
selling season, substantial quantities had to be exported in 
order to maintain an internal price remunerative to the 
producer. / Tn 
61. 
In the middle thirties this export quota scheme becaEe 
greatly refined but the principle of removing a certain am-
ount of the crop in order to establish "remunerative" prices 
on the local market, remained. First there was the introduc-
tion of export certificates which meant that it was no long-
er necessary for each and every trader to export the gazett-
ed percentage of his purchases - he could now enter the 
market for quota certificates and buy sufficient to cover 
his export obligations. When however, speculation in this 
market became rife, the Government agreed to buy and sell 
them at fixed prices which not only served to stop specula-
tion but was itself an effedtive means of influencing the 
local market price, both retail and wholesale. Nevertlwlees, 
the price to the producer still remained largely at the 
mercy of uncontrollable external factors, so an interim 
scheme was introduced for the 1938-9 season prior to the in-
troduction of a new scheme in the following season but if the 
machinery was different, the aims were not. 
The outbreak of war found South Africa an export coun-
try and rather in fear of her export markets since not only 
were several of them soon overrun by the enemy, but it was 
to be expected that stock feed would not receive the same 
treatment as other more essential co~dities by the import-
ing countries. Nevertheless Brit~n agreed to take over the 
whole of the Union's surplus at fixed prices which also meant 
that one of the variables - the export parity level - was 
now reduced to a constant. South Africa was however, not 
2 
able to take ad,antage of this for Graph, overpage, reveals 
A 
that production began to decline from the begi nning of the 
war, so it was not long before all fears of surplus maize 
requiring exportation, disappeared and from 1942-3 it 
became necessary to limit consumption by various means since 
it was impossible to import the deficiency between production 
and consumption. In the last three seasons under review 
production increased sufficiently to enable the restrictions 
/on 
000,000 
lbs 
on consumption to be withdrtwm but the gap between the two 
factors had narrowed down considerably and South Africa's 
ability to provide sufficient to meet her maize requirements 
depended to a much greater extent than ever before on the 
climate - a notoriously variable element. 
The consumption of mealie meal is also included on the 
graph in order to give some idea of the factors operating 
behind the total consumption of maize. It appears that during 
the depression years production •hawed a decline and it is 
obvious that in years of low productivity, the consumption of 
whole maize especially in rural areas such as the Reserves, 
would decline. Thus the consumption of mea.lie meal, mainly 
confined to the urban areas and therefore dependent upon pur-
chasing power, appears to have fallen less than total c onswnp• 
tion and again when production recovered in the period 1933-39 
total production rose at a much faster rate than did the con· 
sumption of mealie meal. In years of good crops it is to be 
expected that more will be consumed in the whole form by both 
human beings and animals on farms and in the Reserves. From 
1942-3 although rati oning would seem to have noticeably check-
ed the total consumption, that of mealiemeal continued to rise 
unchecked which would lead one to the conclusion that it was 
probably stock feed which felt the incidence of the ratbning 
devices most, a conclusion borne out by the estimates of the 
Division of Eaonomics and Markets in the Appendixes. 
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Table 1. 
Area planted to maize, 1929/30 .. 194?/8 (mol~gen). 
Year Ca;p~~Natal 
' 
Transvaal 
I 
' 
' 1929/30 ' 143,861 ' 203_,136 t 1, 231,958 1933/4 213,200 I 193,377 I 1,155,843 
1934/5 143,861 I 165, 208 ' 1,195,119 1935/6 131,168 161,023 1,045,851 
1936/7 ' 179,059 178,58? 1,195,194 
193?/8 169,50? t 1?4,646 ' 1,102,93? 
1938/9 178,6?5 t 16? J 254 ' 1, 183,682 1939/40x 176,606 
' 
1?8,848 
' 
1, 265,259 
1940/1 X 201, 38? ' 176,721 t l, 251,084 1941/2 X t 196,260 154,660 ' 1,138,085 
1942/3 X 1 244,866 164,266 t 1,30?,355 
1 1943/4 X I 2?0, 349 155,?43 l, 321 J 53? 
I 1944/5 
' 1945/6 206,296 169,387 t 1, 2?7 J '721 
1946/? 204,931 187,935 I lt381,417 
' 1947 /_8 211, 3'(?._ __ , .1~5_.§_g~ .. ..!.. . .h384d93 
x Estimates 
Source Union Year Books. 
APPENDIX 
' O.F.S. 
' 1 J 358 J 971 
' l t 231 J 383 
1, 302, ?27 
1,1~2,573 
' 1,400,854 
I 1,174,461 
t 1,406,615 
'1,391,249 
' 1, 390, 791 
I 1,265,943 
I 1,542,738 
I l t 4!.7"51 669 
' 
I 1, 352,125 
' 1,659,733 
' J:., '706 t 642 
Tota.J.. ' 
' 2, 9 28, 4161 
2, 79 3, 803' 
2, 806, 915' 
2, 440,7151 
' 2, 953, 6941 
' 2' 6 21 , 6 51' 
' 2, 936, 2361 
' 3, 011' 9621 
' 3, 019 J 983' 
' 2,?54,948' 
t 3, 259 J 2251 
' 3, 223, 298' 
' 3, 005, 529' 
3, 434 J 0161 
' 3, 458, 036' 
The following four examples have bean prepared to illustrate 
the mechanism of the export ~uota system and the Government 
guaranteed price for quota certificates, and its effe~ on the 
1 o cal market. 
Example 1. Suppositions (al 5o% export quota. 
Trader A. 
Trader B. 
(b Export value • 5/6 per bag. 
(m Guaranteed price • 3/6 per bas 
sells 4 bags on the export market 22/~ 
sells 2 certificates 7/-
buys 4 bags on the local market @ 7/3 
buys 4 bags on the local market 
buys 2 certificates 
sells 4 bags on the local market 
29/-
7/-
@ 9/-
29/-
36/-
Example 2. Suppositions : !a) 75% export quota. 
b) Export price • 5/6 per bag. 
c) Guarenteed price • 3/6 per bag. 
Trader A. 
sells 4 bags on the ex~rt market 22/-
sells 1 certificate 3/6 
buys 4 bags on the local market @ 6/4-i 25/6 
Trader B. 
buys 4 bags on the local market 25/6 
buys 3 certificates · 10/6 
sells 4 bags on the local market @ 9/- 36/-
Exa.mple 3. 
Suppositions : (a) 50~ export quota. 
(b) Export price • 4/6 per bag. 
(c) Gua.renteed price = 3/6 per bag. 
Trader A. 
sells 4 bags on the export ~rket 18/-
sells 2 certificates ?/-
buys 4 bags on the local market @ 6/3 25/-
Trader B. 
buys 4 ba. gs on the l o ca.l 1nar ket 25 /~ 
buys 2 certificates ?/• 
sells 4 bags on the local market @ 8/- 32/-
Suppositions : la) Export quota 50% 
b) Export value • 5/6 :per bag. 
c) Guaranteed price • 5/- per bag 
Trader A. 
sells 4 bags on the export ma.l~ket 22/-
sells 2 certificates 10/• 
buys 4 bags on the local market @ a; .. 32/-
Tra.der B. 
buys 4 bags on the local market 32/-
buys 2 certificates 10/-
sells 4 bags on the local market @ 10/6 42/-
• 
PRODUCTION liND CONSlJMPTION OF MAIZE IN SOUTH AFRICA, OOOLBS. 
Production (.A) 
Year European Native Total Imports Exports Consumption 
On farms Reserves 
B c D 
1929-30 3,452,13B 306,735 71B,25l 4-,477,124 B2 1,245,824 3,231,382 3,131,400 
1930-31 2,753,000 448 ,6oo 3,201 ,6oo 52 364,692 2,836,960 2,957 ,ooo 
1931-32 3,324 ,6oo 4B2,200 3,8o6,Boo 6 538,881 3,26B,015 3 ,25B ,poo 
1932-33 1,305,200 363 ,ooo 1,66B,200 66,669 244,966 1,4B9,903 1,649,900 
1933-34 3,709,443 376,577 737,77B 4,B23,79B 27,211 501 '596 4,349,413 3,929,400 
1934-35 2,999,079 2B0,374 432,759 3,712,212 352 1,000,698 2,711,866 3,051,900 
1935-36 2,480,717 268,815 247,217 2,996,749 1,854 36,B42 2,961,761 2 ,B4l ,Boo 
1936-37 4,5B2,149 459,B95 593,644 5,635,6B8 7,192 1,713,940 3,92B,940 3,978,900 
1937-38 2,972,668 355,268 521,526 3,B49,462 1,252 443,939 3,406,775 3 ,4o6 ,Boo 
1938-39 4,732,071 4B0,274 591,590 5 ,B03 ,935 594 1,424,905 4,379,624 4,129,600 
1939-40 4,141,800 92 941,490 3,200,402 3' 500,400 
1940-41 ... 4,864,800 314 383,025 4,4B2,089 4,282,100 
1941-42 3,268,Boo 2 70,870 3,197,932 3,447,900 
1942-43 
-
4,867,200 14 4,4B2 4,862,732 4,362 '700 
1943-44- 3,674,000 618 12,220 3,662,398 4,162,400 
1944 .... 45 
-
3,676,000 143,008 2,234 3,Bl7,774 3,817,BOO 
1945-46 2,791,430 353,489 486,640 3,559,558 821,962 2,186 4,379,334 4,379,300 
1946-47 3,784,256 486,B33 639,532 4,910 '621 270,457 108,969 5,072,109 4,872,100 
1947-48 5,101,554 552,912 769,433 6,423,899 29 672' 531 5,751 ,397 5,051,400 
1948-49 3,381,779 410 ,B40 409,164 4,201 '7B3 9 218,742 3 ,983 ,o5o 4,843,100 
Notes l:i. From Agricultural Censuses except for years 1930/1 - 1932/3 when the final estimates of the Division of 
Economics and Markets have been used, and 1939/40 ~ 1944/5 when the figures have been obtained from the 
Official Year Books. 
B Refer to calendar years. 
c Refer to calendar years and include re-exports. 
D Consumption adjusted to reflect changes in the level of stocks and in the amount of imports and brought onto a seasonal basis. exports when 
CS'\ 
~ 
Year 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934--35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
1938-39 
1939-40 
1940-41 
1941-42 
1942-43 
1943-44 
1944-45 
1945-46 
1946-47 
1947-48 
1948-49 
Notes : A 
B 
c 
Total 
A 
3 ,100 ,ooo 
2 '720 ,ooo 
2,800 ,ooo 
2,408 ,ooo 
3,140,000 
3,040,000 
2,900 ,ooo 
3,160,000 
3,080,000 
3,160,000 
3,660,000 
4,020,000 
4,040,000 
4,240 ,ooo 
3,980,000 
4,120,000 
4,100,000 
4,520,000 
4,960,000 
5,220,000 
CONSUi'•{P_'!'_ION 
Consumption 
By Human 
Beings 
A 
2,400,000 
2,200,000 
2,200,000 
2,100 ,ooo 
2 '500 ,ooo 
2,400,000 
2,400 ,ooo 
2,6oo,ooo 
2,5oo,ooo 
2,6oo,ooo 
2 '700 ,ooo 
2,8oo,ooo 
2 ,8oo ,o·oo 
2,86o,ooo 
2,8oo,ooo 
2,8oo,ooo 
2,86o,ooo 
2,900,000 
3,ooo,ooo 
3,100 ,ooo 
APPE/VJ>/x .B. 
OF M.aiZE IN SOUTH 
By Animals 
A 
6oo,ooo 
420 ,ooo 
56o,ooo 
200 ,ooo 
540,000 
56o,ooo 
360 ,ooo 
440,000 
460,000 
440,000. 
8oo,ooo 
1,100 ,ooo 
1,100 ,ooo 
1,2oo,ooo 
1,ooo,ooo 
1,140,000 
1,060 ,ooo 
1,420,000 
1,760,000 
1,880 ,ooo 
Estimates of the Division of Economics and Markets. 
From Industrial Censuses. 
AE_RICA, OOOLBS. 
Direct 
r.1o. i ze consumption 
Ground at of maize 
Seed Mills by human 
beings 
A B c 
8o,ooo 
96 ,ooo 
1,386,266 1,013 '730 
40,000 
1,286,832 813 ,170 108 ,ooo 
92,000 1,356,776 1,143,220 
76 ,ooo 1,535,436 864,560 
140,000 1,418,534 981,470 
120,000 1,593,840 1,oo6,16o 
120,000 1,723,326 776,670 
120,000 1,901,888 698,110 
160,000 1,880,048 819,950 
120,000 1,879,148 920,850 
140,000 2,111,918 680 ,o8o 
180,000 1,856,158 1,003,840 
180 ,ooo 2,214,450 585,550 
180,000 2,368,760 431,240 
180 ,ooo 2,133,240 726,760 
200,000 2,382,212 517,790 
200,000 2,908,452 91,550 
240,000 3,084,148 15,850 
Obtained by subtra9ting maize ground at mills from the estimate of consu~ption of maize by human beings. 
This is based upon the assumption that all maize ground is intended for cons1~ption by human beings, one 
obviou?lY not c9rrect but necessa~y in view of the absence of any statistical data enabling the writer to do 
other~~se . It ~s probable that s~nce the lifting of restrictions on the feeding of livestock, the con-
sum.pt~on of meal~e J¥eal and other forms of ground maize by animals has increased, a fact which would partly 
account for the sharp drop in these figures. 
Chapter 3. 
DAIRY 
In this discussion on the production and consumptianof 
dairy products in the Union butter and cheese will be dealt 
with in a certain amount of detail, but other products like 
fresh and condensed milk which would conveniently fall under 
this heading, will unfortunately receive only cursory treat-
ment. This is made inevitable by the absence of reliable 
statistics on any dairy products other than butter and cheese 
and much as it was hoped to deal with fresh milk in particu-(1) 
lar in a detailed manner, that has not been possible. It 
must be further stressed at this stage, that the discussion 
of both butter and cheese will be concerned mainly with the 
creamery and factory products, the reason once again being a 
paucity of statistical data. As can be seen from Appendix 
( 2) 
A (~ ihe production of farm butter was only recorded for the 
years 1929-30, 1933-39, and 1945-4? while the position of farm 
made cheese is roughly similar. It appears however, tha.tt the 
production of farm butter remained fairly constant between 
1933-4 and 1938-9, during which period the output of creamery 
butter was~ubled, although it is possible that the quantity 
of butter produced on farms has declined during recent years. 
In the case of cheese, the farm made product is insignificant 
when compared with the factory made product, it being only 
about 2,% of the latter in 1945~6. 
ba\a.n~:.~ 
Before the 19 29-30 season the Union had been on "a net 
' ( 3) 
importer of both butter and cheese and in its report on 
(1) The best evidence relating to the consumption of fresh 
milk is that obtained from the Division of Economics and 
Markets (see page 96) In the case of condensed milk, pro-
duction figures are not pub~ished. 
( 2) See pa.ge 9t 7. • 
(3) Balance of trade: Butter and Cheese 1923/4-1928/9. 
Net im;port .J.1f) net ex crt - ~ • 
I I: ,19237! t 19.24 5 I 1925 6 !: 192§2?: I 192?/8 =!_ 1928}9 
t Butter 1 X 3137 1 X 1100 I X 1090 I X 2254 I X 3640 I X 3580 
1 Cheese 1 X 89~ 1 X 24 1 X 2041 1 - 82 I X 3?2 I X 4S2 
Source: Report of N.M. c. on Marketing Boards, u. G. 27 /4?. 
/the 
(1) 
the industry the Board of Trade and Industries stressed 
that dairying was considered mainly as a subsidiary enter-
prise and as such the importance of winter feeding, of herd 
improvement and other important matters did not receive the 
attention they warr/nted. The majority of cows milked were 
of a very poor standard and average yields exceedingly low; 
in one district considered suitable for<~rying, an informal 
inquiry showed an average yield of ~ gallons per weekJ or 
130 gallons per annum. The report also stressed the fact 
that costs in the manufacturing part of industry were exhor-
bi ta.nt and preventeHhe local creameries competing on the ex-
port market or paying improved prices for butterfat and 
cheesemilk. In 1925-6 the average output per creamery of 
the 73 creameries in the Union was only 190,000 lbs compared 
with 1,200,000 lbs for 42 creameries in ~ueensland while 
the position with regard to the manufacture of cheese was ( 2) 
even worse. In such circumstances as these it was ine~ 
itable that its cost structure woQd be far hi~1er since the 
advantages of large scale economics would be lost. 
Nevertheless the Board was convinced that the Union was 
a potential dairying country and expressed the view that 
many of the difficulties would be overcome were the country 
to develop an,· export trade of dairy produce - the form in 
which mea.lies should be exported. That was the view express-
ed in 1927 but when production did reach the level where a. 
"surplus" appeared during the two excellent seasons of 1928 ... 9 
and 1929-30 prices on the London market had already begun to 
( 3) 
fall. There was therefore, a twofold need for some 
The Dairy Industry : Report No. 81 of 192?. 
u.G. 27/47. PP 112. 
Price Indices of let Grade Australian and New Zealand 
Butter and Cheese - London. 
' Butter ' Cheese ' 
19267?-1928/9 ioo roo 
1929/30 83 8? 
I 1930/1 66 63 
1931/2 61 66 
19~2/3 49 52 
' 1933/4 43 51 
1934i5 52 52 
/co-ordinated 
co-ordinated form of marketing. 
First in pursuance of the state policy of protecting 
( 1) 
primary industry it was imperative that local prices of 
butter and cheese be not allowed to fall to the levelslrul-
ing on the London market which soon became the only free one 
were 
in existence, and where prices/accordingly even lower be-
cause of dumping. There was further the view expressed by 
the Department of Agriculture that in the long run South 
Africa would be well advised to maintain a re~lar export 
trade in dairy products partly as a result of the world 
supply position of maize and partly because the existence of 
a "surplus" might mean the easier attainment of stability of 
prices on the internal market. In these circumsta.nc~ a. 
ro. 
Dairy Industry Control Board was established by Act of Pa.rlm~ 
( 2) 
ment in September 1930 , the primary aim being to combat 
the slump in dairy prices and to achieve stability in the 
general level of prices in the industry. 
For this purpose the Board was empowered to enforce com-
pulsory butter and cheese export determinations on a propor-
tionate basis between factories and to subsidise exports f~m 
the proceeds of a levy on production of butter, butter subst~ 
tutes and cheese. A total embargo on the importation of but~ 
er and cheese except through or with the consent of the Board 
was also introduced. While the Board had no power actually 
to fix prices t~ be paid to the producer, it was able by such 
means as withholding payment of subsidy to any factory consi~ 
ered to be paying unduly low prices, to maintain some level 
w~ich, although not contrary to the falling general price le~ 
el, was nevertheless appreciably higher than that ruling on 
( 3) 
export mru:kets. 
(1) There already existed import duties designed to protect 
and retain the local market for the South African pro-
ducer , ~lthough they did not apply to imports from South 
West Africa. 
(~ Act No. 35 of 1930. 
(3) In 1933/4 at the lowest point on the overseas market, the 
"premitl$11 on the local market amounted to lOd per lb for 
butter and 9d for cheese. 
/Although 
Although the Dairy Board was never able to achieve com~ 
plete stabilization of prices to the producer, which were 
broadly speaking dependent upon the percentage of the pro-
duction to be exported annually and the prices on both ex-
port and local markets, it is obvious that by maintaining 
prices at levels higher than what they would have been had 
the free-play of the pricing system been allowed to operate, 
an incentive was given for the expansion of production at a 
tj.me when the general level o.f economic activity did not en-
courage any rise in consumption. This movement oft the two 
factors , production and consumption, in opposite directions 
was further intensified by the policies of the Department of 
Agricul ttu·e and its Division of Dairying aimed at improving 
the dairy herds of the country and remedying the position as 
found by the Board of Trade in 192?. In August-September of 
.. 
rr. 
that year a revised mild-recording scheme was introduced, the 
whole aim and object of which was to eliminate the unprofit-
able cows and to "rid the country of any shadow of doubt that (1) 
dairying does pay when it is properly carried on." By 
establishing records of cows included in registered herds it 
vras hoped that dairying would be rationalized and farmers 
would tend to regard it as a specialized branch of farming. 
Two successive years of drought in 1932/3 and 1933/4 
resulted in the Union being on balance an importer of butter. 
It should be stressed here however, that the perishable na-
ture of the products makes it impossible to store them for 
long periods even in cold storage, and the fact that the pro-
duction is so very variable malces any planning of disposal by 
some central body an extremely difficult task. Thus for ex-
ample a dry spring in 1932 meant that it was necessary to im-
port butter but with the sudden. rains production increased so 
(1) 11Milk Recording Advances i n the Transvaal", "Farming in 
Soli1h Africa.", July, 1929, pp 18?. 
/enormously 
12, 
enormously that within the space of a month, a surplus of pro-
duction over consumption was recorded making export necessary. 
After a peak was reached in February, production tailed 
off as quickly as it ~ad increased at the end of 1932 and eo 
from April 1933, all export of butter was prohibited. The 
position with regard to 1934/5 was strikingly similar ~ a low 
winter production, lower in fact than during the disastwrous 
1933 drought 1 importation from South West Africa to satisfy 
requirements over the spring followed by welcome November 
rains and a complete transformation with December production 
the highest on record for that month. In January export was 
recommenced and bearing in mind the lessons of the two pre-
vious years when in certain instances exportation and import~ 
tion were almost simultaneous, the E~rt Executive Committee 
of the Dairy Boa1,d followed a conservative policy and at ·the 
end of August, 1935 stocks of butter in the Union amounted to 
almost 4, 000,000 1 bs. 
There was considerable criticism from certain quarters 
levelled at this conservative policy but with the varying cli-
mate of South Africa the difficulties of a planned system of 
marketing were again exemplified. Vfuile it was recognised as 
financially unsound to incur heavy expenses in storing large 
quantities against some contingency likely to occur once dur-
ing a number of years, the anomaly of exporting butter under 
a bounty and subsequently importing supplies to meet a short-
age 1 could not be overlooked. 
In the powers granted to the Dairy Board was that to im-
pose a levy on butter and cheese manufactured by cre~~eries or 
factories but whereas farm cheese also bore the ld per lb lev,y 
in the case of butter made on farms the position was that onJy 
farmers selling more t han 50 lbs per month were liable for th3 
levy, and then only on the quantity sold i"n excess of the 50 
' ( 1) 
lbs. Therefore not only did the farm butter maker escape 
(1) Defined as a person selling leas than 50 lbs per month. 
/the 
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( 1) 
the levy completely, and the maker of farm dairy butter to 
a large extent, but neither was required to export, and thus 
escaped any share of the loss susttd.ned through compulsory ex-
( 2) 
port by creameries. Consequently they reaped the benefits 
of the scheme withoU-t contributing materially to the cost of 
bringing about such benefits. The Commission on co ... operation 
. ( 3) 
and Agricultural Credit took a serious view of this dis-
. crimination, fearing that it woul<Jlilead to a substantial in ... 
crease in the production of farm butter .to the detBiment of 
creamery production, both in regard to quality and the amount 
to be exported. In actual fact however the production of fann 
butter . seems to have remained fairly stalbil.e during the thirt ... 
ies with the possi'l;llity of a decline during the war years. 
Production during 1935-6 again showed a considerable in-
crease and the perc6ntage to be exported ~s set at 35.5 com-
pared with 31.7 in 1934-5 and 13.1 in the year before that. 
The fact that this followed on another good season meant that 
the Board's limited funds were far from adequate to stabilize 
t he price to producers. In 1934 .... 5 for instance while the loss 
on export was estimated at 1.9d per lb over the total cream~ 
er~ production the Board was able to pay subsidies out of its 
current revenue plus accumulated funds to reduce this 11 gross 
loss" to 4d per 1 b. For the following year, however, the 
gross loss was estimated at 2.ld and with no accumulated fun~ 
the creameries had to bear a total loss, including the Board's 
levy, of 2.7d per lb mea ning that the margin between butter 
and butter fat prices was correspondingly increased. Assuming 
the export parity and bounty to r emai n constant, the greater 
the amount exported the gr eater will be the gap between pric~ 
to the producer a nd the consumer. 
As early a s 1935 it was stressed by the Director of 
(1) One selling more than 50 lb s per month. 
(2) Export of farm butter was not prohibited but its generally 
inferior quality prevented it from entering into foreign 
trade. 
(3) U.G. 16/34 pp 63-4. 
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the Division of Dairying in his Annual report that the levy 
and bounty scheme could never be considered anything more 
than temporary and when the export quota rose to near 40% 
it could not work. Restriction of production was consider~ 
ed impracticable but he suggested that quotas be set for 
producers at prices related to the local market, but deli v-
eries in excess of the quota which would necessitate export 
should be paid for on a basis related to levels ruling on 
the export ma.rket. In short it had become obvioue that ex-
port could not be regarded as an aim in itself but part of a 
general policy whereby no encouragement be given to produc-
ers in form of inflated prices, to extend production fa.r 
above the level of home consumption. 
In October tt- 1935 a scheme for the subsidized consump-
tion of dairy produce for those most in need of these pro-
tective food.s was introduced, to be administered by the 
Dairy Board. The basic principle upon wh.ich it was founded 
was a diversion of so-called "surplus" to local consumption 
a.t specially reduced prices. It had been originally intended 
that the scheme be administered by local co-ordinating commi~ 
tees of charitable organisations but following a poor responre 
fran municipalities, vrho were first approached, the Dairy 
Board itself adopted the a.dmini strat j_o n until 1940 when, foll-
owing the report of the Departmental Committee, it was trans• 
ferred to the Department of Social Wel fa1·e t awards the end of 
1944, and in February 1946 to the Controller of Food. Under 
-,.,e,·r ( 1) 
this scheme milk and. cheese ~ issued free to school and 
pe-school children and butter was made available to certain 
necessitious groups provided they continued to buy a s much en 
( 2) 
the open market as they had p2viously. Initially the 
(1) Parents who cou~d afford it were asked to pay 2/~ per 
child per quarter. 
(2) Butter was issued to charit!tble institutions on the basis 
of the difference between t lb per person per week and the 
amount previously purchased. As Regards distribution, cer-
tain standards were laid down: 
1. Families consistj.ng of 2 persons , whose total i ncome did 
not exceed 6/- per day. 
2. Families of 3 or more persons , whose total income did not 
exceed 8/- per day. 
3~ European railway workers Vlho had to support families whose 
total income did not exceed R/r; ,..,.,..,.. No..-
prices fj.xed. fo1· butter under the scheme wel'e set at 9d, 8 d. 
and 7d for first, second and third. grade respectively but 
while the distribution of milk and cheese to school children 
soon reached significant proportions tb.e price fixed proved 
too high in the case of butter a nd 1 t was not until\i t was 
reduced by 3d on all grades in December 1936, that the dis-
tribution of butter increased so much so that the maximum 
weekly ration per family vras reduced to 2 1 bs per family. 
From the point of v:l.ew of the producer there was no 
benefit under this scheme as the butter and cheese was supp;-. 
lied at~ export parity prices until the beginning of 1938 
when the arrangement was modified to the effect that the 
Board was to supply the butter and cheese at export parity 
prices only during the months when output actually exceeded 
normal sales i.e. when there would presumably be a neeli to 
export. The cost of the scheme was borne by the Gover1w1ent, 
the Board itself and from 1937 the Solth African Railways and 
Harbours Administration. 
( 1) 
It is evident frcm Table 1 that the quantity of butter 
and cheese distributed under this subsidization scheme became 
quite cons;.c1erab1e from about 1937 but while the amount of 
buttel' ·remained substantial untj.l 194? ... 8 by which time in co&-
formi ty with the Government Policy, it was gradul:11y be:i.ng re-
1 
placed by marg~l'ine until June· . 1948 when its distribution was , 
discontinued, the amount of cheese distributed under the 
s cheme fell far sooner. The main reason would seem to be th~ 
the benefits to school children was likely to Teach a point 
of saturation earlier than the distribution of butter, and 
secondly that it was later superfeded by the National School 
Feeding Service so t bat only children of pre-school a ge re-
mained under the "State aide~" scheme. Also it must to some 
extent, have been substitv.ted for by milk powder which was 
( 1) See page • 
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distributed in those areas where fresh milk was not available 
instead of cheese as was previously the case. The distribu· 
tion of butter did in fL~ct reach such proportions that in Jur.e 
1939 the price at which it was supplied was increased by 2d 
per 1 b, and a reduction was made in respect of the income lev-(1) 
el of Coloureds able to receive butter under the scheme. 
The latter step wt.:ts important since Cape Town recei ved"·1i of 
the butter distributed under the scheme and of that amount 
89% went to Coloureds. 
( 2) 
On the assumption that the total amount of butter and 
cheese distributed under subsidization would have otherwise 
had to be exported it appears that exports of butter are un-
derstated by about 4,000,000 lbs each year between the years 
1938-9 to 1944-5 and the peak of "exportation' was reached in 
1939·40 i.e. the first season of the war. In the case of 
cheese the peak coincides with that when subsidi zation was 
not considered. The impor.tance of this scheme in the present 
discussion is mainly in the relationship between th~ value of 
the consumption of these dairy products and the level of Nat-
ional Income since it mean~ that it is necessary to value the 
ordinary and the subsidized consumption at different prices . 
But of that more will be said at a later stage. 
An interesting fact arose durin~ the 19~?-8 season when 
due to extremely poor rains over the spring months of 193?, 
production du1·ing the five months September .. Janua17, 1938 
was 4,000,000 lbs lese than in the previous season. Although 
production did recover later in the season total creamery out--
put was lower than in 1936-? to the extent of about 1,??5,000 
lbs whereas the production of factory cheese s-howed a rise of 
over 2,000,000 1bs. On this point the Director of Dairying 
stated "The increasing tendency amongst farmers to supply 
milk to cheese factories in preference .to producing cream, 
(1) For Europeans the limit was 6/- per day for families of 
mol~e than two persons and 5/- for those of two persons: 
The limits for coloureds were reduced to 5/- and 4/-
respective1y. 
(2) Annual Report 1939, .secretary for Agriculture. "Farming 
in South Africa", 1939 pp 489. 
has probably been brought about by the relatively high price 
obtained for chee se as compared with that for butter, and 
consequently the apparently more attractive returns from 
(I.) 
selling cheese milk." There does appear certe,in statis-
tical support for this statement since the retail prices 
constructed by the Office of Census and Statistics show that 
wbereas in 1929 the difference between the price of butter 
and price of cheese was approximately 6.5d (or 25% of the 
butte1• price) in 1936 the difference had dropped to 2.5d 
(or 15%). The prices for butterfat and cheesemilk also show 
( 2) 
a slight change in the same direction. The significant 
point here is that it can be seen as the beginning of ci r-
cumetances which brought considerable difficulties to the 
Dairy Board during the later war years when the relationship 
between production and consumption had been completely 
changed. 
It is significant too to consider what had been affect-
ed in the decade 1929-39 as regards t.b.e efficiency of pro-
duction both in the primary and secondary spheres. It has 
already been noticed how the :Soard of Tl·ade condemned both 
in their 1927 Report; the revita.lisation of milk recording 
attempted to improve the efficiency of the primary producer, 
t=md the system of registration of creameries .and fact aries 
.. 
attempted to remove the second source of inefficiency. It 
appears that production figures have improved in regard to 
( 3) 
both registered and non-registered herds. While the im-
provement is not s o noticeable for registered dairy herds 
apart from a definite tendency for a rise in the total 
( 1) 
( 2) 
Annual Report of Secretary for Agriculture 1938, "Farm ... 
ing in South Africa" 1938 pp 543. 
Indices of prices of :Butterfat and Cheesemilk (1936/7 -
1938/9 = ~1~0-0)~----~~~~~~~~----~~ 
' Butterfat 1 Cheesemilk 
' 1936/7 88 , 91 
I 1937/8 109 110 
( 3) See 
' 1938/9. 103 99 
Table 2 page 9¥ .• 
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butterfat content, in the case of non-registered cattle the 
improvement is obvious. This would seem to point to the 
fact that there was a decided general improvement and not 
one confj.ned to a few quality herds. An accompanying im-
provement is noticeabQ)e as far as technical efficiency on 
the manufacturing side is concerned for the ave1·age over-
( 1) 
run on all grades of butterfats increased from 19.5% in 
1934-5 to 20.3% in 1938-9. 
As far as the manufacturing industry was concerned, 
costs continued to be high due to the extremely variable de-
liveries between seasons forcing creameries and factories 
to maintain machinery, storage etc. to deal with the maxi-
mum deliveries. The Dairy Board had not been able to influ-
ence the seasonal production to any marked extent and also 
owing to its small financial resources it was not able to 
stabilize the incidence of the export loss and the c~eamer-
ies had still to bear the cost of exporting to a market where 
pices ruled at lower levels than those in South Africa. 
There was however, one indi rcct means in which the Board d.i d 
influence the average manufacturing cost quite considerably 
viz. t~~ough the registration of creameries and factori~s, 
i.n which the Board usua11y adopted a conservative policy. It 
( 2) 
is obvious from Table 3 that the manufacturing and selling 
costs declined apprecj.ably for butter and the reason must be 
primarily that the average output per creamery was increasing 
enabling more manufacturing concerns to attain the benefit of 
a lower avera ge unit cost a ssociated with large scale econo-( 3) ..... : 
mies. In the case of cheese the r eduction is not so con-
siderable, but rememberi ng that prices in general were rising 
(1) The percentage by which the quantity of Butter manufac-
tured exceeds the Butterfat used in its manufacture . 
( 2
3
) See page .9'+ 
( ) Average costw of ma nuf acture of creameries and factories 
by size groups, 1944. 
Creameries: Net cost per 1b 
over 2JOOO 000 lb 1 1ooo6ooo-~,oootooo 5uo,o o-1 ooo ouo 250J000-500~000 
less than 2oOJOOO 
Source U.G. 2?/4? pp 125 
2.235 
2.499 
2.8?2 
3.112 
5.895 
Factories: 
over 300 000 lb 
100, OOOw ~00, 000 
50,000..100 000 
less than ~0,000 
/from 
Net cost 
per lb 
2. 2?1 
2.8?1 
3. 243 9.161 
from about 1933-4 the fact that manufacturing coste showed 
no appreciable increase itself proves that the "real" cost 
of the manufacturing process was lower in 193?-8 than in 
1930-1. 
After the passage of the Marketing .Act, and in view of 
the limited range of the 1930 Dairy Control Act, a scheme 
of considerably wider scope was introduced in August, 1939. 
Included in the new scheme was control over the sale and 
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distribution of fresh milk in the main urban areas but when 
this section was declared ultre vires by the Supreme Court 
at the instigation of certain fresh milk interests, the old 
Board automatically came back in existenpe until october, 
1940 when a further scheme was introduced under the Market-
ing Act. Under this Act the Dairy Board was granted control 
over factory cream, creamery butter, farm and dairy butter, (1) 
cheese-milk, factory cheese, farm cheese, and factory cheese. 
While the new scheme was based very largely upon the princi-
plea of the old one, it went much further in some respects. 
Prices of industrial milk and cream formerly indirectly stab-
ilized between certain ranges, were fixed by the Board; agents 
were appointed on a commission basis to be the only channel 
for the distribution and sale of creamery butter and factory 
cheese; and finally the fixation of maximum retail prices. 
In order to equalize the incidence of losses on export or to 
the State-aided scheme, pools were to be operated for the 
sale of butter and cheese. 
In an attempt to even out the seasonal fluctuations in 
deliveries to creameries and cheese factories the practise 
of paying ' a premium on butterfat during certain manths of the 
year~' introduced by the old Board in 193? was continued and 
from 1942 the basic prices of cheesemilk and condensing milk 
were also increased. 
( 2) ( 3) 
(1) In February, 1941 condensing milk was included and in Se~ 
tember of the same year condensed milk and milk powder 
were added. 
See Table ft. page g5 • 
.Actually no winter premium was paid on condensing milk 
but its price was altered from time to time so as to be 
ld above the full price for cheesemilk. 
~0. 
Production of butter and cheese continued to increase 
during the first two seasons of the war while according to 
the 1941 Annual Report of the Director of Dairying, the con-
densed milk factories processed a greater quantity than ever 
before. Consumption increased enormously in the case of but-
tel' by 131; in 1939-40 and 21% in 1940-1 and by .lzfo and 21% 
in respect of cheese. In the case of butter the local con-
sumption had by 1940-1 caught up with the production, the 
level of export being accounted for by the fact that South 
Africa continued to import a large amount from Scuth west 
Afr:i.ca where production had inc1•eased enormously in the years (1) 
before the war. The reasons for --these startling increases 
in the local consumption are largely to be found in the gen~ 
eral economic condition of the times plus the needs of the 
fighting forces where it is highly likely that the per capita 
consumption of protective foodstuffs like butter and cheese 
is much greater than the same people would eonsume, on the 
average, in civilian life. 
In 1941•2 butter production fell of by some 5t million 
lbs, the reason being the drought which prevailed throughout 
the winter and s·pring months and secondly the fact that 
cheesemilk prices were fixed at more remunerative levels than 
those of butterfat during the seasons 1940-1 and 1941-2. The 
latter is also the main cause behind the fact that whereas 
butter production experienced the substantial decline 1that of 
cheese continued to rise. In terms of butterfat, the price 
of cheesemilk in the thirties was on the average about 2d 
ht"gher per lb than cream. In 1940-1 the decrepancy had 
risen to 4.4d and in 1941-2 to as high as 6.9d and it seems 
that there must have been a definite encouragement for the pr~ 
ducer to sell his milk to the cheese factory instead of to 
(1) Output of creamery butter in Somh West Africa and the 
other protectorates increased from approxin~tely 2,750~000 
lbs in 1932·3 to 12,000,000 in 1939-40. 
/the 
the creamery despite the fact that the costs of producing 
cream would have risen to a lwsser extent than production 
of cheesemilk flince the former is more of an extensive fo1·m 
of farming hence less dependant on purchased feed. In terms 
of the milk equivalent the production of butter decreased by 
about 5% between 1940-1 and 1941-2 while cheese production (1) 
rose by a.boti. 2?%. The fall in butter production neces-
sitated the introduction of a mild form of rationing during_ 
the last few months of 1941 as it was not .until mid-January, 
1942 that production exceeded consumption. It sholld be 
pointed out here however, that the figure given in Appendix 
( 2) 
B for the consumption of butter is probably too low since 
in its determination no adjustment has been made to allow 
for the fact that the trade figures refer to calendar years 
and the production and stock figures to the seasonal years, 
September - August. In view of this it is highly probable 
that consumption was in the region of 45-46 million lbs 
since the figures ~iven for consumption in South Africa and 
( 3) 
neighbo~ing ·territories by the National Marketing Council 
show it to be about 1,000,000 lbs higher in 19il·2 than the 
preceding year, in which case the consu~ption figure for 
1942-3 would have to be correspondingly reduced to about 
(4)' 
48,000,000 lbs. It nevertheless remains that "thel·e is no 
doubt that the consumption of both (butter and cheese) would 
( 5) 
have been much greater had supplies been available ... 
A further important factor arising during 1942 was the 
( 1) Production of Butter and Cheese in terms of Milk equi va-
lent 19 3 5/6 - 19 45 I 6 ( 000. 000 ~;:;;..1 s:::.:.:..4)~""!"'-~~-....--~--~ 
' Butter ' Cheese' ' Butter ' Cheese ' 
f 19 35/6-19 38/9 ? ? • 4 ' 13. 4 t -:-, ~19~4~2~/"7::3~~1~0~0:-:.:...;;:6--:-' ~1~8~.~5;..;;._-:-
'1939/40 105.? ' 15.4 '1943/4 98.4 t 1?.0 
'1940/1 102.? 14.8 '1944/5 90.2 ' 17.8 
' 19 41/2 9 7. 1 18. 8 ' -' ;;.19.;...4.::..:5~/...;;;6 ___ 7;...;9;..::;•..;;.9_' __;1:...:6:..:•:...;;:2;___ 
"[2) see page 97 • 
( 3) U. G. 2? /4? • 
(4) In the Appendix this has not been done as there is no re-
liable means of checking the figures given by the N.M.C. 
and ~heirs for earlier years do no coincide with those 
produced ~ the writer. 
(5) Annua1 Report of Director of Dairying, 1942 "Farming in 
South Africa 11 January, 194S. 
/alteration 
alteration in the amounts levied on sales of butter and 
cheese. The disadvantages of the levy system as .applied 
( 1) 
to farm butter have been stressed above and in 1939 the 
regulations were altered so that any farmer falling under 
the definition of. "a farm dairy bu ttermaker 11 (i.e. selling 
more than 50 lbs per month) was to pay the levy of ld per 
lb on all sales and not as previously only the amount by 
which the sales exceeded 50 lbs. Since 1942 however, e~ 
port losses disappeared and so levy on creamery butter and 
factory cheese, reduced to ld per lb in February 1940, were 
reduced still further to .04d and .05d respectively 'in 1942. 
However the Dairy Board continued to bear t he losses of the 
State-aided scheme and with the possibility that export at 
a loss might re-occur, the levy on farm dairy butter and 
farm cheese was left unalt.ered at the ld per lb level. 
Production of butter recovered somewhat in the following 
season but the increase was by no means sufficient to meet 
the considerable rise in consumption, so that once again rat-
ioning was required to ensure an equitable distribution of 
the available supplies at retail prices which were not allow- . 
ed to rise as much as they would have, had control been l fft-
ed. I t was in the 1943-4 season that rationing began in real 
earnest. 
Q, 
Compared with~1943 winter distribution of 85% of butter 
sold in the summer months of 1942-3, the rationing was inten~ 
sified to 75% on the 9th September, but due to improved pro-
duction during the spring the quantity available was increased 
to 87t% and. a week later sales were allowed on an unres.trict-
ed basis. After the summer months the decline in production 
once again occurred and from 29th May 1944 butter supplies 
were distributed on the basis of 75~; sales during February .. 
l.Jarch of 1944 a nd cheese Sl\Jplies at 5o%. So began the period 
( 1) See page 73 • 
/of the 
of the rationing of these two dairy products which was to 
last until November, 194? in the case of butter and Janu-
( 1) 
ary, 1948 for cheese. In the Table is shown the per-
centage of the consumption of butter and cheese during the 
base period, which was made available for consumption from 
( 2) 
June let, 1944 to the end of the 1948-9 season. One 
of the most significant factors arising from this Table is 
that between the let July 1945 and 30th September 1947 it 
appears that cheese was in "freer" supply than was butter 
and therefore that the demand for cheese was being more 
fully met than was that of butter. On the other hand in 
fifteen months before and 2 years after that period there 
is every indication that the amount of butter available 
i3. 
for consumption in relation to the level of demand, was 
~eater than in the case of cheese. To explain these chan-
gew in relationship it is necessary to consider the priciug 
policy followed by the Dairy Board in these years. 
We have examined the price relationship between butt~ 
fat and cheesemilk up to 1946/7 our finding being that the 
premium in favour of the latter in terms of pence per lb 
of butterfat increased to 7.6 in 194~4 thereafter gradua• 
lly declining to about 6d per lb in 1946-7. However in 
the last two seasons under review the decline was more ra~ 
id, in the summer months of 1947-8 it being only 4d and in 
~ 
1947-8 only ~ld per lb. It would seem therefore that 
the premium of 6d was sufficiend.) to counter -balance the 
greater increase in cost of producing cheesemilk in the 
season 1945-6 and 1946-7 bmt with costs of feed necessary 
in the more intensive cheesemilk areas still continuing to 
rise and the premium falling, it is obvious that the produc 
tion of cream was becoming more remunerative to producers. 
(1) See page 9S • 
( 2) The actual date on which rationing was introduced after-
the 1943/4 summer months was May 29th. (-51 £Qe Table page • 
/In the 
In the case of condensing milk we find that the premium 
over cheese-milk prices (in terms of butterfat content) de-
creased from an average of 6d per lb in the years 1936-7 to (1) 
1938-9 to 3d in the period 1942-3 to 1947w8 and then 
showed a rise in the last season under review. The Nation~ 
al Marketing Council maintains that "the diversion of milk 
from condenseries to cheese factories did not occur to any 
( 2) 
appreciable extent" but even if this is so the fact rem-
ains that a smaller premium for condensing milk made pro-
ducers tend to divert milk supplies from condenseries to the 
fresh milk market. 
It is diff~cu1t to obtain any reliable data in connec-
8Lt. 
tion with production and consumption of fresh milk in the 
Union yet most sources agree that the deliveries (i.e. pro-
duction) of fresh milk increased to a greater degree than did 
production of either butter or cheese during the war. Remem-
bering that the production of cheese-milk and condensing 
milk is more intensive than production of cream and therefore 
likely to be better situated in relation to the large urban 
centres it is evident that any diversion of supplies to the 
fresh market would have been at the expense of production of 
cheese and condensed milk. Prices to the producer of fresh 
milk rose considerably and the difference between them and 
condensing milk prices rose from 4d per gallon in 1938-9 to 
( 3) 
lld in 1946-7. In view of the fact that the price of con• 
densing milk did not increase to the same extent as cheese-
milk, the diversion to the fresh milk market was made at the 
(1) Price fixation for condensing milk was introduced in 194& 
(2) U.G. 27/47 pp 121. 
( 3) Producers' prtces of factory and fresh milk on the Wit-
watersrand 1938/9 - 1946/9. 
d. per gallon. 1938/9 1939/40 1940,1 1941/2 1942/3 1943/4 
ch~ese-milk 5.4 5~7 6.8 9.1 9.8 9.8 
condensing milk 7.7 7.7 8.2 9.7 10.8 10.8 
fresh milk 11.6 12.4 13.3 17.1 19. 2 20.0 
1944/5 1945/6 1946/7 
cheese-milk 
condensing milk 
fresh milk 
11.0 11~9 12.0 
12.0 12.~ 13.0 
20.5 22.0 24.0 
/expense 
expense of the production of condensed milk. 
Instead of employing the price mechanism which would 
have been contrary to the policy of pegging prices and the 
cost of living, the authorities made arrangements for the 
diversion of milk from cheese factories to condenseries, co~ 
pensation at first being paid by the 'l'reasury and later by (1) 
the 1·ecipients of fresh milk alone. Neverthelesss the 
production of condensed milk fell considerably from 1942-3 
an~ from the available evidence the lowest point would seem 
to have been in 1945·6 after which the greater production of 
milk and probably the improved relationship between condens-
ing milk and cheese-milk prices, resulted in an increasing 
( 2) . 
production. During the years of extreme shortage of butt-
er, cheese and condensed milk it is i~portant to note that 
the consumption of fresh milk based upon the estimates of the 
Division of Economics and Markets, did not show any decline 
apart from 1944~5 while the urban consumption increased by 
( 3) 
about 23% between 1943·4 and 1946•?. The position there-
fore seems to be that since total production of milk was not 
able to satisfy the demand for all purposes, fresh milk ob-
tained first priority and after requirements for the fresh 
product had been met there was not sufficient to meet the 
full requirements of the manufacturing industries. The rea-
sons for this phenomenon may be found in the fact that the 
sale of fres h milk is normally made on the contract basisJ 
t hat is the producer, in order to obtain the best price is 
required to deliver a certain quantity per month and these 
producers , previously situated on the perimeters of the 
larger urban centres hSve now been extended through improved 
transport facilities, much further afield. For instance the 
( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
It would . seem therefore that during the years 1944-6, 
the comparative production figures for butter and cheese 
examined above underestimate the effect of the premium 
of ~ese-milk prices over those for cream. 
Se.e Table 4- , p~se _9j· . 
.5ee 'R/>Per.cfi-x R , 'f'.:v(,e 9~. 
/National 
Nat iona.l Marketing Cou neil remark:-
"•• •••• 1\!Iost of the additional milk supply drawn into the 
Reef-Pretoria area has emanated from producers beyond the 
th±rty mile radius. In the Cape ~eninsula, there is also 
a definite shifting of the supply area to the Malmesburg 
region •••••• During .the part two seasons (i.e. 1945-6 and 
1946-7} the shortage of mi1k caused by drought, disease 
and scarcity of feedstuffs, has forced the Cape to draw 
milk regularly from factories as far away as Oudtshoorn and 
Robertson, while on the Rand and for military purposes in 
Pretoria almost every factory had to be tapped, from Bethal 
and E~melo in the Transvaal, Ladysmith in Natal and Twee-
sprui t and other centres in the Free State. In Natal there 
has been an even greater shift. Many supplies to the con-
den sed milk factory at Eacourt, whi c.h was formerly out side 
the fresh milk supply area, have become suppliers to the 
Durban milk market, most of the suppliers to the Donnybrook (1) 
condensery have likewise shifted their patronage." 
The improved transport facilities and the more remune«. 
rative prices for fresh milk were then the major causes in 
extending the supply afea and tapping regions which had 
forr.aerly produced cream or sold their milk to cheese fac-
tol~:tes or condenseries in the rural areas. 
It is appropriate here to consider that product which 
has probably caused .mo:e disagreement. between producers and 
consumers than any other, viz • .margarine. As early a s 1931 
the following quotation a ppeared in ,.Farming in South Africa": 
"The greatest. menace to the butter inclu st r y is the compet i .. 
tion of margarine inter ests, since food margarine is often 
/ (~ 
be -tter in quality and cheaper in price than is bad butter." 
As long as ther e existed a "sur plus" of butterJ to be 
U.G. 2?/47 pp 133. 
By B. Teens "Farming in South Africa", April 1931, pp 4. 
/sold 
s~d on the export market, the dairy producers were safe 
from competition on the local market although it is stress~ 
ed that on the overseas markets butter was being met by 
more and more substitutes. The argument of the economists 
and nutrition experts were based upon the fact that the 
"surpluses" were ones fixed not by any physical capacity 
to consume but merely by the purchasing power of the nation. 
Therefore, they continued, if margarine J~ld be marufac-
tured cheaper than butter, it was evident that it would fall 
within the means of more consumers. The arguments for sub· 
sidization of the dairy products, indeed all products which 
were being exported at prices lees than the local level.s, 
were based on the same assumption, but the attitude of the 
State seemed to be that while it wa.e prepared to agree that 
a lower price would stimmla.te consumption, it maintained 
that the amount by which the price would have to fall in 
order that the whole surplus be taken up, would be too 
gr~at. When for instance, the State Aided Scheme was in i~ 
infancy, it was found necessary to reduce the price of the 
first grade butter to 6d per lb (i.e. 1/1 less than the or-
dinary market price) before any appreciable amount was 
( 1) 
taken up. It should be pointed out howeve1·, that con .... 
sumption habi tis are notoriously slow to change and there 
might a lso have been a type of stigma attached to the purw 
chase of •t~ap" food on the part of the poorer, and gen .. 
erally highly sensitive classes. Nevertheless it is sig• 
nifica.nt that as long as an export "surplus" did exist, the 
pressure of the daity producers was strong enough to prevem 
the introduction of margarine into the South African marke~ 
(1) The questj.on of whethe'r the cost of subsidizing exports 
was higher or lese than the cost whi ch would be incurred 
in disposing of the "surplus 11 on the local market at 
subsidized prices depends on the elasticity of demand 
on the local market. The state and producers were then 
assuming an inelastic demand for butter and cheese. Dr. 
J.N. Reedman in a.n article "State Policy and Nutrition" 
(R.R. Vol. VI No. 1, 1939 pp 32) points out that experw 
ience in England pointed to an elastic demand for 
Dairy p~oducts which are normally but little consumed 
by poorer families. 
/un..o ... 
When the supply position was reversed during the early 
years of the war, the margarine "controversy" once again 
came to the fore. The circumstances which then prevailed 
were hardly those in which the production of a commodity 
which could do much to relieve the malnutrition rife among 
the poorer classes, should be deliberately prohibited in the 
interests of the producer. FUrthermore, the State- Aided 
Scheme which in the thirties had been using what would 
otherwise have been surplus butter at the ordinary price 
levels within the country, was during the war years~ com• 
peting with the local market and diverting between 3,000,000 
lbs and 4,000,000 lbs of butter per annum from unsubsidized 
consumption. It was obvious then that the continued pro-
hibition of margarine could not be counte\nanced as being 
in the interests of the country, and so following recommen• 
dations of the National Nutrition Council under War measure 
20 of 1945 the production of "interim" margarine commenced 
in November 1945 to be ·replaced on 21st July 1947 by 11 table11 · 
margal'ine to be made available in such quanti ties that it 
could be substituted for State~aided butter in the nine 
controlled urban areas. Finally the distribution of state~ 
aided butter in rural areas terminated on June 7th, 1948. 
( 1) 
The weekly ration to persons entitled to purchase margarine 
was 2 lbs per married couple plus t lb for each additional 
member and 1 lb for every single person. The price waa 
ori ginally fixed at 1/7 per lb but was gradually reduced 
until in June 1949 it was 1/4, 3d of which was Government 
subsidy. 
( 1) The following income groups were entitled to purchase 
margarine throu gh registered "butter" distribution 
committees. 
Europeans: Families with a combined income of less than £ 2C8 
per annum and s ingle persons earning less than 
£90 per annum 
Colour eds: Fa.rni1ies with a combined income of less than 
£108 ·per annum and single persons earning less 
than £48 per annum 
Nat:i.ves: No income scales wer e applicable. 
/The 
The attitude of the producers toward~ margarine had 
not changed however, and is crystalized in the f.ollowing 
statement made in the Chairman's address at the 194? Gen-
eral Meeting of the South African Creameries Association:-
urt is impossible to foresee what injury may be done 
to the country as a whole, and to agriculture in particular, 
if the Dairy Industry were compelled to compete with a riw 
val undertaking such as is contemplated in the establish~ 
ment of margarine factories •••••. rt would appeal to those 
in auth0rity to reconsider the position even at this late 
( 1) 
hour." 
( 2) 
Cofumenting on this address~·. C.W. Abbott stressed the 
fuct that margarine was primarily intended to reach the 
poorer parts of the community where butter at 2/? per lb was 
( 3) 
far too expensive , and that free and unrestricted sale was 
not envisaged. From the estimates of the National Nutri:bion 
Council, he quoted the consumption of butter per head among 
Europeans as 1.2 oz per day- a figure very low for optimun 
nutrition. 'J.'aking 1.5 oz per day per person as a desirable 
ration the total requirements of the whole population was 
abollt 350,000,000 1 bs so that the deficiency from a nutri-
tlonal point of view amounted to approximately 300,000,000 
lbs. It would be many, many years before this deficiency 
( 4) 
was ever bl·idged. I'largarine, he pointed out, was a. com-
plement to, and not a substitute of butter. 
Before concluding, it is interesting to note that for 
the season 1948-9 the recorded milk prod!-lction figures in .. 
regard to registe1·ed cows showed a decided improvement both 
( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
Q,uoted in ":Mar garine", by Dr. c. w. Abbott, "Farming in 
South Africa!' January, 1948 pp ?. 
Q.uoted in "Margarine 11 , by Dr. c.w. Abbott , uFa.rming in 
South Africa" January, 1948 pp ?. 
In actual fact of course the market price did not fair-
ly reflect the supply position as there was ratloning 
of about ?5% at the time. 
The production tar get of margarine under licence had 
been initially set at ?,ooo,ooo lbs and was raised in 
January, 1949 to 12,000,000 lbs. Actual production in 
1948/9 amounted to 11,400,000 lbs. 
/in percentage 
in percentage of butterfat and production of milk over the (1) 
1938-9 figures. 
SUMMARY 
The period under review automatically falls into 2 
sections, the first in which the Union was on balance a n~ 
exporter of butter and the second where the supply condi-
tions were completely the opposite. The dividing line be-
tween these 2 periods is ·on the basis of plain figures, 
about 1941-2. If one however, takes into account the fact 
that since 193?-8 substantial quantities of butter had been 
distributed under the State-Aided Butter and Milk Scheme, 
and as~umes that all consumed under this head would other-
wise have been exported, the turning point becomes 1942,... 3. 
The position in regard to cheese is slightly different int 
sofar as the export trade had never risen to such signifi-
cance as had the exportation of butter. During the years 
when exports of butter were at their highest, the quantity 
exported was between 20- 25;o of total creamery production, 
the percentage of factory cheese exported very rarely rose 
above 15%. This was one reason why the change in the dis-
tribution pattern of dairy products is better revealed in 
the case of butter than it is for cheese. 
If the Union was an ocporter of butter and cheese, it 
did ao ,under conditions where the price realized on the 
local market was higher than that received from export. 
Under the Dairy Control Act of 1930 a levy was imposed on 
all butter and cheese sold except that made by farm butter-
makers , in order to pay a bounty on all exports. The local 
price was therefore maintained at such a level as to ensure 
producers of a reasonable price i.e. to encourage the main-
tenance of a level of production which was in fact not in 
(1) A total of 4204 registered cows were tested, the ave-
l'age production figures being: 9228 1 bs of milk: 
3.955~ of butterfat and 364.944 lbs of butterfat. 
c. F. Table z page SN· 
/line 
9o.. 
· line with the fundamental economic functions of supply and 
c. demand. The many criticisms of such a practise whereby such 
an essential protective foodstuff was being exported and 
sold at prices less than those at which local consumers 
could buy the product, found expression in the introduction 
of the State-Aided Butter and Milk Scheme in 1935-6 under 
which school ehildren and the poorer classes received butt~ 
cheese and milk either free or at very low cost. 
In 1940 a new marketing scheme came int~ force under 
the Marketing Act of 1938. Control was far wider and where 
under the old scheme prices to producers could only be in-
directly affected, they were now fixed as were retail prices 
of all the dail-y products apart from fresh milk, which foll-
owing the decision of the Supreme Court of 1940, remained 
outside control. 
During the period 1·929- 30 - 1940-1 the product ion of 
butter had increased by approximately 125% and cheese by 
just over loo% but with control over pr odu.cer prices vest .. 
ed in a eertain body it was inevitable that the prices for 
the different products would at certain times, be 11 out of 
gear 11 • When one has taken into account the fact that 
cream production is more extensive than production of cheese 
milk, and therefore more dependent upon climatic condi tiona, 
it can only be an unfavourable price for cream in relation 
to cheese-milk prices that could result in a. fall in the 
production of butter by over 40% between 1940-l and 1946-7 
while production of cheese fell by less than 15%. A study 
of the prices fixed by the Dairy Industry Control Board do 
reveal the fact that in the years 1940/1-1943/4 in partie• 
ula.r cheese-~ilk prices were on a more favourable plane 
than prices f or butterfat and it is significant that where-
as the production of butter fell considerably in 1941-2 
that of cheese continued to rise until 1942- 3.· 
It must be admitted that lack of reliable statistics 
relating to the production and consumption t of fresh milk 
/detracts 
9t. 
detracts a great deal from the c~nclusions that can be 
reached from this discussion. It would appear however1 
t:tfe:t on the evidence of the estimates of the Division of 
Economics and l'!.:arkets and certain Government Reports, that 
abe actual total production of fresh milk did not decline 
in South Africa in these years, o~ if it did no a much (1) 
smaller extent than did production of butter and cheese. 
92. 
This is to be accounted for by the greater demand for fresh 
milk which was met from areas which had previously supplied 
milk for industrial purposes , and the greate~ premium· offel~ 
ed by the uncontrolled fresh-milk prices over cheese-milk 
and other prices fixed by the Board. The combined effect af 
a continued increase in demand fo~ butter and cheeee and tbe 
diversion of milk from their production to the fresh milk 
mar~ets resulted in a substantial gap appear&ng between su~ 
ply and demand of these two and other products like conden-
sed milk. The result was the imposition of rationing in 
1942-3 which became most severe in 1946-7. 
The complete reversal of the picture is revealed by 
the decision on the part of the Government in 1945 to allow 
the production of a certain quantity of margarine in the 
Union. This commodity had always been considered by the 
dairy producers as their greatest competitor and the prohi-
bition over its production in the thirties and early forties 
had obvi ously been to their advantage if not to the advan-
ta.ge of the Union as a whole. To follow such a policy dur- · 
ing circumstances of severe shortage could not be .counter-
nanced even in spite of continued opposition of dairy in-
terests, and so prohibition was abandoned and the manufac-
ture of ?fOOO,OOO lbs of margarine, later increased to 
12,000,000 lbs was perrtitted, most of it to be distributed, 
under Government subsidy of 3d per 1 b, to the poorer classes 
in place of butter. 
(1pp<l.yt d. he. ( 1) See 'Pabl-e A , page 9& • 
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Table 1. 
Q,uantitics supplied under the State-Aided Milk and Butter Scheme. 
000 1 bs. 
' 
I 
I 
' 1 
' t 
I 
' t 
' f 
I 
' 
1 
Year I Butter I Milk I Cheese I Milk I ~..far gar i ne 
'000 gals' I Powder I 
1935-6 I 191 I 4'74 I 221 I 
1 936-? I 584 I 1,480 ' 1, 229 I t 193?-8 I 2, 583 I 1,486 ' 1,189 I 1938-9 
' 
4,094 
' 1, '793 ' 1,187 I 1939-40' 4,156 I 1,912 I 1,119 
1940-1 
' 
1,205 
' 1,912 ' 893 1941-2 ' 4,058 I 1,467 ' 17? I 1942-3 I 4'#026 I 1,236 
' 
589 I 8 
1943-4 3,709 I 1, 263 468 I 9 
1944-5 3!<557 ' 624 66 I 12 1945-6 ' 3,198 I 282' 22 228 1946 .. 7 2,814 ' 249 I 33 X 1947-8 1,399 I 237 ' I 3J. 2, 807 1948-9 I 210 I 414 ' - I 261 I 6 488 --·- ~ __ ""'_.,..z.. ' 0 
x not available. 
Source : Union Year Books. 
Table _§. 
Milk Production : 1932/3 - 1938/9. 
' 
- Milk -Percentage I Butterfat Year 
' 
Number of 
' 
I 
of cows 1bs. I Butterfat 1 bs. 
Regi sterad Herds: ----r 
1932 ... 3 
' 1, 244 808?.3 3.696 T 248.939 1933·4 I 1,449 8210.9 3.763 308.9?0 
' 1934-5 1,838 8162.9 3.5?0 291.410 
' 1935-6 ~,485 7918.4 3. 749 296.888 
' 1936-7 2,495 8042.3 3.778 303.804 
' 1937 ... 8 2,.473 8663.7 3.696 320.192 Unregister-ed Herds: 
1932-3 10,4:66 5650.1 3.481 196.?00 
1934-5 9,558 5247.0 3.713 194.825 
' 
1935 .... 6 10,274 5517.0 3.542 195.433 
I 1936-7 10,562 5945.3 3.686 219.148 
1 1937 .. 8 10,706 6104.2 3. 599 219.699 
' 1938-9 12i527 6551.7 3. 724 244.010 
--Source . Annual Reports of the Division of Dairying. . 
Table 3. 
The number of creameries and elleese factories, average output, 
and average unit coats of n~nufacture and sale of butter and 
cheese. 
Year No. oT. 
' 
output per 1 IJanufacturing' Selling 
' factories factor~ ExEensea ExEensea 
' Butter 1 Cheeae 1 Butter 1 Cheese 1 Butter 1 Cheese 1 Butter1 Cheese 
1 1929-30 1 70 I 260 ' ' 2.74 I 1.13 I ~ ( 1930-1 ' 68 :~ 305 ~ ' 2. 63 J .96 1.13 t 1931.,..2 I 66 130 323 68 I 2.47 2. 21 I 1.01 
I 1932--3 
' 63 :~ 115 325 ~ I 2.47 ~ 1.07 ~ '19 33""4 60 311 66 I 2.53 2.26 1.14 1. 24 
'1934-5 57 105 465 I 93 ' 2.16 2.00 I 1.10 I 1.08 
' ' 
I 
'1935-6 56 105 575 I 104 I 1.98 1.99 I 1. 29 I 1. 22 ' 
11936w? 
' 
56 105 I 54? 100 I 2.15 I 2.4? 1. 21 I 1.47 1 
t 1937•8 . I 54 105 I 57? 121 
' 
2.24 
' 
2.21 1. 29 ' 1.19 ' 
'1940-"1 I 52 102 ' 865 I 132 1.95 2.33 .98 I 1.11 I 11941-2 ' 51 98 ' 793 I 166 2.09 2.19 1.06 ' 1.1~ I I 
'1942- 3 I 51 95 I 829 I 171 ' 2.10 2. 47 ' 1.08 I 1.16 1 11943-4 
' 
50 91 
' 
854 
' 
1 ?3 ' 2.33 2.64 
' 
.95 
' 
1.14 
' '1944~5 
' 
50 88 I 781 ' 187 ' 2.68 I 3.07 ' 1. 00 I 1.17 ' 
Source . U. G. 2?/47 pp 130. ' . 
Table 4. 
Weighted average annual prices of butterfat, cheese-milk and con-
densing milk, 1936/? - 1946/?. 
Butterfat 1 Cheese-milk 1 Condensing milk ' 
Year 1 Pricexl (l~ricexl (1) 1 Price 1 ---~--, 
1 per 1 b. 1 I1'19:ex 1 per .9<d. 1 Index ' per gal. 1 Index ' 
I 1936-? 11.8 I 88 5.0 I 91 I ?.3 9? 
I 193?-8 14.6 I 109 6.0 I 110 I 7.3 101 
I 1938-9 13.,8 I 103 5.4 I 99 ?.? 102 
I 1939-40 I 14.3 10? 5.? I 105 ?.? 102 
1940-1 14.6 109 6.8 I 124 I 8. 2 109 
1941•2 18.5 138 9.1 I 166 I 9.? 128 
1942_.3 19.? I 14? 9.8 I 1 ?9 I 10.8 144 
1943~4 20.5 153 9.8 1?9 I 10.,8 144 
1944-5 23.9 1?8 11.0 201 12.0 159 
194~6 2?.2 I 204 11.9 218 12.9 1?1 
I 1946•? 2?.5 I 205 12.0 220 13.0 1?3 
x includes all pemiums. 
(1) 1936/? - 1938/9 = 100 
Source: 
Table 5. 
Rationing of Butter and Cheese, 1/6/44 - 31/8/49. 
t 
t 
t 
' 1 
1/6/44 .. 31/9/44 
1/10/44 - 31/12/44 
1/ 1/ 45- 31/ 3/45 
1/ 4/45 - 30/ 6/45 
1/ ?/45 ... 30/ 9/45 
1;i0/45 - 31/12/45 
1/ 1/46 31/ 3/46 
1!' 4/46 - 30/ 6/46 
1/ ?/46 30/ 9/46 
1/10/46 31/12/46 
1/ 1/4? .. 31/ 3/4? 
1/ 4/4? 30/ 6/4? 
1/ ?/4? - 30/ 9/4? 
1/10/4? - 31/12/4? 
1/ 1/48 31/ 3/48 
1/ 4/48 - 30/ 6/48 1/ 7/48 .... 30/ 9/48 
1/10/48 31/12/48 
1/l/49 - 31/ 3/49 
1/ 4/49 30/ 6/49 1/ ?/49 ... 30/ 9/49 
' Percentage of consumption during perio~ 
February • March, 1944. 
Butter 1 Cheese 
58 t 40 
63 50 
?5 51 
?2 t 68 
eo • 64 
40 55 
54 44 
?5 66 
6? ?o 
40 ?0 
60 60 
54 60 
50 60 
?3 60 
100 8? 
100 100 
83 ?5 
?5 62 
?1 60 
?2 60 
95 60 
Note : The periods indicated do not agree vJith the . actual ra--
t ion periods as aster·mined from time to time. They ~m ve 
been based on quarterly periods to facilitate compasi- / 
son. 
Source Unt j_J. from U. G. 2? /4?, subsequently the writer 1 s 
own calculations. 
AllPeroil( A. 
CONSUMPTION OF FRESH MILK IN SOU'Y.d aFRICA.· 
Urban Rural Constmlption Total Retail Value of Consumption 
Consumption Consumption Price 
Year European Reserves do per gal. Urban Rural 
Farms 
OOOgals OOOgals OOOgals OOOgals £000 £000 
A A A A B c 
1929-30 40,130 31,810 60,500 132,440 27o592 4,610 5,310 
1930-31 41,900 31,880 58,750 132,630 26c408 4,610 4,990 
1931-32 43,830 31 '770 57,000 132' 500 24.048 4,390 4,450 
1932-33 45,790 31,660 55,250 132 ,6oo 24.224 4,620 4,390 
1933-34 47,760 31,550 40,130 119,440 24.552 4,890 3,670 
1934-35 49 '750 31 ,450 41,180 122,380 24.416 5 ,o6o 3,730 
1935-36 51,760 31,340 41,940 125 ,oLJ-o 24.376 5,260 3,690 
1936-37 48 '750 31, 2tl·O ~~ ooo 135,890 24.160 4,610 4,390 ./ .-' ) / 
1937-38 50,160 31,130 57,100 138,390 25.008 5,230 4,6oo 
1938-39 53,100 31,020 59' 500 143,620 24·o 724 5,470 4,660 
1939-40 57 ,ooo 30 ,910 40 ,Boo 128,710 25<>208 6,130 3,770 1940-41 57 ,ooo 30,810 49,400 137,210 26.160 6,210 4,370 
1941-42 62,700 30 '700 53,500 146,900 30.336 7,930 5,320 
1942-43 68,400 30,570 57,500 156,470 33.376 9,510 6,120 
1943-4-4 75,810 30,490 57,500 163,800 34.024 10 '750 6,240 1944-4-5 79 ,Boo 30,380 39,100 149,280 35.608 11,840 5,150 1945-46 84,360 30,270 49,400 164,030 38.000 13,360 6,310 
1946-47 92,340 29,210 65 ,6oo 187,150 39.072 15,030 7,720 1947-48 92,340 30,000 65 ,6oo 187,940 38.760 14,910 7,720 
1948-49 99,730 30 ,ooo 39,100 168,830 39o488 16,410 5,690 
Notes : A Estima t es of the Division of Economics and Markets. 
B From the Office of Census and Statistics. 
c Valued at ~ the retail price per gallon. 
\C 
!" 
Year 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
1938-39 
1939-40 
1940-41 
1941-42 
1942-43 
1943-44 
1944-45 
1945-46 
1946-47 
1947-48 
1948-49 
PRODUCTION Al'!D CONSUiifPTI ON OF BUTT::3!1 I N ED UTH AFRIC~ 1930-49. 0001bs. 
Production 
Creamery 
A 
19,922 
20,950 
18,038 
20,476 
18,658 
26,444 
. 32,135 
31,800 
30,024 
36,460 
44,472 
45,366 
39,701 
43,463 
43,320 
38,948 
33,824 
33 ,543 
47,471 
46,343 
Farm 
B 
11,266 
11,959 
14,276 
14,430 
12,995 
13,260 
12,458 
9,907 
10,696 
Consumption 
Imports Openin g Exports Closing 
Stock Stock Creamery Adjusted Ordinary Su.bsidized 1:1.d justed 
c 
1,690 
1,244 
1,110 
2,640 
2,897 
1,947 
2,644 
5,825 
3,988 
2,571 
1,594 
6,310 
8,276 
12,175 
9,651 
6,622 
5,454 
5,495 
6,857 
8,089 
D 
2,892 
1,370 
1,110 
3,207 
2,186 
900 
3,918 
3,028 
1 ,372 
2,850 
3,860 
4,823 
3,380 
3,704 
2,543 
1,833 
3,041 
3,036 
5,229 
3,545 
E 
2,907 
4,527 
4,328 
2,513 
2,859 
9,010 
9,307 
7,315 
3,675 
7,128 
7,475 
7,038 
6,428 
4,724 
2,321 
452 
181 
329 
676 
444 
F 
1,370 
1,485 
3,207 
2,186 
900 
3,918 
3,028 
1,372 
2,850 
3,860 
4,823 
3,380 
3,704 
2 , 543 
1,833 
3,041 
3,036 
5,229 
3,545 
5,774 
20,227 
17,552 
12,723 
20,497 
20,982 
16,463 
26,362 
31,966 
28,859 
30,893 
37,628 
45,081 
41,225 
52,075 
51,360 
45,910 
39,102 
36,516 
56,336 
51,759 
G 
18,280 
18,510 
13,270 18,ooo 
20,110 
20,690 
25' 550 
27,730 
31,990 
33,060 
37,270 
45,080 
41,230 
52,080 
51,360 
45,910 
39,100 
36' 520 
56,340 
51,760 
18,280 
18,510 
13,270 
18,000 
20,110 
20,690 
25,309 
27,146 
29,407 
28,166 
33,114 
40,875 
37,172 
48,054 
47,651 
42,353 
35,902 
33 '706 
54,941 
51,550 
191 
584 
2,583 
4,094 
4,156 
4,205 
4,058 
4,026 
3,709 
3,557 
3,198 
2,814 
1,399 
210 
H 
56,060 
62,280 
60,850 
66,090 
61,730 
66,100 
Notes : A. From Division of Dairying. 
From Agricultural Censuses. 
Refer to Calendar years. 
B. 
Co 
D. 
E. 
Fo 
G. 
From the Office of Census and Statistics and refer to the quantities held on the 1st September of the first 
year stated except for 1929/30 and 1930/1 when the date is 1st January of 1930 and 1931-respectively and 
for 1931/2 when it is 1st October, 193lo 
Refer to Calendar years and include re-exports. 
From the Office of Census and Statistics and are as at 31st ~tugust of second year stated except for 1929130 
and 1930/1 when the date is 31st December. . 
Consumption is here adjusted for the years 1929/30-1939/40 in order to bring imports and exports onto a 
seasonal basis. After 1940 the relevant data is not available~ 
Consumption adjusted for years 1943/4 - 1948/9 to reflect the rationing in force during those years, on the 
following basis :-
19.43/4 
1944/5 
1945/6 
1946/7 
1947/8 
1948/9 
Year 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
1938-39 
1939-40 
1940-41 
1941-42 
1942-43 
1943-44 
1944-45 
1945-46 
1946-47 
1947-48 
1948-49 
Notes 
PRODUCTION AND CONSUllllPTION OF CiiEESE IN SOUTH ~ti'RICa, 1930-49 OOOlbs. 
Production 
Factory 
A 
7,217 
9,311 
8,258 
7,210 
6,946 
9, 775 . 
10,998 
10,498 
12,757 
13 ,878 
14,336 
14,971 
17,702 
17,778 
16,994 
16,300 
14,934 
15,985 
20 ,185 
18,101 
Farm 
B 
446 
399 
493 
355 
405 
278 
300 
330 
Imports 
c 
451 
311 
380 
393 
383 
433 
469 
626 
752 
751 
216 
180 
145 
375 86 
25 
89 
420 
241 
50 
Opening 
stock 
D 
1,870 
1,675 
1,360 
1,125 
972 
900 
1,976 
1,586 
1,317 
2,217 
2,435 
2,214 
1,746 
2,789 
1,811 
1,805 
3,520 
3,257 
2,811 
2,394 
Exports 
E 
1,197 
2,206 
2,372 
1,343 
400 
2,728 
1,449 
1,694 
2,800 
4,395 
2,598 
1,304 
2,6o8 
1,236 
798 
758 
190 
216 
377 
220 
Closing 
stock 
F 
1,675 
1,360 
1,125 
972 
900 
1,976 
1,586 
1,317 
2,217 
2,435 
2,214 
1,746 
2,789 
1,811 
1,805 
3,520 
3,257 
2,811 
2,394 
3,592 
6,666 
7,731 
6,501 
6,413 
7,001 
6,404 
10,408 
9,699 
9,809 
10,016 
12,175 
14,315 
15,194 
17,895 
16,288 
13,872 
15,096 
16,635 
20,466 
16,733 
Consumption 
G 
6,120 
8,270 
7,130 
5,210 
7,060 
7,570 
9,340 
9,6oo 
10 '550 
10,090 
11,850 
14,320 
15,190 
17,900 
16,290 
13,870 
15,100 
16,640 
20,470 
16,730 
H 
6,120 
8,270 
7,130 
5,210 
7 ,o6o 
7,570 
9,119 
8,371 
9,361 
8,903 
10 '731 
13 ,427 
15,013 
17,311 
15,822 
13,804 
15,100 
16,640 
20,470 
l6,TW 
J 
19,780 
23 '790 
25,590 
26,410 
23,800 
27,880 
A From Industrial Censuses except for years 1930/1 and 1931/2 when the figures published in 11Farming in South 
Africa 11 have been used • 
B From agricultural Censuses. 
C Refer to Calendaryears. 
D From Office of Census and Statistics. (For comments see "Production and Consumption of Butter", note 4) 
E Refer to Calendar years and include re-exports. 6 
F From Office of Census and Statistics. (For comments see "Production and Consumption of Butter", note 4 ). 
G Consumption is here adjusted for the years 1929/30-1939/40 in order to bring import s and exports onto 
a seasonal basiso ~fter 1940 the relevant data is not available. 
H Total consumption less quantities sold under subsidization. 
J Consumption increased to show the effect of rationing o The following percentages of "full require~~~t~" 
were taken : -
1943/4 
1944/5 
1945/6 
1946/7 
1947/8 
1948/9 
63;:; 
86% 
60% I 
Chapter 4. 
SUGAR 
Although the period under review only begins in 1930, 
it has been decided, in order to trace the development of 
sugar production in this country, that a short discussion 
of the position before this date in both the Union and the 
99_ 
world as a whole, is necessary. A further point of explan~ 
tion is deemed appropriate at this stage; while the discuss~ 
ion is ultimately concerned vdth the position as it affects 
South Africa, it is impossible to divorce it from the wider 
international aspect and the writer would therefore explain 
at this stage that although the digressions on the interna-
tional sugar situation may appear irrelevant at the actual 
point of discussion, it is hoped that their significance 
will become more and more obvious as the thesis is develope~ 
SUgar production was considerably affected by the first 
world war. With the centre of conflict in Europe, it was to 
be expected that the production of beet sugar would be severe 
ly curtailed in that region while, at the same time, the sue-
ta.ined demand for sugar in conditions highly encouraging to 
the producer, resulted in large areas being put under cane 
on the other continents. It was, however, inevitable that 
some time after the cessation of hostilities, beet produc-
tion would be resumed and there would not be sufficient 
total demand to warrant the current level of sugar produc-(1) 
tion, at prices remunerative to the producer. Thus it 
was that prices of sugar on the world markets after the se-
vere drop in 1921 recovered up to about 1924-5 by which time 
the production of beet sugar in Europe had risen to its pre-
(~· 
war level, and then followed the severe decline in prices, 
.• (c.i.f. ) 
a 1,f. o._k~ 
(1) See Table 1, page 1~9 , showing the production of cane and 
beet sugar during the years 1919/20-1939/40 as compared 
with the pre-war level. 
(2) Raw susar Prices 1920-34. I 
1920 192~24 1926 1ll28 lg30 1932 1934 
per sht. ton £ 16.46 13.90 18.85 11.10 10.48 5.85 4.22 4.23 
Eer 1 b cents. 11.?2 2.92 4.00 2.53 2.39 1. 26 .?8 .90 
- . 
Source. S.A.S.Y.B. 1943-4 . ~ • 
/made 
100. 
made even worse by the general reduction in purchasing power 
throughout the world during the 1931M33 depression years. 
South Africa was no exception in this general picture of 
countries outside the actual theatre of war increasing produc-
tion to take advantage of the temporary shortage of sugar on 
world markets. In the decade 1913-14 to 192~4, production in 
the Union rose by just over 120%. In this "build-up" period, ( 1) 
encouraged by a protective barrier of £3-10, self-suffi-
ciency was assured an4 South Africa began to develop as a 
minor exporter of sugar. In common with most other countries 
producing fairly considerable quantities of sugar, the South 
African industry found itself in difficulties when prices 
started falling and import duties were raised in order to proM 
teet the domestic .fi!ndustry. Thus in 1926 the Board of Trade 
' 
and Industries reccomended to the Government that the tariff 
on imported sugar be increased by means of a suspended dUty of 
£3Ml0 per ton, to £8. In the same year the SUgar Act gave le~ 
ality to the Fahey Agreement the main points of which were 
that producers were to be paid according to the sucrose con• 
tent of their cane, and not as previously merely by weight; 
that millers who were signatories to the agreement were to 
share in the export trade on a pro rata basis and that sugar 
was to be supplied to manufacturers using sugar as a raw mat-
erial at lower prices so that they would be placed on favour-
able terms to meet competition from foreign countries. 
During this period of surging economic nationalism, when 
most countries were interested only i n the circumstances of 
the moment, South Africa was by no means the only one to pro-
tect its domestic sugar industry. The new outlook on economic 
factor s was such that it tended to spread from one country to 
another, the barriers to international trade becoming thicker 
and more impenetrable as time went on. The sustained price of 
sugal, j_n the Union obviot.Sly lead to an increase in production 
(1) This was made up of the import duty of £4-10 per ton less 
the excise duty of £1 on all sugar manufactured. 
/for, 
for, as a protected industry in bad times, the point to 
which it was economic to increase production was extended. 
101. 
Simultaneously the lower purchasing power resulting from de-
pressed trade conditions limited consumption so that the in-
creased production had to be diverted to export, at prices 
far below those ruling on the domestic .market. 
The reverse side of the picture also affected the Union. 
Other countries experiencing similar conditions were obliged 
to find export outlets and several, including the Seu'!ih 
am• rr g th<.hr fhe h~t.tt:fr 1{fr tCiJ.f1. 
African, resorted to dumping their sugar on foreign markets". 
This form of price discrimination meant that sugar could be 
landed at Union ports at a price which even when increased 
by the import duty, was lower than the local trade price. 
Representations as to the existence of the dumping of sugar 
were made by the Natal Sugar Millers• Association in August 
and October of 1928 but the Board of Trade, in considering 
the case stated: "although satisfied ••• (that) dumping of 
sugar was taking place within the tel~ms of the law, • • • did 
not consider such dumping as sufficient menace to the local 
industry to justify the imposition of a dumping duty, which 
might in any case not be in the public interest under the 
circu3stances at the same time, but left it to the industry 
( 1) 
to deal with the matter as it thaught fit. n 
The action taken by the industry was one of price dis-
crimination whel~eve:r it was satisfied that dumping was 
occurring; thus, while the customa1•y price of £24~10 per 
ton was maintained, in certain instances sugar was offered 
at lower prices in order to compete with the imported pro-
( 2) 
duct. These steps were by no means sufficient and the 
Sugar Association's finances were not large enough to enable 
(1) S.A. Sugar Year Book, No. 1, 1930, pp 213. 
(2) For example during November, 1928 10,000 tons of Natal 
su gar was sold at £22-10 per ton c.i.f. Cape ports to 
counteract the dUmping. Imports during November and ne~ 
cember totalled 5,900 tons as compared with 18,000 tons 
for the whole of 1928. S.A. s. Y.B., No.1, 1930 pp 213. 
/it to 
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it to meet this so- called "unfair" compet:f.tion as pl~ice 
quotations from Germany and czechoslovakia fell to £12 per 
ton c.i.f. at Caie ports. Furthel· representations were made 
for state interference to aid the local industry and, in 
view of the seriousness of the situation, the Board of Trade 
decided to initiate an investigation to determine to what 
extent dumping was actually taldng place. The result of 
this investigation was conelusive proof of the existence of 
( 1) 
dumping, and the Board in its subsequent report to the 
Government recommended the imposition of dumping duties on 
sugar imported subject to the provision. that the wholesale 
price would not be increased above £24-10 per ton f.o.r. 
Durbe,n, and. that manufacturers in the Union should continue 
( 2) 
to receive the benefit of the lower price. In August, 
1929 the dumping duty was proclaimed on all imports from 
Germany and Czechoslovakia, the duty being the amount by 
which the domestj. c value (i.e. f. o. b. port of shipment) ex-
ceeded the export price (i.e. c.i.f. at Union ports less 
freight from port of shipment). On the 6th of tbe following 
(1) 
~ 2) 
The report gave the following data 
existence of dumping. 
GERlil.ANY, 9th March, 19 29 
Curl~ent domesttc price 
lees Excise Duty 
plus freight to Hamburg 
Domestic value f.o.b. Hamburg 
Export price c.i.f. Ca~e Town 
less sea freight ( 30/• per ton) 
Export price f.o.b. Hamburg 
Amount of dumping 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 12th March, 1929 
Current domestic price 
less Excise duty 
plus freight to Hamburg 
Value f.o.b. Hamburg 
Export price c.i.f. CapeTown 
less see. freight ( 30/- per ton) 
Export price f.o.b. Hambur g 
to support the 
s. d. per leo 1bs 
22 5 
4 7 
17 io 
6 
18 4 
12 3 
1 4 
10 ll 
7 5 
30 2 
11 8 
18 6 
10 
19 4 
12 0 
1 4 
10 8 
Amount of dumping 8 8 
Prices to manufacturers were to be based on the bona fide 
c. i. f. quo tat tons at Union ports plus the old duty of 
£4-10 per ton except where goode were destined for export 
when there was a further rebate of £3-10 per ton. 
/month 
10~. 
mont.~1 the duty was extended to cover imports from. the U.S.A. 
and later in the year to Canadian sugar. 
Despite these measures, it was found dUring the 1929/30 
season tb.at importers were obtaining supplies from such 
sources as Cuba, Holland and Mauritius, yet the "Boal'd (of 
Trade) was satisfied that this sugar does not at present (1) 
come within t.b.e purview of our dumping legislation.n 
By the Sugar Act of 1926 the local industl~y ha.d been grant-
ed a virtual monopoly of the Union ma~rket subject to certain 
( 2) 
conditions, the fulfilment of which placed a financial 
burden upon all cane growers delivering cane to the mills. 
It was estimated by the Board of Trade in their Report No. 
106~ tl~t the fulfilment of these conditions m•ant a cost 
of £2·10 per ton and this was the amount by which importers 
benefitted since there was no necessity for them to sell to 
manufacturers at a rebate or to export part of their eupp-
lies. The increase in the amounts of sug~r imported merely 
meant that a greater proportion of the local crop would have 
ti~ be expo1·ted and sold on tb.e badly depreciated London mar-
ket: so that while production in 1929/30 was only 4,000 tons 
more tr~n in 1928/9, the percentage of the total crop ex-
ported was 43 whereas during 1928/9 it had been only 29. 
Further, the increased supplies available for consum~­
tion obviously would le~d to lower prices to the producer, 
the stabilization of which was the main aim of the 1926 leg-
islation. In view of this "very grave situation ••• the in-
crease (in customs duty) should be sufficiently large as to 
: .. ( 3) 
virtually of'Ose the Union market to outside producers. 11 
on this rea~omendation the Government increased the protec-
tion from£? per ton (i.e. £8 less Excise) to £11-10 in 
( 3) 
Report 106 of the Boa.1•d of Trade and Industl~ies, 1930. 
~o supply sugar to manufacturers at specially reduced 
prices and to pay the fretgbt on sugar from Durban to the 
Cape ports' ~:o· t·ha.t the f.o.r. Durban price would equal 
c.i.f. Cape ports• price. 
Report No. 106 of the Board of Trade and Industries, 1930. 
/March 
10~ . 
March, 1930 and in July of the same year the ordinary dump-
ing duties were withdrawn as the necessity for their contin-(1) 
ued existence no longer remained. 
As pointed out above, the increased production had to 
be diverted to the expert market where fortunately South 
Africa enjoyed the advantages of the British and later the 
Canadian, preferential tariffs. It was obvious to the Board 
( 2) 
of Trade in their report in 1932, that the export of sug-
..tk. 
ar was the ttprincipJ:.:e agent in the depression of cane prices" 
since the levies to meet manufacturers rebates etc., were of 
a very stable nature. It was recognised "that sugar exports 
are being carried too far, and, that if the Industry persists 
in fall owing the lines upon which it is now working disaster 
will overtake it if the preferential rebates ••• are with-
( 3) ( 4) 
drawn. 11 It had been previously suggested that an Ar-
bitration Court be appointed with -powers to sanction or dia-
allow the planting of new lands to sugar, but this was later 
abandoned in view of the administrative coste involved in 
such a scheme. Instead the Board suggested that the export 
of sugar be limited to 175,000 tons per annum. At the same 
time it was recommended that all millers be compelled to join 
the export pool since unless this was done, non-members would 
be sharing in the benefits (yhe higher price on the local 
market caused by the exportation of a certain percentame by 
millers who had signed the Fahey Agreement) while not paying 
any of the costa. 
It is obvious from reading the reports of the Board of 
Trade, the impartial body, that the time had come for physical 
control of production. The suggest ions actually put forward 
( 1) 
( 4) 
". It can be seen from Appendix A, page l ?l \ , how the impo1·t of 
sugar fell following this legislation. 
Report No. 119 of Board of Trade and Industries. 
In report No. 119 of 1932 it was estimated that £3-15 of 
the local return on export (viz. £9-15) accrued from the 
preferential tariffs. 
Report No. 106 of Board of Trade and Industries, 1930. 
/however 
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however, tended to attempt to cure the problem indirectly 
and not at the source, as for instance the international 
Chadbourne Agreement, had attempted. It was as if the die-
ease was recognised but the cure was considered so drastic 
and unpopular as to cause even those who realised the need 
for it, to shrink frcm its imposition. Therefore, tnetead 
of restricting the actual production it was considered more 
desirable to follow the indirect course of imposing a limit-
atlon on export - the attitude seemed to point to a resign-
ed acceptance of the lose on export as the cost of maintain• 
ing the local industry. 
The Chadbourne Agreement, mentioned above, was one of 
international control of the world's sugar industry. Brought 
into operation following the Brussels ASreement in 1931, the 
scheme was essentially based on the restirction of production 
in the major producing countries. It was however, never like-
ly to succeed due to the fact that only nine countries were 
signatories to the agreement. Thus, while Cuba agreed to re-
strict her 1931/2 crop to 3,122,000 tons • a reduction of 
( 1) 
1, 549,000 tons - and certain European countries reduced 
their beet acerage by 19%, the fact that there were many pro-
ducers and potential poducera outside the control of the 
scheme, meant that by June, 1933, when the World Economic 
Conference met in London, although these countries had cut 
production by 6,61?,000 tons in other areas there had been an 
increase of 3,11?,000 tons eo that the net outcome was a. re-
duction not sufficient to check the disast , rous fa.ll in world 
prices. 
However,. the local industry was still by no means pro a-
percus, even on the artificial basis upon which its whole 
structure was based. ~uotations of overseas cargoes contin~ ( 2l 
ued to fall; American sugar was quoted at 7/6 per 100 lbs 
(1) Germany, czechoslovakia, Poland, Bel gium and Holland. 
(2) Usually Cuban sugar refined in the u.s.A. 
/c.i.f. a.t 
fOb. 
c.i.f. at Union ports, which amounted to £21 per ton landed 
as compared with the local price of £22-15 at the ports. The 
Board of Trade emphasized that the uncertainty and general 
lack of expected success in the Chadbourne Agreement had made 
matters worse since countries were doing all they could to get 
rid of surplus stocks, action which pulled prices down even 
further. In April, 1932 the Board stated that "a fresh menace 
to the local industry had now presented itself, the gravity of 
( 1) 
which is not yet possible to estimate." It maintained that 
since the aim of previous legislation to reserve the domestic 
market for the local industry, had not been totally achieved, 
:l.t was necessary to increase the customs duty from £9 to 
£12-10 per ton, which it duly recommended. In support of this 
recommendation it continued t-
"· •• there seems to be a better pl~ospect of some control of 
production being attained if the industry is assisted to retain 
the South African market as the foundation of its activities, 
provided that local prices are not raised to further compenea-
( 2) 
ticn for the loss on export." 
In all fairness to the Board it should be stated that two 
further recommendations were made, the first providing for the 
withdrawal of the suspended duty should "in the opinion of the 
Minister, the wholesale prices of sugar {'b~) .dnwarrantably in-
( 3) 
creased, 11 and the second that the maximum price of sugar to 
the consumer at the ports be decreased from 3fd. per lb for re-
fined and aid. for mill while to 3!d. and 3td. respectively~ as 
protection of consumer interests. All these recommendations 
were given effect by procl~mation 96 of 1932. 
The lack of success of the Chadbourne conference is re-
vealed by the later developments at the ~qrtd Economic Confer-
ence in 1933. Cuba submitted a £heme whereby for 10 years 
ll) Report 119 of Board of Trade and Industries, 1932. 2) ~port 119 of Board of Trade and Industries,, 1932. 3) Report 119 of Board of Trade and Industries, 1932. 
/contracting 
contracting parties would 
(a) not start the construction of any new factories, 
(b) not increase the productive capacity of existing facto-
ries, 
(c) not rebuild any factories which had ceased to produce, 
(d) not grant any new subsidies, either direct or indirect, 
to production or export and 
/1 (e) not increase tariff duties above 70% and/ valorem up to 
J 
the beginning of September, 1935. 
However, such a scheme was not acceptable to many countries 
either because it would mean abandoning a policy of self-
sufficiency adopted by some, or because the degree of control 
was too wide. Remembering the 1 essons of t . .b.e Chadbourne 
Agreement, no formal scheme was proposed but various countries 
gave assura.nc~s that by theil• policies they would not place 
any further quantities on world markets although many by ad• 
mitting their aims of self-sufficiency, were ih fact reduc~ 
ing the effective demand on the world marlceta. South Jlfrica 
stated that she did not intend to increase. l:leF exports above 
the current leve+,though she was not prepared to subscribe to 
any formal limitation of production. 
A further overseas development was the alteration in the 
Britj.sh tariff affecting sugar. On April 20th, 1933 the 
British Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that a new pre-
ference scru.e had been granted to colonial producers by the 
introo.uction of two additional rates in the tariff schedule. 
The result was that on . sugar of 96° polariz~'tion Brit.iah lev-
ied a duty of 2s. 4.8.d on what was called "Preference Certi ... 
ficated Colonial" sugar applying to a maximum of 2?5,000 tons 
p.a. allocated between the different colonial producers, one 
of 3s. 4.8d on any excess of this figure from Colonial sources 
~ 
one of 4s. 4.8d on sugar from Dominions and 8s• 1.6d on sugar 
from countries 
/other 
( 1) 
other tltan those of the Empire. .After these had been in 
force for one yeax they we1· e replaced by a triple rate oohe-
dule whereby Colonia.l suga1·s received preference over domino 
ion on a fixed quantity of 360,000 tons per annum, the new 
schedule to apply for three years. 
The international aspects of the sugar 11 pltb1 em" had 
therefore not improved and South Afl'ica still continued to 
( 2) 
supply about half of her crop a s exports the majority of 
which went to the United Kingdom and Canada, to be sold at 
( 3) 
prices far below the domestic levels. In its report pl'&o 
liminexy to t h e expir; of t he Fahey Agreement in 1936, the 
Board of Trade formulate d a new scheme in which provision 
was to be made fol· the protect ion of t h e small ~·ower, in 
which all millers and therefore all growers, were to be mezn.. 
bers of the export pool;in wh ich some equitable scheme for 
the determination of quotas was to be set out and in whi~ 
some provision was to be made for the restriction of produ~ 
tion. It was stressed that the existence of the £15 net pro-
tection s hould be sufficient inducement for t h e seperate 
interests 
(J.) British i.El.P.ort duties on suga.1· before and after April, J933 
' ' Before .A~p~r...;.;io...:~~-'-:-' -=--=-=~'~_.;;;A;;.,f_t_e~r~A~"'. r il , 19 3 3 ' 
t per cwt .. ' Full 'Pl•efer.- ' Full Domin• t Colon: ' P. C. c.K t 
' 
1 entia.l 1 ion ' ial I 
' e. d. I s. d. ' s. d.' s:-d. ' s. d. 1 s. d. ' 
199° 11 8 1 5 1.01 11 8 I 5 1.01 4 8.21 3 6.5' 
'98 °-99° 11 8 1 4 9.2' 11 8 I 4 9.21 3 8. 2 ' 2 7.21 
'97°- 98° ' 8 7 ' 4 7.7' 8 7 ' 4 7.7 1 3 7.1' 2 6.5 1 
196°-97° I 8 4.31 4 6.31 8 4.31 4 6. 3 1 3 6 2 5.7 1 
195°•96° I 8 1.61 4 4.8 ' 8 ~6 1 4 4.8 1 3 4.81 2 4 •. 81 
:K "Preferential- Certificated Colonial": Source: S.A.S.Y.B. 
1To. 5 1934 pp 7 3 .. 4 
( 2) The percentage of ex port to total sales was as follows 
during the years 1929/30 - 1935/6: 
1929/30 43% 1932/3 51% 
1930/1 50% 1933/4 50% 
1934/5 
1935/6 
1931/2 50% 
(3) Ave r age price received on sales within the Union and on 
ex_port 1 192~/30 .. 1935/6 ~! ton) 
' _ ' Domestick1 Export 1 --'7, - D=--om_e_s_t':"""J.':"'", c~,=-.- Ei:portr 
1929730 1 14. 11. 9 1-9.17. 6"t 1933/f I 14.17. 2 I 7. 8. 8 I 
1930~1 t l f .12.11 ' 7.14. 4 ' 1934/5 ' i~ .. 17. 9 ' 6. 4 . 1.' 
t 1931!..2 I 1 3.12. 0 t 7. 2 . 3 I 1935/6 I 14.14. 7 I 6. 7 . 9 I 
1932.2_ 1 15. Q. 0 I 5.14.10 I 
it exc1 uding ref' i ni ng mar g1':n;-::a.~n:::d~S:;:o~u~t:;:h:--:A~f;:r:--:;i:-:c:-a-n-s-u-g-ar--A-s-a-o-c-i-a...__;_ 
tion J. evies. 
/within 
within the industry to arrive at some equitable .and wor~ 
able solution to all the problems. The great significance 
of .this report is the ultimate decision to apply the very 
direct means of limitation of production as a cure for the 
troubles of the industry and the paradoxiea of state policy 
towards that industry. It was as thougp the intricacies 
of the ecomomic structure were at last appreciated and it 
was recognised as inevitable, that if o~e p~·t of the 
economy is tampered with more and more interference is 
necessary. .Although that interference ma.y. not be popular, 
unless it is applied the position is not so.lved and the 
equilibrium of the industry is no nearer attainment. 
Before proceeding to describe the new agr~ement 
arrived at between representatives of millers and growers, 
it is necessary to consider the change that had come over 
the actual physical production of cane in Natal during the 
early 1930's. Previous to 1930 1Uba' had been the only 
variety of cane grown i~ Nata l and in fact other varieties 
were strictly forbidden except in quarantine. Natal is 
really not ideal for cane gsowing because of its high lat-
itude in comparison with the other main cane producing 
areas and it is actually only the presence of the warm 
Mozambique current just off the Natal coast that enables 
cane to be grown at all. Consequently a comparatively 
hardy type of cane suits the climatic conditions best where 
18-22 months are requi.red for the full growth of the cane 
compared vnth approximately a year in warmer and wetter 
areas. In the early years of cane production in Natal the 
suitability of 1Uba' was responsible for its general popu-
larity. However, at the Mt. Edgecombe experimental station 
various canes had been under test ane in 1930/1 five new 
varieties were released for commercial planting. These 
/new 
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(1) 
new types generally had a higher sucrose content and grad-
ually 'Uba' was replaced until in 1938 the area under other ( 2) 
varieties exceeded that under the older type, Thus, 
. ( 3) 
while the totwl area under cane increased by only 16% be~ 
tween 1929/30 and 1935/6 ~ the actual production of sugar 
increased by almost 40%. The increase in production was 
then pr&marily due to the planting of new varieties of cane 
and it was obvious to those who saw the need to limit pro-
duction, that to do so on any basis other than a restriction 
of the amount of cane which each individual planter was to 
deliver to his mill, would be insufficient. 
The first task which faced the conference between mill-
era and grewera was the restriction to be placed upon the 
total production of sugar in the Union. By the Internation-
al Sugar Agreement of 1936, South Africa had been allotted an 
export quota of 224,000 tons per annum and eo the production 
quota was determined using this figure in conjunction with 
the estjmated consumption in five years time so as to allow 
some flexibility in planning and some compensation to those 
planters who had just begun. 
The Sugar Industry Central Board of three members, the 
Chairman to have no financial interest in the sugar industry, 
was to be the final body of arbit~tion although provision 
was made within the agreement for the division of this total 
quota among the sep~rate mille. In each mill provision was 
made for a Mill Group Bbard Which had to divide the quantity 
of cane needed to pt')duca the quota for the mill concerned. :~ 
(l) A trial of the different varieties was conducted over a 
period of 23 months at Mt. Edgecombe, the results being 
as follows: 
Tons cane 
per acre 
P.O.J. 2725 32.66 
co. 290 37.67 
C.H. 64/21 30.82 
Uba 30.12 
P.o.J. 272? 26.96 
P.o.J. 2878 25.41 
P.O.J. 2714 25.10 
( 2) See Table 2, page 130 (3) I have taken area under 
30,000 in 1929/30. 
sucrose % 
17.20 
14.87 
15.32 
14.93 
15.70 
16.07 
16.~ 
Tons sucrose 
per acre 
5.618 
5.609 
4. 722 
4.497 
4.233 
4.083 
4.016 
cane owned by non-European as 
/among 
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among producers supplying that particular mill. This was to 
be done by first dividing the amount of cane required between 
Europeans and non-Europeans based upon their average delive• 
ries during the years 1931/2 - 1935/6. Not later than the 
15th October the Board was to ascertain from each grower how 
much .he had still to cut and in the event of any onegrower 
not being able to fulfill his quota, the deficiency was to 
be allocated to those with surpluses, pro rata to those sur-
pluses, in the appropriate section. 
In the case of both Europeans and non-Europeans the 
small gt·ower was placed in a favourable position qy being 
able to draw upon a special reserve allowed by the Mill Boards 
for ~referential assignments where it can se shewn that the 
financial commitments of individual ••• growers as at 23rd 
( 1) 
March (are) such that special consideration is justified." 
A further provision was made whereby a small European grower 
was entitled to a minimum quota of 3, Boor: tons as long as 
there was the likelihood of his being able to produce that 
amoQnt. Smaller planters gained another advantage in the 
Equalization Fund financed by (a) specific annual amounts 
from mills, (b) a levy of td. per ton on all cane crushed in• 
cluding that produced by millers themselves and (c) an~ addi-
tional levy of td. per ton on cane belonging to miDler-plant-
ers. This was to be paid to the South African Cane Growers' 
Association, the final payment to be worked out from a for-
( 2) 
mula designed for the benefit of the small grower. 
In an attempt to restrict the growing tendency for mill-
ere to gain control over planters by producing cane themselvoo 
the agreement specified that in addition to the special pay~ 
ment by miller-planters to the Equalization FUnd, their 
quotas were to be 1 imi ted to the highest average deli very of 
any two consecutive years during the period 1931/2 .. 193.5/6 
(1) South African Sugar Year Book No. 8, 1937, pp 17i. 
(2) The original formula was 15000 - Y 
7500 lOd. per ton where Y 
was the tonnage delivered b~t due to the increase in cane de• 
livered by small growers the factor had to be reduced as 
follows: 1936/7 - 9.60302d. 1937/8 - 8.69874d. 1938/9 . ... 
8. 5d. 
liZ. 
Hence only individual planters could obtain quotas in excess 
of their peak deliveries during those particular years. 
Having defined the basis upon which production was to 
be limited, the remainder of the agreement was a continuation 
of the 1926 Fahey Agreement whereby millers agreed to export 
their respective quotas as determined by the Crop Disposals 
Coramittee of the Council of the South African Sugar Associa-
tion and to pay certain levies in proportion to the amount 
( 1) 
of sugar produced for local consumption. 
The following statement sums up the aims of the new agree 
ment which obtained force of law by the Sugar Act of 1936. 
"The reorganisation of the South African SUgar Association in 
1936 marked the commencement of a period in the history of tbe 
industry in which it is condidentally expected will see it 
established on a basis of a planned economy wherein provision 
is made for the intelligent use of the industry for the grea~ 
( 2) 
est good of the greatest number thrC?ughout the Union." 
It might be thought that the completeness of this 1936 
agreement would have tied up the problem so well that no 
loose ends would remain but this was by no means eo. Althougn 
the amount of cane which any individual planter could deliver· 
to a mill was limited by quota, there was nothing to prvvent 
him producing more than he was entitled to deliver and it was 
hardly likely that the authorities would stand aloof while 
planters produced in excess of their quotas and had therefore 
to allow the excess to rot on the fields. Consequently, it 
was decided in 1936/7, the season immediately following the 
agreement, that a supplementary agreement be formulated wher~ 
by further cane would be accepted provided that sugar produc-
ed from that cane had to be exported and so would not reduce 
( 1) 
( 2) 
There were two important changes, the first being that 
these conditions were to apply to all millers and second-
ly that no mill producing less than 10 000 tons was to be 
required to export more than half its total output. 
South African Sugar Year Book No. 9, 1938, p~ 21. 
/the 
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the domestic price level of sugar. In this way an additional 
·31,083 tons ' of sugar were produced from 301,038 tons of cane 
in 1936/7. 
The danger of such a situation is well revealed in the 
following: ''The exjient of 'this surplus (estimated at 
1,300,000 tons for the current season) indicates that up to 
the present producers have not appreciated the realities of 
the si tua.tj.on brought about by the ad opt ion of quotas. For 
several years to come (the) industry's output must be limited 
to approximately the present figure. and the surPlus cane at 
present in sight is more than it is likely there will be an 
( 1) 
a.ccomodation for, for many years to come." 
The alactity with which these supplementary agreements were 
agreed to seems to show a weakness of policy, a. weakness 
which could only serve to blur the results so that theexact 
benefits of the scheme as a whole would not be discern~ble. 
A further most important development out of this scheme 
was the introduction of a. cheaper grade of sugar - p6pularly 
known as No.2 Grade "Government n sugar, which was to be of 
not less than 98°polarization. This was most important from 
the point of view of the whole industry since it aimed at in• 
creasing domestic consumption at the expense of exportation, 
which was the main reason for the continued distress in the 
industry. The price for this new grade was fixed at 2td. per 
~b. at all points not more than five miles from any station, 
siding or halt. There is no need to look any further than 
the figures of sales of No. 1 refined and No. 2 grade in 
( .2) &came 
Appendix B, to prove how popular this new gradeAin the con• 
sumption pattern of South Africans. While in the period 
·1936/7 - 1948/9, the increase in sales of white sugar, both 
( 1) 
( 2) 
Annual Report of South African Sugar Association 1938, 
S.A.S.Y.B. No. 9, 1938, pp 27. 
See page r32- • 
direct 
direct to consumers and to manufacturers, was 86%, the con-
sumption of "Government 11 sugar increased fivefold. 
It was exceedingly unfortunate that almost as soon .. as 
the international sugar situation was so altered by the eve-
nts of the war, the loss of Java, the Phillipines and other 
important sugar producing areas, South Africa should be hit 
by two successive years of deficient rainfall. In the sugar 
belt it is generally considered that the year ~an be divided 
into three phases. The first four months, with high rain-
fall and temperatures, constitute the principal growing 
'''"'· 
period of the cane, the period May-August may be termed the 
ripening period with low rainfall and relatively low tempera-
tures, and the third in which rains and temperature are both 
gradually increasing, the revival period. Although therain-
fall for the 1939/40 season was up to the average, it was 
very badly aetributed and only ?.11" fell in the important 
revival period, during which the average was over 16 11 • In 
1940 the total again compared favourably with the average but 
almost 1311 fell in the normally dry period and _of the 17.32" 
,.. 
which fell in the last four months nearly half occu~ed in 
November. 
In planning for the disposal of the 1940/1 crop, 
arrangements had been made for the sale of 263,000 tons to 
the British Ministry of Food, but owing to the short crop, 
and the increased local demand, the contract could not be 
fulfilled and the shortfall of 40,000 tons was to be made up 
from the following crop. When that was harvested there was 
only just sufficient to cover the shortfall carried over 
from the previous season without any further export to the 
United Kingdom, a set of circumstances which evoked consider-
able criticism in certain circled where it was felt that 
more could have been done in the Union to leave a greater 
quantity ava~lable for the U.K. where rationing had already 
become fairly severe. Especially was this criticism prevalert 
/in 1943 
in 1943 when the domestic consumption of sugar increased 
by almost 25% whilst the figure for expor~actually fell 
An important feature of the 1942/3 season was the 
reduction in the benefits granted by the industry to manu-
facturere using ~~gar as a raw material. In view of the 
increasing financial burden to the industry arising from 
these rebates, the Minister of Finance approved the aboli-
tion of the export rebate of £3-lO per ton, the reduction 
of the rebate on local products by £4-lO per ton except in 
the case of sugar used in the manufacture of jam and con- -(1) 
densed milk, and the abolition of the special reduction 
of £1 per ton granted to manufacturers of condensed milk. 
The implication of this reductdon in rebates was that 
the domestic and international markets for sugar had after 
so many years returned to some measure of equality. As long 
as the local price was maintained a.t levels higher than t 
those prevailing on the world market it was necessary to 
grant rebates to manufacturers to enable them to compete on 
equal terms with those in other cou~riea. As soon as the 
demand for au gar increased sufficiently t.o raise the world 
price, and similarly there was the fall in the available 
supplies, it became no longer necessary to pay rebates on 
the same scale as previously since doing so merely placed 
the manufacturers in an extremely favourable position, but 
one hardly likely to foster a sound industrial development. 
Furthermore, additional rebates had formerly been 
allowed on sugar which was used in the manufacture of comm-
odities f~r export. Now, the financial burden placed upon 
the industry in order to fulfill this condition imposed by 
the Fahey Agreement, was not very great in the years before 
1938/9 since the only countries· providing a market were 
neighbouring stat·es like South west Africa, the Rhodesias 
(l) In the case of sugar for the manufacture of products 
other than jams and condensed milk, the rebate after 
reduction amounted to £4-15 (or trade price of £18 per 
ton). The selling price to manufacturers of the two ex-
ceptions was £14 per ton. 
/and 
and Portuguese East Africa where demand was limited by the 
low purchasing power. During the war years however, the in-
crease in the world price of sugar left South African manu-
facturers. in a relatively favourable position and not only 
were they able to take advantage of the increased demand in 
Southern Rhodesia and other African territories, but ·large 
quantities of products like jams, jellies and canned fruits 
(I) 
were exported to overseas countries. Taking the group of 
products nja.ms, jellies and marmalade" as an exa.mple , export 
increased from 1,734,000 tons in 1937/8 to 50,863,000 tone in 
( 2) 
1942/3. It was clear that continued payment of these re-
bates was beyond the resources of the industry; just as the 
considerable increase in the amount of sugar used in manuf~ 
turing made it impossible for the sugar industry to continue 
to meet the burden of ordinary rebate payments. 
In 1943 a new Determination, published under clause 2 
, '· ~. (l) (a) of the Sugar Act of 1936, was made 1the princip~ 
changes being that growers' quotas were stabilized in order 
to allow for planning of production, previously hampered by 
I 
the fact that growers had no guar~ntee that their quotas 
I 
would not be cut. A further innovation was that quotas were 
to be based upon a wei~t of sucrose and not as previously on 
cane; a.lso that grov·.'ers were di v:!.ded into categori<:}B (miller-
planters, European growers, .Indians and Bantus) so that if 
supplies of one particular group was short, their particular 
export quota would be correspondingly lower and price, under 
the prevailing circumstances, higher. Under the old scheme 
there had been a premium on surpluses since shortfalls by 
certain growers were redistr ibuted among those with surpluses 
pro rata to the amount of those surpluses. The new agreement 
maQe the allocat ion pro rata not to the surpluses themselves 
but to the quotas of those with surpluses. 
!lb. 
Po,. 1nsbt"<e1 c.xpo~t of- J'an1s , Jelh~,S' etc.. ,._ tho. U."" . 1n'c'-se-' 
..., •' • ~- ..._ {-rom 2'll,ooo lb$ t1. ~ betW See Table 3, page 1ao • ,903,ooo een 
193~ an d. 191f"+, 
/The 
~he increase in the 1943/4 crop meant that a far 
greater quantity of sugar was available for export to the 
u.~ where the British Ministry of Food had agreed to buy 
all the sugar that South Africa could produce at prices fi~ 
ed annually and 11while it is a matter for ~·egret that the 
tonnage available ••• from the current crop will not come up 
117. 
to the amount expected ••• this is due partly to the increase 
in South African consumpt ioneincluding the increased require-
ments of manufacturers. The latter are, however, supplying 
the Ministry (of Food) with large quantities of jam, canned 
( 1) ( 2) 
fruits etc., containing a high percentage of augar. 11 
The desire of the Government to export as much as poss-
ible to the Allied countries engaged in the war effort took a 
more actife turn in the 1944/5 season when the sale of sugar 
was subjected to a mild form of cont~ol. During the first 
six months oft~~ season sales reached the figure of 260,664 
tons, a level of demand which had it been permitted to conti~ 
ue unchecked, would have reeul ted j.n an increase of 18% in 
the course of one year. In view of its aim of exporting 
100,000 tons, not incJ.uding the 10,000 tons supplied under 
contract to Southern Rhodesia, the industry, with the Govern .. 
ment' s approval, limited the sales to the public during the 
second half of the year, to ?o% of white sugar taken up during 
the first six months and 90% of No. 2 grade. 
It was estimat ed that the world demand for sugar 
exceeded the supply by approximately 2,000,000 tons and most 
importing countries were obliged to impose severe restrictions 
on the consumption of this product. In the u.s.A. individuals 
who were not engaged in work demanding additional energy 
foods, were allowed only 4.7 oza. per week, or 15 lbs. per 
year - lees than t of what they were consuming before the 
( ~) 
war. Bearing these circumstances in mind and the fact that 
( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
South African Sugar Year Book, No. 13, 1943/4, ~ ?3. 
The quantity of jams and jellies exported to the U.K. du~ 
ing the period. 1938/9 - 1945/6 was as follows: 
1938/9 Z70,~1'7 1940/l 20,311,30.3 1942/3 4~-_to7,Zot l944/59i,9<>~,l.!i).b 
19 39/40 1, 340,'-tloO 194!/2 3 5', :i'll, i~"Z 1943/4 'II, S,9/, SWo 1945/6 '15;97~-,1!.39 
South Afl•j.can Sugar Year Book, No. 14, 1944/5, pp 51. 
/there 
there was no i ndication that supply would be materially in-
creased during the coming season, the Government announced 
that control of sugar distribution would be continued during 
1945/6 and furthermore through the South African Cane Grow-
ers' As so ciat:i.on encouraged planters to supply as much cane (1) 
,,.._ 
as they could, regardless of ·the quotas. The millers also 
did much to help attain the record level for output b~ 
arranging to extend the season at certain mills and to di• 
vert such cane as was left over in afeas where mills had 
already closed. 
If 1944/5 cannot be regarded as the exact year in which 
the relationship between production and consumption was com-
pletely reversed, because the re~tl·ict.ion ofsales was caused 
not by an actual deficiency of output; the years 1945/6 and 
1946/? cannot be regarded as anything but the beginning of a 
relationship completely new to the industry. 
Sugar was one of the very few commodities whose price 
had not risen during the war years and at that fixed price 
consumption had increased to such an extent that product i.cn 
had been overrun. In 1945/6 under the policy of sales re-
striction, a total of 71,?41 tons was exported of which 
60,541 went to the U.K. whose Uinistry of Food had, inci• 
dentally, prolonged their cont1•act until 1949. At the 1944/6 
rate of consumption the restrictions are estimated to have 
saved 37,541 tons in the space of six ·months; assuming no 
increase in demand during 1945/6, an1. assumption clearly 
false, the actual sales underestimate the level of demand 
at the fixed prices by approximately 75,000 tons, a figure 
gre-ater by over 4,000 tons than the net exports of the Union. 
1947/8 Illustrates the position even more clearly; South 
Africa had become a net-importer of eug~r. 
( 1) Members of the South African Cane Growers' Association 
exceeded their a ggre gate sucrose quota of 349,9?5 tons 
by 13,625 tone i n 1944/5 • S.A.SlY. B. No. 1 4 , 1944/5. 
/The 
The fact that the prife of sugar had not been in-( 1) 
creased is very important in this discussion since it 
must obviously have exerted a strong influence on consump• 
tion. In view of this it is not surprising that the ind-
ustry should have appealed for release from the static 
prices at which it had disposed of its sugar. It is even 
less surprising when lt is noticed how production fell away 
from the record level in 1944/5. Rainfall figures at the 
Mt. Edgecombe experiment station show that in 1943/4 42.7? 11 
fell, in. 1944/5 36.12 11 and in 1945/6 only 25.57 .. , and bear .. 
ing in mind that cane in South Afric(':t requires two favour-
able seasons, it was inevitable that production should de-
cline and that expectations regarding 194?/8 should not be 
particularly bright. 
119. 
As a result of these circumstances and the fact that 
manufacture1·s no longer required the rebates to ensure them 
of an equal advantage in disposing of their commodities, the 
rebates to manufactureEe of products in which sugar was an 
( 2) 
ingl·edient, eRcept jams, condensed milk and canned fruits, 
wa.s abolished as from the 31st October, 1945. This probably 
accounts to some extent for the fall in sales to manufac-
turers in 1945/6, but notwj. thstanding this legislation, pay-
ment of rebates placed a burden of £479,533 upon the indus-
try and brought the total cost under this head since 1939/40 
( 3) 
to £3,689,1331 
In October, 1946 the Government approved a temporary 
increase of td. per lb in the price of all su~~rs, the pro~ 
ceeds of wbich were to be applied for the relief of those 
growers whose annual harvesting based on peak deliveries 
between 1943/4 and 1945/6 did not exceed 15,000 tons. The 
(J.) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
Apart from the withdrawal of part of the manufacturers'' 
rebates in 1942/3. 
Manufacturers of these commodities consumed 50,000 tone 
of sugar in 1945/6 ~ S.A.S.Y.B, No. 16, 1945/6. 
South African Sugar Year Book, No. 16, 1945/6, pp 2?. 
/increase 
increase in revenue amounted to £2-1-8 per ton and was to 
be paid out as follows: 
An increase of 6/- per ton to those harvesting 4,000 tons or 
An increase of 4/3 per ton to those harvesting between 4,000 
and 10,000 tons, and an increase of std per ton to those 
harvesting between 10,000 and 15,000 tons. 
Any deficiency between the increased revenue and the amounts 
to be paid out to growers under this scheme was to be borne 
( 1} 
by the Treasury. 
Towards the end of 1946 the Board of Trade began an in-
quiry into the state of the sugar industry and among its re-
commendations in its final report were: 
(a.) the abolition of the excise duty, introduced as a war 
measure in 1915, because "in the opinion of the Board it 
had served its purpose (and) its continuance is in con-
flict with the Government's endeavour not to increase 
the price of foodstuffs." 
(b) the suspension of rebates to manufacturers since they 
"are still in a distinctly more advantageous position 
than their competitiors in other countries." 
(c) the restora.t ion of retail prices "to the level e 1·uling 
immediately before let October, 1946, 11 i.e. the date 
from which the id per lb increase had become operative. 
The latter recommendation immediately came under severe 
criticism from the sugar industry: 
"The record of fixed prices for our product is unique ex-
cept for A\lstralia, where the industry, like our own, is 
state controlled and wher e, also, urgent appeal is being 
made for relief. But the proposal that the price of sug-
ar should revert to its pre-war level in the face of the 
( 1) It wa s estimated that the defj. ciency in 1945/6 would am-
ount to £196,000. 
/vastly 
12o. 
vastly changed economic and industrial condmtione and the 
Government's own experience as a buyer of commodities 
( 1) 
during and since the war years, is almost Gilbertian." 
The only possible explanation for this recommendation 
would seem to be that it was considered that the benefits 
accruing from the other two, which would of course inc1·ease 
the price to the producer , would be sufficient to counteract 
the increase in costs and would at the same time be in line 
with the Government's policy of restricting the rise in the 
cost-of-living. However, while the first two recomraendations 
were enforced the third was not, so the industry reaped a ( 2) 
benefit of £3-15 per ton. 
The substantial carry-over from 1945/6 added to the ori-
ginal estimate for 1946/7 of 493,500 tons, led to the con-
clusion of an increased supply for domestic consumption and 
sales were made on tlrls assumption. However, evidence of tha 
crop's deterioration became increasingly emphatic and by Se~ 
tember the industry was, with Government approval, compelled 
to reconsider its earlier decision and for the remainder of 
( 3) 
the year sales were cut by 10%. In fact it was not until 
the beginning of 1948 that the restrictions on the distribu-
t ion of sugar were wi th.dra.wn. 
The 1947/8 crop, although a distinct improvement com-
pared with the previous season, also revealed the effects of 
the prolonged drought of 1945-47 and, as mentioned above, 
the Union was on balance an importer of sugar. The industry 
was unable to supply sufficient to manufacturers for them to 
meet the demand for their own products so, to meet the de-
ficiency, new manufacturing interests and acme of those al• 
ready established and unable to increase their output,appeal-
ed to the Government to 1·e1ax the tariff restrictions on 
( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
South African Sugar Year Book. No. 1?, 1946/7, pp 19. 
Since a price increase of i d per 1b meant a rise of 
£2-1w8 per ton, the value of the benefit from the other 
two recommendations mu s t have been £1-0•0 for abolition 
of excise and 13·4 for suspension of manufacturers 
rebates. 
Thereby saving about 10,000 tons - S.A.S.Y.B. No. 17 , 
1946/7. 
/overseas 
l2J. 
overseas sugar, supplies of which had bedome available 
following the suspension of control by the International 
Food Emergency Council. This had occurred because of the 
world wide shortage of dollars and certain countries, not-
ably European, although requiring the sugar could not 
afford it; therefore the allotments made but not taken up 
were offered to anyone able to pay the exporter, in this 
case Cuba, in its own currency. The Board of Trade after 
an investigation, recommended that refined sugar from over~ 
ceas for manufacturing purposes should be permitted entry 
into the Union as a temporary measure, in such quantities 
as the Minister of Economic llevelopment might determine, 
under rebate of the whole duty normally payable. 
It was recognised by most people concerned with sugar 
that 194?/8 was a significant year. It was the year in 
which conclusive evidence had been established that quotas 
fitted only certain conditions and those had disaJ)peared. 
It was reco$nised that the time for private enterprise had 
arrived. and those who had been so~vourably inclined to-
wards Government assistance in the thirties now appealed to 
the Government to foster individualism among growers and 
millers alike. In official circles the recognition was one 
of the need to dispense with the restriction of production. 
With a variable output almost unavoidable and self-suffic-
iency still .of strategical importance, it was necessary to 
encourage production in order to allow for some safety mar-
gin between productio.n and consumption. 
In discussions between representatives of the industry 
and the Government the long term policy was a goal of 
?25~000 tons of sugar to be reached within a period of five 
years. To give effect to the immediate and near future, it 
was decided that tbe existing cqwta system should be suspendEd 
and that, together with miller-planters, growers should be 
permitted to increase their production from registered lands 
i.e. the quota would automatically increase with deliveries. 
/The 
123. 
The allocation of new quotas was to be determined by the 
Ministers of Economic Development and Lands but with the pro-
vision for settlement of a large number of ex-service-men in 
the sugar belt, it was to be expected that the total area 
( 1} 
under cane would also increase. In accordance with this 
policy the expansion of cane production in the Pongola dis• 
trict of Zululand was approved of in pr$nciple and as . a tem-
porary assistance the industry agreed to subsidize the trans-
port charges to existing mills on cane reaped from lands 
under cultivation at that date. It was however, realised 
that the permanent development of that area depended not on 
any form of subsidization, but on the provision of railway 
facilities and mills. 
The last year under review marked the re-entry of South 
.f\frica onto the export market but, e.a w~ know now, that re-
appearance was to be only temporary. Consumption increased 
considerably from a crop second only to the record breaking 
1944/5 season but it was noticed 11 that this demand was not 
sustained during the 1 ast sj.x months of the year • • • and evi• 
dence is accumulating to show that the peak of national con-( 2) 
sumption, under existing conditions has been reached. 11 
In planning the disposal of the crop, 561,328 tons were set 
aside fo~ doiestic consumption, a decrease of 6,580 but as 
it turned out, this was in accord with the facts for sales 
( 3) 
by the industry in 1949/50 amounted to 538,912 tons. It 
i s significant that total consumption during 1948/9 was 
grea ter than production in all but four years since the beg-
inning of cane growing in Natal. 
In considering the export prospects, it was fortunate 
that South Africa, a s a member of the Commonwealth, had a 
( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
In the Sugar Year Book for 194?/8 it was stated that in 
the past two ~~~rs more than 130 new growers, mostly ex-
servicemen, had commenced operations. 
This was but a temporary reverse for in 1950/1 sales 
reached a new record of 602,353 tons. 
Annual Report of South African Sugar As sociation, 1949 ~ 
S.A.S.Y.B., No. 19, 1948/9 pp 1 3. 
/guaranteed 
12t..t. 
guaranteed market in Great Britian for although in physical 
terms there was no over-production of sugar, currency diff· 
iculties necessitating exchange restrictions to balance in-
tcrnational accounts, meant that much potential demand never 
became effective. The British gua.r¢ntee extended to 1952, 
I 
by which time the industry hoped to be producing ?25,000 
tons, vras at prices fixed a.nua.lly in consultation with 
supplying countries. For 1949 the price fixed was £24-6-8 
per short ton c.i.f. London, one which was considerably (1) 
higher than that obtainable on the domestic market. 
SUMM.ARY 
The story of sugar production in South Af~ica during the 
twenty years under review is very similar to that of the other 
products - beginning with ~duction increasing enormously, 
encouraged by a State policy of protection. In an industry 
which fell under control far earlier than other agricultural 
enterprises, the degree of control was almost complete as 
early as 1926 when an agreement between millers and growers 
became legally binding upon signatories by the Sugar Act of 
1926. The build-up period occurred earlier in the vase of 
su~ar than for other commodities, so from about 1930/1 the 
policy was not one of increasing: production but of maintain-
ing the level already reaBhed. The aim as stressed over and 
over again was one of preserving the domestic market for the 
domestic industry, of price discrimination between different 
types of consumers, of overcoming geographical advantages by 
mean!! of a special pricing policy. It was not a policy pur-
sued by the Union alone; at a time when economic nationalism 
was the answer to all problems, most countries were a.dvocat-
ing protection of certain interests a.nd in general imposing 
(1) The f.o.b. D~rban equivalent of the c.i.f. quotation was 
£22-10. This was for 1 raw1 sugar i.e. of 96° polarization, 
The price on the domestic market would be £24-16-8 (the 
whole-sale price for let refined) lees £4-0-0 (the refin~ 
in g margin) or £20-16-8. 
/restrictive 
restrictive measures designed to kill the aims of another 
age - "ltissez faire". 
However, as in any kind of planning, having interfered 
with the economy at one point, the State had to follow that 
with the adjustments at others. Having increased the cu s-
toma duty to shut out foreign competition, it was necessary 
to peg the retail price, to limit production for producers 
had been encouraged to expand production following the more 
remunerative internal prices and this increased production 
had to be diverted to export where the price realised was less 
than half that ruling within the Union. Thus came the quota 
system for growers in 1936, but even that was not sufficient. 
Growe1 .. s found themsel vee with cane in excess of their quotas 
and rather than see it rot on the lands, supplementary agree-
ments were introduced whereby further quotas were diverted to 
the export market to be sold at prices which did not even 
cover the production costs. 
On the consumption side, the fixed prices for sugar serv• 
ed as a stimulant as soon as the 1931-3 depression came to an 
end. At a time when most prices were rising that of sugar 
was remaining constant and demand was consequently incroased 
by substitution for other foods. Furthermore, th~ introduc-
tion of the 2nd grade in 1936 served to stim~late consumption 
still further by falling within the means of the poorer sec-
tions of the community. This "Government" sugar soon became 
of great importance in the nation's consumption pattern, eo 
much so that by 1948/9 sales of the brown sugar were more than 
half those of the refined product. Simultaneously manufactur-
ers, benefitting from the fixed and extremely favourable price 
at which they could buy sugar, found increasing markets for 
their own products - both within the Union and oversea s . 
The net result of a consumption stimulated by a fi xed 
price at a time of otherwise rising prices, and production 
strictly limited, was an inevitable narrowing of the gap be-
tween the two. From 1933/4 to 1946/? the policy was one of 
/consolidating 
IZ6. 
consolidating the level of production attained during the 
re 
early thirties, a policy revealed by the figures for acer-
age under cane. In 1934 this was 391,000 acres, in 194? 
it amouhted to 3?~~000 and only from that year on did it be-
gin to increase. What increase there was in production was 
not as a result of more widespread planting> but of techni-
cal improvements such as the introduction of new cane var-
ieties and better processing methode, as is borne out by the 
increase in percentag~ of overall recover at mills. Between 
1930/1 and 1944/5, the record year of the twenty year period 
production increased by 56% or about 4% p.a. - in the same 
space of time consumption rose by almost 160%. From the 
record level of exports in the 1939/40 season they fell heav-
ily during the later war pl'iod, a time when the world demand 
for sugar far exceeded the available supplies, and during the 
last three seasons under review countEies other t!~n Southern 
Rhodesia, with whose Government the Union had a contract, re-
ceived negligible quantities from S~th Afric~. 
The years 1945/6 to 1947/8 marked the turning point in 
the relationship between production and consumption. The 
rigidities of planning could not cope with such increased i:rr-
consumption as occurred in years like 1941/2, 1942/3, 1944/5, 
194?/8 and 1948/9. The time had come 11 to banish a ••• all 
fears of a surplus; scrap forever the hateful, restrictive, 
uneconomical, nationally disgraceful io.ea of quotas, e.nd go 
all out to produce in the fullest extent of which we are cap-
able, encouraging the individual enterprise and initiative 
which is waiting to develop the future as their fathers dev• (1) 
eloped the past." What a far cry from the 11 planned eco-
nomy wherein provision is made for ••• the greatest good for 
( 2) 
the greatest number throughout the Union", of 1936. 
The general picture of the production and consumption 
(1) Speech of Sen. the Rt.Hon. G.E. Heaton-Nicholls to the 
S.A. Technologists Association, 1948. 
(2) See above, page 11~ 
/of SUgal• 
of sugar is well portrayed in the accompanying gTaph. The 
fall in consumption during the depression years, the sus-
tained increase in production accompanied by consumption ris-
ing at a slightly slower rate and the consequent widening of 
the gap in the period, 1932/3-1938/9, are all revealed in the 
graph. Then, almost as if fate had taken a hand, production 
began to fall off just at a time when the consumption of suga~ 
promoted by the increased prosperity of the country and the 
fixed prices of suga1·, .entered a period of extremely rapid 
increase. Although the gap was not in dangeE of altogether 
disappearing, rationing was introduced in the 1942/3 season 
in an attempt to provide a greater export surplus for the se-
verely rationed British people. The dotted red line illustra~ 
es what the course of consumption would have been had there 
been no rationing through the trade and is based upon figures 
and comments in the annual SUgar Year Books. The rationing, 
never extremely severe, was greatly relaxed in 1946/? when 
the purpose of its imposition disappeared with the ending of 
hostilities, and the exp6rt surplus, which in the first sea-
eon of the war, had exceeded 300,000 tons, now fell to merely 
10,000 supplied to the Southern Rhodesian Government under 
contract. 
The restriction of production was at an end but not the 
shortage, for it was to be expected that the increase in 
pr oduction necessary to meet the ever expanding consumption 
would take several years to materialize. 
Tons 
. 660,06 
500,00 
400,00 
200,00 
100,00 
Production 
Consumption 
adjusted for 
rationing. 
Consumption 
Graph4: Production and consumption of sugar in South 
Africa 1929/30 - 1948/9. 
Table 2. 
Percentage of 'Uba' to total cane harvested. 
1929/30 
1930/1 
1931/2 
1932/3 
1933/4 
1934/5 
1935/6 
1936/7 
1937/8 
1938/9 
1939/40 
1940/1 
1941/2 
1942/3 
1943/4 
1944/5 
1945/6 
1946/7 
194?/8 
1948/9 
100.00 
100.00 
1oo.oo 
99.96 
99.72 
96.68 
88.80 
63.7? 
51.90 
28.mA 
25.08 
19.28 
13.10 
8.99 
6.50 
4. 25 
2.83 
1.91 
1.53 
.72 
Table 3. 
Source: S~uth African Sugar Year 
Books. 
Production and Consumption of ''jams, jellies and ma1·ma-
lades", 1929/30-1948/9. (000 1bs.) 
129. 
$ 
1 Year ' Production~ 1 Importee 1 Exports~ 1 
3 year --r 
1 moving 
Consumption' average 
I . 
'1929/30 18,883 512 1,641 17,?54 
I 1930/1 427 1,661 ... 
11931/2 ( .. · .. - '232 1, 283 
-
; 
-
) 
11932/3 20,056 303 1,178 19,181 
'1933/4 22,461 400 1, 361 21,500 
'1934/5 25,053 421 1,580 23,894 
'1935/6 25,481 573 1,543 24,511 
'1936/7 27,694 695 1,548 26,841 
I 1937/8 I 29,148 543 1, 734 27,957 
'1938/9 31,710 365 3, 239 28,836 
I 1939/40 46,408 406 22,091 24 ,725 
I 1940/1 76,651 66? 39,302 38,016 
'1941/2 104,412 42 48' 939 55,515 
(1942/3 97,424 92 50,863 46,653 
'1943/4 129' 322 41 1l6,93G 13,430 
'194%5 154,899 3 I 104,906 49,996 
1945 6 137, 806 188 69,241 68,?53 
1946/7 141,075 451 69,556 7ll,970 
'19 47/8 1?5,992 233 I 103,259 '72,966 
! 1948i9. I -~01, 5_21 10 51,281 _50,_250 
K From Industrial Censuses, :t•efer to financial years of 
e Refer to calendar years - the second year mentioned. 
ll Include ships' stores except for years 1939/40-1942/3 
are not available. 
'of consum- • 
;et ion. 
(17,754) I 
(19,181) I 
21,525 
23,302 
25,082 
26,436 
27,878 
27,173 
30) 526 
39,419 
46, 7 28 
38,533 
36' 69 3 
39,583 
63,573 
71,230 
65,062 
i ndi vi dual firms 
for which they 
1913/4 
~ = 
..8.1Iler ica 5,601 
Asia 4,428 
il..frica 539 
.R.ustralasia 402 
Spain 8 
Total Cane 10,978 
BEET : 
No America 747 
Europe 8,924 
Total Beet 9,671 
GRAND TOTAL 20,649 
TABLI~ 1. 
SUG.H.R CROPS OF THE WORLD 2 1213/4 and 1912/20 to 1232/40. 
(thousands 
1919/20 1921/2 1923/4 1925/6 
. 
7,320 7,692 8,319 9,760 
5,463 5,519 6,619 7 ,o66 
651 592 640 749 
254 417 335 698 
6 15 9 9 
13,694 14,235 15,942 18,282 
750 1,041 890 937 
2,917 4,491 5,665 8,348 
3,667 5,532 6,555 9,285 
17,361 19,761 22,497 27,567 
of short tons) 
1927/8 1929/30 1931/2 1933/4 1935/6 1937/8 
9,142 8,642 7,806 9,130 9,595 
7,723 8,022 8,727 7,932 8,704 9,412 
730 783 837 1,050 1,059 1,200 
659 673 771 882 877 1,064 
10 29 18 22 14 
18,264 19,006 17,688 19,792 21,285 
1,111 1,156 1,202 1,707 1,239 1,345 
8,996 9,120 8,359 8,814 10,118 10 '783 
10,107 10,276 9,561 9,891 11,357 12,128 
28,371 30,000 28,567 27,579 31,149 33,413 
Source South African Sugar Year Book, No. 13, 1943/4. 
(acknowledged to Messrs. Willett and Gray). 
1939/40 
9,756 
9,021 
1,184 
1,190 
14 
21,165 
1,723 
10 '717 
12,440 
33,605 
~"PP!:IY.J>/K If. 
PRODUCTION .t.~.ND CONSU1IPTION OF SUG.aR IN SOUTrl AFRICA, l930-49a TONS. 
Year Area Cane Sugar Opening Refining Closing 
under crushed Production Imports Stock Exports Losses Stock Consumption 
Cane 
a B 
1929-30 309,918 3,005,663 298,635 18,400 34,209 127,245 4,620 20,245 199,134 
1930-31 289 ,o 53 3,803,883 393,205 5,886 20 ,245 193,326 5,580 35,176 185,254 
1931-32 300,860 3,130,783 325,899 _4,268 35,176 159,517 4,773 15,354 185,699 
1932-33 372,189 3,489,960 3 58,905 490 15,354 179,322 3,880 10,114 181,433 
1933-34 390,890 3,673,375 391,173 870 10,114 190,846 3,791 7,884 199 '536 
1934-35 383,463 3,874,215 358 '738 1,226 7,984 121,194 4,468 25,861 216,423 
1935-36 393,004 3,867,536 417,318 736 25,861 212,506 3,839 9,468 218 '102 
1936-37 395,268 4,181,973 446,409 1,298 9,468 169,599 5,385 30,759 251,432 
1937-38 390 '519 4,489-,022 507,210 1,496 30,759 258,047 3,589 17,612 260,217 
1938-39 388,544 4,658,962 522,732 1,697 17,612 22~,811 5,249 29,477 283 '504 
1939-40 3 75,670 5,346,006 595,556 1,114 29,477 30 ,827 4,829 20,458 292,033 
1940-41 369,392 5,309,227 572,880 1,295 20,860 234,025 5,638 25,242 330,130 
1941-42 373,063 3,921,436 452,119 2,013 25,105 59,336 6,495 32,846 380 '560 
1942-43 373,603 4,704,430 524,975 1,062 32,822 60,826 6,o6o 3 5,215 450 '758 
1943-44 375,192 5,278,914 585,392 1,036 35,104 154,408 5,535 19,554 442,035 
1944-45 371,829 5,351,945 614,158 1,360 19,530 111,990 6,752 31,159 485,147 
1945-46 376,287 4,607 ,o 55 553,074 848 31,094 71,741 6,215 57,976 450 ,o84 
194-6-47 378,921 3,990,017 474,769 780 57,891 10,000 8,139 72,961 442,340 
1947-48 387,475 4,543,255 512,005 20,898 72,920 10,000 7,775 63,422 524,626 
1948-49 406,160 5,216,144 607,845 10,905 63,422 15,024 7,5oO(i) 81,275 578,373 
Notes All figures from Sugar Year Books. 
A. Year ends on 30th April of second year. · 
B. From 1932/3-1948/9 for Europeans and non-Europeans, otherwise for :Suropeans a+one. 
area under cane owned by Europeans for other years was as follows : 
336 '500 1932-3 
1933-4 347,991 
1934-5 355,714 ( i) Estimate of the writer. 
....... 
~ 
:--., 
,A;?'lJ £ N •• Nir _4, 
·CONSUMPTION OF SUGAR L"N" SOUTH .aFRICA, 1930-49o TONS. 
Sales of white Industrial Consumption 
sugar Sales of 
Year Consumption Government Total 
For direct To manuf- Sugar Sales Aerated Jams Sweets 
consumption acturers ·tla ter etc. 
A B B B 
1929-30 199,134 156,516 24,217 180 '733 2,300 6,071 11,497 
1930 .... 31 185,254 156,974 22,664 179,638 
1931-32 185,699 158,038 23,279 181,317 
1932-33 181,433 155,405 25,482 180 ,887 2,331 7,141 11,306 
1933-34 199,536 175,559 23;803 198,362 2,699 7,696 13,062 
1934-35 216,423 185,971 28,882 214,853 3 ,ooo 8,746 14,080 
1935-36 218,402 185,482 31,697 217,179 3,671 9,315 15,905 
1936-37 251,432 183,335 33,342 33,032 249,779 5,189 8,866 17,084 
1937-38 260,217 179,640 34,414 44,667 258,721 5,040 10,443 17,577 
1938-39 283 '504 178,275 38,418 65,114 281,807 4,770 9,062 ;18,860 
1939-40 292,033 168,469 43,773 78,677 290,919 5,361 16,252 18,038 
1940-41 3~0 ,130 189,132 51,117 88' 586 328,835 7,169 26,307 21,420 
1941-42 3 o,56o 197,446 72 '543 108 '558 378,547 8,557 34,373 24,414 
1942 .... 43 450 '758 240,606 70,819 144,271 455,696 8,790 34,898 26,843 
1943-44 442,035 212,057 78,430 150,512 440,999 10,008 46,671 28 '704 
1944-45 485,147 227,930 100,208 155,649 483,787 11,228 56,175 30,489 
1945-46 450 ,o84 204,488 88,500 152,598 445,586 10,724 51,757 27,882 
1946-47 442,340 205 '541 88,066 146,953 440,560 10,819 54,670 29,375 
1947-48 524,626 246,295 98,423 159,010 503 '728 12,283 66,846 29,967 
1948-49 578,373 313,342 89,781 164,785 567,908 15,614 41 ,o26 29,291 
Notes A. From Table I. 
Bo From Industrial Censuses. 
all other figures from Sugar Year Bookso 
/3~ 
Chapter 5. 
:MEAT 
-
The emphasis in this chapter will be on the production 
and consumption of fresh meat in general, for while an 
attempt will be made later to assess the degree to which 
the consumption of specific types of meat have changed dur-
ing the twenty years under review, an inadequacy of data 
makes it impossible to follow the discussion along the 
lines of the different meats. It must also be stressed at 
this stage that imports consisted of livestock from adjoin-
ing countries to be slaughtered at Union abattotre and also 
frozen and chilled meats from these and overseas sources. 
The figures for slaughterings will therefore, overstate 
thenumber of South .African livestock by the imports of 
slaughter livestock from neighb~ing countries like South 
west Afric a, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Basutoland and the 
( 1) 
Rhodesias. 
As in . the case of some of the other products already 
discussed, the period under review opened with the emphasis 
being placed upon the export possibilities of the livestock 
industry of the Union. The geographical and climatic con-
trols certainly seemed to be advantageous to the development 
of an export trade since the internal consumption, while 
quite cons idera.ble, was not sufficient to encourage ranch .. 
ing on a scale comparable with areas like the Argentine, 
Brazil , Australia and the u.s.A. which were the main produc• 
ing countries. The Union had. exported small quantities of 
frozen beef under contract to the military authorities of 
Italy but this had been confined to meat of an inferior 
quality. It was consistently stressed that South Africa 
could never hope to develop an export trade of any magnitude 
until the quality of her beef and mutton had improved in 
(1) It is also true that certain of the livestock included 
in imports were strictly for the . purpose of re-export 
especially a number of consi gnments from Southern 
Rhodesia between 1930 and 1937. 
/such 
such quantities as to ensure regular consignments so that 
the shipping companies could provide ships equipped with 
cold storage facilities. Frozen meat is transported at a 
temperature of between 10°- 20° Fahrenheit whereas the 
chilled product requires one of 28°-30° Fahreru1eit. and 
costs become higher because the carcases must be hung and 
not stacked. The poor quality of the South Afrj.can pro-
duct meant that it could be frozen, as in the freezing pro-
cess much of the flavour is lost, but was not at all suit-
able for chilled beef which was of course the commodity for 
which the higher demand existed on the London market. 
The main reasons for the poor quality of the meat, 
applying to both beef and mutton, were on the one hand that 
the demand within the Union placed a dominant influence on 
meat of poorer quality and on the other that the quality 
of the livestock wtself was greatly ·affected by the lro•ge 
proportion of native owned "scrub" cattle and the absence 
in many instances of a commercialized attitude towards 
farming by the European farmer himself. The nature of the 
demand function was in the main the outcome of the impor-
tance of the mine contracts and theil' influence of the gen-
eral consumption pattern, an influence which resulted in a 
pattern of prices in which the relatively small ~·emium 
for higher grade beef offered little inducement for improvew 
ment of quality. The fact that almost half the total number 
of cattle in the Union were owned by natives whose general 
attitude towards cattle resulted in their poor quality) 
exerted a strong influence upon the quality of the herd in 
general for in 1925 a survey of the Department of Agl•icul• 
ture showed that only 32% of European owned cattle were of 
an improved type. It was furthermore stated in 1934 that 
about 80% of the cattle entering the abattoirs every year 
were ordinary medium or scrub and "this position has a 
baneful effect on pastoral industres generally and on the 
/cattle 
( 1) 
cattle ipdustry in particular." 
The position as regards mutton was very similar. The 
sheep population of the Uni·:>n was mainly of a Merino type 
( 2) 
reared for their wool quali-ties and whilst the quality of 
their mutton and lamb was high enough to satisfy local re--
quirement s, it was hardly adequate to compete with the Au e .. 
tralian and New Zealand pro1iucts on th:e London market. Any 
attempts at export would ne ·:::essi tate considerable oro sa-
breeding, and provision of !3nsilage, good ~ and grain con-
centrate to augment natural grazing, the value of which is . . 
on the average in South Africa very poor. 
The importance of the ,;xport trade was therefore two-
fold. It could do much to :tmprove the quality of the local 
livestock by increasing the demand for higher quality meat 
and thereby. coonteract the :Lnfluence of the local market, 
and it would also, it was submitted, increase the income of 
the producer by being a subistitute for t he low priced maize 
and wool on the world markets. It has already been stressed 
( 3) 
in the discussion on maize~ how the world price of that 
commodity fell diaa.st~ouely in the early 1930 1 e due to the 
accumulation of sto cks in the Argentine and Danube valley; 
at the same time it was rumoured abroad that there were 
frlt;:gne of a shortage in the world production of beef as a re-
sult of droughts and the prt~vailin g competition of rising 
wool prices in the late 1920 1 s. In an article in Farming 
( 4) 
in South Africa in 1930 O.J. Uys maintained that as a re-
( 5) 
sul t of a decret~se in the number of cattle in the Ar gentine 
( \"' . ) :Briti{~ ' s main source of supply of 404,000 between 1927 
and 19 28 and a f all of 24% :Ln the export of chilled and 
"Farming in Soutb . .African, October 1934. 
About 12% of the total number of sheep were non-wooled 
breeds. 
See pa. ge 3'? 
I.J:;_ 
~ ~1 
~ ~.~ 
(~. ) 
"Meat Expol·t of the Unionn by c. J. Uys; "Farming in South 
Afr:l.ca" May, 1930 pp 5. 
• 
This was not confined to the Argentine for in the U.S. A. 
cattle decreased from 6B million in 1920 to 55 in 1928 
and in Australia ·was o. bout 20% 
frozen meat, Great Britian had become greatly concerned 
and it was suggested that South Africa could assist in meet-
ing the meat shortage. The advisability of diverting the 
export of maize to stock/ feed and exporting the cereal in l ( 1) 
the form of beef have already been examined and when the 
price of wool on the world market began to fall the export 
of mutton as a substitute for wool gained more and more sup. 
port. The export of meat was however, in the nature of a 
vicious circle: it was one of the main means of improvi~g 
the quality of stock but at the same time itself depended 
for its success and profitability on an improvement. In 
view of the fact that the South African product would not be 
able to compete with thebetter quality products from the 
Argentine; Australia and New Zealand, it was necessary to 
( 2) 
pay a subsidy on the export and in addition an indirect 
subsidy was obtained in respect of the lower railage rates 
on meat. destined for export. As a. l·esul t of this pro pagan• 
da and monetary incentives to export, the quantity of beef 
exported overseas (i.e. not including South West Africa and 
the Rhodesias) from South African cattle increased from 
( 3) 
about 1,500,000 lbs in 1928 to 22,000,000 lbs in 1933. 
An important factor in regard to the export of meat 
from South Africt.~ was the out come of the ottawa Conference 
held in 1932 whereby certain restrictions were imposed by 
Great Britian on the importation of meats from foreign 
sources. In the case of chilled beef importation from for-
eign countries was not to exceed the 19 3!· 2 leveJ., the im-
portation of frozen bee~ and mutton was to be reduced by 5% 
per quarter until a level of 65% would be reached in April -
June 19 34 with the proviso tr.tat Australia '::S export of mutton 
( 3) 
See a bove, page 3b • 
On frozen and chilled beef an(.export subsidy ranging 
from 35-20% on the former and 35-25% in respect of the 
latter was gazetted on 22nd July, 1932. 
Figures from the Official Year Books. R~odesian and 
South West African cattle have been sub•tracted. 
/and 
and lamb to the U.K. was not to exceed the 1932 level. On 
the e~pectation that the United Kingaom1 s demand for meats 
would not fall, it was confidently e~pected that the reduc-
tion in the participation by foreign countries in this mar-
ket , would be of consj_ders.ble benefit to South African meat 
producers. 
Within South Africa the main concern centred around the 
violently fluctuating prices of livestock to producers. 
~~ile they were in some part inherent in the auction system 
and out-of-hand sales which predominated the local market-
ing, the higb~y variable and uncertain climatic conditions, 
which are typical over large parts of the Union , no doubt 
'i.{'l 
contributed mater :Lally in the instabiJ.i ty of the slaughter 
stock markets. The practi~ of out-of-r~nd purchase on the 
hoof must have also been the cause of greater instability 
and the resulting uncertainty, combined with the widespread 
belief that auction sales were frequently manipulated by 
the stock deale~s resulted in more and more stock being pur-
chased by the wholesale butehers or speculators from the 
farmers direct or at the ccuntry auctions, which merely 
served to aggravate the position further. 
With the seasonal variation in the numbers of 11 vestock 
sent to the slaughter poles, it was inevitable that price 
I 
fluctuations would be considerable and it was a fact of 
course that the very fluctuations should have tended to in-
duce a greater measure of stability in the supplies by 
creating an incentive to produ cere to market the:i.r eta ck in 
11 non- flush" periods. There can be little doubt that this did 
in fact occur but it was probably not the producers them-
selves who reaped the benefits but rather the speculators 
and others who bought the stock from the farmer direct and 
offered. it when prices had improved in harmony with a temp-
orary shortage of supplies. The speculators were in fact 
performing a highly useful economic function but the general 
disatisfaction on the part of the producer "added to the de-
pressed conditions of the industry during the second half 
of the twenties, and the subsequent drastic decline in 
prices during the 1929-33 depression (made) attempts to (1) 
alleviate the situation • • • • • • inevitable. 11 
Therefore, in addition to the substantial subsidies on 
the export of fresh meat under the Export Subsidies Act of 
1931, an attempt at regulated marketing was made in 1932 by 
the establishment of a Meat Trade Board of three members 
/3~. 
under Emergency Act No.29 of 1932, with powers to determine 
t he maximum.number of cattle and sheep which could be sold 
during any particular period on any m~~ket as defined by the 
Board. As its powe~s were extremely limited it was super-
ceded by a larger and more representative Board established 
under the Livestock and Meat Industries Act (No. 48 of 1934) 
which provided for the regulation of the marketing of slaugll-
ter stock on the major inter nal markets ; for an imposition 
of a levy on all cattle slaughtered at abattoir poles for 
commercial purposes; for the payment of bo~ties on the export 
of meat fr om the proceeds of such levy and for the introduc-
tion of a Cattle Improvement Scheme. 
The Board commenced operation on the Rand market where 
about 40% of the cattle and 22% of the sheep slaughtered in 
the Union were elau~1tered on the assumption that if prices 
could be stabilized on that market the influence would spread 
to the other markets fairly quickly. In order to regulate 
the supply of slaughter stock onto this market the permit 
system was introduced, whereby no stock could be brought in• 
to the Rand controlled area from either the remainder of 
South Africa, or outside territories, except by permit. The 
permits were based on the estimated saturation level of de-
mand at the desired price level. This form of control was 
extended to Ca~- Town in March, 1936 and Durban in october 
(1) Report of National Marketing Council on Marke ting Boa rds 
U.G. 27/47 pp 149 . 
/1942. 
1942. 
In··.addi t ion the Board did all it could to stimulate the 
auction system in preference to the selling of stock out-of-
hand, since it believed that auctions would stimulate compe-
tition and restrict the operations of speculators. Thus in 
139. 
Cape Town, where private sales had always been more popular, 
the Board developed a well patronized auction market by ~·ant-
ing preferential treatment in the granting of permits to 
those applicants who wished to bring supplies directly into 
controlled areas to slaughter for their own account. The 
permit system was ri~ver very successful because of the large 
number of applications to be dealt with at certain times of 
the year; because it was impossible to take into account the 
supply conditions of all the different regions in granting 
quotas although the Board. die. follow the policy of gl·Jmting 
preferenc·e to drought-stricken areas, a,nd most important be-
issued 
cause there was no means of ensuring that all permitsLwould 
be taken up. In actual fact nothing like the number of per-( 1) 
mite issued would be taken up and so while at certain times 
ovel· 25,000 applications were made when the weekly quota was 
( 2) . 
between 5,000 and 6,000 it was quite possible that in .issu-
ing 6, 000 only 4, 000 waul d be used. Ell the ~.ai t system 
could really achieve was a slight ironing out of uneveness in 
the supplies during the peak months but without· offering any 
extra incentive it could not hope to divert supplies on any 
substantial scale to the periods of short supply. 
( 1) Issue and use of permits_on Joh~nesbur~ ma£ket. 
' 
1 Ran~e in ~erce~ta~~ us~ over 6 fl~sh months.'' 
' Cattle . 1 Sheep 
'19~.----- 54 - 70 ' 68 - 82 ' 
' 1940 ' 59 - 70 63 - 78 ' 
' 1941 ' 44 ~ 69 50 ~ 67 
I 1942 I 48 • 54 46 • 56 
( 2) s ource : u.G. 2?/47 pp 150. U.G. 2?/47 pp 150. 
/Whenever 
Whenever supplies appeared to be in excess of require-
ments on the controlled markets the Board arranged for the 
!Ito. 
supplies to be taken off the market at agreed prices and ex-
ported. Thus in Johannesburg the Department of Agriculture 
was itself responsible for the preparations of severw. ship-(1) 
menta of chilled beef while monthly shipments were inaug-
urated through East London by the Cape Eastern Meat Export 
Association. To encourage the production of high grade 
slaughter- stock and to develop an overseas outlet the Board 
also subsidized, from the proceeds of the levy of 2/• per 
head of cattle, 6d per calf and 3d per sheep or goat, the 
export of high grade fat lamb and mutton to the British mar-
ket. Nevertheless and despite the general propaganda on the 
p&•t of the authorities to further the export trade, the 
quantity exported remained insignificant in comparison to ( 2) 
slaughterings within the Union. 
In furthering their .!--POlicy for the betterment of the 
livestock of the Union, there was included in the powers of 
the Livestock and Meat Industries Control Board a provision 
for the introduction of a cattle Improvement Scheme. This 
was instituted by proclaiming Improvement Areas, at the re-
quest of the farming community, in which after a period of 
not less than 12 months and not more than 18, no bull might 
be kept or introduced without inspection. In conjunction 
with this scheme a Bull Subsidy Scheme was introduced where ... 
by approved bulls could be bought on a Government subsidy up 
(1) Between November, 1934 and M~ , 1935 the Depm·tment org-
anised and prepared 17 shipments (3054 head of cattle) 
and between February and May there were regular weekly 
shipments apart from a fortnight break in March. 
(2) Exports of Beef , Mutton and Lamb subsidized by the Live• 
stock and Meat Industries Control Board. 
' Beef ' Mutton and Lamb ' 
No. of I % of annual' No. of ' %of annuaJ ' Year 
1 carcasses'~l~~hterin~' carcasses 'slaughterings' 
t 19 34• 5 t 3, 223 1 • 6 t - I ... I 
' 1935-6 17,707 ' 3.0 ' 740 
I 19 36.,. 7 5 , 212 t • 8 4 , 48 6 
1 1937 ... 8 3,182 • 5 29, 97? , 
t 1938-& 8,247 1.2 46,858 
1939-40 8,474 ' 1.2 80,769 
1940•1 9,495 I 1.2 I 23,803 
1941 -2 354 I 
.1 
' .. 9 
1.3 
2.1 
• 6 
sou~- : u.G~.~l70~/~44~.--------------------------------
/to 
to £12-10 per bull and £25 per applicant, the latter in-
( 1) 
creased to £50 in 1938. 'l'he poor quality of the bulls 
previous to the introduction of this scheme is revealed by 
the fact that over half of those inspected were rejected. 
It was recognized that provision for the scheme was by no 
means adequate to ensure the development of a sound live-
stock industry and further steps were taken to assist in its 
development. For instance it was recognized that the off-
spring of the improved bulls would require better handling 
and feeding, so in 1936 a subsidy scheme for the erection of 
silos in maize producing areas was initiated by the Govern-
Ito. 
ment in an attempt to encourage a system of mixed farming in 
the maize belt whereby the cattle reared on the ranches would 
be sent into the maize belt . for fattening. Government ass is-
tunce was originally limited to bona fide maize farmers in 
certain districts where t he Department of Agriculture was 
convinced th~G a change over to mixed farming would be bene-
ficial, but later extended over the whole Union, and amount-
ed to 25% on final evaluation of silo or shed provided that 
prior approvement had been granted. A limitation of £50 per 
farm and £100 per farmer was set. 
The drought of 1933 and 1934 affected the alaughterings 
of sheep to a far greater extent than cattle as is reflected 
in the figures in Appendix ~ on page ~7, but it also led to 
a maJ.•ked increase in wholesale prices for sheep in 1933-34 
when in comparison with cattle price s, t hey ruled at very 
( 2) 
hi gh levels. When climatic conditions reverted to nearer 
{1) 
( 2) 
By August, 1937 there were 124 :tmprovement districts and 
£138,000 had been paid out in re spect of 15,590 bulls or 
an average of £8-17-6 each. (Annual Report, Secretary of 
Agriculture, 1937). 
Indices of wholesale prices of cattl e, sheep and pigs on 
!h.£._ Joha.nne sbu~ g mar_!<et. ( 1924L5-1~38L9 • 100) 
1 1 Ca. ttl e ' Sheep 1 . Pigs 1 
' '(Good medium) ' ~Mediu~. Uerinos)' (Baconer s and' 
t 
1 and C.£f!l~ound ' ' Po~~~ ' 1929-30 f' · - B- I - 9Q I • 118 I 
19 30-1 t 9 3 I ? 2 8 4 I 
1931 ... 2 81 ' 56 67 
1932-3 ?4 ·63 63 
1933-4 94 109 105 
t 1934-5 94 108 101 
1935-6 99 93 90 
1936-7 106 97 ?8 
Source : U.G. 2?/47 pp 148. 
/t., 2-
the norm, and sheep supplies increased the prices once (1) 
again fell into line with one another. The discouraging 
feature of the m~·ket for beef viz lack of inducement to pro-
duce quality beef, unfortunate in view of the pressing need 
to improve the quality of livestock, remained and in fact the 
difference between first grade and compound beef prices de-
clined as a result of the increased demand by the mines for 
their natives in 1935-36 but gradually the rtpremium" in-
cre ased as the process of urbanisation continued and with in-
creased purchasing power the demand for quality by Europeans 
began to influence the market against and the domination of 
( 2) 
compound re,quirements. In an attempt to develop the mar-
ket for quality in south Africa. the National - Mark Scheme 
was extended to meat on local markets, the difference between 
the price for National-mark prime and compound beef on t he 
Johannesburg market being between 14/ ... and 17/- per 100 1 bs 
dressed weight. The extent to w~~ch the demand for beef by 
t he mines 
/dominated the total demand pattern is revealed by the fact 
that the grading of carcasses brought into the Johanne s hlrg 
abbatoir during 1937-38 ahowed the following percentages of ( 3) 
total supply of beef. 
(1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
19 37-38 .......... 1938-39 
Compound..... . . . . . . . . . . . . 55. 2 • . • • • • • • • • • 32 
Ordinary medium. • . • • • • • • • 27.? • • • • • • • • • • • 31 
Good mediums . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.8 . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
The actual average realised pr ice for medium ~·ade mutton 
on t he Johannesburg and Pretoria markets fell from 6.2d 
in January, 1935 to 4.8d in January, 1936, and for lamb 
from 6.3d to 5.3d. 
Prices of beef on the Johannesburg market. (dressed weight 
in shillings per lOQ_lb.) ·- __ 
1 1 Prime 'Good Medium' Good Compound ' 
July, 19 35 30.5 26.5 23.2 t 
December, 1935 ' 33.7 29.2 25 .5 
June, 1936 31.0 26.? 23.0 
December, 1936 37.0 31.5 27.0 
' June, 193? 34.0 29.75 ' 26.0 
t December, 193? 4?.?5 ' 41.0 35.25 
' June, 1938 38.25 1 33.5 29.5 
December, 1938 41.0 39.0 35.0 
Jun~, 1939 3?.5 34.5 29.?5 
Source Annual Reports, Secretary 
of Agr i cu1 tur e. 
11 Grading of Beef" by R. Hirzel ; "Farming in Sout h Africa.", 
1938 pp 1 ?3. 
/Prime 
P1·ime 
Super 
..................... 3.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
••••••••••••••••••• ..:..• .:...• _.;;..• ..:;.4 ••• ••• •••••••••• 
4.5 
2.5 
100.0 100 
On the assumption that no compound beef was beine; consumed by 
Europeans and that non-Europeans consumed nothing but compound 
only 10/o of consumption of beef by Europeans consisted of 
high quality meat. The improvement is reflected in the second 
column which shows the percentaee during 1938-39. 
The export of beef continued but on a declining scale al" 
though under Government propaganda and the :payment of Govern-
ment subsidies and the Board's bounties based on quality,the 
... Tatal Stock Owners .Association commenced export from Du1·ban 
and the Co-operative ~ .. eat Co. Ltd was f ormed in Kimberley for 
the same purpose. The Government announced that it would pay 
subsidies on the export of meat at the 1939 levels for a fur ... 
ther 5 years after wb.ich they would decrease by 201~> -p.-~ a. The 
Board bowever, gave the assurance that provided its finances 
and market condi tj.ons permitted it, the decrease in the amount 
(1) 
of subsidy would be made up by increased bounty payments. 
It would seem t he refore that the official attitude was still 
that South Africa could and should develop an export trade in 
meat even at the cost of pa~ying very substantial subsidies to 
encou1•age JGhat development. 'rhtlls was the attitude which pl·e-
vailed wb.en v:ar broke out in September , 1.939. 
~ben one examines the total production of beef , veal, 
mutton and lamb, in abattoirs and on farms, the increase be 
tween 1932-3 and 1 938-9 amounts to approximately 20/'o lor 3.3/~ 
p.~) but it is significant to realize that the increase in 
respect of mutton and lamb between 1924-5 and 1936-7 was in 
t.b.e region of 11/" p , a, Thel·e was first tbe drop in supply of 
(1) The followin~ 
on the expor-c 
Chilled Beef 
Grade .i:1 
GrG.de B 
Grade c 
:r.·rozen Beef 
_X - quality 
Frmzen .u.u tt on 
Grade A. 
Grade B 
Frozen Lamb 
Grade A 
Grade B 
Gl•a.de C 
were the rates of sub~idy and 
of certain meant in lg3?. 
Subsidy Bounty 
1-~-~ · ltd. 
1 . a. l4d. 
-lfd. 1 d. 
_a_d 4 • 3d 4 . 
?d 1 1 dl § . ltd. -;rd . 
l~ifd . 1 ~l.d. 
1 d. ltd. 
id. 1 d. 
bounty paid 
/ ___ .._.I. --· 
!Lt 3 . 
mutton and lamb following the severe droughts of 1932-3 and 
1933-4 after which slaughterings of small stock increased at 
a far greater rate than did slaughterings of cattle and 
cal vee, a state of affairs which the National Marketing Couno-
il maintains was evidence of the change over in many parts of (1) 
the country, from. wool to catt.le farming. An examination 
of the relative prices for wool and slaughter stock reveals 
that it was after the 1936-7 season that the change in favour 
of beef occurred, a change which was likely to induce substi-
( 2) 
tution of cattle ranching for wool growing. Furthermore 
the figures for the number of sheep in South Africa support 
the contention that it was after 1937 that the substi·tution 
must have occurred for up to that date the number of sheep hai 
been increasing showing that slaughterings were lees than the 
natural increase. It appears .ltlll:el~ef:ore that the substantial 
increase in s1aughterings in the two seasons 1935·6 and 
1936~7 was probably a natural outcome of the improvement in 
the climatic conditions for despite the fact that during this 
two-year period the increase amounted to about 11% p.a. in 
1937-8 the production of mutton and lamb was only slightly 
above the level of 193~3, before the effect of the drought 
was felt. 
Slaughteringe contmued to increase considerably; in the 
first three seasons of the war the increase in total produc-
tion of beef, veal mutton and lamb were 7%, 11% and 7% respe~ 
tively while in the case of slaughterings at the abattoirs 
only, the increase was even greater. The demand for meat, 
possibly accentuated by an increased demand for stock for 
U.G. 27/47. 
Price Indices of Wool, Beef and Mutton prices. 
(~9~6L7- 1938/9 = loo). 
1 Year 1 Wool 1 Beef 1 Mutt-on~ 
' 19 35- 6 1 00-' 8 2 91 
I 1936-7 123 88 - 9$ 
' 1937-8 98 104 1"()'9 
' 1938-9 79 108 97 
' 1939-40 117 105 105 
' 1940-1 103 ' 113 109 
· Source : U.G. 10/44, pp 14. 
/speoul ati ve 
speculative reasons, however, increased. even more markedly (1) 
and the result was that livestock prices rose enormously. 
As the permit system operated under the Meat Board was pri• 
ma.rily intended to deal with a surplus positlon, it was aJ. ... 
together inap~ropriate under the conditions of relative 
scarcity which developed, and was in effect suspended, al-
though retained nominally. To ease the ei tuation exports of 
meat to England were di econtinued; apart from a few ClPI!laign-
ments during 1941 the aim of which was to retain a place on 
the British market; and to assist producer exporter organi-
zations; the weight requirements and quotas on imports from 
( 2) 
the adjoining territories were withdrawn; and in order to 
prevent as far as possible the purchase of milital~y require-
ments from further encouraging the inflationary spiral of 
prices, the Food Control Organization took over the supply 
of meat to the military. 
In their report on the position in 1943-4 the Meat Com-
mission arrived at the conclusion that the increased slaugh~ 
erings of cattle and sheep during the first three years of 
the war had not resulted in any serious inroad. j.nto the cap-
ital of the industry. It is important to remember that 
slaughterings may ·either be part of the natural increase ol~ 
they may be from the actual livestock which are to produce the 
net increase in the future years. As long as the total livew 
stock population was increasing, it was safe to say that the 
(1) Indices of wholesale prices of Cattle, Sheep and Pigs on 
the Joha.nnesbUl'f£ market 1938i9-.~9.4.2L3 (1924i5-1938/9 aloo) 
' Cattle ' Sheep ' Pigs ' 
' (Good medium ' (Medium :,[erinos) ' ( Baconel·s and t 
' and comEOUJ.'!d;} ' Po.;:~rs __ 
1938/9 I 127 I 99 118 -~, 
1939/:40 124 I 108 107 ~ 
1940/J 133 ' 111 97 ' 1941/~ 162 ~ 136 113 
1942 3 195 ' 1 ?8 158 
2 Under a Trade Agreement the number of catti-e~1-n~t~~~u-c-e~d~~  
from adjoining territories had been restricted as follows: 
Southern Rhodesia 5,200 per annum 
:Sechuanaland 10 ooo " " Swaziland 4; 500 " " 
South West Africa No restri~ion 
In 1940 Southern Rhodesia discontinued to export live~ 
stock to the Union, but the increase in numbers from 
other territor ies is revealed in Appendix r-t • 
/slaughterings 
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slaughterings came from the natural increase. In the case 
of cattle the population had risen fairly consistently from 
1934 to 1939 whereas in the case of sheep the peak was reach• 
ed in 1937 after which it had begun to fall due, as we have 
discussed above, to the increased relative profitability of 
cattle rearing over wool gJ."'owing. No Agricul tura.l Census 
had been taken since 1939 owing to shortages of staff, and so 
the findings of the Meat Commission were arrived at before 
the results of the 1943 census which covered rural areas only1 
were known. On the basis of an annuul natural increase of 
364,000 head of cattle per annum in the period 1935 to 1939, 
and having in mind that some 46,000 more cattle were being 
introduced every year from adjoining territories than in pre-
war years, there still remained a substantial 11margin 11 be-
tween slaughterings and the natural increase. The findings 
as regards cattle were proved by the results of the 1943 ceo-
sus of the number of livestock as the increase amounted to 
approximately 1, 200,000 in the space of 4 years, or about 
2. 5~b p. a. as compared with an j_ncrease of approximately 3% 
p.a. between 1934 and 1939. 
The examination of the position in respect of sheep 
slaughterings did not resu1t in the same optimism on the part 
of the Meat Commission. Approximately 1, 000, 000 mo_re sheep 
were slaughtered in 1942 compared with 1939 and even ~low-
ing for the increase in small stock imported from neighbour-
ing territories, "the Commission cannot avoid the impression 
that the census which is now being taken will show a reduction 
in the present sheep population when compared with that of (1) 
1939". This conclusion was borne out by the 1943 census 
wh~h revealed that the number of sheep in the Union had de-
clined by approximately 400~000 While the Comrndssion did 
note the possibility of a reduction in the sheep population, 
(1) U.G. 10/44 pp 5. 
/in othel~ 
in other words recognised that the increased production of 
mutton had in part been derived from cutting into the capi-
tal stock of the country, they regarded the probable decrease 
as so small as not to ~ffect the general position to any sub-
stantial degree and therefore came to the conclusion t~ "the 
supply position in regard to cattle could be regarded as fun" 
damentally sound (and as regards sheep that) as a res~ of 
the past two favourable lambing seasons, the position will ( 1) 
right itself in the near future." 
While it concluded that the decrease in the livestock 
population of the Union would, if any at all, be negligible 
the Meat Commission did not attempt to argue with the fact 
that there had already appeared a. sca.rci ty of meat. The main 
factors causing the enormous increase in demand were omnside~ 
ed to be the increase in the nwnber of convoys on the Cape 
route following Italy's entrance .into the war on the side of 
the Axis cou~tries; the demand of the military where meat is 
the basis of the diet; the increased demand by evacuees and 
prisoners of war; the concentration of the population in ur ... 
ban centres and the generally increastd purchasing power 
of the consumer. 
It is difficult to provide evidence as tc the increase 
in meat supplied to passing convoys as ship's stores since 
no figures were published in the .Annua.l Reports of the Board 
of Trade and Shipping for the years 1940 to 1943 inclusive. 
Nevertheless from the figures for 1939 and 1944 it is evi-
dent that the increase must have been fairly consideraQle and 
in an attempt to bridge the gap of four years certain unpub-
lished figures originating in the Department of .Agriculture 
are included to provide some idea of the increase in the years 
~941, 1942 and 1943 which were the busi~t on the trade route 
around the Cape to and from the Far East. These figures show 
(1) U.G. 10/44 pp 6. 
/that 
that in 1944 the quantity of beef, mutton and po:r·k increased 
by almost ~ , 500,000 lbs but in 1942, the maximum year, tbe 
difference was more t.h~n 29,000 , 000 lbs. It is difficult to 
judge the reliability of t he fie;:ures fol' the years 1941, 1942, 
and 1943 without any means of checking on them, yet it woul d 
seem that the quantity of beef mutton, veal and pork shipped 
as stores amounted to approximately .1~ of the total. produc-
tion of these meats in the Union in 1939, approximately 3. 61o 
in 1942 and . ?% in 1944. It is probable that the unpublished 
figures are in excess of the actual quantity shipped, and 
while the quantity itself increased substa.ntia.lly, it neverthe ... 
less remuined. insignificant when compared with the total con-(1) 
sumption. 
·As far as the demands of the military axe concerned, j_t 
is difficult to obtain data to prove how much this demand 
affected the supply position but in view of the fact that the 
requirements of the troops at the front were in the form of 
preserved and canned meats and the consistent statements a-
ppearing in official sources , to the effect that Union manu-
facturers were not taking advantage of the mili ta.ry demand for 
meat , it seems likely that the increase in demand must have 
been limj.ted to the l'equil·ements of training troops within 
the Union. Since this in fact was not the creation of a new 
demand but merely the substitution of a .1lili te.ry one for a 
civilian, tl:'Lc Wl'i ter is inclined to the view that the increase 
arising from this factor was not as substantial as it has been 
( 2) 
made out to be. Similarly the wrj_ ter is inclined to the 
(1) 
( 2) 
The increase in quantity mhi~ped as stores ~~ounted to 
155o of the increase in total production of beef , veal , 
mutton, lq.mb and pork betvreen 1939 and 1942 and only 4/d 
bet\.yeen 1939 and 1944. See Table 1 page ~~-,_ 
The vn·iter does not dispute the fact that military re-
quirements were substantial but this docs not necessa-
rily mean that the net increase in demand (i.e. vr.hen re-
duction in civilian demand due to enlistment is subtract-
ed fr om milit~·y requirements) was as considerable. The 
only reason to suppose that mi1i tary requirements in-
creased the total demand lies in the proposition that non-
Europeans troops were better fed in the army than in 
civilian life. 
/view 
(4'3. 
view t~t the increase in demand caused by the influx of 
evacuees and prisoners of war has been grossly exag~erate~ 
in explaining the rise in demand for meat products during 
the war yeaJ.' s. 
The Meat Co~mission also stresses the importance of the 
shortage of tractors and its effect of a substitution of trek 
oxen for ploughing and other operations formerly performed 
by tractors, and the increased speculation in farms caused 
by business men putting the5.r money into farms and stock as 
a stable form of investment, as an important cause in the 
shortage of meat supplies. BeaJ.•ing in mind the fact that this 
would have occasioned an increase in the livestock population 
during the war years, which did not occur especially after 
1943, the writer feels that once again too much emphasis has 
been placed upon certain factors and too little on the main 
causes of the increase in demand for meats viz. the increased 
prosperity of the country and to a lesser extent the greater 
concentration of demand in urban areas. 
The conclusion arrived at by the Comraiasion regarding 
the adequacy of supplies in the Union stressed that "were in-
creased slaughterings •••••• the only demand factor, supplies 
should be readily available to meet th.i s demand, provided it 
showed no further substant ia.l increase and supplies were not 
11( 1) 
adversly affected by unfavourable natural conditions • Since 
there were other demands however , like the need for trek oxen 
and the effects of speculation, which were in the natue of a 
cycle !ecreasing supplies to the market currently but which 
would supplement them l ater when the greater natural increase 
from a greater capital stock would appear on the market, the 
Commission accordingly advocated the·imposition of wider con-
trol over the marketing of livestock. They did not envisage 
any need for a forraal system of rationing with cards etc. but 
(1) u.G. 10/44 PP 10. 
/suggested 
suggested that since the shortage was not expected to be con-
siderable and since certain of the factors influencing demand 
were cyclical in nature) a form of rationing through the trade 
would be adequate to meet the circumstances. The practical 
difficulties of such a rationing scheme were well recognised 
and it was advocated that the non-European and poorer sections 
of the Europeans be encouraged to become regular customers of 
a certain butcher in order to ensure an equitable distribu-
tion of supplies among different income groups. .Also "the 
Commission ••• wishes to emphasise that it co nsiders effecj;ive 
price control as the ''sine qua non' of any attempt att ration-(1) 
ing. 11 
The applicability of the :permit system to conditions of 
scarcity had never been considered- the whole system had 
been introduced in ol·der to maintain a remunerative level of 
prices to the producer so that when prices began to rise eno~ 
( 2) 
mously reflecting the shortage of supplies in 1941 and 1942 
the efficacy of the permit system was revealed as bei;ng very 
limited. Accordingly in october, 1942 maximum wholesale and 
retaill selling prices , according to grade and cut , were intro-
duced in the 4 major urban centres. At the same time ''indica-
ted'' :prices were :published at which butchers were supposed to 
purchase their livestock from producers, and others in order 
to be able to aeJ.l at the fixed prices. Due to the growing 
( 3) 
sc;;u·c:i.ty of u..ll ty? e t o~ meat bu.tc 11er:found it impossible 
to obtai. n stock at~: the "indicated" prices because they were in 
competition wit .t butchers in uncontrolled areas, and conse-
quentJ.y the evasion of price regul atj.ons s oon became 
( 3) 
U.G. 10/44 pp 12. . 
As far as retail price s are concerned, do.ta produced by 
the Off ice of Census and. Statistics ehow a 20% increase 
in 1942 compared with the previous year in the case · of 
beef and mutton and one of 17% for pork. The increase 
cont i nued into 1943. Produ·cel'S 1 pr i c(\~ show Hn equally 
substantial i ncre~se (see footnote .. , on page l'iS ) • 
It is significant to note that 1941/2 was a peak yea:r for 
sJ.aughterj.ngs of cattl e J sheep a.nd pigs and they sfiawed 
a marked decline in subsequent years. 
/wide s pread 
!5o. 
widespread. 
It was next sought to restrain consumption and accord-
ingly quotas for butchers were introduced in respect of the 
Rand , C1..1.pe Town and Durban in July 1943, extended to Pieter-
mari tzburg, Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth, :E:ast London and 
Kimberley in October of the same yea1· and still later to all 
abattoirs in the Unien, the quat as being based upon the 
slaughterings during the first nine months of 1943. Even 
this extension of control did not prove sufficient to bridge 
the gap b.etween a decre:asj.ng supply and increasing consump-
tion so that following the repor·t of the !•fieat Commission in 
1944 a more coW,prehensi ve scheme of price control was intra-
duced under which notonly wholeatue and retail prices were 
fixed but also producers prices since even after the extended 
control introduced in 1943, the discrepancy between "indicate (1) 
ed" and the actual open market price continued to prevail. 
It was reaJ.i sed that maximum selling prices for meat 
could only be made effective if butchers could obtain their 
supplies at prices which would enable them to work on the fi~ 
ed eelJ.ing prices. In order to ensure this, and to introduce 
a more enforceable system of rationing, it would be necess'fU'y 
to aJ.so obtain effective control over stock supplies and so 
all slgughter stock introduced into the nine 1 a.rge urban ce n-
tres, which no1·ma.J.ly accounted for u.bou t ?0 to ?5% of the to-
( 2) 
tal urban consumption of meat was purchased by the Meat 
Controller through appointed agents at the fixed producers 
prices and allocated accord~ng to the quotas to the ~ferent 
butchers in each area.. 
In fixing prices to the producer it was found impl'a.c-
\ 
tiable in view of the even greater scarcity, to impose the -
(1) In fact, during the scarce months of 1943 it was greater 
than eve:r·, especially for cattle, see Table 2. , page 165 . 
( 2) U. G. 2? /4? pp 152. 
/level 
/:ft. 
level of 1942 indicated prices and they were therefore de-
termined on a slightly higher basis under the dres·sed weight 
and grade scheme also introduced in 1944. It was impossible 
however, to maintain one partl cul !.ll' pri co ovel' the whole 
yea:r as the supply of cattle in particular is extremely se~ 
son sl so winter premiums on cattle were announced at the be-
ginning of the season (about March or April) to increase at 
a given rate and later decline from about october. Since 
the supply of sheep and pigs to the slaughter houses are not 
nearJ.y so seasonal, producers' prices remained constant 
throughout the year. It was a.l so necessary to make allow-
ance for premiums between the different urban centres since 
farmers who continued to bear tbe cost of t~ansport to the 
market, naturally preferred the nea.rcet centres. Sunh cen-
tres as East London, Port Elizabeth, Kimberley and Bloemfon-
tein which are close to the important production areas can ... 
not normally absorb all the stock produced in their areas, 
certain centres like East London would with no inter-centre 
premiu@s attract a great deal of mutton but rela.tj. vely ~i ttle 
beef, so it was essential that some form of price differen-
tiation between the different urban centres be imposed. 
These premiums were however not rie;idly enforced and were 
altered from time to time in conformity with the prevailing 
supply conditions. 
The considerable fall in the number of ca.ttl e slaughter• 
ed in abattoirs in 1943 and 1944 is blamed on the misunder-
standing on. the part of furmers as to the exact purpose of 
the new scheme .. many were cUsinclined to market their stock 
until they had satisfied themselves e.s to its effect . The 
scheme as it was originally . introduced soon showed gre~t set~ 
backs especially insofar as it applied to the main urban are~ 
alone. .As the 1944 winter approached the supply posit ion 
gradually deteriorated and gave rj. se to all kinds of undesir-
able practices. Meat was reaching the controlled areas on an 
ever increasing seale by the "back door". More and roo re 
townsmen began to draw their meat supplies from butchers 
I.: •• _..._ 
just outside the controlled ~·eas. The business of these 
butchers expanded rapidly, and offered a growing market to 
producers and specuJ.H.to1·a who refused to abide by the fix-
ed prices. It became cleai that unless these and other 
tendencies were curbed, control would become seriously 
undel·mined. Thus in July, 1944 the maximum consumers' 
prices were extended to all districts, but the enforcement 
of such measures and others which were inevitable if the 
cont1·ol was to achieve its: ,purpose, vTas of course an ex-
tremely difficult undertaking in the rural areas. 
Speaking at a Congress in October, 1944, the Mini:Ster 
of .ngricul tu1·e said:-
"Meat was short , partly becm.:tse in the first four years 
of the war five years supply of cattle had been slaugh-
tered. In the year 1942 to 1943 about 300,000 head of 
cattle had been supplied for military purposes along 
and at the same time civilian consumption had increas-
ed. So great had been the drain of the Country's 
stock that the previous year's cows in calf' had been 
slaughtered as well as many of the country's breeding 
t'tnima.ls. The shortage , therefore was inevj.table." 
In view of the fact that less than a year previously tlJB.e 
Commission of Inquiry had come to the conelusion that the 
cattle position was fundamently sound and during 1943 and 
1944 t~ere were less cattle slaughtered than in the pre-
vious year, this statement i s most surprising. It does 
however, show that the effect of the increased sJ.aughter-
ings were long del~ed. It was not in the years 1940 to 
1943 when the slaughterings were at their height that the 
short~@e was greatest but during 1944 and 1945 which were 
the two most difficult years in respect of obtaining meat 
supplies by importation. Thus for instance the total im~ 
portation of meats and meat products from overseas reached 
its maximum of 16,500,000 lbs in the years 1941 and 1942 to 
fall to just over 7,000,000 lbs in 1944. Exports which 
/totaled 
1:73. 
totaled over 6,5COJOOO lbs in 1941 dropped to 600,000 in 
i 
1944. The result was that the Unions demand on the world's 
short supplies reached its maximum in the years when those 
supplies were at their lowest ebb and. when the Union itself 
was unable to contribute towards them. 
From the middle of 1942 under the international food 
planning of Combined Food Board and London Food Council the 
British Ministry of Food was appointed as sole buyer through-
out the world apro·t from North America and the United King-
dom. The first difficulty which arose was the unwillingness 
private 
oti the part of the Union Government tci prohibit . / import~ 
tion of meat. .As the whole success of the venture depended 
on the Ministry ofFood' s ability to obtain meat from the 
South American replublics at reasonable prices, which in turn 
depended on it beine placed in a monopolistic position as far 
as buying was conce1•ned, the Union Government d:i.d finally 
submit to the argument of the International body. 
The difficulties were not restricted to the mere avail-
ability of tbe meat products a.l though this of course played 
a major role especially in 1944 and 1945 when the increased 
demand from the liberated peoples of Europe and other former 
occupied countries made the po si ti on even more serious. 
There was also the quest ion of shipping which became more and 
more important as the war progressed until it reached its 
most difficult period in 1944 when with the preparation for 
the invasion of France and J. at er the need for a continuous 
lifeline across the Atlantic, little cou1d be spared for the 
route between South America and Smth .Africa. which as we have 
seen when discussing the maize position, was a major diffi• 
culty throug~tut the war period. There were however, other 
diffic:blties especiaJ.ly in regard to the importation o f can-
ed corned beef which was of course in demand for the front 
line troupe. The u.s.A. had refused to allow co rned beef to 
~e u sed as ships stores and had requested other Allied 
Nat ions to do the same, yet the applications for meat products 
/submitted 
submitted by South Africa. to the planning authorities contin-
ued to include corned beef to be supplied as ships stores. 
The United States had also introduced a. limitation on the 
consumption of corned beef by civilians and Great Britian 
continually tried to persua.o.e South J~frica to accept other 
meat products like corned porks in lieu of the beef product 
since she felt that if the u.s.A. was prepared to make the 
sacrifice others should do the same. The South .African au- . 
thorities however stated that they c·ould not accept products 
wh.ich were unknown in the country, an attitude which was 
maintained despite the critical position of 1944, but at the 
same time had to agree that no allocation to civilians would 
be made. The means of overcoming the crisis of 1944, whereby 
the Defence ~uthorities released 500,000 lbs of corned beef 
per week a.s long as the shortage lasted., v1ere hzu·d.ly likely to 
promote any feeling. of co-operation between the Union and the 
London Food Council who immediately came to the conclusion 
that the Defence requirements_ had been grossly overated in 
order to allow for this "magnanimous gesture 11 on their part. 
The attempt made -by the Government to obtain meat and 
meat products from overseas sources proved that they were 
well aware of the shortage within the Union but many of these 
efforts ran counter to the essential purpose and workin§B of 
the international organization and therefore came to nothing. 
On several occasions it approached the London Food Coancil in 
connection with offers from Sotth J:Jnerican packers, requests 
which could only be turned d.own if for no other reason than 
the principle involved in the British Ministry of Food~eing 
the sole buyer. It would appear th~~t South .American interests 
were attempting to break the monopoly hold of the Interna-
tional Organization and in their des ire to augment the short 
supplies within South Africa, the Union Government was in da~ 
ger of becoming their unwitting tool. Similar requests con-
tinued throughout 1945 and 1946 and the Food Controller atte~ 
pted to obtain permission for the importation of such 
/varieties 
varieties as Vienna Sausages which did not directly come 
. under the auspices of the Fooo. Council, only to be inform-
ed that sanction of such a request would merely encourage 
the dj.version of meat into the production of those a.rti-
more 
cles which were far jof a luxury nature than tinned beef. 
Whiie it was inevitable that a certain amount of misun-
derstanding should develop between the planning body and 
member countries it would seem that there were vonsidera-
tions other than purely economic, which influenced Gov~ 
ernment policy. 
The allocation of supplies within the Union during 
these critical years of 1944 and 1945 has been parti~ly (1) 
explained above, but it is time that the control mea-
sures were considered in a little more detail. Prior to 
the introductj.on of the 1944 scheme, the Meat Board was 
responsible for the regulation of supplies of slaughtered 
stock to the four main urban centres. As it had the nee ... 
essa1·y organization, it was decided that the Board should 
continue to exercise this function of issuing the permits 
for allocation to each urban centre, the alloca~ion bang 
worked out by the Meat Control Organization. In detel·min ... 
ing these quotas for the different urban centres, the lev-
el of consumption, immediately before the introduction of 
the scheme, VTas used at the outset but v:hen circumstances 
permitted, saturation tests were conducted in the various 
centres in order to establish new quotas to take into 
~ 
account such factors /as the increase in population between 
different centres and changes in consumers' habits. Due 
to the general sca1 ... city of supplies :such tests could not 
be c~·ried out at the same time at all centres, nor could 
they be conducted simultaneously in respect of all types 
of meat. While they were therefore but a very crude means 
(1) See page #51eb~t • 
/of 
of determining a bas,is on which to alter quotas from time 
to time, they did represent the fairest approximation that 
was possible. As far as the actual alloc~tion of supplies 
in relation to full requirements is concerned, it is diffi• 
cult to obtain any reliable information, but the Meat Com-
mltssion stated that "att present butchers throughout the 
Union are limited to 80% of their killings during the per-(1) 
iod let January to 30th September, 1943" while the Nat-
151>.7. 
ionu.l Marketing Council reported that "issues during the 
last 12 or 18 months (i.e. June 1945 to December 1946) have 
( 2) 
been equaJ. to about 75% of the approximate full requirements. 
The Meat Board was empowered to fix slaughter quotas to the 
outside butchers and to ration them on a basis corresponding 
to that applicable to butchers inside the controlled areas 
but this was obviously a far more difficult task than was 
control in urban areas since no possibility existed for the 
use of saturation test s and administrative control was far 
more cumbersome. 
In considering the new scheme it is essential that it 
be examined in the light of three main factors:-
( a) the seasonality of supplies in general. 
(b) the distribution of supplies between the controlled 
centres and 
(.c) the di stri button of supplies between controlled and un-
controlled areas . 
Under a system of auctions and free competition it was 
the a.utomatis~m of the pricing mechanism which controlled 
\ 
the flow to the markets .. obviously during flush seasons the 
market would tend to be depressed and would improve during 
the scarce winter months. With the introduction of the fix-
ed prices for slaughter stock it devolved upon the system of 
winter premiums to even out supplies over the year. In the 
1944 ... 1945 season a total premium of 5/- was set, 
--
( Z) 
•) . \ 
\ 
(1) u. G. 10/44 pp 11. 11 Now11 being the end of 1943. 
( 2) U. G. 27/47 pp 15,. 
(3) Actually the premium paid was increased to about 8/6 by 
special premiums during November, 1944 and subsequent 
months of scarcity. 
/increased 
increased to 10/- in 1945 - 1946 and to 15/- in 1946 - 1947 
when experience showed that 10/- was insufficient to draw 
adequate supplies during the "off- season". On this point 
the National Mw.·keting Council reported: 11 Since the intra ... 
duction of the meat scheme in May, 1944, there haa been a 
pronounced increase in seasonality in the marketing of cat-
tle despite efforts to counteract this by introducing se~ 
( 1) 
eone.l price premiums in imitation of the open marked. 11 
It appears that the premium has had a definite effect on 
marketing but the effect has not always been one of level-
( 2) 
ing out supplies between the flush and sc~·ce seasons. 
For the 1947 - 1948 season the full premium was fixed at 
1?/6 with the exception of Grade LY for which it was 12/6; 
for the following season however, the pl•emiugL was reduced 
to 12/6 for all grades while the basic price of super, prime 
and Grade Y were increased by 5/- per 100 lb dressed weight. 
The seasonality of the supply position still remained in 
1949 although the peak periods then showed a marked tenden ... 
cy to fluctuate. 
As far as the distribution of supplies between the 
various centres is concerned the inter- centre price pattern 
received constant at tent ion in accordance with changing cir ... 
cumstances but the need to transport carcasses from one cen-
tre to another nevertheless remained. This cost the Direc-
to1·ate of Ivieat Supplies £97,631 in 1947-8 and £135,126 in 
1948 ... 9. In both 1946-7 and 1947-8 as many as 54,000 cattle 
unit c~·casses had to be transferred between centres and on 
examination of the percentage of trade issues to trade 
quotas in different cenbres the ma.ldistribution between 
(1) U.G. 27/47 pp 157. 
(2) The National Marketing Council in U.G. 27/47 (pp 160)' 
stated: "the numbers of cattle sent to Johannesburg and 
Durban markets showed a significant decline between the 
months of May and June, wben the fixed seasonal price 
premium had not commenced or was still small". In short 
the effect was often the complete reversal of the no~ 
mal seasonal pattern due to fi~ed premiums instead of 
ones designed to meet the fluctuating natural conditions. 
/centres 
centres is .still revealed el.though the range shows a marked 
decline in the last season under review. The constant low 
percentage in the case of Durban and Pietermaritzburg is to 
be accounted for by the fact that the large Asiatic popul~ 
tion are non-beef eaters and as shall be shown later, mutton ( 1) 
was in far shorter supply than was beef. 
As regards the distribution of slaughtering~between 
controlled and uncontrolled areas, the main faature since 
1940 has been the significant fall in the percentage of to-
tal slau~hterings of sheep slaughtered in the controlled 
( 2) 
areas. Mutton production had been decreasing since 1941/2 
and it was to be expected that the greater portion of the de~ 
crease would be passed onto the controlled areas. The extent 
to which the supply of mutton fell is revealed by the fact 
that during 1946/? and i94?/t8 the actual slaughterings of 
mutton in controlled areas was below 40% of the quota of 
those areas. The main reason for this decline in the produc ... 
tion of mutton and lamb was the ~~ro nsiderable increase in wool 
prices immediately after the wartime control over that com-
modity had been lifted, which followed on the substantial de-
cl·ease in the sheep population from 30"211,000 in 1943 to 
24,331,000 in 1946 due to droughts;.and ~he slaughtering of 
capital stock. Of the other meats, the production of beef 
and veal was best maintained and once maize became available 
as stoc~feed the production of pork showed a marked increase 
ih the last two seasons under review although it was far from 
adequate to meet the level of demand increased by the substi-
tution of pork for mutton. 
So far little mention has been made of meat products 
other than in their connection with imports during the war 
period. The only products of w~~ch there is adequate data 
A~>re"d.'" See fflabl e 
See Ta.bl e 
page 
page 
{IQ7 
f!o'f 
• 
/available 
available to compute some figure of consumption with any 
reasonable degree of accuracy, are bacon and ham. An exa-
minution of these two meat products reveals that the ~an~ 
tity of pork used in their manufact~re rose from approximate-
ly 15,000,000 lbs in 1929/30 to 44)000,000 in 1948/9 (i.e. by 
alma st 200Jb) , but as to the actual quantity manufactured, no 
reliable statistics have been found to include production on 
farms. As far as industrial production is concerned, the 
increase was approximately 200% but it is significant that 
part of this increase has been in the nature of a reduction 
in the net importations in pEe-war yero·s when the average 
balance on foreign trade amounted to approximately 400,000 
lbs per annum. Since 1938/9 exports have coneistenly ex-
ceeded imports even when no account is taken of ships' stores 
in those ye~·s·when figures are not available. The Indue-
trial Censuses also include the quantity of beef used indus-
trially but no detailed division of the production of such 
commodities as tinned meats, is available. The only guide 
that can be obtained is by examining the imports and exports 
of certain meat products, an examination which reveals a 
steady increase in the imports of preserved meats and meat 
pastes although part of the rise has been offset by an in-(1) 
crease in exports, many of them re-exports. Nevertheless 
while in 1930 the net importation of preserved meats was 
2,500,000 lbs, it had risen to lOPOO,OOO lbs in 1949 which 
must lead one to the conclusion that the production of @eat 
product s did not rise to such significant proportions as that 
of, for instance, bacon and ham, a factor which is d.ue large-
ly to the severe shortage of fresh meat during the last 6·? 
years under review, a period when therewas every incentive 
for greater production of preserved meats. etc. 
( 1) See table s page lb5 • 
/SUMMARY 
SUMMAAY 
Having already dealt with four ~~oups of agricultural 
products, it is not surprising that in the late 1920's and 
early thirties, the emphasis in official policy should be on 
the need for increased export from the Union. We have al-
ready seen how the export of maize was discouraged in offi-
citu circles in favour of the conversion of "surplus 11 maize 
into beef and mutton, the export of which would, it was ex .. 
pectedJ be ~~eatly to the advantage of producers. The export 
of mutton was further encouraged when the price of wool fell 
so drastically in the depression years, since almost 90~ of 
I the sheep in the Union are wooled types. There were however, 
" 
several import ant barriers to the development of a sound and 
economic export of fresh meats. Since the development of 
refrigeration the demand on the European markets, apart from 
military and other contracts in which South African exporters 
usuru.ly obtained a share, had been almost entirely limited to 
the ._· chilled and not the frozen product. The chilling process 
preserves the quality of the meat to a far greater extent 
than does freezing and the very poor quality of the Union's 
exports therefore meant that there was never sufficient quan-
tities of chilled beef available to warrant a regular ship. 
ping service from the Uni on to the United Kingdom and Euro-
pe~'1 countries. There were two main factors accounting for 
t he poverty in quality. First there was the very great in-
fluence of the Hati ve owned 11 scrub" cattle both in the Re-
serves and on ii.'uropea.n farms, and secondly the domina1ion of 
!61 
the demand for inferior ·q_'1:l.ality me-ats to fulfil mine contracts 
etc. This domination over the general demand pattern obvious-
ly afforded no incentive to the producer for a widespread i~ 
provement of the herds. 
In an attempt to overcome these disabilities of the lo~ 
cal industry and to encourage exportation, the Go vernment in-
troduced certain measures such as the payment of expat subai-
diesJ 1 a.te1' suppJ. emented by the bounties offered by the 
/Livestock 
ll>'J.. 
Livestock and Ueat Industries Control Board set up in 1934, 
the Cattl_e Improvement Schemef the payment of grants on 
schemes for the storage of maize and of course the controll-
ed marketing scheme itself, all of which it was hoped, would 
put the local indust1-y on a mol'G economic footing than it 
then was. The main medium of control was the permit system 
whereby the numbel' of animals entering ddntrolled areas, at 
first limited to the Rand but 1 at er extended to Cape Town and 
Durban, was to be controlled to attain some pre-determined 
level of :prices which, would then, by virtue of the impor-
tance of these markets on the general economy of the country, 
be transmitted to other areas. 
During the first three seasons of the war period demand 
for slaughter-stock rose considerably due to a vro·iety of 
factors such as the gene1·a.l improvement of economic condi ... 
tions the continued concentration of the population in urban 
areas where the a.vailabili ty of meat in small quanti ties is 
an important factor in consumer habits, the demands of the 
miJ.itary, requirements for ships ' stores, t he demands of 
evacuees and P.o.W's, the shortage of tractors necessitating 
the substitutmon of oxen and the increased investment in 
livestock; and prices rose all round. Under these circum ... 
st~nces the permit system, primarily designed as a restric~ 
ti ve measure, was useless, and so following the Report of the 
Meat Commission in 1944, a far wider degree of control was 
granted to the Control Board whereby retail, wholesale and 
later producers' prices were fixed, for the first nine con-
trolled areas and then the whole of South Africa. 
It was i nevitable that there wo\lld t)e a time lag before 
the effects of the increased slaughterings of 1940, 1941 and 
1942 would be felt and so it was that the supply position in 
the Union reached its worst state at a time when the Interns,.. 
tional planning authorities found it virtually impossible to 
meet the requirements of the Union as stated in the latter's 
/application 
16J . 
applications. Not only had the worl1 supplies decreased 
and demand increased to meet the requirements of liberated 
peoples, but shipping facilities had reached their lowest 
ebb as far as this country was concerned. In these circum .. 
stances it was not surprising that differences should arise 
be·tween the local and the planning authorities, yet it 
would appear that South Africa. was making a strenuous attempt 
to wage a. war on a "business- as-usual" basis, one which more 
than once came into conflict with the wider interests of the 
Allied cause. 
Wlbth the advent of peace and the almost fantastic in-
crease in wool prices, the production of mutton which had 
been falling since 1942, continued to do so while that of 
beef and veal began to rise but pork was in extremely short 
supply owing to the restrictions on the use of maize as 
anlmal feed. The ·ao·ntrol over consumption had therefore to 
continue and it is probable that no~ more than So% of the 
country's requirements at current prices , was being made 
available during the years 1945-9 , a truly remarkable state 
of affa.il·s when one considers that only 15 years prev.ihously, 
the need for increased export was being so ardently stressed. 
Table 1. 
Fresh and preserve~ meats supplied as ships' stores, 1938-45. 
000 1 bs. 
'Beef 
'Mutton 
'Pork 
1 Bacon and Ham 
1 Other sal ted 
1 and cured 
1 1938 1 193911940 1 1941 ' 1942 ' l943' 1944 1 1945 1 
I 5031 514 1 - 1 ll,200 1 18,3001 4,500 1 3,l76 12,084f 
121 1 ~12 1 w ' 4,800 1 8,300 1 5,400 11,2231 833 1 
28 1 621 ' 2,100 1 3,300 1 2,700 1 '728 1 494 1 
31 1 76 1 I I I 648 1 5691 
99 1 127 1 - ' 8¥300 1 14,8001 3,805 11,165' 6621 
' ' 1 ' 
-'~P-r~e~s_e_r~v~e~d_m~e~a_t_s_'--~1_9_1 _!Q~------~-------------------8~2-2_' __ ~2_9_9 1 
(Tt\b le 2, ovev po.~e) 
Table 3. 
~uotas and percentage of quotas issued in controlled centres, 
1946/9 
1946-? --,--194?-8 I . 194e ... 9 
g,uota (fj zo 1 • :~uot a-co::! g~1ot u ·:=:~ 
'Blee.mfontein 11,136 82.3 
' 
. 11,069 I 84.4 11,344 ' 88.5 
'Cape Town ?1,491 91.5 ?1,?94 I 92.6 81,34? 
' 
84.5 
· 
1 Durban 45,994 ?? .. 1 52, ?84 ??.6 ' 55,608 ' ?9.5 
'East London 13,501 ?3.1 13,624 ?6.? 12, ?23 
' 
81.1 
'Kimberley 9,490 81.9 9,0?4 ' ?8.3 ?,810 ' 85.5 
'Pietermari tzbg •. ' 8,108 80.3 8,581 I ??.9 ' 8,648 ?9.4 
'Port Elizabeth ' 25,824 69.9 26, 310 73.5 ' 25,951 79.5 
'Pretoria 41,899 77.2 35 , 993 88.1 I 39,046 86.3 
'Rand 86.3 I 81.4 1 23? 407 1 89.1 
' 
' 
' 
' 
1 
1 Total 
222:1581 
450a .. Qg1, 83.7 
214:436 
443 665 I 82.6 I "479:883 ~ a:6~o :~ 
Source .Annual Reports, Secretary of Agriculture. 
Table 4. 
Distribution of slaughterings between controlled and un-controlled 
areas. 
~------~~'~P~e~r£ent~e of ·-total~-s~1-a-u-~~h~t-e-~~i-n-~-s~i~n--c-ontrollefi areas 
Cattle I SheeE ' Pi€£8 Calves 
1939 
' 1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
I 1945 
' 1946 
' 194? 
1 -1948 
69 ' 61 
?0 63 
69 64 
70 65 
70 62 
69 56 
?4 55 
?6 52 
?2 45 
70 42 
68 
?0 
66 
67 
63 
72 
63 
57 
64 
86 
86 
89 
90 
90 
87 
81 
81 
81 
Source : Annual Reports, Secretary of Agriculture. 
Table 2 
Average monthly open market prices and 11 indicated 11 prices 
of slaughterstock on the Johannesburg market. 
I Q~tt1_~ ( z- :fui_oool bS}J-She~:e (d. :eer . :1 ~ ) 
Market 1 "Indicated" 1 M:arket 1 "Indicated" 1 
' 1942:0ctober 5?.1 53.2 · FTo-:7 ' 8.8 
November 59.3 53.2 11.0 8.8 
December ~8.4 53.2 10.2 8.8 
1 1943:January 51.6 53.2 9.4 1 8.8 
February 49.2 53.2 , 8.6 1 8.8 
March 47.'7 48.2 9.8 8.3 
April '' 48.2 48.2 10.2 8.3 
May 48 • 4 48. 2 10. 3 I 8. 3 
June 49.3 48.2 10.2 1 8.3 
July 58.1 51,8 10.3 1 8.8 
August 59.0 55.3 10.2' 9.2 
September 1 6?.9 54.8 10.9 1 9.2 
october 69.4 54.8 9.6 1 9.1 
November 6 7. 6 54. 8 10. 1 1 9. 1 
December 61.4 54.8 11.4 1 9.1 
' 1944:Jan~y 59.1 54.8 10.4 ' 9.1 
February 53.5 54.8 10.3 1 9.1 
March 5o. 9 54 • 8 1 o. 9 ' 9 • 1 
April 47.5 54.8 11.4 1 9.1 
May ' 48.2 ' 54.8 9.8 1 9.8 ------~S~o~u~r-c-e--~u~.~G~.·~7/4?. --~-----
Ta.bl e 5. 
Import a~d exports of meat products, 000 lbs 
Imports ___ ~:eorisK 
' Year '~M~e-a~t~'~S~al~t-·e-d~'~T~i~n-n-ed' Tinned 1 Other 'Salted ~.P~r-e_s_e_r_v_e~d~' 
' Pastes'& Cure~' Beefe'Ton~ue~ 1 Preserved 1 & Curedi ~ 
I 1930 t 126 t t I I 2 588 I 76 I 109 I 
' . I 1931 I 105 I .,. 3,035 11 I 39 
1932 I 66 I 1,764 42 
1933 ' 107 ' .. 3~c393 33 28 
t 1934 I 179 I 6,699 115 23 
1935 I 174 I I 8,854 39 56 
19 36 ' 223 ' ' ' 5' 2? 9 26 39 
I 1937 I 225 157 7,746 89 199 
' 1938 ' 205 156 ' 6,460' 297 2,078 138 149 
1939 I 248 I 172 I 5,6721 358 2,586 206 148 
1940 212 161 110,254 1 331 1,401 31 173 
1941 381 285 ' 8,628 1 599 3,985 165 1,625 
' 1942 61 ' 138 4,890 1 328 4,309 102 1,334 
' 1943 302 ' 52 ' 668 5,062 10 4,146 
1944 I 638 I 62 188 2, 249 809 1, 448 
1945 ' 433 ' 71 ?9 10, 331 420 766 
1946 1 2,091 '' 63 - 24 7,887 194 ?66 
1947 ' 310 ' 52 284 ' 10,013 196 404 
I 1948 I 159 I 70 792 I 13,567 283 1, 280 
I 1949 I 269 I 91 1? I 12,585 405 2~589 
K Does not include ships store s in t he ye ars 1940~3. 
e Other t han bacon and ham. 
e I ncluded i n "other preserved" in years other than t hose stated. 
A'PPEf'I.PIJc 4 .. 
NUMBERS, OF CATTLE, SHEEP, 1-1.ND PIGS IN T.dE UNION, AND IMPO~~lTS OF SLAUGHTER STOCK. 1930-49. 
Cl-iTTLE SHEEP PIGS IMPORTS FOR SL.tiUGHTER 
Year European Non-European Total Wooled Non-wooled European Cattle Sheep 
000 1 s 000 1 s OOO's OOO's 000 1 s owned OOO's 000 1 s 
.8. b... A 1-i. 1-i A 
1930 5,172 5,402 10 '574 43,912 4,446 495 6lb 53a 1931 79a 1932 
-
lOla 1933 134a 1934 5,210 4,777 9,987 30,257 4,754 408 96b 103a 1935 5,496 4,902 10,398 30,207 5,628 523 104+ 109a 1936 5,912 4,992 10,904 33,316 6,389 619 128+ 76a 1937 6,197 4,991 11,188 35,835 5,199 538 72+ 126+ 1938 6,305 5,102 11,407 32,796 6,206 449 101+ 145+ 1939 6,537 5,314 11,853 31,990 6,299 466 75 159+ 1940 96 158+ 1941 106 157+ 1942 124 188+ 1943* 7,425 5,643 13 ,o68 30,211 7,677 629 132 248a 1944 115 168a 1945 
-
102 24a 1946 7,511 5,082 12,593 24,331 6,501 530 151 6a 1947 7,162 4,951 12,113 24,442 6,282 546 165 1948 7,380 5,090 12,470 25,767 6,845 693 152 1949 7,120 5,122 12,242 25,595 6,313 761 208 
.A. Agricultural Censuses. 
* 
Rural Areas only, 15th Novembero 
+ From Report of the Meat Commission UG 10/1944.) Include animals slaughtered in the 
a From annual Report of Trade and Shipping. ) Uni on and exported as beef. 
b "Farming in s oA. II Refers to year ending 30th June' 1930. 
....... 
~ 
~ 
PRODUCTI ON OF BEEF, V~L, MUTTON AND LAfuiD, tOOO LBS. 
BE~F VEAL MUTTON Li!..MB iiND GOATS MEAT TOTaL 
Year Abattoirs A B Farms & Reserves E abattoirs A C .r.~.ba ttoir s A D Farms ·& Reserves F 
1929-30 291,000 78,000 2,100 
1930 ... 31 78,000 
1931-32 
-
79 ,6oo 
1932-33 245 ,ooo 79,600 2,100 
1933-34 272,000 79 ,6oo 2,200 
1934-35 274,500 82,500 2,300 
1935-36 316,500 82,500 2,500 
1936-37 334,000 82 '500 2,8oo 
1937-38 326 ,o 00 85,600 3,000 
1938-39 327,000 85,600 3,100 
1939-40 360 '500 85,600 3,300 
1940-41 399,000 99,100 3,900 
1941-42 428,500 111,500 4,100 
1942-43 425,500 113,000 4,200 
1943-44 371,000 103 ,ooo 4,300 
1944-45 404,000 104,200 4,700 
1945-46 498,000 139,200 5,ooo 
1946-47 545,500 106,900 5,800 
1947-48 554,000 117,500 5 ,6oo 
1948-49 586,ooo 117,500 5,400 
89,900 77,400 538,400 
76,400 
74,400 ... 
109,100 73,400 509,200 
85,100 73,400 512,300 
so ,6oo 73,400 509,300 
100,300 73,400 573,200 
123,900 71,300 613,200 
116,300 74,000 604,900 
123,100 71,000 609,900 
129,600 70,000 649,000 
15o ,6oo 69,000 722,600 
157 ,20Q 72,000 773 ,6oo 
141,400 71 ,ooo 774,100 
123,500 69 ,000 670 , soo 
123,800 69,000 705 '700 
118,400 73,000 83 7,400 
108,300 67,000 834,400 
102 ,soo 72 ,Boo 849,900 
96 ,ooo 69,900 875,800 
a~ For years 1929-30 and 1933-34 the Office of Census and Statistics otherwise :Wea t Industry Control Board for actual 
number of animals slaughtered . 
B. Obtained by multiplying number slaughtered by 500lbo 
Co Obtained by multiplying number slaughtered by 50lbc 
D. Obtained by multiplying number slaugh~ered by 34lb. 
Eo Obtained by multiplying estimates of Div. of Economics and Markets as follows:- Slaughterings on farms - 300lb. 
Slaughterings in Reserves - 250lbs. 
Fo Obtained by multiplying estimates of Div. of Economics and Markets as follows : - Slaughterings on :Su:ropean farms -
30lbs. Slaughterings in Reserves 20lbs. 
Year 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
l937-3B 
l93B-39 
1939-40 
1940-41 
1941-42 
1942-43 
1943-44 
1944-45 
1945-46 
1946-47 
1947-4B 
194B-49 
PRODUCTION .n.ND CONSLThiPTION 
Total Imports 
Production 
A 
538,400 320 
395 
104 
509,200 31 
512,300 1016 
509,300 573 
573,200 BB 
613,200 B3 
604,900 89 
609,900 335 
649,000 275 
722 ,6oo 454 
773,600 4959 
774,100 7413 
67o, Boo (3457)a 
705 '700 7640 
B37 ,400 1754 
B34 ,400 6444 
B49 ,900 266 
B75 ,Boo 14 
AtJr~tYJ">/x c: 
OF BEEF 2 VEAL 2 
Exports 
aB 
30,916 
22,B54 
16,B37 
22,262 
6,3B4 
15,077 
22,B13 
1B,lB4 
4,B25 
9,61B 
B,Bl2 
19,914 
29,174 
2,020 
5,196 
3,42B 
4,309 
1,903 
2,446 
2,B04 
a Does not include imports from S . W ollo and Northern Rhodesia. 
A Refers to calendar years. 
MUTTON '2 AND LliMB I 000 LBS. 
Used as Raw water- Consumption Adjusted 
ials in Industry Consumption 
c D 
4,7B7 503 ,ooo 
3,925 4B3,000 
5,B75 501,100 
6,513 4BB,300 
7,233 543,200 
7,399 587,700 
9,Bl0 590,400 
9,619 591 ,ooo 
12,67B 627,BOO 
17,910 685,200 
16,Bl2 732 ,6oo 
15,095 764,400 
14,555 654,500 B20 '700 
13,653 696,300 B73 ,Boo 
17,177 817 '700 945 ,ooo 
19,B76 Bl9,900 9B4, Boo 
21,172 B26 '500 992,100 
23 '776 B49,200 1,021,000 
B Includes ships stores except for years 1940, 1943, and 1944. For years 1941 and 1942 the figures for ships stores hav8 
been obtained from ~published sources (see text page) otherwise from Annual Report of Trade and Shipping. 
C From Industrial Censuses, mutton included from 1944-45 but is relatively insignificant. 
D In view of the fact that since about 1942-43 supplies have not been sufficient to meet full demand requirements, consum-
ption for the years 1943-44 to 194B-49 is here adjusted on the following basis. 
1943-44 ... ~5~ ! 1944-45. - 5~ of slcughter1.·ngs in abbatoirs since it is assumed that it was only urban consumption which was restrict-
194S-4o - 1% ed by the scarcity at the fixed prices. These percentages are not the same as those produced by the 
1946-47 - D~~ Director of Meat Supplies sint:::c it cannot be accepted by the writer that th.e quotaz represent the 
1947-48 - Bo;.- ) actual level of demand at current prices. 
194B-49 - 80 ,·J ) 
• 
Year 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
1938-39 
1939-40 
1940-41 
1941-42 
1942-43 
1943-44 
1944-45 
1945-46 
1946-47 
1947-48 
1948-49 
Notes 
PRODUCTION 1-l.ND CONSlJ.LUPTION OF PORK, B.c1.CON AND HA~~ , 000 lb s. 
Production of Pig's Meat 
Abattoirs 
.ab 
21 ,6oo 
24 ,ooo 
21,300 
24,300 
29,900 
30,200 
32,000 
31,600 
38,700 
48,100 
59 ,ooo 
56 ,6oo 
58' 700 
65,800 
54,900 
52,900 
68,100 
88,000 
Farms 
c 
9,920 
10 ,ooo 
10,000 
10,000 
12,000 
12,000 
12,040 
14,080 
14,000 
14,000 
13,000 
13,000 
12,000 
11,000 
11,000 
10,000 
10,000 
10,400 
10,000 
10,000 
Total 
30,500 
34,000 
33,300 
36,300 
41,900 
44,300 
46,ooo 
45 ,6oo 
51,700 
61,100 
71,000 
67 ,6oo 
69 '700 
75,800 
64,900 
63,300 
78,100 
98 ,ooo 
Used in man-
ufacture of 
Bacon, Ham 
Sausages 
etc. 
13,114 
14,012 
14,670 
16,595 
18,355 
18,830 
20,829 
22 ,o66 
29,135 
33,653 
35,685 
34,966 
35,827 
30,781 
30,873 
38,039 
44,118 
Consump-
tion of 
Pork 
15,500 
20,900 
19,300 
21 ,6oo 
25,300 
25,900 
27 '200 
24,800 
29,600 
32 ,ooo 
37,300 
31,900 
34,700 
40,000 
34,100 
32,400 
40,100 
53,900 
1-l.djusted 
Consump-
tion of 
Pork 
E 
83,100 
88,600 
89,400 
101,500 
116,200 
107,300 
100,000 
Production 
F 
7,678 
6,455 
6,823 
6,984 
7,601 
8,043 
9,528 
9,495 
11,565 
15,233 
19,365 
20,611 
18,747 
18,139 
15,477 
15,696 
18,001 
21,704 
Bacon and Ham 
Imports Exports 
G 
615 
57C 
364 
366 
786 
565 
427 
395 
367 
288 
59 
149 
245 
242 
226* 
641 
559 
490 
388 
13 
GH 
478 
537 
224 
127 
117 
67 
50 
95 
177 
314 (525) ( 706) (418) 
(217) 
939 
690 
548 
575 
549 
3,623 
Consump-
tion 
?,Boo 
6,700 
7,500 
7,500 
8 ,ooo 
8,300 
9,700 
9,400 
11,100 
14 '700 
19,200 
20 ,6oo 
18,000 
18,100 
15,500 
15 ,6oo 
17,800 
18,100 
A. 
B. 
c. 
Until 1943-4 from the Office of Census and Statistics, subsequently from the Uea t Industry Control Board. 
Converted on the basis of 110 lb per carcase. 
Estimates of the writer using the Agricultural Census figures for the years 1929-30, 1935-6, 1936-7 and 
1946-7, converted at 80 lbs per carcase. These figures refer toslaughterings on European farms only. 
D. 
E . 
Fro.n Industrial Censuses - do not include pigst meat used in manufacture of bacon and ham 
Consumption figures for the period 1942/3-1948/9 have been adjusted to estimate the level 
current .prices with no rationing, on the following basis: 
1942/3 727~ 
194 3/4 7'J;; 
1944/5 85% 
F. From Industrial Censuses. 
G. For Calendar years. 
H. Do not include ships stores for period 1939/40-1942/3. 
* Does not include imports from S. W • ..::... and N. Rhodesia. 
1945/6 
1946/7 
1947/8 
1948/9 
on farmso 
of consumption at 
'l. 
Chapter 6. 
SUMMARY 
"The old order of agricultural economic condi tiona 
m~ be said to have passed away. we are ever seeking for 
our products wider markets beyond our borders. 11 
This extract from the editorial in the January, 1930 
number of "Farming in South Africa" is an apt description 
'?c. 
of the attitude of policy makers towards South African 
agricv.l ture in the period which marks the beginning of the 
twenty years under review. The t1·ansition period caincided 
with a change in the international supply position as well 
for it was in the 1 ate twenties and early thirtj.es that 
signs of over-production of the essential staple foodstuffs 
like wheat and maize began to appear and provj.ded what could 
later be interpreted as signposts towards the Great Depress-
ion. It was recognised within the Union that there were 
many factors, both natural and in the character of many of 
its farmers, which would b~· the way to an efficient agri-
cultural industry yet it was generally accepted that this 
country possessed the requirements of an agricultural ex-
porting community. If we: ·were to divide the twenty year 
period in which we are interested, the first ten years would 
be synonomous with two words - control and export. 
This emphasis on the need for export however, differed 
between the products. In certain cases the desire to build 
up an export trade was based on a long term determination 
to improve the quality of the produce by extending the mar..-
ket as in the case of beef the improvement of which had 
never received any incentive in the w~ of premiums ofi the 
local market due to the limited demand for quality grades. 
In other cases however , export was considered as an aim in 
itself and not as an integral part of a general agricultUl'al 
policy. It was in these instances as for example the dairy 
productsJ that the principle behind the Government subsidi~ 
zat:l.o n of exports was based primarily on t he need to limit 
/the 
the supply to the local market and in such a way to in-
crease the revenue to the producer. That these aims were 
often not considered as part· of the general policy is re-
vealed in the attempts to in~grate maize and cattle fanm-
" 
. 
ingJ and in the policy towards wheat. In their atte~t to 
improve the position of maize farmers , the Government ~ in-
t2.·oduced the quota system designed to limit supplies to the 
local market but which at the ·same time operated to the 
disadvantage of those farmers who purchased their require-
menta of maize for stock-feed. At the same time it was 
accepted almost without question that it would be in the 
interests of South african agriculture in general to en-
courage the feeding of mtdze to animals instead of export-
ing the so- called surplus to badly deprectated overseas 
markets .and so until the introduction of a rebate on maize 
utilized as stock-feed, the two policies were in direct 
conflict with each other. In the case of wheat it would 
appear that policy makers once agQin were not sufficiently 
aware of the effects of artificial stimulation of produc-
tion by means of favourable prices, on the general agric~l-
tural position in the country. Although it was plainly re-
cogni sed that climatically the country was not sui teo. to 
this cereal, the protection granted to producers had the 
inevitable effect of encouraging substitution of wheat for 
other types of farming on lands which from the point of 
view of wheat were extremely ill adapted. 
The writer does.not wish to convey the impression that 
So~h Africa alone adopted this policy of protection towards 
her agriculture - a proposition which would most certainly 
be false. It has often been said that the philosophy of 
"1 ai ssez faire 11 belonged to the nineteenth century and if 
this is so then the present century could aptly be des-
17r. 
cribed as the "revival of economic nationalism". Especially 
woud this be true of the first five years of the fourth 
decade when the evils of an unfettered economic system were 
/blamed 
blamed for the disa.st~rous circumstances of the Great De-
pression and when the escape from the stranglehold ~free 
competition and the dangers of uncontrolled capitalism was 
the ma.ln theme in economic policies almost throughout the 
civilized world. The practical expression of the new phil• 
osophy soon showed that economic nationalism could not mean 
insulation unless all international trade was discontinued 
since it was through this medium and the international flow 
of capital that the economic conditions of one country were 
transmitted throughout the trading world. This is well re• 
vcaled in the case of sugar ~here the imposition of customs 
duties designed to keep out forgign competition raised the 
internal price at a time when consumption was tending to d.e... 
cline due to a. decreasing purchasing power, this in turn left 
a greater exportable surplus which had to be disposed of in 
many cases, at prices below the cost of production in order 
to obtain admittance to other protected markets. This mere-
ly started the whole cycle over again. The South African 
authorities could therefore claim with certain justification 
that protection was necessary in view of the policies of 
other countries. 
If the justification existed for the protection of the 
local industry from conditions v:hi ch were considered tempo-
rary, it nevertheless remains that there seems to have been 
a. notable failure on the part \ policy framers to appreciate 
the intricacies of the economic system. Protection meant 
higher producers' prices and higher prices to the consumer 
since the costs of protection were invariably passed on the 
~ ~latter. Higher selling prices to the producer obviously 
served as an encouragement for the extension of production 
while on the demand side the effect must have been to cur-
tail expenditure. It is true that in certain cases protec~ 
tion did not lead to an increased production either bec~lse 
as in South Africa1 the correlation between climate and pro-
duction is greater t .han that between wholesale prices and 
/output, 
/ 
• 
output, or because, as with wheat , the protection granted 
to one product was less than that granted to others. 
The inevitable result was that production would in-
crease at a greater rate than would consumption. If one 
examines the supply position of the in4ividual products in (1) 
the,irst five years co~ered by this survey , it is imme-
diately apparent that ap~·t from wheat, the Union supplied 
sufficient to meet the direct requirements. When one exam~ 
ines the position in the second five-yeal' period in all 
cases except fresh meats, the per centage of consumption to 
local production had fallen. The average annual consump-
tion of wheat during the pe1· iod 1934/5-1938/9 was only 
slig~tJ.y above the average annual production, also the com-
bined fall in the peEcentage of maize and mealie meal con~ 
sumed at home is significant, und it was inevitable that 
fears of over-pro duct ion should be voiced. .As f a.r as; .maize 
was concerned the emphasis had been for many years on the 
17.3 . 
need to divert the surplus towards stock feeding yet in @Sn-
eral this seems to have had a smaller ef~ect than was anti-
cipated. That there should arise fears as to the over-pro-
duction of wheat seems umazingJ and of course in the ~ase 
of sugar the fenrs had for a long time been practically ex-
pressed in the control over the area planted to cane. 
If the polio¥ of protecting the primary producer could 
be justified, that of exporting a certain quantity in order 
to achieve some. price considered remuncra.ti ve to the produc-
er was entirely another matter . The main criticism of eco-
nomists and others was levelled against this practice of 
raising the price to the consumer in order to paj the pro-
ducer a higber price. If the producer was to be as sisted, 
and was thereby encouraged to increase output , it was surely 
right thatt the local consumer should receive the benefit of 
the increased physical supplies , instead of having to pa;y a 
hi gher price in order to foot the bill for increased pay-
ment to ~·oducers by way of export subsidies. What these 
( 1) See T·abl e ( page 182 . /experts 
experts were in favour of was the subsidization of certain 
foodstuffs to the population whi ch would in ~feet mean 
that the costs of protection would fall not directly on 
those consuming the products , and thereby tend to be regres~ 
ive ., ·but upon those most able to bear the burden as it would 
come from the pro ceeds of Income Tax revenue. The arguments 
revolving around subsidization of consumption within the 
Union instead of paying out large sums of money to make up 
for the difference between the locally 11 fixed 11 price and the 
export price , were probably the most important of the decade 
insofal~ as agricultural policy was concerne-d. In actual fact 
the difference between the subsidization of consumption by 
human beings and the granting of rebates on maize to cattJ.e 
farmers, which as we have seen above was essential in view 
of the artificially increased pl'ice of maize , is really not 
very great yen it was consistently maintained in official 
circles that sttbsidization would not be justified by the 
costs of such measures and the dangers inherent in any 
scheme of subsidized consumption which was not absolutely 
perfect. :Besides the fact that there was fo.r from suffi ci-
ent data on which to base a conclusion that the cost of sub-
sidization would be greater than the benefit s , or in other 
words that the total amount paid out would exceed the pro-
ceeds of the levies imposed by the various Control Boards , 
it was not correct to state, as was done, that because the 
price of butter distributed under the State-Aided Scheme 
h ad to fall to 6d. per 1 b before any app2·eciable amount was 
taken up, the same conditions were applicable to all food-
stuffs. It is absolutely inconcei vub1e that the price 
el ast i city of demanC. and tlle consumer habits of different 
groups of the population should be the same for all corrunodi-
ties. 
Why was it then that ull these questions which had 
CilUsed so much criticism in the t hirtiesJ and the fear of 
over- production, virtually ~isappea.red in the second decade 
under review ? 
/ 'J'he 
The immediate effect of the war was the loss of certain 
export markets and the development of ship2ing J ifficulties 
after the beginning of the German U-boat offensive. The 
''phoney" waJ: of tr.e first few months of 1940 soon gave we:y to 
the successes of the German war machine in Europe and Africa 
and from then on the battle became one not confined to the 
actual scenes of conflict but covered many other aspects Sll<th 
a s the provision of adequate food supplies for t he milital~y 
forces and the United Kingdom whose economy was based upon 
the impol·ta.tion of most foodstuffs. At a meeting in Decem-
ber, 1941 proposals were worked out for the establishment of 
a Combined Raw Materials Board and it soon be~a.me obvious 
that 1t was no less nece ssary in the case of foodstuffs foll-
owing Japan's entry into the war. In March, 1942 a meeting 
of representatives of the Dominions, the Colonial Office, tre 
British Treasury, the Dominions' Office and the Ministry of 
Food met in London and decided to appoint ad hoc committees 
for certain specific commodities. It was soon evident how-
l 
c{er, that a planning body was needed to fully and effectiv~ 
' 
ly a11 ocate t he fo od.stuffs in short supply and make the full-
est use of the shipping facilities and so in May , 1942 it 
was agreed between the British and American Governments to 
establish. a Combined Food Board to obtain the expendittious 
utilization of the food resources of the United Nations. 
The Dominions were kept info1~1ed and consulted, so while 
they were no~ptual pal'ties to the discussions they were ~iven 
ample opportunity of influencing the decisions reached and 
it was largely through this influence that t ·he co-ordinating 
machinery took t he form of two bodies - the Combined Food 
Board in Washington and the London Food Committee in London 
to look after the interests of t £e Eastern Hemisphere. 
The London Food Cor.a.mi ttee collected the information re-
lating to requirements of countries in their "sphere of in ... 
fluence" and made recommendations as to allocations to the 
( 1) 
Combined Food Board in Washington although t,P.ere was a 
(1) I~ the case of certain commodities like cocoa, tea and 
rJ.ce the L.F. c. was the allocating body. 
pro vi sian that should the final recommendations of the 
C.F.B. differ uppreciaoly from those of the L.F.C. , they 
should be referre d back to the latter body. The Union 
was represented by the Senior Trade Commissioner. To-
wards the end of 1943 it was decided to change the L.F.~ 
5.nto the London Food Council and to alter membership to 
one of ministerial standine so that from then on the 
Union ' s representati~e baceme the High Commiesj.oner. 
It is necessary to have some idea of the purpose and 
mechanism of the plannir1g authorities for it . was not long 
before the supply position within the Union was complete-
ly reversed und inste~d of being fe~·ful concerning sur-
pluses and export markets , the emphasis was now on where 
to obtain supplies to meet the ever increasing l'equire ... 
mente of t he Union. 
The reversal in the whole supply position of all im-
portant foodstuffs can be accounted for by forces which 
affected both producU.on and consumption. On the produc-
· tion side the main factors were the severe shortage of fer-
tilizers and machinery and on the consumption, the phenom-
enal increase in economic activity within the country. 
The intel'nat ional author). ty in the case of fertilizers 
was a Joint Co~nittee of representatives of L.F.C. and the 
JJ.Jied Raw Materials Board. Shipping difficulties were 
once again of pa.l·amount importance so that in the years 
1943"5 the issue of permits for the purchase of fertilizers 
by South .Hfric an farmers emounteci to between 25 and 667~ of 
total requirements as estimated by the Department of ~gri ... 
culture as far e.s phosphatic fertilizers were concerned. 
It was officially stated in 194? that South Africa's normal 
annual requirements of chemical fertilizers wa.s some 
450:~000 - 500JIOOO tons of which 90% should be in the form 
of super ... phosphates . 'l'otal suppl ies in 1948 appear to 
have been somewhat over 400JOOO tons but still less t han 
(1) 
the estimated requirements. In view of the ·~~fficulty 
( 1) Q.uoted in "A Survey of the Trade in Fett ilizers 11 by the 
C'ommonwea.lth Economic Committee, 1950, par 150. 
in obtaining fertilizers from overseas' sources> tr.e pro-
ducti on in the Union in creased qui tc considerably but 
atj.lJ. remained but a small proportion of total demand. 
The shortage of tractors and other machinery requis-
i tee was an important factor in limiting production of cer ... 
tatn foodstuffs especially from about 1942 onwards. In 
1943 about 7 , 300 tons of agricultural machinery was import~ 
ed compared vd tr.1 estimated imp'Ort requirements of 20,000 -
( 1) 
25 1 000 short tons and while the supplies did improve in 
1 ater years even in 1946 there was by no mea,ns suff).cient 
to meet tre accumulated demands of 4-5 years. As far as 
furm labour was concerned, the effect is of far more doubt-
ful importance. It is true th5.t South African a.gricul ture 
has developed on an abundant supply of . c:C.e~p , unskilled 
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l~bour und it is probably true that during t he war years e~ 
li stment and the· drift to the towns did cause some form of 
short age based on pre- wa:r utilization of 1 abour, partly 
eased by the employment of P.o. W' s , but it is far more like ... 
ly that it was the combined shortu.ge of machinery tending 
to encourage a. greater demand for native farm laboll', tl::.at 
was the main cause of the claimed "labour shortage". 
The reasons for the increase in consumption have been 
Q"Onsidered in the discussions on the specific commodities so 
that al1 tho.t need be said here is to reiterate the opinion 
of the writer that too much emphasis has been placed on tern-
porary fact ors such as military requirements, increase in 
ships ' stores, the increased demand created by evacuees and 
P.o.w.s e.nd the fundamental reason viz. the increase in pur-
c.husine power hu.s in this wey been partit.Uly lost sight of. 
r. The mere fact that the consumption showed ~o significant 
tendency to fall after the ce ssation of hostllities appears 
to bear tr~is opinion out, viz. that the underlying causes 
were not temporary in nature. 
(1) From .Annual. Reports of tho secretary of .Agriculture. 
/Such 
Such a fundUL1enta.l change in the internal su.:pply pos-
( 1) 
itionJ well· illustrated in Table 1 where the percentage of 
consumpt j.on to local production shows un increase for all 
cormaodities ap~~~rt from jams and the meat group, obviously 
had a marked S:rfect on the rel u.ti onship between the Food Con-
trol Organisation in South Africa and the C.F. B. - L.F.C. 
plannine:. body. It was inevitable that the narrow interests 
of a pe..rtlcul ar country would clash with the bl'oa.der need.s 
of the Jillies for the successful pursuance of the wax yet 
even making allowance for this, it appears that the Union 
authorities in certain instances did not quite appredate the 
gravity of the situation. It is significant that severe 
criticism was levelled again.st the sugar industry for not 
making more sugar available to the strictJ.y rationed u. K., 
also that the Food Controller seemed to go to considerable 
lengths to obtain imports , sometimes directly against the 
purpose of international control as for instance when the 
Conoul-General in Buenos Airec made ~urchases of rice, butt-
el• u.nd canned meat without approval of c. F. B. - r.. F. c. In 
his annuw. Report for 1942 the Secretru·y of bgriculture re-
marked: "While the we.r economy of most countries has made 
td 
strict rationing of the pl•incip~ articles of food absolute ... 
ly unavoidable , the Union is today in a compro·atively favou~ 
u.bl e posj. tion insofar as this matter is concerned ••• so fw.• 
••. mclze, butter a.nd cheese have been the only locally pro-
duced products where direct re stricti ve di stri but ion measuroo 
have had to be applied. 11 Countrj.es like New Zealand and 
Australia, also producer countries, were waging a war under 
conditions o~airly strict rationing in order to supPly the 
food importing Allied nations while the obvious conclusion in 
the case o~ South .Africa must be that she was not prepared 
to sacrifice the support for the politj.ca.l party in power, 
(1) See page /82 • 
/though 
178. 
on 
though/this poli t:i.cal issue there must be some justifica-
tion bearing in mind the circumstances of the times, and 
therefore would not accept rationing unless all else had 
failed to ameliorate the po sition. .As it eventually turn-
ed out, rationing was necessary. 
Generally speaking, the dividing line between free and 
restricted consumption can be taken as 1942-3; in certain 
cases like wheat, butter , maize und cheese the change-over 
was slightly earlier, in othe r s like sugar a little later. 
In some products like butter , cheese ana the meats the sup~ 
ly position never improved sufficiently in the period under 
review, to enable the restrictive measures to be lifted al~ 
though the improvement in the cereu.J. crops and especially 
maize, in. the last three seasons exerted an important'- fav-
our able influence on the supply position. The rel ut ionship 
of maize to the other food. products such as meats and. the 
dairy products i s so fundara.entLl that an i mprovement in its 
production will soon lead to an increase in the output of 
these other foodstuffs. As the staples and foundation of 
the diet, maize and wheat are of major importance in the 
adequacy or otherwise of food supplie_s ... wh.en maize mid 
wheat are together in short supply as in 1945/6 the sli:orta.ge 
wj_ll be most severe, when maize is sheEt, by means of impel·-
'71-
ta.tj.on it may be possible to obtuin sufficient wheat supplies 
and that therefore the European section of the community 
will not feel the shortage to t he same extent as the non-
Europeans . A shortage of maize on the other hand will un-
doubtedly tend to affect the non-European and espec i ally the 
Africans to a far greater extent. Maize is in fact the 
foundation upon which much of the a.gricul tura.l industry is 
buiJ.t and this f act il1ustra.tes one ·impol·ta.nt defect in the 
methodolo gy employed in this study- viz.the examination of 
t he specific products in co nditions of semi-isolation. To 
do so is dangerous for it is impossible to consider maize, 
mee.t and t he dairy products as separate and unrelated comm-
/odi t ies 
odities but it was nedessary in order to attain some sys-
tematic treatment of the subject. The object of this~um­
mary is therefo1·e to draw together the separate threads and 
show how these threads are in fact merely untidy ends of the 
same tapestry. 
Finally it is desirable to sugeest some possibilities $ 
to the future , at t his stage concerning the ability of pro-
duction to keep pace with consumption, a.ssu'@ing the 1 atter 
rs-o. 
to contj.nue to increase at the present rate . It is probable 
that the agricultural potentiu.J. of the Union is fa.r from com-
pletely sapped and that improveci methods especially the gre~­
er mechanization of ft~min€, and a change from the tradition-
al combination of the factors of production, i.e. abundant 
cheap, unskilled labour, would be instrumental in substan-
tj.aJ.ly increasing supplies. I!.ost j,rnportant in th:bs respect 
a.re the l:Tati ve Reserves the soils of which are generally ·Of 
better quality than on the average in South Africa. It is 
ir11perative that practices in these areas be improved so as to 
take fullest advantage of the potential. Whether or not it 
is in the interests of the country as a whole to allow such 
relatively fertile land to remain in the hands of a people 
whose e.g1.·j.cultura.l habit s are notoriously poor, is of course 
not a matter foJ:' the writer to debate, but is one that will 
definitely have to be faced , probably i n the not too dis-
tant future. 
But basically the ability of producer.s to extend output 
t o meet the increas·ing comu.mption re quirements if this coun-
try is not permanently to be placed in a position where im-
portation is necessary or where, and in the present dtrcum~ 
stances this seems far liklier, consumption will have to be 
permanently curtailed by restrictive measures , must depend 
on one factor more than any other - WATER. Far seeing South 
Africans have for ye~~ s stressed the fact that it is not the 
gold which will ultimately determine the level of ci vi1iza-
t ion in this southern tip of Africa, but water; the writer is 
/not 
not competent to judge whether or not South Africa is in 
the , throes of the fourth dry period in its history as cer-
ta.in· scientists maintain, yet he is convinced that the key 
to tomorrow in this country is water. 
The complete reversal of the agricultural scene can 
no better be described than by comparing the following 
statement by the Secl·etary of Agriculture in the 1948 
.Annu$1 Repo.rt with that with which this chapter was intra-
\ 
duced.: 
"Our aim should ever be the attainment of the optimum 
self-sufficiency, with due regro'd to all requirements 
of self-security and the maintamnance and improvement 
of our sources of production." 
m. 
T.-illLE 1. 
Production of certain com.:nodi ties in five-yearly periods. OOOlbs o 
Period Wheat lllaize Mea lie Sugar Jams Butter Cheese Beef, veal Pork 
Meal mutton & 
lamb 
19 29/3 0-3 3/4 686 ,ooo 3,595,000 1,096,000 353 ,ooo 20,500 19,600 7,800 520,000 32 ,6oo 
1934/5-38 /9 1,014,000 4,400 ,ooo 1,336 ,ooo 450,000 27,800 31,200 11 '()'00 581,000 42,800 
1939/40-43/4 1,029,000 4,163,000 1,611,000 546,000 90 ,soo 43 ,300 16,400 718 ,ooo 64,200 
1944/5 -48/9 898,000 4,554,000 2,134,000 552,000 142,300 40,000 17,100 821,000 76,000 
Consumption of certain commodities in five-yearly periods, OOOlbs. 
Period Wheat Maize Mea lie Sugar Jams Butter Cheese Beef, veal Pork 
Meal mutton & 
lamb 
1929/30-33/4 754,000 2,985,000 943 ,ooo 170 ,ooo 19,800 17 ,6oo 6,800 496,000 18 ,6oo 
1934/5-38/9 1,026,000 3,482,000 1,073 ,ooo 213,000 26,400 27 ,Boo 9,400 564,000 25,000 ) 1,136,000 3,951,000 1,543,000 318,000 35 '700 45,400 15,100 653 ,ooo 35,100 
1939/40-43/4) (46 ,500)* (15,800)* ( 70 6 '0 00 ) >l< C54,100)>l< 
) 1,150 ,ooo 4,593 ,ooo 2,086,000 383,000 62,800 43 '700 16,600 802 ,ooo 40,100 
1944/5-48/9 ) (63,400)* (25,500)* (963,000)* (82,900)* 
* Estimated consumption with no rationing. 
Consumption as a percentage of local production in five-yearly periods. 
Pa:iod ·:!heat Maize Mea lie Sugar Jans Butter Cheese Beef, veal Pork 
Meal mutton & 
lamb 
1929/30-33/4 109.9 83.0 86.0 48.1 96.6 89.8 87.2 95.4 57.1 
1934/5-38/9 101.2 '79.1 80o3 47o3 95.0 89.1 81.0 97.1 58.4 ) (107.4)* (96.3)* (98.3)* (84.3)* 
1939/40-43/4) 110.4 94o9 95.8 58.3 39.3 104 .. 9 92.1 91.0 54.7 ) (158.5)* (149.1)* (117.3)* (109.1)* 
1944/5-48/9 ) 128.1 100.9 97.8 69.4 44.1 109.3 97.1 97.7 52.8 
* 
Estimated consumption with no rationing. 
fi.l. 
Chaptel· 7. 
CONSUMPTION .AND THE POPtJL.ATIOU. 
We have already several times, tmd will do so still 
more, come up against the difficulty of the "paucity of stat-
istical evidence" and even in such an important field as 
population statistics for South .Africa in the twenty years 
under discussion only twice has there been conducted a cen-
sus that covers the whole population. It would not be at all 
adequate to compare consumption and the population merely in 
the two years 1936 and 1946 since in the latter year most of 
the products with which the writer is concerned, were in re ... 
etricted supply. In these circumstances such a comparison 
could not hope to trace the development of the relationship 
between these two factors and it has therefore been ~sid­
ered essential to use estimates of the population ~ti the 
other years. 
The demand for food, which is more than any ethel' comm-
odity limited by the "confines of a man's stomach", i:': ob-
viously dete r mined considerably by the population especially 
in so fw.1 as the upper limits are concerned. The relation-
ship between these two quantities has exercised the minds 
and reasoning of men for many years although for almost a 
century nothing of any considerable importance wt~.s added to 
the realistic but pessimisstic thoughts of Robert Mal thus 
who was responsible more than any other for the defeat of the 
theories of the 11 invisible hand" and the perpetual harmo ny 
within the economic system. The conclusions at which :I{althus 
arrived were based primariJ.y on the fact that he considered 
the demand for foodstuffs and the level of population as two 
synonomous terms and thus was able to compare the supply of 
food v1ith the level of the population. The Malthus "spectre" 
was one in which the demand for food was continually press-
ing against the supply gove1·ned by the niggurdJ.ine ss of na .. 
ture, due to the incl'easing gap between the rates of grovrth 
of population and the supply of foodstuffs. Yet within half 
/a. century 
a century economists were announcing that the "spectre" was 
the product of a diseased mind, that the problem was no 
longer onep f finding sufficient food to feed the population 
but one of finding markets for the products grown in ever 
increasing quantities in the "new world". Whether or notl 
we are any nearer the conditions which plagued Malthus and 
his colleagues is a question which will deserve our consid-
eration at a later stage but what we should note here is the 
importance that has for many ye~·s been granted to the rela-
t ionship between consumption, the 1 evel of population and 
the supply of foodstuffs, In the light of ~d.ern economic 
theory, the emphasis which was placed on the latter two fa.c ... 
tors was definitely too great but it nevertheless remains 
that there must be a certain correlation between the twol 
· The nee~ to devote more space than mere mention to 
these factors is strengthened by the much more recent devel-
opment in policies relating to food w the Nutritional Frob-
lem. This development , which can be identified with the 
more humane principles of modern thought, economic and other~ 
hus since the 1930 ' s been extremely significant and the reduo-
tion of the nutritional gap has in most countries beccme one 
of the main foundations upon which food policies m•e being 
built. No longer is the "cruel mechanism" of the economic 
system. allowed to operate where the very existence of men and 
women are concerned, the belief is now based upon the fact 
that each and everyone deserves the necessities of J.ife in a 
simj.lar way as another generation decided that education was 
something of which all sholld receive the benefit. 
The present chapter will therefore be based to a large 
extent on the consumption of these particular foodstuffs in 
their relationship to the nutritional requirement& of South 
Africa although it is import ~mt to note here that it will be 
impossible to say that the nutritional standards of the South 
African population are hi gh or low merely on the evidence of 
six or seven commodities. On the other hand as far as these 
arc representative of the total consumpti on of food , and 
/t hP. 
the writer believes them to be so, some very close approx-
imatd:ons to the actual facts can be expected. 
Before proceeding to ex;unine the nutritional standards 
of the population as far as is possible in this discussion, 
it i s interestinr to note, in view of what has been s~ 
concerning the over- emphasis on popu1 at ion changes in d.e-
termining the level of demand for food in the past, that in 
the period 1930/1 - 1941/2 one in which su:pply was unre-
st:ri cted apart from measures to conserve wheat in the last 
season, correlation between the physical consu~ption and the 
level of the population Ylas very weak j_n all cases except 
for flour and meal and fl'e sh mille. In both cases however , 
th0re are other factors to be discussed when the effect of 
changes in income on the demand for specific foodstuffs is 
considered, which must have exerted fal' more influence on the 
consumption than did the increase in population. 
It was stated above that the upper limits to food con-
sumption are determined largely by the level of population; 
below that condition of optimum-consumption the main factors 
in the determination of food consumption will be the National 
. 
Income. It is true that, as we shall see later, that as In ... 
come rises t he fnaction of that income spent on food tends to 
decline so that we s hould expect to find that at some cri ti-
cal level of the :i.{ational Income the optimum por ca.pit t'l. 
physical consumption has been reached and from that point on-
wards any increase in consumption will be determined by move-
ments in the population assuming tbere to be no redistributim 
of the national Income. It must be obvious therefore, that 
the importance of population in determining the amount of 
foodstuffs consumed is sli crht and confined t o a very speci a.l 
model, and this is realised in modern economic thought by 
the recognition that from an economic standpoint , ma.lnutri .. 
tion and poverty are synonomous. Dr. Kal'l Bremer, present 
Minister of Health, stated in 19 39 that "everywhere the 
economic conditions ••• determine the nutri tloneJ. s t andards 
/of the 
(l) 
of the ••• population. u 
In Graphs 5 and 6 are shewn the rise in conswnption :per 
capita for the various froducts under review for the twenty 
2) 
I 
years 1929/30 - 1948/9. The main fact which stands out in 
these graphs is that in every case except maize in its whole 
form and flour and meal, there has been a notable increasing 
trend in the quantities consumed per head of the popu~ion. 
On the assumption that this benefit was sh~·ed by the whole 
population, an assumption which will depend on the distribu-
tion of the :t;ational Income during those years anC.. the corre-
la.tion between income and food consumption, two conside1·atiom 
which will receive attention in the following section, it 
means that the population must have been better :fed in 1949 
( 1) 
( 2) 
"Nutrj_tion of Europeans in Rur-al Jireas" by Dl'. K. Bremer, 
Race Relations Vol. VI, No. 1, 1939. 
It is not entirely satisfactory to use per capita figures 
when considering nutritional aspects or any other where 
comparison is to be made over a period of time for they 
do not take into account changes in the age and sex dis-
tribution of the population. In view of the fact that 
very little information is available concerning these as-
pects of the population, the writer has been obliged to 
use per capita figures throughout the following discuss-
ion. Ail examination of the census result s for Europeans 
in the years 1926, 1931 and 1946 reveals a slight tenden .. 
cy for the European populatj_on to be becoming slightly 
older as the table below shows. There was no means of 
checking this tendency of change for the other racial 
groups but there would seem 1 i ttle cause to assume that 
the change in their case should be the same as for the 
more civilized European comm.unity, already possibly show-
ing the signs of a dec1 ining population. It must be 
assumed t herefore that there has been no change in. the 
age and sex distribution suffj_ciently appreciable to aff€ 
ect the conclusions to be drawn from the per capita con-
sumption figures. 
Percentage distribution of the population by racial 
groups in certain age groups. (a) 
/%. 
Group European .Asia.t ic Coloured .African 
0-l 
&.3 
4-5 
6 ... 7 
8-9 
10-11 
12 .... 13 
1926 
4.8 
4.7 
4.8 
4.6 
4 .• 6 
4.5 
4 .. 6 
1931 1936 
4.7 4.3 
4.5 4.1 
4.3 4.3 
4.3 4.3 
4.4 4.1 
4.3 4.0 
4.2 4.0 
1936 1936 1936 
6.6 6.5 4.8 
6.7 6.4 6.4 
6.6 6.2 6.0 
6.5 5.9 5_. 7 
6.0 5.3 5.4 
5.5 4.8 4 .. 8 
5.2 4.8 4.9 
/than 
(l) 
than in 1930. 
From Graph a it is noticeable that for most products I 
the per capita consumption fell during the depression years, 
the only exception being flour and meal where, the writer sug-
gests, the substitution of these two commodities for bread, 
might have exerted sufficient influence to lead to these cir-
cumstances. · The same tendency for per capita consumption to 
fall is seen in Graph 6. If we neglect maize, mealie meal and ( 2) 
fresh milk, the figures of which for certain reasons the 
writer does not consider as accurate as the rest, the tendency 
from 1933 onwards was one of a general increase in the quanti• 
ties consumed per head bf the population. The check to this 
increase occurred at different times for the different pro-
ducts. In the case of butter a most significant drop occurred 
in 1943/4; for cheewe the decline also set in about that y:ea.r 
while the meat group appear to have begun to fall in the same 
year although the per capita consumption of pork had declined 
.in the previous year due probably to difn.cul ties in obtain-
in~ mai ze for feed purposes. As f~· as the wheaten group 
(bread, flour and meal) is concerned, the increase was ~ot 
abruptly brought to a stop but appears to have tailed off into 
a static period although there appe~·s to have been a. decline 
in 1946/? while the per capita consumption of mealie meal, the 
other staple cereal, declined in 1942/3, rose again in the 
next two seasons only to fall slightly in 1945/6 which apart 
from the doubtful accuracy of the figures, must be accounted 
( 1) 
( 2) 
At the expense of anticipating the r esults of the inquiry 
into the distribution of the Ua.tionaJ. Income , the writer 
should state here that thel'c appears to have been a ten-
dency for u redis t ribution in favour of t he lower income 
groups so thc.t the conclucion munt be that the general 
standard of food consumption has improved. 
These reasons are mainly inherent in the statistics them ... 
selves. For whole maize the consumption fi gures have been 
obtained by subtracting maize milled (figures from the 
Industrial Censuses) from estima.te3 of the Division of 
Economics a.nd ::.::a.rkets for human consumption; for mealie 
meal it has been assumed that all is consumed by human 
beings and no account ha.s been taken of stocks; for fresh 
milk all figures are based upon estimates of the Di vi-
sion of Economics and !!:1rkets ... in each case there are 
tremendous objections. 
/fol~ 
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for by the close correlation between production and consump-
tion during the war years when importation was fraught with 
so many difficulties. The decline in the case of sugar, while 
not appreciable, occurred in 1943/4. The general conclusion 
must be that the period 1942/3 - 1946/? represents one in 
which the general improvement in the supply of foodstuffs in 
relation to the population, a notable featu:re of the decade 
1933-43, recolvod ~severe check although t he per capita con-
sumption of most products nevertheless remained above t he lev-(1) 
Gl attained in the years immedi ateJ.y preceding the war. 
The recovol'Y from this "trough" once again differs be ... 
tween the products, and even behvoen the products within the 
groups. Thus for instance the per capita sonsumption of butt-
er did not recover to t he level of 1942/3, nor did the Qnsump• 
tion of bacon and ham, while within the meat group the trend 
was a d.ecrca.sing one for beef, mutton and lamb but for pork 
there was a considerable improvemen)l.i. Of the other commodi-
ties mealie meal seems to have increased more than most while 
t he wheaten group and sugro· exhibited a slight improvement, 
but one which only left the per capita level of consumption of 
bread, flour and meal at approximately the same as in the per-
iod 1942/3-1945/6. It is difficult to ascertain the importance 
of the increase as regal'ds mealio meal for besides the doubts 
already expressed as to the acceptability of the statist~s 
themselves, there would appear to have been a very substantial 
substitution of mealie meal for whole maize. Thus in 1936/7 
the total pe1· capita consumption of both amounted to 192 1 bs 
w~ile in 1946/7, the last yem· for which the figures can be 
accepted as even approaching the facts, the combined amount is 
211 lbs so that the indication is t!1a.t a.n examination of mealie 
meal over-estimates the increase in per capita consumption of 
maize products as a cereal group. 
(1) A notable exception was butter, t h e per capita cona~mption 
of which was in 1945/6 the lowest since 1932/3. 
/As 
IF C. 
As has been stressed above, it is imp~aaible to use these 
per capita figures in a nutritional study apart. from saying 
that if the improvement was felt by all persona ip the communi-
ty, there appeal·s every possibility that the general standard 
of nutrition has improved over the period under consideration. 
It is however, possible to employ statistj os i'ro.n various other 
sources which will throw a. certain amount of light on the per 
c~pi ta consum;d;ion or' different groups. 
For instance it would seem that the optimum per capi to. con-(1) 
sumption of sugar is approxim~te+y 100 1 bs per annum, which · 
would mean that t~e direct consumption of sugar by Europeans, 
e.ssumed to have reached the optimum which on the evidence of the 
1936 inquil7 into Eur ope~n expenditure , is :reached at a rel9.ti ve-
ly low income level, ·would be as shown 
1930, 1936, 1942 and 1946: 
1930 
European Population (000 1 s) 1 ,.800 
N'on-Eul·opean Population ( 000 1 s ) 6,90¢ 
Total consumption of sugar (ooo lbs) 
European consumption at 100 
1 bs pel· head 
!Ton-European consumption 
( 0001 be) 
lifo n- i:Gur ope an consumption 
lbs per head 
Per capita consumption by !\on-
Europeans p . a. ( 1 bs) 
314,000 
180,000 
134,000 
19.4 
below for the four years 
1936 1942 1946 
2,000 2 , 200 2,400 
7,600 8,300 9 , 000 
3?1 , 000 535, 000 714,000 
200,000 220,000 240,000 
171,000 315,000 474,000 
22.4 38.0 52.? 
On the assumption that the per capita consumption of sugar by 
Europeans lias rer11a.ined constan~, one which seems fairly justi-
fiable, in 1946 t he per ct{.pit·a. for non-Europeans appears to 
have almo s t trebled when compared witb 1931, and in 1946 was 
approximately half t he European level. 
(1) This figure is quoted in the s . .A. Sugar Year Books e..nd is 
borne out by the examination of the consumption of sugar 
ovex· twenty income groups ~s shewn in the inquiry into 
expenditure by European f~1ilies, discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter. 8. In this study the quantity of sugar 
:purchased per man unit actually decreased fro1t1 9. ?8 1 bs 
per month (or 117.36 1bs per annum) in the income group 
earning less than £125 p.a. to 7.25 lbs (or 8? .00 lbs 
p.a..) in the £ 575-600 p.a. income groups. 
/From 
From figures published by the Directorate of IJ:eat 
Supplies it is also possible to obtain some idea as to the 
per capita consumption of meat for different groups, in tlus 
case urban dwellers and others. 
Tota.J. consumption of fresh meat ( ooo 1 bs.) 
Ordin~·y Trade Issues in nine urban 
areas ( 000 lbs.) 
Estimated population of nine urban 
areas ( 000 1 s) 
Per Capita consumption in nine urban 
ro~eas (lbs. p.a.) 
Consumption in other areas 
(000 lbs.) 
Population in other areas 
( OOO' a) 
Per capita consumption in other 
areas ( 1 bs. p. a.) 
1946/& 1948/9 
854,000 903,000 
3?6, 000 413,000 
3,100 3,400 
122 123 
478,000 490,000 
8,300 8_,900 
58 55 
It is of course not possible in this case to draw any infer-
ence from a disparity in incomes as it cannot be 'claimed with 
insufficient statistical proof, thu.t the level of income in 
urban areas is necessa:t•ily higher than in 11 other 11 areas. on 
the other hand however, if one considers that the p~pulation 
in these 11 other 11 areas would. be composed of European and 1\on-
European, the latter to a large extent resident in the Re-
serves, it is obvious that not only is the per capita con-
sumption very mu ch lower in the non-urban · areas but wht hin 
them the disparity must be very considerable with the vast 
tro. 
(1) 
majority of -non-Europeans consuming approximately 40 1 bs P- a. 
per head or 1/3 of the per capita figure for urban are·as it-
self affected by the disparity of incomes between Europeans 
and non-Europeans in those areas. 
As far as the wheaten ~·oup of bread, flour and meal is 
(1) This is a rough estimate based upon data supplied by the 
~ivision of Economics and markets concerning the product-
~on of beef, veal, mutton a nd lurnb in the Reserves and 
estimates of the writer of t he production of pork for the 
years 1946-48. 
/concerned 
11t_ 
concerned, the per capita figures show a marked tendency to 
remain stationery over the last eight seasons under review. 
The 1936 in~liry into European expenditure reveals that the 
( 1) 
physical saturation point is reached at a low income level, 
and. there is also a slight tendency for the consumption per 
man unit to fall as income rises so that the stationery nature 
observed in Gl'aph 5 must be accounted for by the fact that non-
Eu1·opeans in urban areas are more and more turning to the pur-
( 2) 
chase of bread in place of his traditional cereal, maize. 
The rise in the per capita consumpt:i.on figures for maize 
and mea.J.ie meal which persists even when the two are taken as 
one group, must be accounted for by the urbanization of the 
Fative population in whose diet these two are most important. 
Within the group the apparent substi tutioh of mealie meal for 
maize must also be put down to this ul·banization as well as 
the fact that it is highly probable that JTati ves in the He-
serveo are turnine towards the EJ.ore refined product as their 
contact with the European level of ci ililiz ution ano. cuJStoms 
through traders and the system of migratory labour, becomes 
closer. 
As far as the dairy products ~·e concerned, it seems pro~ 
bable that the consumption of butter and cheese among natives 
is insignificant in the total. Certainly b~ta:t>y surveys a-
mong urbanised lTati ves, discussed in Chap tel· 8, l'eveal that 
even in the "upper income groups" theil· impo:rta.nce in · the diet 
is small. Assuming therefore that the consumption is limited 
to the European section of the popula.tj.on, the per capita. con-
sumption figures would have to be increased. by approximately 
(1) For a. fuller discussion of this point see Chapter 8 page 20~ 
( 2) See page Zr7 for further discussion on this point. It is 
also important to note that the European pop.u-la.tion in 
the period 1936-46 increased by 1. ?% per annum which was 
slightly less than the percentage increase over the whole 
population (1.76) so that had wheaten products been con-
sumed by Europeans only, we would have expected the per 
capi t~ consumption to have declined. 
/4oo% but 
400% but the trend of change would not be substantially 
altered since the proportion of Europeans in the total popu-
lation has remained fairly constant over the twenty year 
period under review. Concernin~ the consumption of milk, the 
estimates of the Division of Economics and I,rarkets are them-
selves prepared from the standpoint of consumption assuming 
that the per capita figure for Europeans and non-Europeans on 
( 1) 
!f:Z. 
farms have remained. constant, and a highly variable co nsump-( 2) 
tion in the native Reserves dependant on olimatic conditions. 
The per capi t.a consumption of fresh milk among :~ati ves in Re--
serves would be as fol1ows in the years, 1936 t~nd. 1946 
1936 1946 
Population (000 1 s) 2, 960 3, 270 
Tot a.l consumption (000 gallons) X 46,300 60,200 
Per capita consumption (gallons 
p. a.) 16 18 
x Average for three s easons of which 1936 and 1946 are the 
centre and assuming that there is no 11export" or 11 import 11 
of fresh milk from or i nto Hati ve Areas 
Urban consumption for these two years from estimates of the 
Division of Economics and I1!arkets and population census figures 
work out as 16 and 20 gallons per head respectively compared 
with an estimate by the same institution of between 20 and 24 
gallons for 1948/9. Wll.ile the writel' does not wish to place 
much emphasis on these figures for milk, the doubtful accuracy 
of which he has already stressed, they do indicate that great-
est deficiency in regard to this product occurs not in the ru .. 
r al areas but among t he non- Europe ans in the towns as it would 
seem fairly reasonable to assume that the per capita consump-
tion among Europeans would be about 35 gallons per 
(1) 
( 2) 
The f i gures given are approximately 45 gallons per Euro-
pean p. a . a.ncl 2. 5 ga.llono per non-European the latt er 
be:i..n3 in the opini on of the writer, gr ossly under-estimated. 
.be, f ·f?,r.. . as th~ Reser1iee·: a.re concerned, consumption is based 
~pon an assumed production of 80 gallons per cow per annum 
where the number of cows in milk are taken as 14~ o f the 
total number , the same as for Europeans and i s adjusted 
to take into account cJ.imatic condition~ by means of an 
index of maize yields. 
/annum 
( 1) le"ve 
annum which wouldAvery little for the non-Europeans in urban 
areas. 
We can now pro ceed to consider, within the limitations im .. 
posed by our statistics , bot.h as to their accuracy and pwcity, 
the implhications of our findingE a::: far as the nutritional 
s t anda.rds of the country are concerned. 
lna.lnutrition is a word y;.hi ch economically interpreted is 
synonomous with poverty so it is obvious that whe1·e the income 
of a communi ty is distributed. in such a way that discrepancies 
( 2) 
between persons are great , as in South Africa., the incidence 
of malnutrition will be great in so far as the propol'tion of 
the population earning low incomes is significant or not. Nu-
trition therefore becomes dependant upon the level and distri-
bu tion of the Hational Income, t he population and t he pby si cal 
consumption of foodstuffs. At the expense of a nticipating 
what will be said later in connection with the distribution 
of t he National Income , the writer would state at this stage 
that the redistribution which has occurred in favour of the 
lower income ~·oups especiru.ly during t he w~· years must have 
improved the ability of tho ~;:;e most needing it , to better their 
nutritional standards. Whether they have i n fact done so will 
depend on the per capi ta consumption of fo odstuffs in gmmeral 
and certain significant foodstuffs in particul~·. 
The first question which we will consider is whether the 
total production of foodstuffs within the Union was at any time 
in the period under review, adequate to meet t he nutritional 
requirements of the popuJ.ation since if the answer to this 
question is found to be yes, the whole problem becomes one of 
the distribution of the food, and hence the inequality ofincomes 
(1) 
( 2) 
The 1936 inquiry ahows a range in per ca9ita consumption 
from 6.3 to 33.5 gallons per annwn with an avergge of 
approximately 25-30. Since tobl]. ur·b~n per capita ansump .. 
tion increased by almost 40;o between 1936 and 1 9 49, the 
writ er i s of the opiniop that t he figure quoted in the 
text is on the conservative side . 
For statistic~ e vidence of this see Chapter 9 . ll.t . 
/In 1939 
In 1939 in an ~ticle "Food Resources of the Union in 
(1) 
relation to the Nutritional Requirements of the PopuJ.ation", 
Dr. O.G. Haylett considered this question in fairly consider-
able detail taking the age and sex structure of the population 
and food require.!lents relative to age into account, assuming 
everyone to be engaged in 11x:oderately hard work 11 and using 
what he acknowledges as arbi tr~oy "but ••• based on the recom-
menda.tions of a number of authorities" constituents of the 
caJ.orific requirern.ents of the adequate diet. He also based 
his conc:T.usions on the fuct that "biologically speaking, there 
is no reason why the standards (for the European) should not 
f'ltF. 
apply equally well to the entire population of al1 racial groupfJ 
The conclusions arrived at (2) were that the consumption of 
foodstuffs of plant origj_n exceeded the estimated requirements 
of all races, that there was sufficient meat , poultry, meese 
and fish to provide ~or the European aection but insufficient 
for the population as a whole and that the estirtlated supplies 
of daity produce were not even sufficient to mee t the needs 
of the Europeans, let a.l one the whole community. In general 
the shortfall of all foodstuffs of animal origin was consi der~ 
able and unfortunately this groups cover~a most of those foods 
providing the protective elements in the diet . h similro· 
study conducted by the Division of Economics and ~.'Iarkets in the 
(1) 
( 2) 
Race Relations, Vol. VI Ho. 1, 1939 pp 1?. 
The findings of Dr. Haylett can be summarised as follows: 
Requirements and Supplies of food in South Afric~ 1936. 
(Megatherms • 1 megatherm • 10 Caloi.;-i-es) ~ ---
V.'heat, flour 
Maize Meal 
Sugar 
Other 
Total : Plant 
Whole Jln:il k 
Butter 
Cheese 
and meal 
Foodstuffs 
. 
Other 
Total 
Beef, 
Pigs' 
Other 
Total 
Dairy Produce 
Vea.J.., Mutton, Lamb 
meat 
: Meats etd!~ 
Re~uirements Supplies 
1 , 134) 
3,320 2,814)4,710 
?62) 
1,784 
5,104 
1 , 641 
?3? 
420 
2,?98 
1 , 231 
1,589 
5, 299 
143 
130 
19 
240 
532 
45? 
4? 
8 
512 
No eetj_mates have been made for mea.ta , milk and poultry 
produced und. consumed in 1TatJi ve Reserves. 
/same 
sru:ne year , which included estimates of foodstuffs not con-
sidered by Dr. Haylett, revealed that while the totalpro-
duction was adequate in terms of a.ll nutritional require-
ments other than calcium, the general conclusions arrived 
by by Dr. HayJ.ett concerning the division between potec-(1) 
tiveand energy producing foodstuffs were accurate. 
The writer has attempted to show in the table l:dow 
the position as it existed in 1949 on the same basis of 
cu.lculation as used by Dr. HayJ.ett and assuming thatthere 
has been no alteration in the age and sex structure of the 
population other tht-m the 28;; increase between 1936 and 1949 
Re uirements and Su lies of food in south Africa 1949. 
Megatherms • 1 megatherm • 10 calories 
Wheat, flour and mea.1 l 
Malze Meal 
Sugar 
Total : Plant foodstuffs 
Whole Milk 
Butter 
Cheese 
Total : Dairy Produce 
Beef , Veal, Hutton and Lamb 
Pigs' meat 
Total : :.1:eats etc. 
Requirements 
4,250 
6,533 
2,100 
943 
3:t581 
1,5?6 
-
Supplies 
2 , 010) 
3 J 9 24) ? , 6 6 4 
1 J? 30) 
524 
214 
3~ 
840 
101 
\Vhen compared with Dr. Eeylett 1 s figures for 1936 there 
seems little change in t he general position apart fwm the 
fact that the inclus i on of estimates here for consumption 
of meat and milk in t he Reserves increases t he calorific 
value of the consumption of those two i terns quite consider-
ably. The supply of tbe group wheat, maize and sugar con-
tinued to exceed by far the requirements in t h is "ideal" a.rxl 
in fact the surplus appears to have increased, while in re-
sp ect of the other two ~·oups the position remains virtually 
unchanged. 
The fact that these protective foods are usually rela-
tively expensive means that the major portion of the comm-
unity Gioes not even consume such commodities as but tel~ and 
cheese while t heir consumption of meat and milk is usually 
(1) Race Relations, Vol. VI, No. 3, 1939 pp 125. 
/hopelessly 
ho:pel essly ina.de quate from the nutri tiona.l :point of view. 
Dr. Fox in 1939 remarked in connection with the Native Re-
serves, 11 e,s with many other :primitive :peop1es, a• customary 
diet simple and monotonous though it m~ be, is quite cap• 
able of maintaining a satisfactory level of nutrition pro-
vided it can be obtained in sufficient quantj.ty. However it 
has not the same elasticity a.s those based: on bl'oader found&-
tions; hence changes which appear at first insignificant may 
bring about far mol'e serious consequences ••• The amount of (1) 
melnutri tion or disease that existec~ must be appalling," 
and explained that the apparent contradiction between his 
observations and the low rejection rates for mine recruits, a 
fact wt.ich was often used. to vindicate the payment of low 
wages and the satisfactory nutritional standards in the He-
. eel'ves, was partly to be explained "by the fact that tlhe 
actual adult population represents a highly selected gnw.:p, 
many of the less robust having died off in infancy or child-
( 2) 
hood. 11 But malnutl~ition is by no means restricted to the 
rural Natives nor indeed to the natives alone although of 
course as the main body of the lower income groups, it is in-
evitable that they should be the main sufferers. In the ur-
ban locations the plight of the non-European is quite as 'bad 
as, j.f not worse, than, those who have not left their tradi-
tionaJ. homes, due to his contact with a much higher level of 
civilization than he is able to participate in with his very 
limited resources. In such circumstances it is inevitalbme 
that many should be attracted by the so- called 11 soft 11 foods 
like tea, sugar, higl:'.ly refined me alie meal and white bread, 
( 3) 
£Ul foods of low or ne~.igible protective food value. 
Summing u:p what has been s a id concerning nutrition in 
its very broad aspects, two important features stand out. 
(1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
11 Nutri t j_onal Problems Amongst the Rur aJ. Bantu 11 , by Dr. 
F.W. Fox, Race Relations, Vol. VI, No. 1 :pp 5. 
11 Nutritiona1 Problems lilllongst the Rural Ba.ntu 11 , by Dr. 
F.W. Fox, Race Relations, Vol. VI, No. 1 pp 5. 
See also ~ Chapter 8 for further discussion. 
/First 
First the problem is not me1·ely one of ma.ldistri but ion of 
avt:-;.ilable supplies - the supplies themselves appear to be in ... 
adequate to provide·· a diet to each and everyone in the coun,... 
try which will satisfy certain basic requirements of quantity 
and quality. Secondly, and this is a problem which will be-
come more obvious ip the two following chapters, to the fun-
dar.uen.tal inadequacy of supplies must be added the wide dis-
parity between income levels of di :fferent groups within~ he 
country and t he abject poverty in which such a large part of 
the community li ve. 
Finally it is interesting to make some interm:.tional com-
parisons of the per capita consumption of certain of the food-
1'17. 
stuffs with which the w1•:J.ter is dealing. Four commodities, 
meat but· not including pork, butter, cheese and sugar have been (1) 
chosen. In the (l'a.se of fre sh meat while South Africa can-
not compare with such countries as :t.Tew Zealand, .Australia and 
the Argentine, its per capita consumption had by 1949 equalled 
that of Canada and exceeded that in Great Bri t ian where of 
I \ .• 
course consumption is severely restl·icted. On page ! Jlo above 
it was estimated that the per capita consumption of all fresh 
meats (i.q. including pork) outside the' nine controlled area.s 
amounted to 55 1 bs p. a. and this will still be a substt'l.ntial 
over-estimation of the figure for the v~st majority ofthe 
people in the Union while a small few may be approaching the 
very high levels recorded. in the three main export"ing countries 
If we ~ere to assume that Europeans alene consume~utter, 
the per capita consumption figures would appe~· quite respec-
t able alongside those for Contj.nental countries, the U.s. A. ani 
' ! 
Great Briti~n since 1938 , for in 1941 the per capit a ~gure for 
. ' ) 
Europeans alone would amount to 21.4 1 bs p. a. and in 1946 to 
15 . 3 lbs. One significant feature about this commodity is that 
while most countries sb.ow a marked tendency f or their pe1· 
(l) See Tables ~ - 5" pages ZOI- 'f. . 
/capita 
capita consumption to decline, South Africa consumed more in 
1949 per head than in 1930, a pleasing fact in view mf the re-
marks made above in connection with nutrition and the protect-
ive foodstuffs. The consumption of cheese is low whether one 
assumes that all is consumed by Europeans or not, for in 1946 
it would h.ave only have amounted to 6.4 lbs p.a. per European 
inhabitant, although it is notable that this would have been 
higher than for both Augtrali~d Canada, but much less than 
the European countries where cheese is a favourite food. For 
both butter and cheese the simil exity between the figures for 
South .Africa. and Southern Rhodesia is noticeable v:hen they are 
calculated purely on the basis of European population. 
As regards sugar, the ·relative position of South Africa. 
is better, from t he statistical standpoint, than for the other 
three connnodities. While the consumption per capita has de-
clined in most countries since the early years of the second 
World ·v::a.r, South .hfrica in the last yew: under l'eview was con-
Sluning more per head than ever before. On the assumption that 
the direct consumption by Europeans amounted to 100 lbs p.a., 
the non-Europe an we found wbuld be consuming approximately 54 
lbs in 1946 which, remember ing the position of t .be other comm-
odi ties, compares very favourabl y with most countrie s and in 
fact exceeds t hat of France, Eire and probably most European 
countries. The prediliction of the Native for sugar and hie 
lncorpora.tion of this i tern into his diet often unforilna.tely at 
the expense of other more nutritious foods, is in the opinion 
of the writer the main cause for this state of affairs. 
The conclusion must be that on the average, peopleconsume 
less per head of most foodstuffs in South Afrj_ ca than most 
othe1· countries especially th.ose such a.s the other Dominions 
with. whose level of development so many in this country would 
compare the Union, <:1lthough the w1•iter suspects that were it 
possible to compare the per capita consumption of cereals, the 
concl usj.on might be very different. That however , would merely 
provide further evidence of a general low standard of living 
/in 
in South Africa. At the same time "persons with adequate 
means are feeding far better than people even in food. ex-
porting countries such as Australia and New Zealand. It 
is unnecessary to say that in south ~frica persons with 
~ I 
money are feeding far better than people in Bri ti.a* or on 
(1) I 1./ 
the Continent of Europe." 
(1) Report on the Distl~j.bution of Food Supplies by Sir 
Henry French G. B. E. , K. C. B. U. G. 31/46 pp 9. 
If'!. 
'T'IJBL.£ /. 
-PER CAPITa CONSUMPTION OF CERT . .->.IN FOODSTUFFS IN SOUTH AFRICa. 
Year Population Bread Flour Butter Cheese Milk Beef Pork Bacon Maize Mea lie Sugar Jams 
& Hea"l etc . & Ham Meal etc. 
lbs. lbs ozs ozs gls lbs ozs ozs lbs lbs lbs ozs 
A, ~1\ es €i D 
1929-30 8,536,400 28 50 55x 12 15.5 59 29 15 119 111 36 33 1930-31 8,712,800 34 15 15.2 36 
1931-32 8,892,300 24 13 14o9 
-
36 
1932-33 9 ,o65 ,300 25 55 32 9 14.6 53 37 12 90 106 34 34 
1933-34 9,243,100 24 46 56x 13 12.9 54 33 13 124 99 38 37 
1934-35 9,427,800 27 45 59x 14 13 .0 52 -=l '7 13 92 102 39 40 ..J I 
1935-36 9,589,898 29 47 63x 16 13.0 57 42 13 102 124 38 42 
1936-37 9,8o5,ooo 30 47 66x 16 13.9 6o 42 14 103 89 44 43 
1937-38 9,988 ,000 31 41 73x 17 13. 9 59 4/lr 16 78 122 44 45 
1938-39 10,172,000 31 48 72x 16 14.4 58 ? 0 15 69 118 48 43 J/ 
1939-40 10,3 55 ,ooo 31 46 58 18 12.4 61 46 17 79 133 48 47 
1940-41 10 '532 ,ooo 35 47 68 22 13.0 65 49 22 87 135 50 60 
1941-42 10,718,000 39 45 62 23 13. 9 68 56 29 63 159 56 70 1942-43 10,900,000 45 52 ~7, 26 14.4 70 47 30 92 137 70 57 1943-44 11,084,000 46 53 74 24 l4o8 59 50 26 53 155 66 53 1944-45 11,267,000 47 51 65 20 13.3 62 56 26 38 169 68 56 
1945- 46 11,418,349 48 51 69x 21 l4c4 71 47 22 64 164 62 89 1946-47 11,662,000 50 39 65x 23 16.1 70 44 21 44 167 60 98 
1947-48 11,890,000 48 46 76 27 15.8 70 54 24 192 68 88 
1948-49 12 ,320,000 56 44 67 22 13.7 69 70 24 197 78 
Note s .i-l. From the Offic ial Year Books ; esti mates exceot f or years 1935-36 and 1945- 46 when census figures are taken • 
B Includes farm butter for years marked :x:, otherT::i.se crsamer~r anly . Farm but ter would increa se the figures 
by about 18 ozs in earlier years to 13 ozs i n the la ter . 
c The amount of fa rm cheese made is so small as to make no differ ence to the f i gures. 
D Does not include bacon and ham made on farms . 
n.!U.E ~. 
PER C~PITA CONS~illPTION OF BUTTER IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES, LBS. 
Year Great U o S o~'t • New Austra- Canada Eire Nether- So Rhod- France Switzer- South South 
Britain ~ealand lia lands esia land Africa Africa 
A B ·c 
1930 18o7 17 .. 3 39o7 28.9 30.6 14.2 19.1 13.3 16.7 3 .. 5x 
1931 20.9 18.1 43 o0 29.0 30 .. 8 16 ., 0 2lc3 12.0 14 .,3 16ol 2ol 
1932 21..7 18.3 42.7 29.3 30()5 19o0 20.2 11o8 14.3 15.9 1.5 
1933 23.5 17.9 44.0 31.1 30.2 
• 
16.7 2L5 12.0 13.9 15o7 2.0 
1934 25.2 18o3 44c3 30.8 31.1 41.4 15.9 20.6 12.7 15.7 15.4 3.5x 
1935 25o2 17.3 41.2 32.8 31.8 41.9 13.8 21.2 12.7 15.2 17.0 3.6x 
1936 25.0 16o6 47.3 32.4 32o9 28.0 12.4 22.7 12.9 15,0 19.,9 4.,0x 
1937 24.8 16.4 40o0 33.8 32.3 11o2 22.0 12.3 13.9 21.2 4olX 
1938 24ol 16o4 42.8 32.6 31.9 32o2 12.3 24.9 15.0 4.5x 
1939 17.3 42o2 30.3 30.7 34.,3 12.3 24o9 11.0 14.8 4.5x 
1940 14.0 l6o9 42.2 33.3 31.4 34.0 15.0 25.9 8.2 13.7 3.6 
1941 10o2 15.9 42.9 33.3 31.2 34.4 18o3 28.2 7.1 11.,2 5.lx 4.3 
1942 7.7 15o7 47()6 34.6 3~-1 39.6 17.4 26 .7 6.6 9·3 3.8 1943 7o6 11.7 47o7 27.5 2 .5 40.6 12.1 2lo6 7o3 9-7 ~4.8 
1944 7o7 11.9 40.,5 26.1 29 .8 39-5 11.9 19.5 6.0 9.5 4 .6 
1945 8.5 10o8 31.3 25o9 28o 8 39.7 8.4 l6oO 6.0 9-3 5 .Ox 4.1 
1946 l0o9 10.2 30.5 25.3 25.6 40-9 11.9 16.7 7o5 10.4 4.4x 4.3x · 
1947 11.2 11.1 3lo5 24.8 28oO 32o2 1lo7 18.6 7.7 14.3 4.0x 4.lx 
1948 12.5 l0o2 30 ·9 24.3 28.7 ' 37.1 11 .. 9 16.9 9·3 10.6 5.8x 4.8 
1949 13.8 10.6 33.0 25.2 23.5 39.5 6.4 18.9 12.,8 5.3x 4.2 
Notes All figures apart from the final column have been extracted from the reports of the Imperial Economic Committee 
and the Commonwealth Economic Committee. 
A. Europeans onlya 
B. Europeans only until 1942. The discrepancy between the figures marked x and those in the fina 1 column 
is accounted for by the fact that here it appears that some estimate has been made of the production of farm 
butter. 
c. For all persons but covers only creamery butter except in years marked x when figures for farm butter are 
available. If the production of the latter is e stimated at about lO,OOO,OOOlbs per annum, the per capita 
consumption figure for 1949 becomes 5.1 lbs. and the remaining figures all rise by between o8 and 1.0 lbs. 
~ 
:--
~.B~E ~ 
PER CaPITa CONSli~PTION OF CHEESE IN CERTaiN COUNTRIES, LBS. 
Year Great U.S oAo Ner; ..... ustra- Canada n.rgent- Nether- F!'~nce Switzer- So Rhod- South South 
Britain Zealand lia ina lands land esia Africa a.frica 
A. A B 
1930 10.2 4.6 7o4 3o8 3.6 3.2 12 .2 15.5 4.3 .8 
1931 4.5 7.0 3.7 3.5 2.9 12o9 11o2 16.3 4.3 1.0 
1932 4.4 6.0 3.8 3·3 3.4 11.·5 11.0 17.2 5.0 3.8 o9 
1933 4.5 5.0 4.4 3.4 4.1 15.4 11 . 0 19.4 4.8 3.4 .5 
1934 9.4 4.8 3.5 3.6 3.8 14. 7 10.8 18.5 5.2 3-9 ·9 
1935 9.1 5.2 3.8 3.6 3.8 14.7 12.7 17.4 5.7 4.1 .9 
1936 8.8 5.4- 4.5 3.7 4.9 16o7 12.3 17o2 5.3 4.9 1.0 
1937 8.6 5.5 4o3 3.6 16.1 14-.6 20.1 4-.9 5.2 1.0 
1938 8.9 5.8 4.3 3.6 6.2 17o0 17.0 1.1 
1939 5.9 3.8 3.8 7.6 17o4 13-9 17.6 1.0 
19~0 8.2 6.0 3.7 3 .8. 8.2 13.7 14.8 20ol 1.1 
1941 8.3 6.0 5o3 4.6 7o4- 14o3 9.0 17.4 1.4 
1942 14.0 6.3 5.9 3-9 8.7 11.2 7.3 22.3 1.4 
1943 15.5 5.0 5.7 4o3 9.0 10.1 6.4 22 .0 1.8 
1944 10.3 4. 9 5.8 4.6 10.4 9 o0 4.4 21 . 6 1.5 
1945 9.7 5. 9 5.9 5.1 11.0 9 o7 4.9 20.9 1.3 
1946 10.0 6.9 6.1 4.2 10.3 10 . 8 10.6 19.8 1.3 
Notes . Al+ figures apart from the final column have been extracted from reports of the Imperial and Commonwealth • Economic Coa~ittees. 
a. Europeans only. 
B. For all races. 
Year 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
Notes 
PER CAPITA CONSU11PTION OF SUGAR IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES, LBS . 
United Australia U.S.A. 
Kingdom 
.... 
105 102 108 
104 105 105 
100 106 103 
104 104 99 
107 106 103 
107 107 102 
112 111 96 
113 95 
112 98 
72 119 95 
67 125 104 
69 159 86 
68 144 80 
71 149 89 
70 134 74 
76 131 75 
80 130 92 
81 139 96 
Canada 
98 
90 
93 
97 
96 
101 
... 
99 
103 
80 
77 
84 
69 
72 
88 
89 
Eire 
62 
65 
68 
56 
43 
35 41 
39 
39 
40 
India 
A. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
21 
18 
13 
14 
19 
15 
16 
17 
18 
17 
18 
17 
France Denmark 
57 
54 
55 
54 
56 
57 
... 
54 111 
51 112 
55 123 
58 97 
29 95 
32 97 
30 75 
33 74 
26 61 
31 71 
35 72 
36 68 
Poland 
26 
23 
21 
21 
22 
25 
27 
South 
Africa 
47x 
5lx 
46x 
48 
52 
53 57 
65 
75 
76 
82 
81 
75 
76 
84 
South 
Africa 
B 
36 
36 
36 
34 
38 
39 
38 
44 
44 
48 
48 
50 
56 
70 
66 
68 
62 
60 
68 
All figures apart from the final column and those marked x have been extracted from Reports of the Imperial and 
Commonwealth Economic Committeeso Those marked x were obtained from the S.A. Sugar Year Books. 
A. Includes the sugar value of gur and includes Pakistan after the division. 
B. Refers to direct consumpt~on only. The writer has been unable to verify the reason for the discrepancy 
between his and the other figures quoted but it is probable th~in their computations, the I.E.C. and 
c.~oC. have included sales to manufacturers. Adding sales to manufacturers to the writer's figures in-
volves an increase of approximately 12% which will bring them much closer than they are at present. 
Year 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
Great 
Britain 
9-7 
98 
95 
97 
98 
99 
109 
80 
80 
78 
65 
64 
59 
55 
59 
67 
66 
62 
60 
FGR CaPITA CONSUMP'.riON OF BE:.;F, VEAL, MUTTON 1tND LAMB IN CERTAIN COUNTRIEo, LBS. 
U.S.,Ao 
64 
62 
60 
65 
70 
68 
74 
70 
69 
69 
69 
75 
76 
67 
75 
78 
78 
85 
77 
76 
Canada 
74 
65 
63 
62 
74 
72 
66 
73 
73 
69 
70 
74 
76 
86 
83 
82 
83 
82 
72 
69 
New 
Zealand 
186 
252 
205 
196 
221 
246 
253 
200 
196 
164 
168 
168 
184 
Australia 
A 
171 
171 
173 
199 
194 
198 
206 
218 
227 
216 
198 
226 
216 
184 
172 
165 
179 
194 
198 
Argentina 
225 
200 
207 
217 
230 
240 
244 
194 
194 
195 
185 
185 
170 
164 
163 
168 
191 
209 
221 
226 
Eire 
48 
64 
71 
70 
68 
85 
83 
South 
Africa 
B 
65 
76 
67 
74 
77 
79 
77 
uo.uth 
Africa 
c 
59 
53 
54 
52 
h'7 
/ ( 
60 
59 
58 
61 
65 
68 
70 
59 62 
71 
70 
70 
69 
Notes All figures apart from the final column have been extracted from reports of the Imperial and Commonwealth Economic 
Committees. 
A. Excludes military consw~ption except for ~ustralia in 1947. 
Ba Excludes production in non-European areas and presumably does not include the Native population in the 
Reserves in the determination of the per capita figure. 
C. The writer's calculations includes native production and consumption thereby showing the difference in per 
capita figures in respect of Europeans and Natives. 
Chapter 8. 
FOOD AND EXPEfTDITURE. 
The subject in this chapter is an ex~aination of the re-
lationship between the level of income of.a family, or some 
other economic unit, ~1-nd the expenditure firstly on food, 
taken as one commodity, ~md secondly, the specific foodstuffs 
with which we are concerned in this study. The aim will be to 
find some functional connection between the level of income 
and the proportj.on of that income spent on certain foodstuffs. 
A law, associated with the name of Engels, for, many 
years accepted as an integral part of economic theory states 
t hat as t he income of a family, or any g;roup of persons, i.n-
creases the portion of that income spent on food will tend to 
decrease since food is one of the essentials of life. Most, 
if not all, studies in this field prove this proposition cor-
rect and Cl ro:k in his 11 Condi tiona of Economic Progress 11 finds 
no reason whatsoever of disputing it though he himself quali• 
fies the law by stressing that 11 there are very great differ-
ences in ••• consumption between farrdlies in different coun-( 1) 
tries at the same income level. 11 We shaJ.l therefore con-
aider this question in the light of the circumstances which 
are found in this country, and in order to do so we must 
immediately bear in mind that these "very great differences" 
may indeed apply with equal force between different groups 
within one country as between countries. Thus we must remem-
ber that consumption habit s af the European may be very di f f-
el~ent from t hat of the Coloured or Asiatj.c, that the proper-
tion in which income is s pent by the urb~mi sed native mey 
differ considerably from that of a Native living in one of the 
Reserves, and so on. These questions will be our concern in 
the present chapter. 
First, let us consider how the Europe an's pattern of 
(1) "Conditj.ons of Economic Progress ", pp 3'74. 
/expenditure 
expenditure changes as his income does. For this pur-
pose the data drawn upon is that produced in the Report 
on the Inquiry into Expenditure of European Families in (1) 
Certain Urban Areas in 1936. It should be noted 
that it is not entirely satisfactory to base our die-
cussion on a unit campo sed of a family since there tU'e 
factors such as the size and age distribution which 
( 2) 
will _influence the family expenditure on food. To 
overcome this difficulty, it is usual to convert the 
numbers of a family into man-units according to some 
( 3) 
recognised scale. 
As income rose from the - £125 cl ass through to 
c::. 
the £5?6-600, the percentage of t hat income apenU on 
(1) U.G. 21- 193?, hereafter referred to as the 1936 
inquiry. This inquiry which covered 1,618 families 
earning between £100 and £600 per annum is by far 
the most comprehensive attempted in this country. 
( 2) Thus, for instance, in the 1936 inquiry the number 
of man-units per family varied between 3.14 in the 
-£125 group to 4.95 in the £551-575 group. 
(3) That used in the 1936 report was proposed by the 
Health Organisation of t he League of Nations and 
is as follows: 
I Co-efficient 
' Age +----- -4-
Male 
' 
Both Sexes I Female 1 I 
.under 2 .2 ... 
2 - 3 
-
• 3 
4 
-
5 .4 
6 
-
7 .5 
8 
-
9 .6 ~ 
10 .. 11 • ? 
I 12 - 13 .8 
I 14 - 59 1.0 ... t .8 
I 
I over 60 . 8 
/food 
2a1.. 
(1) 
food tended to decline from approximately 40 to 2? 
while expenditure on clothing remained fairly constant 
and that on "othel" expenses" rose considerably, relative 
( 2) 
to the increase in income. This does not take into a-
ccount the differences bettween families due to size and age 
distribution of members as mentioned earlier. Hence Table 
( 3) 
2 has been compiled to show the percentage of total fam-
ily income spent on food per man unit, converting persons 
into man-units according to "the scale on page ~ob 1'he 
result shows that the decrease is even more pronounced be-
cause the number of man-units per farnily rises wi t.h income. 
( 1) In this su1·vey the ac.tual money spent on food was accord .. 
ed to the i tern "food" and not as is adopted by Clark, the 
wholesale value of food consumed, on the reasoning that 
included in the retail valuation is the value of services 
connected with the marketing process. It is highly pro-
babl-e that the higher income groups will consume a fa:r 
greater portion of services in their actual expenditure 
on food items, in which case the fall in the percentage 
spent on food, as income rises, would be even greater, 
were the food to be valued at ttJ.e wholesale level. This 
point is considered extremely important when considering 
the consumption of foodstuffs in relation to a changing 
income since if retail prices are used, as in fact they 
will be throughout this study, the increase in the con-
sumption of foodstuffs will tend to be over-emphasised 
with the greater gap between retail and wholesale prices 
as remuneration for the more elaborate and expensive 
services. On the other hand there is of course, the supp-
ly side of the picture; the many developments in the mar-
keting sphere (e.g. refrigeration etc.) provide cheaper 
maJ.•keting services, thereby reducing the gap. In the dis-
cussion which follows these complications will, ho ·wever, 
not be taken into account, but are mentioned here in orda· 
to make clear that the wri te1· is quite alive to the 
limitations of the facts and therefore the conclusions 
aJ.•rived at after a consideration of those facts. we shall 
be assuming then, that the supply and demand functions 
·for the marketing servj_ces included in the 1·etail valu-
ation of t he food stuff s do not alter the position either 
between different income groups at a given date, nor 
during a period of time due to industrial developments. 
This does not n~ce ssarily mean that there is assumed 
no chan ge in two functions; it includes the faJ.' more 
realistj_c assumption that a change in one will be counter-
acted by an equal chanee in the other, in the opuo site 
direction. This assumption is necessary since th~ dis .. · 
cus s ion is based upon the fact that it i s possible to 
~ake data feferring to a given moment of time and apply 
~ t over a period of time. That is to say we will be using 
t~e family budgetary figures, which show how the expen-
d~t\!re pattern changes as income ri ses between a number 
of Iamilies.at a given date as being appl icable t«1> the 
case where ~ncome of a certain comrnunity rises over a 
period of -time. 
See Table 1. page 223 • 
See page .22.) 
/We must 
We must note here that with the greater number of man-
units per f~1ily in the upper income groups, it is very pro-
bable that the same food would be obtained cheaper through 
bulk-buying. However, when we consider a National Income 
over a period of time this complication no longer exists, 
unless there is some evidence of a general increase in the 
/ 
size of families. On the other hand, it is also a. fact that 
as income of a family increases t.he quaJ.i ty of foods con-
sumed i@proves and with it, the cost; therefore it is pro~ 
bable that these two tendencies will to some extent, cancel 
out each other. 
While it is true that the percentage of expenditure on 
food to total income decreases as income rises, it never-
theless remains that the actuaJ. expenditure increases. In 
( 1) 
Table 2 is also shewn the actual average expenditure on 
income 
food per man-unit through the twenty/ groups as shewn in the 
1936 inquiry, together with an index where the expenditure 
on food of the group earning between £126 and £150 is taken 
as 100. Although income rose by 300% (i.e. from the £126-
150 group to the £551-575 group) the expenditure on food 
( 2) 
rose by just over lOO~b . 
Since we are not ultimately concerned in all food pro-
ducts b~t only specific ones, it is now time to consider 
these pai·ticula.r commodities in the light of the findings 
of the 1936 inquiry. We have already seen the disadvantages 
of using figures relat ing to fa;.-nilies, so in the following 
discussion we shall confine ourselves to expenditure per 
man-unit first as an absolute quantity and then as a per-
centage of total income. It is not advisable to compare ex-
ON. 
penditure ~a particul(:ll' f oodstuff with the expenditure on 
food in general since the latter is itself a varying func-
( 3) 
tion of income. 
(1) ( 2) 
C3) 
See page ;?,~~ 
The average income per family in the £ 126-150 group was 
£138 and in the £551-575 group, £555. 
This method was empJ.oyed by Dr. J.C. Neethling in an 
article "Inelasticity of Food Consumption 11 , in "Farming 
in South Africa". but his figures will be increasingly 
over-estimated a s tncom~ ~; AP~ -
(1) 
In Table 3 is shewn the actual expenditure on the 
specific foodstuffs in which we are interested, and other 
closely related products. From this it would appe~~ that 
the expenditure on all the comraodities examined, ap~·t from 
wheaten flour and meal, mea..lie-1neal, condensed milk and 
sugar, in creased as income increased. In the case of 
mea.lie-mea.l the expenditure seems to have been fairly con-
sta.nt and for condensed milk there was a considerable de-
crease, it presumably being replaced by fresh milk in the 
upper income groups. The case of wheaten flour and meal is 
interesting since, taken in conjunction with bl'ead, it 
would appear that the lower income groups purchase the flour 
and. meal and bake their own bread while the more well-to-do 
fa'llilies are content to purchase their requirements of bread 
and so spend far 1 ess on flour and meal. The figul'e s for 
sugar are surprising in view of the fact that 01 ark main-
tains that "sug~· consumption appears to rise rapidly and 
( 2) 
continuously with income", the best possible explanation 
being that part of the sugar requlrements are diverted into 
other suga.1· products like syrup and jams, a nd that even at 
the lower income groups a semi- sa.tul·ation point has been 
( 3) 
reached. 
The increase in expenditure on bread is partly offset 
by the decrease in the case of flour and meal so that when 
taken together as one group, the percentage increase is but 
15.5%, while income rose by 3?7.7~ . Expenditure on f resh 
milk rises fail'ly constantly and to the extent of about 
357.1%, but t here must be some subs titution between fresh 
and condensed milk as income increases. In studie s on the 
See page 2.2.'? • 
"Conditions of Economic Progres~", page 374. 
01~~k allocates 50/" by weight of 11 sugru.~ products to 
sugar • on this basis the co~sumption of sugar would be 
11. ?9 1 bs per month per man unit for the lowest income 
group, or 141 1bs per annum which even when reduced to 
a figure per person (approximately 100 lbs) is very 
high in compari son wit h other countries. 
/consumption 
.2/o. 
consumption pattern of non-Europeans, the fact that condeb-
sed milk contains such a large amount of sweetness is often 
stressed, so we cannot merely add the amounts spent on fresh 
and condensed milk together and regard it legi ti.mately as 
one 1 c or.~nodity 1 • Dividing the expenditure on condensed 
milk as 50~ t o milk and 50% to sugar , the increase in ex-
penditure on milk falls slightly to 330 . 2%. The increase in 
the case of the other dairy products is also considerable; 
in the case of butter it a.."!lounts to 24?.6% and for cheese , 
350%. Fresh meat is by far the greatest item in the ave-
rage family ' s budget and it is only to be expected that 
with the consumption so high in the lower income groups, 
the increase would not be so considerable since a semi-
saturation point j_ s reached earlier than for other products. 
This is shewn in Table 5 where the increase amounts to 
40.7% while income doubles itself (i.e. from the -£125 group 
to £226-250), whereas over the whole range of twenty income 
groups the rise in expenditul'e on fresh meat is only 79.67~. 
Combining fresh and other meats, the increase is 89. 3/o show-
ing that as income increases the demand for the compaJ.'ati ve-
ly more expensive tinned and potted meats becomes stronger, 
partly no doubt in substitution for the fresh product. 
Broadly then, on the results of this examin-ation it 
would seem that we couJ.d divide t his group of commodities 
into four classes, the division depending on the extent to 
which expenditure rises as income does. In the first class 
would b~ the dairy products , the increase in expenditure on 
which was approximately • 7 5 of the l'i ee in income ; in t~e 
second meat , the figure for which would be about • 5; ·the 
third would be the combined bread-flour-and-meal, (.mA), and 
in the fourth, mea.lie-meal and sugar where expenditure 
actually fell as income increased. 
Let u s now proceed to consider how income i s spent 
between the various goods andservices in other income groups 
and for persons other than Eurqpeans. It is important to 
/bear 
:1//. 
be a.r in mind, in this respect, the difference in consuming 
habits between races, and the manner and extent to which 
these habits have become altered through the contact of a 
primitive people with a higher level of civilization. The 
examiniation of expenditure will therefore be considered in 
such a wey as to show (a) how expendi tul·e on food and speci-
fie foodstuffs varies with income for those non-Euro-peans 
resi~ent in urban al~eas and (b) how this pattern of expendi· 
ture differs from that of the tutal Native. In both these 
attempts, it is necessary to point out at this stage that 
many of the conclusions will be nothing more than rough es-
timates since there is no source of information comparable 
with the 1936 inquiry. In most cases the surveys have cov-
ered only a small number of families in a certain locali. ty, 
in many only the broad division of expenditure is considered 
and specJ.fi c food items are not ·mentioned, in all the basic 
The survey covering t he largest number of consumers was (1) 
that undertaken by ?!... Janisch, and conducted in Johannes-
burg during the period of January to november , 1940. .After 
di scu ssi~ the many diffi cul ties facing the investigator in-
to social conditions, "the reluctance and often the inability 
of the person questioned to di vu.lge true information ••• the 
reticence of the investigator to intrude too far upon the 
( 2) 
privacy of the individual human being, 11 and the difficulty 
of aa.curately assessing the true family income , 1liss Janisch 
ca;ne to the conclusion that 11 there is no·. constant rel a.tion 
between the size of the family, the wage earned and the 
( 3) 
amount of food consumed." Nevertheless , from data 
( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
"A study of African Income and Expenditure of 987 fami -
lies in Johannesburg" by M. Janisch published by City 
of Johannesburg, Non-European and Native Affairs Dep~·t­
ment, December , 1941. 
"A study of ••. 987 families in Johannesburg" , pp 2. 
".A study of • • • 987 families in Joha.nnA Rhll1~"' " ,__ A 
produced i n Appendix VI of this study to show the percentage 
( 1) 
of total expenditure spent on food for four differ~ in-
( 2) 
come groups, Table 4A has been constructed. These fig-
ures relate to 182 five-person families none of whom had 
sub-tenants. The result is amazing in view of conclusions 
arrived at after the examination of the survey of expendi-
ture on food by European fa..'Tiilies. Whereas in the 1 a.tter 
case in accordance with "Engels' Law 11 , there was a definite 
tendency for the percentage of income spent on food to fall 
as income itself increased, here exactly the opposite pre-
vails. However, before we attempt to assess t he causes of 
this phenom~n~n and its importance to this discussion, let 
us consider some of the other s~rveys in this field and sec 
whether their results agree with those revealed above. 
In a. thesis publ ished under the title 11Rooiya.rd ... a 
.Z.I:J.. 
soclological survey of an urban 1Tati ve Slum Yard", E. Hellman 
included several budgets of which 14 she regarded as "being 
(3) (4) 
fairly· satisfactory". This data is shown in Table 4B. 
designed to show the relationship between the percentage of 
total expenditure spent on food and the level of total ex-
penditure tpeelf. The result points to the fact that there 
is no reason to suppose that food expenditure is a decreas-
ing function of total expenditure since there are as many 
Q€ those f&dlies earning relatively high incomes in the up-
per percentage groups as there are of t he poorer families. 
(1) Throughout the discussion relating to non-Europeans 
total expenditure is used instead of income because of 
the difficulties, stressed in all budget~·y inauines, 
of obtaining an accurate figure for income due ~to the 
reluctance on the part of subjects to divulge revenue 
from such sources as (illicit) beer-brewing or the ·many 
gambling games which are an integral part of 1\rative life 
in the locations. 
( 2) 1 See page Z2~ • 
(3) Sin?e the maj?rity of these surveys were funda-mentally 
soc7olo~ical. J.n character, it is probable that the eco-
nomlC sJ.de Wlll not be as reliabl e as they mi ght be. (4) See page Z2:i • 
/D.G. Bettieon 
D.G. Bettison conducted a budgetary survey among three (1) 
Native families in !Uncan Village, East London in July, 1949. 
It aimed at obtaining relevant information from three broad-
ly defined social classes and of the three families taken, 
A ; was a house hold of well-educated, comparatively well-
off' Afl•i cans, 
B a family, semi-educated (J. c.) and of slightly above 
the average health and 
C a family almost illiterate, migrant, and whose income 
falls within the most numerous wage level of Africans. 
The resul ta of this investigation conform fru.· more closely 
with those of the European inquiry and in connection with 
family B, Bettison had this to say: 
11The inaccuracy of data in respect of class B allows fo1• 
few certain conclusions to be drawn, but judging fnnm 
the results as they stand and from my experience of the 
subject and other sL~ilarly placed households, I venture 
to mention that it is likely that this class is actually 
cutting down on edible items in order to spend more on 
non-edible items. The factor~operation is probably 
social prestige. 11 
However the evidence of a survey conducted over 157 
( 2) 
African families in the ~denburg Locatidn does not support 
this contention, nor the finding~s of r.:iss Janisch. Tm:s 
( 3) 
evidence set out in Table 40 , shows that the proportion 
of household income spent on food is plainly a de creas:hg 
function of income and that as t he per capita income range 
rose the percentage spent on food fell from 142% where all 
(1) The following figures have been obtained from the pri-
vate files of the investi~ator: 
~Fa.mil;E I Total Ex;Eenditure I Food I Percentage ., 
I £ per !llonth I £ p.m. "' f O 
A 54 . 11. 5 I 26. 14. 41 49 
B 15. 6. 7. I 6. 8. 7 I 42 
c 2. 4. ? X I 1.13. 6·~ ~ ?5 
(x - per week). ( 2) 11Experiment at :fJ:dendale 11 by the Department of Economics, 
( 3) University of Natal, 1951. See page 2.2.5" • 
/ihcorne 
income was not stated, to only 29t; • In regard to Indians, 
a similar position prevailed except that there appears 
strong evidence that they spend a greater proportion of (1) 
their income on food than did the .Afri c a.ns. 
In view of the 1 a.ck of comprehensive data. on this sub .. 
ject, the wide differences between tribes , and the length 
of urbanisation of the native families, it is impossible to 
arrive at any defnib.e conclusion. It is probable that the 
family which has resided in an urban area for some time will 
tend towards the European pattern of expenditure , spending 
a lesser proportion of their income on food pS their income 
( 2) 
rises, whereas those who have just come into the towns 
will attempt to live at ~uropean standards on a f~· lower 
income, in Which case they "eat according to the capacity 
of (their) pockets and • •. food is usuru_ly the first item 
( 3) 
of expenditure which is mal.• ked out for s:peci al economy. r 
There is however , definite evidence that the urbanised 
Native spends a greater proportion of his income on food 
than does his European counterpart. 
The writer is inclined to place greater reliance upon 
the Edendale survey insofar as the statistical evidence is 
concerned, since it was conducted on an economic and not a. 
sociological basis. This is not meant to detratb from the 
J..o.....,e 
importance of sociological surveys such as Abeen mentioned 
above, but it is considered that the statistical data in 
these surveys are not as reliable and valuable as the gene-
raJ. observations of the investigators based upon their in-
timate contact with the non-European population. In view 
of this, it has been decided to consider the results of the 
Edenda.le survey in greater detail than the others which 
will be used to present the experienced views of the inves-
ti gators rather than the actual budgetary figures. 
(1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
.Africans spent on the average 661., of total income on 
food, Indians ?4% although their average income was 
higher. 
Of the .African families covered by the Edendale survey, 
46% had lived at Edendale for more than 5 years and a-
nother 26% between 1 and 5 years. 
"Urban Native food in Johannesburg" by Dr. E. Hellma--n. 
/Tn thi R 
In this Edendule survey, it was found that, while the 
expenditure on all groups of food products in which we are 
here interested, rose, they did so in varying degrees. Un-
fortunately the food products are ~·ouped together wn such 
a way as to partly prevent any definite proof being claimed, 
since for instance wheaten products are grouped with maize 
and meat is included with fish and eggs. nevertheless, the · 
results do show that the percentage of per capita expendi-
. ture devoted to cereals fell steadily and noticeably, that 
on sugars remained almost const~~t, that on meat rose con-
siderably while n.ilk products began by increasing and then (1) 
fell. 
There are several interesting points arising from this 
analysis of expenditure. Following the results of the 1936 
inquiry into the expenditure pattern of Europeans, it was to 
be expected that cereals would attract a decreasing part of 
total income as that income increased; the results in respect 
of sugar also correlate very closely with the tendencies tn 
the case of the Europeans a1 though it is surprising that the 
consumption is not higher, bearing in mind the prediliction 
for sugar on the part of natives, a point mentioned in most 
of the sociological surveys. 
It is in the case of the two remaining product groups 
that the surprises occur. In the European survey it was 
found th~t the expenditure on meat expressed as a percentage 
of income, tended to fall as the income of the family rose, 
yet here the tendency, and it is a. strong one, is the exact 
reverse. It m~ be p~·tly explained by the inclusion of 
other items in the group but a far more acceptable answer 
would seem to lie in the very great partiality that natives 
have for meat. It would seem then that among the very poor 
this liking that natives have for meat is suppressed by 
poverty and its purchase inc~@a.ses quite considerably as 
(1) See Table 5 page Z~-s 
• 
/income 
income rises. Nevertheless in view of other evidence in 
this connection, we should not be prepared to accept this 
considerable increase in expenditure on meat as a general 
tendency without examining some other bud.geta.ry surveys. 
In terms of the actual amount spent on the groups the 
percentage increase i s gTeatest in respect of meat where it 
amounts to approximately 7501<>, f ail'ly su bst a.ntia.l fol· "milk 
and milk products 11 (500/~) and "Sug;u•s" (300/'G) and compart11-
tively smrul for the cereal group where it is only 150/'o. (1) 
.2!&. 
In his "Bantu in the Ci ty 11 , R.E. Phillips made a study 
of the expenditure of 46 families whom ·he considered "a high-
ly aelecti ve group. 11 The heads of the families and the ma-
j oJ:·!bty of the wives ha~e been to s chool and Jtjhey have become 
a ccustomed to European foou. Yet, it is probably safe to say 
that the average location dweller, existing on his diet of 
mealie meal, bread and starchy foods , would follow fairly 
closely in the foodsteps of hi a educated brother were it not 
( 2) 
for the sheer lack of means. 11 Almost at the same time 
Dl· • . E. Hellman and Mrs. E. J. Krige were collecting material 
relating to expenditure of native families in Johannesburg and 
Pretori~. Dr. Hellman herself comp~·ed the findings of these 
( 3) 
two surveys with those cf Phillips, so it would seem leg-
i timate to do the same in an attempt to verify the reWl. ts of 
( 4) 
the Edendale survey. 
The results of this comparison a.:t•e notable in sofar t1.S 
they agree with tbe findings at Edendale in respect ar~. -.the 
cereals group and sugaJ.•, but not for meat and milk. Whereas 
the Edendale survey showed a continuous rise in the percen-
( 5) 
ta.ge of income spent on mea.t ," in thi a case there is an 
actual drop of 4d. in the amount spent per man unit and a 
~~~ 
( 3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
Pub~ished by the LovedaJ.e Press in 1937. 
Published by the Lovedale Press in 1937 . 
"The diet of .Africans in Johannesburg" by E. Hellman, 
R.R. Vol. VI. No. l, 1939 pp 8. 
See Table 6 page ~l(o • 
Note that the percentages in the Edenda.le survey relate 
to f.otal income whereas in the other two surveys they 
relate to total food expenditure. They are therefore not 
comparable in an absolute sense. 
,. 
J11B.rked decline in the ·percentage of total food expenditure 
devoted to meat. It would appear most likely that the dis-
crepa.ncies are due to differences in locality, the avail-
abi-lity of meat in the locatlons and the fact that over 12 
years separate t he surveys. The results in respect of milk 
show a definite tendency for a greater part of total food ex-
penditure, and therefore to a lesser extent of total income, 
to be spent on fresh milk as income rises, and a slightly 
lesser proportion on condensed milk. These results are far 
closer those of the survey into the expenditure by European 
families where the substitution of fresh for condensed mille (1) 
as income rises, was noted. 
There is a very significant fact revealed in these fig-
urea, viz. wr-ile, within the cereal group, t he expenditure on 
mealie meal, the basis of t he diet, expressed as a percentage 
of total food expenditure, fell quite considerably, the per-
centage in the case of bread remained fairly constant. The 
importance of this is that a wheaten product is graduhlly be-
ing substituted for a maize one following the contact with the 
Eul~opean standard of c-i viliza.tion where bread has been the 
( 2) 
foundation of the diet for hundreds of yeal~s. In this re-
spect it is interesting to note from the Edendale report, 
th.at the consumption of cere o~s by Indians is less dependent 
( 3) 
upon maize products than i::.: .. the food -habits of the .African. 
It is obvious that the Indian is much nearer the Europeans' 
pattern of expenditure on cereals. 
( 3) 
See above, page ..210 
·In her article "The dj.et of the African in Johannesbu~;:gf, 
E. Hellman states that the consumption of bread wa.s, like 
maize concentrated on the refined product - white bread. 
In one particul~ s~op 60 loave s of white to 2 of brown, 
were sold. 
Consumption of ceree~s by Indians and .Africans - Edendale 
1949. 
Indians Africans 
/'o % 
Mealie real 27. 2) 5o. 4) 
Samp 1.4) 54.5 10.6) 73.6 
Mealie :lRdC:C 25.9) 12.6) 
BoermeaJ. 24.4) 10.1) 
Bread 19.~ 43.6 14 • 2) 24.3 
Rice .7) . .. , 
Kaffircorn ) 1.9 1.4) 
, t Other 1. 2) • 7) 2.1 bani~gde :T£~:~e .iifricu.na families were comparatively well ur-
percent : e~. • was a severe shortage of rice at the time. ~ n p~ +~ n~-~~--~ --~-~L -
:vr. 
Finally there is the investiga.t :i.on made by D. G. 
Bcttison into the expenditure by thl·ee families at different 
standar6.s of living, which while subject to the criticism of 
being far too limited, is included in t he disnussion rather 
( 1) 
more for t h e observations of the investigator. In this 
survey the pe1•centage of total income spent on meat shows a 
definite decline, a.l t.r.,ough it should be pointed. out that in 
comparison with the other surveys, the actual expenditure is 
high wbich might account to some extent for the large fall 
in proportion of income devoted to meat purchases. Further 
evidence of the substitution of wheaten for maize products 
is revealed for the expenditure on mea.J.ie meal, samp and 
other maize products fell from 5/9 per man unit to 1/9 for 
the well- to- do famiJ.y while for bread it increased from 1/6 
to 2/J.O in family 2 then falling to 2/2, a fall which was 
campensate~ by the fact that 3/4 was spent on flour and 
meru., so that the percentage of income spent in wheaten pro-
ducts exhibited a slight ri se. The figures in respect of 
mille cannot be refarded by the writer as a true feflection 
of the general position among native location dwellers and 
will therefore . mot be considered. .As regHrds sugar, the 
figures once again show a constancy in the amount spent, 
whi·ch can be explained by the fact that a saturation point 
has already been reached in its consumption, even in the 
( 1) Survey conducted in an East London location in 1949, tmd 
obtained from the files of the investigator. Soo T-blo 
-pase • 
The following figures have been obtained from the pri-
vate files of the investigator. 
Family A ' Family B 
-=--~I~n;,;;c..;;:o~m~e_...,p;:.;:.~m;;;.;•;.__.,,...,.._ _ ....:£=.5;:;...=..6 :..• -=.1.::::.:1 • 5 £15 • 0. o. ' 
'i"1 ~N~o~·~~o~f~m~an~~u~n~i~t~·s~~----~~8--~ 3.5 
' Expenditure on: a. d. 1 "Wt--'~" s. d.' · %X 
1 Bread ' 2. 2 1 1. 6 ' 2. 10. ' 3 . 3 
Wheaten meal I 3. 4 1 2. 4 
MeaJ.ie meal, sa;mpl 1. 9 • 1.3 I 4. 4 ' 5.0 ' Fresh Milk ' 7. 6 1 5.5 I 6. 5 I 7.5 I 
Condensed .Milk 10 1 .8 
' Powdered Milk 112. 9 1 2.0 
1 Butter ' 2. 6 ' 1.8 
1 Sugar 1 2. 11 2.1 I 1. 2 I 1.3 I 
1 Meat ' 7. 3 
( X - percentage of 
5.3 ' 8. 7 ' 10.0 I income 
FamilX C 
£9. o. 
3.5 
a. d.' 
1. 5 
5. g 
9. 0 I 
.. 
2. 4 I 
8. 3 I 
o. 
%X 
2.8 
11.1 
17.5 
4.4 
16.1 
/poorest 
I I 
( 1) 
poorest family. 
Q. 
The African's preailicnion for sugar 
therefore exhibits itself in the point of saturation being 
reached far earJ.ier tltan would otherwise be the case - au-
gox is almost as much an essentiul in the diet as is mealie ( 2) 
meal . 
As far as food consumption in the native Reserves is 
concerned the immediate diffioulty with which one is faced 
is the fact that no detailed and reliable investigation has 
been made of the expenditure on foodstuffs. In his survey 
of economic conditions in the Ke~sk&mnahoek district in the 
Ciskei, Professor D. Hobart-Houghton collected mater ial re-
lating to the broad division of expenditure on food and 
other items and from this data, vrhi ch has not been publ i she~ 
Table 8 has been constructed to sho·w the relationship bet-
( 3) 
ween cash income and expenditure on food. It is evident 
that while the absolute expenditure on food rises as income 
does, when expressed as a percentage of total income it 
falls from ?2;(} to 4?7o for the richer families. 
( 1) 
( 2) 
As regards the actual composition of the diet , 
11 The outstanding contrast between the urban Native diet 
and their rural diet is that the former is charac t erised 
by a predominance of meat, e. lack of green vegetable 
food.e:t the practically total omission of fruit, and·' the 
paucity of fresh milk. The Native has always shown a 
marked prediltction for fresh meat , fmd many women care-
fully explained to me that one of the advantages of urban 
residence is the facilities it offel·s for the daily 
( 4) 
purchase of small quanti ties of meat ... Fresh milk has 
In the case of Europeans , the expmditure on sugar per 
man unit varied between 2/3 and 2/8 per month. 
It is interesting to note that while Government sugar 
cost 3d per lb and white 4d. per lb the .African prefers 
the latter , reflecting the effect of Urbanisation on 
the food habits of t h e Uati ve. 
See page i!2.fo • 
The consumption of meat in the Reserves is being in-
c~easingly limited to fe.sti ve functions. 
/been 
been ousted from the daily diet of urban Uati ves, (since) 
not only dtes condensed milk keep longer but in its 
sweetened form serves the additional purpose of a sub-
stitute for sugar in tea, and for the Native, tea is only 
( 1) 
tea, when j_ t is very sweet. 11 
5'UIVJURY. 
Wheat: The consumption of wheaten products is not very great 
among the rural Native population as the cereal foundation of 
the diet has always been provided by maize, kaffircorn and 
other crops better suited to an area of summer fainfall. 
Among the urbanised Natives , however , there has been a defi-
nite substitution of bread, flour and meal for maize products 
especially among the younger generation. It is only to be 
expected that this wj_ll continue as it is one of the most im• 
portant respects in which the original African diet differs 
from that of the European. The urban ~Jati ve a1 so shows a 
marked preference for white bread, once again due to his con-
tact with the higher J!:uropea.n level of civilization. .As re-
gards the European population, when wheat, flour and meal 
are taken as one group, the expenditure on that, expressed as 
a percentage of total income, shows a definite tendency to 
fall. 'l'he most striking point in this connection is the 
change within the group between bread and flour and meal. It 
would appear that a.s income rises there is a decided substi-
tution of bread for flour and meal. 
t:aize: This was the foundation of the original African diet 
and remains as such today in the rural areas. Among the ur-
ban Native population, besides the fact that its place::.ia 
gradually being taken by wheaten products, there is the sig-
ni f icant fact that it i s consumed j_n the more refined product 
- mealie meal. Thi s is significant insofar as the maize 
equivalent of total consumption is obviously increased when 
consumption is diverted to the more refined product, end f rom 
(1) E. Hellman, 11 Afric a.11 1936, Vol. 9 No . 2. 
/the 
the nutritional point of view it is an undesirable devel-
opment as the germ of the meal is lost in t he refinin# pro-
cess. In the diet of the average European, maize is an 
insignificant item. 
Dairy Products: The rural Native consumes little of these 
c.ommodities , even the production of fresh milk and ''amasi ' 
has declined in recent years due to the poor type of st oak. 
The consumption of fresh milk is probably still lese among 
:ul-,1 . 
the location dwellers and is everywhere substituted by con-
densed milk which at the same time satisfies the Uati ves 1 de-
mand for sugar. Consumption of butter and cheese is almost 
negligible ~aong all but the very riehest of urban Natyes and 
even in the poorer section of the European population the com-
paratively high ptce result in little being devoted to their 
purchase. As income increases fresh milk tends to replace the 
canned product and the essential protective nature of this 
group begins to be appreciated as it falls within the means 
of the consumer. Dairy products l'eveal by far the greatest , 
increase as income rises among the European co~munity, and 
there is no reason to suppose that were the income of the ur-
ban non-European to be raised, the same would not occur. 
Sugar: One of the most significant differences in food con-
sumption between rural and urban Natives is the importance 
that sugar has achieved in the food habits &nang the 1 atter . 
It is true that with an increase in cash income within the 
Reserves there is the probability that purchases of sugar f rom 
trad.ers has occurred, but to the urban Native it has become 
an essential due no doubt to his well known partiality for all 
things sweet. So great is this prediliction that the amount 
spent on sugar purchases by even the poorer African families 
in t be locutions, is almost as much as that spent by European~ 
Among t h e 1 atter too, there seems to be evi dence that at the 
lower income levels a semi- saturation point has been reached 
in the consumption of actual sugar although that of sug&r 
/ products 
pvoducts (i.e. when account is taken of products like syrups, 
j runs etc.) does· show a rise. 
Meat: T.his was one of the pillars of the original diet of 
the pastoral African people but with the complete change in 
their economy - a change resulting in a sc~~city of land-
and the continued significance of cattle in the economy of 
the Reserves mea~t their quality showed a marked deteriora-
tion and t.b.e consumption of meat is now almost limited to 
festive occasions. .Among the urban popul aJ.; ion the affinity 
towards meat remained and its avCJ.ila.bili ty in small quanti-
ties meant that it once again became, with maize, the bacl<: .. 
bone of the diet. As regards the European, the consumption 
i a high even in the lower income groups, and while expendi-
ture on meat and the quantity consumed do show an increase, 
there is a definite tendency for increased expenditure on 
canned and other preserved meats , a part of which must be in 
substitution for the fresh product. 
Table 1. 
Europ~ans: Percentage of Income spent on various goods and 
services, in 9 urban areas, for twenty income groups, 1936. 
1 Income Group 1 Food ' Rent ' Clothes ' Medical ' othel· 
and 1 expenses 1 expenses ' 
' shoes 
£ /6 70 7o ro /o 
less than 125 I 39.8 24.4 9.0 2.1 24.7 
126-150' 38.7 
' 
24.9 
' 
9.7 1.8 24.9 
151-175 38.2 ' 26.3 ' 10. 7· 2.5 22.3 
' 176-200 ' 37.5 ' 23.3 ' 11.8 2.0 25.4 1 
' 201-225 35.5 ' 24.1 9.4 2.8 28.4 
·226-250 32.5 ' 22.6 9.2 2.8 32.9 251- 2?5 ' 29.8 23.7 ' 9.8 3.2 33.5 276-300 ' 31.1 22.0 ' 10.0 3.2 33.7 
' 301-325 ' 30.0 I 21.9 I I 9.5 3.4 35.3 326-350 ' 29.0 ' 21.1 ' 9.5 3.3 36.1 351-375 ' 29.4 21.2 I 8.7 3.3 3?.4 
1 376-400 
' 
27.3 21.8 ' 8.6 3.6 381.7 
' 401-425 ' 28.0 ' 21.8 ' 9.0 3.4 37.8 426-450 ' 27.8 20.8 ' 8.7 3.4 39.3 451-475 26.8 20.8 ' 8.5 3.1 40.8 476-500 27.6 
' 
19.9 
' 
9.4> 3.6 39.8 
501 .... 525 
' 
26.2 20.1 1 8.6 3.7 41.4 
526-550 
' 
26.9 19.3 
' 
8.9 3.6 41.3 
551-5?5 
' 
26.6 20.2 9.0 3.0 41.2 
' 576-600 I 26.9 I 19.2 9.8 3.3 40.8 
Soul·ce: "Inelasticity of Food Consumption" by Dr. J.C. Neeth-
ling. "Farming in South Africa", Mey 1938, pp 176 
(From U. G. 21/37.) 
Table 2. 
Percentage of family income spent on food, pel' man unit, and the 
actu aJ. expenditure in 9 urban areas, for 20 income groups, 1936. 
I Income group No. ofl~ Us' Income 
' 
Expendi-
' 
Index 
f per 
' 
spent on 1 ture on 1 (£126-150 ' t fami1~ food food • 100) 
£ % £ 
less than 125 
' 
3.14 12.7 '1. 5. 4 1Q)4 
' 126-150 3.65 10.6 '1. 4. 4 100 
I 151-1 7"5 4.05 9.4 '1. 5. 2 103 
1 ?6-200 3.95 9.5 '1. 9. 1 120 
201-225 4.07 " 8.7 '1. 10. 2 124 
' 
226-250 3.44 9o4 '1. 17. 10 156 
1 251-275 3.82 7.8 '1. 13. 10 I 139 
' 276-300 4.09 7.6 '1. 16. 11 152 301-325 3.86 7.8 '2. o. 1 165 
326-350 3.70 7.8 '2. 4. lL' 183 
1 351-375 3.90 7.5 '2. 5. 8 ' 188 376-400 4.04 6.8 '2. 3. 8 178 
401-425 4.11 6.8 '2. 6. 5 191 
' 
426-450 4.19 6.6 ' 2. 8. 1 ' 198 
' 
451-475 4. 24 6.3 '2. 8. 5 
' 
200 
' 
476-500 4.59 6.0 '2. 7. 9.' 196 
501-525 6.52 5.8 '2. 9. 2 ' 202 526-550 4.55 5.9 '2. 11. 8 212 
551-575 4.95 5.4 I 2. 9. 9 205 
I 576-600 4.83 5.6 '2. 13. 3 I 219 
Table 4. 
Expenditure on food as a percente~e of total income or total 
expenditure - Non-Europeans. 
A. From "A study of African Income and Expenditure of 98? 
f~ilies in Johannesburg" by M. Janisch, 1940. 
'Income Group 'Aterage Income'Average ex~ 
' p.a. ' p.m. 1 enditure on 
' Numb~r of 
families 
1 ' ' food_~~~------7 __________ __ t £ £ £ I fO 
25-50 3. 12. 9 I 1. 6. 1 I 35.? 
51-?5 4. 5. 11 I 1.15. 4 I 41.2 
;__ ?6-100 6. 11. 5 ' 3. 6. 3 ' 50.4 
10J.-125 _..§_. 15. 10 I 4.16. 8 I 49.6 
20 
115 
41 
5 
B. From 11Rooiyard .. A Sociological survey of an urban Native 
Slum yard" by E. Hellman, 1934. 
·' I 
Distrlbution of families by the percentage of total expendi-
ture spent on food. 
~~-%~~--o~f~t-o~t-a~l--~~--------------------------
1 expenditure -------~Total ex2enditure I I 
~'-=s~·p=e=n~t~o=n~f~o~o~d_1 _£~3-. 4-~ £4-5__ __ £5-6 ~6-? 1 £?-8 __ '~£8~---
60~ 1 I t 
50 -60% 1 1 
40 -50% 2 1 
I 30 -40% 2 
1 
1 
1 
f 20 - 3~ - -' -------~2 ---------------1=----~--
c. From the Edendale survey by Department of Economics of the 
University of Natal, 1948. 
Households Average Food 1 As % of 
income --~--exEenditure 
No. 1 Average ' per ' per 
Per capita 
income range ' 
'-=---:---:--· 
I 
--, 
Under 5/-
5/- .. 9/11 
10/- - 14/11 
15/- to 19/11 
20L- an<! _  over 
1 M. U. s 1 c a ;pit~' M. U;:_;;..• ..,.---------~ I So d. 1 So d. I ---. 
44 I 4 •? 5 4 o 5 I 6 o 3 
64 I 4.49 5. 3 I ?. Q 
26 I 3. 85 t 6 o 4 8 o 0 
11 I 4 o 48 I ? o 6 ? o 4 
12 ' 2. a o ' ~__g_:__.l o • .:..· _o:;.._ __ 
Table 5. 
142 
?3 
51 
42 
29 
Weekly expenditure on certain foodstuffs at different income 
levels 
Source : Experiment at Edendale, page 202. 
Table 6. 
Monthly expenditure on cel~tain foodstuffs of two income gltllps. 
' Expenditure per man unit on: ' Grou.:e_.A Grou;e B --r ~ s. d. 2. 1 1. 9 
Bread ) % of total food expenditure' 12% 11;0 
s. d. 
' 1. 5 1. 5 
' Mealie~ % of total food expendit-ure: 8% 19% 
meal 
s. d. I 1. 6 ? 
Fresh ~ % total ' 9% 4% Milk of food expenditure,
I s. d. 4t 6 
' Condensed t Milk ) % of t ota.l food expenditure'· 3/; 4% 
s. d. I 2. 3 1. 10 
I Sugar ) 
"' j<J of total food expenditure' 13% 111~ 
s. d. I 3. 11 I 4. 3 
' 
Meat )_Lf of to~al food e~~nditure 1 23/f __ _ ~- 28t! I , ... _
Group A. Educated men's families with a medium income of 
£10 p.m. i.e. twice as much as the average lo-
cation family , from, "The Bantu j,n the Ci tyn by 
R.E. Phillips. 
Group B. Families at various income levels, but containing 
a majority of poo·r families from surveys conduct-
ed by E. Hellman and E. J. Krige. (Conversion to 
man units on the basis of l chiJ.d = t man unit.) 
Table !l. 
Expend! ture in a Native ne sel~ve .... Keiskrunma.hoek, 1949. 
'Total Expen-'No. of'Average 'Average ~ of 'Expenditure ' 
1 diture p.a. 1 fami-'total exp€hExpendi- 'total exl6n food per' 
,. 
1 lies 1 endi ture 1 ture on 1 pendi- 1 person ' 
' E • l:· ' !.2.2.SL..£:..§::..~-t~· {;}·;;.::x~· e::.---:-----;:::----:-£ -·--~- £ 1 £ 1 7o £ 
'less than 25' 66 1 16.13. 8 1 11.1·9.4 1 ?1.? ' 2. ?.10 
25-50 83 I 35.11. 1 t 23.1)..2 I 66.3 I 3.14. 9 
51-?5 34 I 62.1?. 0 t 36. 1.2 I 5? .4 t 4.14.11 
' Over ?5 ? ' 95. 9.10 ' 44. ?.6 1 46.8 ' 5.16. 9 
Source : Unpublished data collected during the economic sur ... 
vey of the Keiskammahoek district by _Professor 
D. Hobart Houghton. 
TABII: 3. 
average monthly expenditure oer man unit on certain foodstuffs, 1936. 
Income Bread Flour l.Jea lie Fresh Conden- Butter Cheese Sugar Golden Jams FrE:sh Ot:b_er 
Group and Meal Milk sed Syrup etc. Meat Meats 
Meal Milk 
£ s d s d s d s d s d s d s d s d s d s d s d s d 
-125 • 9 4. 2 • 5 .11 1o 4 1. 7 0 2 2. 7 • 3 • 5 4. 6 . 2 126-150 1. 3 3. 7 0 4 lo 2 • 11 1., 7 0 2 2 • 3 • 3 • 4 4o 5 • 2 151-175 .11 3. 9 .3 1. 7 010 lo 9 0 3 2. 6 . 2 0 g 4. 4 • 1 176-200 1o 5 3. 3 • 4 1ol1 o10 2. 0 0 5 2. 6 • 3 • 5. 3 . 4 201-225 1. 3 2ol0 0 3 2. 7 olO 2o 4 • 7 2 .. 4 0 3 • 7 5. 6 • 2 226-250 2. 6 2. 5 • 4 3.11 • 8 3. 1 • 7 2. 8 • 4 . 8 6. 4 • 4 251-275 2. 3 2. 4 • 4 3. 7 0 5 2. 7 0 7 2. 2 • 3 • 8 6. 4 . 4 276-300 2. 7 2. 1 0 4 4o 1 • 6 2oll • 8 2. 5 . 3 • 8 6. 5 • 5 301 .. 325 2. 2 2. 6 • 4 4o 4 • 6 3o 1 • 8 2. 3 • 4 • 9 6. 6 • 6 326-350 3. 4 1.11 0 4 5. 2 • 5 3. 5 • 8 2. 4 0 4 .11 6.11 • 8 351-375 2.10 ') 2 4 5o 2 7 3. 9 8 2. 3 4 .11 7o 2 7 '-• • 0 • . • 376-400 3· 6 1. 7 • 4 4. 9 0 • 5 3. 4 • 8 2. 3 • 4 .10 7. 0 • 7 401-425 3. 4 1.10 . 3 5 .. 2 • 3 3o 9 . 9 2. 4 • 4 o11 7. 5 • 9 426-450 3. 7 1o 7 • 4 5. 7 • 4 4. 1 0 8 2. 4 • 4 lo 1 7o 5 • 6 451-475 3· 2 1.11 • 4 5o 9 • 3 3. 7 0 8 2. 3 • 4 1. 0 7. 8 . 8 
476-500 3. 3 1. 8 • 4 5. 1 0 3 3o 7 0 9 2. 5 0 4 .11 7. 8 • 9 501-525 3. 5 1. 8 • 3 5o 7 • 2 3o 9 • 9 2. 3 . 4 1. 0 7. 6 . 9 526-550 3.10 1. 4 • 5 5. 6 0 2 3.11 .11 2. 2 • 3 1. 2 7· 8 1. 1 551-575 2.11 1. 7 • 6 5. 3 0 3 3.10 .10 2. 5 . 4 1. 1 8. 3 . 9 576-600 4. 0 1. 7 • 4 5.10 • 2 4 .. 4 0 9 2. 2 • 4 1. 2 8. 1 .10 
Source : U.G. 21/37. 
Chapter 9. 
THH: DIS'l'RIBUTION OF THE NATIONAL INCmiiE I N. SOUTH AFRIM· 
our Interest in distribution of the liational Income in 
relation to changes in consumption, ia due to t he fact, as we 
have already seen, that as income increases the portion of 
that income spent on food does not increase in the same pro-
portion; nor is the increase in consumption, either in terms 
of quantity or value, of one particul L1.l" com.modi ty the same as 
for all others. It is therefore by no means sufficient to re-
whe.thevo 
late consumption to National Income; we must consider~there 
has been any redistribution of that income during the period 
under review. Should it be found from such an investigation 
that there is now greater equality of incomes, we would be 
justified in saying that consumption would be ~fected by 
(a) the general ~·se\ in Uationa.l Income and (b) the redistri .. 
/ 
butj.on in favour of the lower income groups. 
In other words , we would not be justified in stating 
that the consumption of any product had risen merely because 
the National Income had done so , since it is by no means in-
conceivable that the sa~e increase could have been realized 
by the redistribution of a fixed National Income in favour of 
t hose persons more disposed to the purchase of t hat part icu-
lar COrtl!UOdity. 
In considering this aspect of the ~ational Income , the 
followihg is the course that will be pursued: we shall first 
consider the division of t he ~Jational Income between Labour 
and the other factors of productj.on (viz. Capital, Land and 
Enterprise); then attempt to establish how the share of La-
bour has itself been redistributed between the different clas~ 
es of employees over the period 1930-1950. n severe lack of 
(1) 
sui table stati sties makes this task extremely difficult, and 
no more than a. fairly well-founded estimate of a trend is 
claimed here. 
(1) Report of Industrial Legislation Commission of Enquiry 
U.G. 62/51 pp 37. 
/In a 
In a memorandum submitted by Professo~ D. G. Franzen, of 
Stellenbosch Uni versi.ty, to the Governor of the South African 
Reserve :Bank, it was said that in 1945/6, salaries, wages and 
"supplementary la.bou:r income", constituted 651; of the Natj.on-(1) 
al Income. However, statistics are a.va.iJ.able in regard to 
the manufacturiHg and mining industries and the South African 
Railways and Hw.·bours which show that whiJ.e the percentage 
share of Labour (i.e. remuneration of employees) in the total 
income produced was fairly constant in the manufacturing in-
dustry, it rose considerably in the case of the other t\~occu-
pat:i.ons. Actually the figures show that for all three occv.pa-
~ ti.ons, the share of Labour tended to dec.line until the ,_ .·. 
beginning of the Second World War, when such factors as the 
introduction of cost of living al.lowa.nces for non-Europeans, 
the constant price of gold combined with others to increase 
( 2) 
Labour 1 s share. 
It is highly probable that Labour (i.e. the recipients 
of wages and sal aries) constitutes the major part of the 1 ower 
income group, while recipients of profit s , interest and rent 
are the more well-to-do of the population. If this is so, 
then the increase in the percentage share of Labour, as far as 
i a shewn by the figures produced, means that there has been a 
red i stribution of income in favour of t h e lower income groups. 
It is only right to state here t h at these three occupations 
employed only 1/6 of the total working population of the Union 
in 1946, weighted, as it is, by the lurg e number of lra.tivea 
( 3) 
in the Reserve s classified as working. neverthele s s, it 
would seem justifiable to accept this evidence as proof of the 
trend in the r edi.str.ibution of income in favour of Labour, at 
1 east for occupations oth er than farming . 
We must now proceed to consider whether, within the share 
of the 'l:Jational Income ew.·ned by Labour, there has been any 
( 1) Report of Industrial Le gislation Commission of Enquiry 
U.G. 62/51 pp 3?. 
See Table 1 ~) Incll:lded po.~e .<~3 . 
Included in the 'working population' are all Natj. ves in 
the Reserves of 10 years of age, or more, . whereas f~ other 
races, the lower age limit i s 15. Further all Reserve fe-
male~ are :lassified as working, while their European 
?ounterpart~ are called 'hous ewifes', and not included 
J.n t h e working p opuJ. at i on. 
further redistribution and if so, in whose favour. To do this 
it is necessary to divide the total labour force into classes 
in order to allocate a share of the total income accruing to 
Labour, t o .each particular class. Bearing in mind the broader 
interest in this di vj.sion, the foJ..lowing groups have been 
/ 
chosen:- salaried employees and wage earners, in turn divid~ 
into European skilled and non-EUJ~opean unskil.led. This di vi-
sion is not to be regarded as a rigid one; there is no doubt 
that there do exist Europeans who are not termed 11 skilJ.ed" and 
similarly non-Europeans who pe1·form skilled work, but 
"the most outstanding characteristics of the occupational 
distribution of the population (in South Africa) is the 
close relation between occupation and race •••• Professional 
superviGory and skiJ.led work is performed mainly by :&;uro-
peans, to a lesser extent by Coloureds and Asiatics, and to 
an almost negligible extent by Africans. This is true of 
all branches of economic activity: agriculture, mining, 
manufacturin€;, transport, public admini stl·ation, and pro-
fessional work with the exception of teaching, nursing and 
religious service where non-Europeans serve their compat-
(1) (2) 
riots.tt 
The reasons for this close relationship are largely to be 
' found in the economic development of the country, based on a 
reJ.ati vely scarce skilled labour supply and the then seemingly 
inexhaustible pool of unskiJ.led native labour; a state of cir• 
cumsta.nces perpetuated by convention, 1 egal restrictions and 
a "civilized labour" policy instituted by the Government in 
( 3) 
1924 and never completely relaxed. On the other hand, the 
severe shor tage of skilled and semi- skilled 1 abour during 
World War· II, due to the absence of many Europeans on mil..i tary 
service, gave a chance to the non-European to enter the semi-
(1) 
( 2f ( 3) 
The Handbook of 
pp 109. 
See Tables 2( A) 
S.E.lP.C. Report 
Ra.cd Ralations. "Labour 11 by s. v. d . Horst 
and (d) po.~e -''-~-3 
:To . 13 U. G. 53/48 :pp 36. 
/sldlled 
skilled grades. The wide acknowledgement by industrialists, 
of the efficiency of non-Europeans as machi!le operatives mu.st 
have further reduced this strict rel a.tionship of recent years. 
Thus, for example, the Wage Board states in its report for 1948: 1 
"It appears that ••• there is a tendency for .Asiatics, and 
to a lesser extent Coloured, to infiltrate into skilled 
and semi- skilled work. Even in the case of lTati ves who to 
a gl'eater extent are handicapped by lack of education, train-
ing or other disabilities, from performing work requiring 
any dee:ree of skill, there is nevertheless a. gl·adu.hl move-
ment towards their absorbtion in more highly paid employ-(1) 
ment." 
Once again}!: the only reliable statistics of average sal-
a.ri es e.nd wages relate to manufacturing, mining and the. s. A. R. ( 2) 
& H, and even in these there are certain deficiencies which 
must be mentioned. First, income-in-kind is only included in 
the figures for manufacturing, "in respect of which, the in-
dustria.l census forms define salaries and wages as including 
th'e value of hou.sing, boarding and rations, 11 and for mining 
after 1946/?~· Prior to that date, lack of complete informa-
tion in respect of items other than food supplies, resulted in 
food being the only item of income-in-ldnd included. FUrther, 
the fi gurcs in respe·ct of the o. A. R. & H. and mining for the 
w~· years are subject to a defect ro·ising from the fact that 
pernwnent employees who enlisted for military service, were in-
eluded asemployees whereas only that portion of salaries and 
wages was included which was payable by the original employer 
i.e. the excess of the salary or wage which the.employee would 
have received over remuneration paid by the Department of De-
( 3) 
fence. However, if these figures are employed as evidence 
of a trend rather than actual earnings, they should not be the 
cause of much inaccuracy. 
2) See Table 3, po.ge .l.~. !1) Report of the Department of Labour. 3) U.G. 62/51 pp 43. 
/The 
The figures in Appendix show, firstly, that in both 
I 
~;;:anufacturing and the s. A. R. & H., wages to European; employees 
increased by more than did salro·ies during the period 1929/30 ~ 
1949/50: secondly, that average earnings of non-~uropewsin man-
ufacturing and on the railways increased to a ~·eater extent 
Z5f. 
than did wages of Europeans. Combingng these two results, it is 
obvious that as far as the figures go, there has been a definite 
redistribution in favour of the lovrer income groups, bo(h EUro-
peans and non-European. On the other hand, the statistics as 
regards mining seew to point to a de fin~ te advantage accruing 
to ~uropeans, but as ·no subdivision of earnings of Europeans is 
available, nothing further can be said. (1) 
As mentioned above, t hese three occupations employed 
only about 1;6 of the total working population of the Union in ( 2) 
1946, so they cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of any 
general il-end. Unfortunately further statistics on wage earnin§:l 
are difficult t o find, an~ many of t hose that have been produc~ 
ed are little more than estimates; as for instance , those based 
on minimum wage rates. Nevertheless it will be necessary to 
examine some of them in order to determine whether they support 
the trends shewn in the figures examined above. 
In the Official Year Books are published tables rel at ing 
to the salarie s and wages paid by Local .Authorities, subdivided 
into European and "Other" , from which it wo·w1ld appear that dur .. 
ing the period 1929/30-1947~ (data. is not available subsequent 
to that d.a.ts)., t he aver age earning per European increased by 
almost 90%. while earnings accruing to persons enumerated under 
"other" increased by over 130~;; . Furthermore, in 1929/30 the 
avel·age wage of "others" was approximately 18i ... of the average 
earning of a European, whereas in the period 1942/3-194?/8, it 
( 3) J. 
varied between 21. 6/b and 24. ?/o . It must be a.d.mi ttelim.t 
there is no means of testing whether ~uropean wages have risen 
) See Table 4 , pa.$le 2'1~- . ! 12) See page t. 2~$ 3) see Table 3 (I) page 2\j.:i 
/by 
·Ju •. 
by more than European salaries, as was the case in the man-
ufa.cturing industry; in which case it is quite conoei vable 
that tbe earnings of certain .ti:uropeans might have increased • 
by more than 130%. Nevertheless, there seems to be the same 
defj.ni te trend in favour of the non-European as was shewn in 
the figures taken from the Report of the Industrial Legisla-
( 1) 
tion Commission of Enquiry. 
played 105,275 persons in 1946 • 
These Lecal J~uthorit5.es em-
( 2) 
. Also published in the OfficiaJ. Year Books are statistics 
maintained to be "fairly reliable 11 , of the average wages pai-d 
to unskilled native labourers employed in various clAsses of 
trade, commerce and industry, in t he chief urban areas. "The 
figurew have been obtained from the wage returns collected by 
the Office of Census a.nc~ statistics, and include the esti-
mated value of food and lodging, as well as any other bene-
( 3) 
fits. 11 It should be pointed out that these fi g;ures will 
of course, to so1.a.e extent, be a duplicate of those produced 
for manufacturing alone. However, in support of the ma.:kim 
that too much evidence is better than too litt.ll::e, they are in-
cluded. in an adjusted form. They are published. for each urban 
centl·e separately and are here weighted on the s ame basis as 
( 4) 
has been used in compiling the retail price index since 1938. 
The result follows very closely the trend already been in 
respect of the manufacturine industry, in that during the pe-
riod 1929-1947 the f~)'centage increas·e in average weekly 
earnings is 132.2%. It is impossible to state how rr~y of 
U.G. 62/51. 
Number of Em lo ees of 
1 Europeans 1 17,350 
' ot11ers 1 __ ~4~2~·~3~8~6~~--~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~--~1· ~Total 59.736 __ 70..~.~94 1 1 Source : Union Ye a.r Boo ks-:.N:::::o;..Js:...; • .,.:;..:l::--:2~--~L;;;..;.:..;:. __ ....;;;;-=~...;..;;--
( 3) Official Year Boo~ No. 25 1949, pp 318 . 
(4) Cape Town 11, Port Emizabeth 4, East London 2, Kimberley 1, 
Pietermaritzburg 2, Durban 6, Pretoria 5, Witwatersrand 27, 
Bloemfontein 2. 
( 5) See Table 5, po.,e ~~s. 
/the 
the ? 2, 0'63 natives classified under "Commerce and Fin<.mce 11 in 
the 1946 census, are co:Vered by this evidence , but t:te s:illhi-
1 ari ty between these and other figures do show a. remarkably 
close relationship between earnings of natives in diffeTmlt 
occupations • 
.According to the Report of the Industrial Legislation Com-
miaj.on of Enquiry there were ?0?, 282 persons occupied as under 
11PersoneJ. Servj.ce 11 in 1946, of vrhom only 25,000 were Europeans. 
Since 1939 tlte Office of Census and Statistics has collected. 
datu of wages of domestic servants in connection with :Dhe 
( 1) 
annual rent census, and from fi gul~es acknowledged to this 
source, Sheila v;:m der Eorst ha..s shewn that during 1940 ... 44 the 
average inc1·e ase in wageD of domestic servants for the four 
( 2) 
1 argest urban areas was between 29~~ and 37%. While this 
increase is not as great as that recorded in the manufacturing 
industry during the stmila.r period, (except for European sala-
ries) it is on a Pal' with increase~ in the other occupations 
examined. I)-It VJOld be impossible to maintain that this evidence, 
/1 
restrj.cted as it is, should be regtu-ded as a generalisation of 
condi tj.ons throughout the country, yet it seems to show that, 
at least as far as domestic service is concerned, the trend in 
earnings of 1::on-Europeana is not confined to those occupations 
for which more complete statistics m·e available. 
Finally, vre can obtain some idea of the trend, if nothing 
more, from an examination of the minimum wage rates and cost of 
living allowances laid do~TI in Wage Boro·d determinations. It 
is not correct to state , us some have done, that these minimum 
wage rates can be used in deri vine: conclusions invol virJgabso-
( 3) 
lute incomes, but a comparlson .of changes in minimum rates 
to different cJ.asscs of employees in a similar economic occu-
p~tion is permissible, provided one w_ways bears in mind the 
(1) ~l'he se fj_fUl'es are confined to 3- 6 roomed houses construct-
ed of br:ick, stone or concrete, rented furnished or non-
furnished. 
( 2) See Table 6 , "a.ge J.l.f..~ 
( 3) 11 ••• the lowest wage payable tends to become the highest 
wage paicl. 11 "'l,he Cost of Li ving11 by Ethel Wix. Institute 
of Race Relattons. 1951. 
/essential 
essenticl limitations in the stati stit~rs. s. v. d. Horst has 
produced figures relating to comraercial employees which show 
. 
that during 1940-4? the minimum wage rata granted by the Wage 
Board to labourers over the age of 18, not specified as non-
European but who, from the actual rates laid down, could cer-
taj_nly not be Europeans, has in e;ener a.l increased more than 
have grants in respect of male and female shop assistants and 
( 1) 
clerical employees. 
The stage has now been reached where it is essential t hat 
we acknowledge anc.... attempt to bridge, e,n important gb.p j_n the 
whole discussion - viz. the income of the farming conununi ty who, 
in 1946, numbered just less than 50/~ of the total working popu~ 
( 2) 
latj.cn. 
Broadly those engaged in farming can be di vi<ied into t.bl·ee 
claoses:- the farm owners outside the Reserves, predominantly 
European; the farm labourers, almost excJ.usi vely non-Eul1;pean 
and finally those natives resident in the Reserves at the time 
( 3) 
of the census. l~o stati stj.cal evidence could be found us 
to t he division of IJati ves between those employed on farms and 
those in the Reserves and classified as working, but using the 
same ratio as tb.at in which the total native population was di-
vided between those two areas, the 2,139,219 Natives occupied 
in farming would be d:l. vided as to some 1, 200,000 in the Rese1•ves 
( 4) 
and 900,000 on farms. 
Since no really reliable figures relating to the change in 
incomes of farmers could be discovered, it was reluctantly de-
cided to disregard them in this discussion. As reg8l·ds e~·nin~ 
( 3) 
( 4) 
See Table ?,ra.?Je 1<-~C. . 
. At the time of the 1936 census all females of 10 years and 
older in tb~ Reserves were classified as working - in 1946 
a very large number of these were classified as 1 housewives' 
'l'he Industrial Legislation Commission of Enquiry has esti.;. 
ma'ted this figure at 1,100,000 and thus their figure fo1· 
the percent age of working populatj. on engaged in farmine; is 
56.2%. Since it is not considered justified to include all 
females in the Heserves as working, the 1946 census figures 
have been adhereddto, giving a figure of 46.9/6. T.hi s figure 
is still in .exce~s sj_nce it includes natives in the Reserves 
f1•om 10 years of age, whereas for the other races the 1owe1• 
age limit is 15. 
See Table 8 , pa.!Je. ~4.r... 
In 1946 the total native popula.tton in Reserves was 3, 26'7, 
000 and on farms, 2,45?,000. 
/of 
of farm labour·ers, t.he most reliable data is that :produced oy 
the Division of Economics and .·a.rkets at various times cJ.uring 
the period under review. The considerable difficulties attach ... 
ed to the valuation of certain items included in the average 
'total' wage make tlblese figures really little more than well-
informed guesses. FUrthermore ccnfd:~~ ~·j og in view of the 
fae·t-: that·, in most cases , the. • total' wage includes some vaJ. ... 
uation given to food supplied by the farmer, it cannot be said 
that the consumption of foodstuffs by the labourers depends 
upon their income, but rather that income depends ~:m the valua-
tion given to food insofar as 1 t is supplied by the farmer. 
Nevertheless these figures do show that in the m·eas exam~ned, 
'total' incomes of farm labourers have increased by approxi-
( 1) 
ma.teJ.y 70-80/~ between 1929 a.nd 1950. 
In connection with the 1To.tj.ve Reserves, it is mo8t im.por-
tant to remember the significance of mi~·ant labour in the 
whole economic structure of t he family unit. True, there ~·e 
other factors wbich urge the native 'to seek the "bright li';hts 11 
of. the city, but at the root of the migratory labour systsm is 
economic necessity - the need to supplement what income they 
can obtain from within the Reserves, by t heir present methods 
of cul ti vat ion. 
"The people of this District ( Kei skarnmahoek) are seen to 
be dependant upon the ero·nings of emi~·a.nts for their very 
(f) 
existence, and it is poverty which forces them out to work. 11 
The economic survey of the Y.e iskammcl1oek distri at carried 
out by the Department of ~conomics of Rhodes University, re-
/ vea.led that between 113 e..nd t of the total cash income of .. the 
family unit, and approximately t of income-in-kind., came from 
outsj.de the Reserve; further more thai over 2j5 of the fdilies 
drew the greater part of their cash incomes from remittances by 
(1) 
( 2) 
? .. <I' See Table 9 J /-4'o 
"The :BJconomy of a Native Reserve. 11 by Professor D. Hobart 
Houghton. 
/emigrant 
(1) 
emigrnnt workers. On tb.e assumption that the proportion 
of the earnings sent or brought home by emigrants, is a fun-
( 2) 
ction qf the earnings of the emigrant himself , or herself, 
the connection between wages paid to natives in urban ~cou~ 
pations and incomes of residents in the Reserves, becomes ob-
vious. If averae:e wages paid by industry, the rail ways and 
Local Authorities etc. have risen, as, in fact, we have seen 
they have done, it must be that the dependants of the-se emi-
grant workers have also benefitted by the redistribution of 
the !:rational Income. 
The economic survey of Keiskammahoek also revealed that 
between 1940-1 and 194?-8, the total sales to natives by 
tra~ders increased from approximately t.:.50, ?00 to £136 ,800 , 
vj.z. almost 1 ?o%. The toto.l cash income of the District is 
derived from wages from employment wi t·hin the Reserve ; vMue 
of produce sold and remittances from emigrant workers. Since 
the first was found to be fairly constant, and the second but 
a very small part of the total, 6.8;,;, the source which app-
lied the wherewithal to finance the increased purchases, must 
( 3) 
have been the third. 
"It :seems probable that in explaining the increase of cash 
incomes in recent years greater importance should. be attach• 
ed to an increase in earnings (of mt.grant worker s ) thlltlnl to 
( 4) 
a 1 arger ·number of emigrant workers. 11 
The increase in income from sources outside the Reserves 
can also be explained by the fact that the migrant workers are 
being attracted more and more, by the higher paid occupations. 
For instance, while there appears to have been no decrease in 
(1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
The average total income of a family was macfe up of: .. 
Cash Income from with in the Reserve £19. 9. 2. 
Income-in-kind from within the Reserve 5. 5. 3. 
Cash income from without the Reserve 11. 10. 5 . 
Income-in-kind from without tJ:'J.e Heserve r . . l. 11. ?. 
Total £37 . 16. 5. 
"Family Income and Expenditure in a L:iskei Native Reserve" 
by Pr~fessor D. Hobart Houghton a nd D. Philcox. S • .A.J.E. 
Vol. 18, No. 4, 1950. 
There are many complaints among natives in the Reserves 
tbat the young peopJ. e now- a- days do not e:end home as mu~h 
~s f~rmerly, but spend their earnings upon themselves. 
Fan11ly Income and Expenditure in a Ciskei Native Reserve H 
S.A.J.E. Vol. 18 No. 4 1950. . 
"Trade in a. Ci skei Nat ive Reserve" by .Prof D Hobart Houahton a nd B. Forsd i ~lc Q " T ,., •• • ~ - -·- • -
the number of emigrants, the percentage of South African nat-
ives employed on the mines, where cash wages are far less than 
elsewhere, has declined significantly in recent years. 
It is time that we paused for a while to consider how far 
we have pro[i'ressecl in this discussion. It was introduced in 
order to ascertain \7hether, during the period under review, 
there was any indication of a redistribution of the National 
Income, and if so, in whose favour this redi stri but ion worked. 
From a compm.-ison between the reward of I,abour and that of 
other factors of production, there was found a definite trend 
in favour of the former; similarly there was strong evidence 
of a favourable redistribution to wage earners when compared 
withsalaried employees, and finally the evidence with regard to 
comparative earnings of Europeans and the unskilled non-Eu1•opem 
was in favour of the latter. On the assumption that owners of 
of , 
factors/production other than Labour, exe in higher income 
groups thm1 employees, and simil~'ly thatealaried employees earn 
more than wage earners, the concJusion must be that the :ration-
al Income has been redistributed to t he benefit of the lower 
income gr9ups, since there can be no argument that Europeans 
earn more than non-Europeans. 
~ 
All this evidence is presented in Graph '7- , drawn on a 
semi-logari tbmic sceJ.e in order to show . the rate of increase of 
earnings to different income groups , or as we have seen, cUffe-
rent races, in various occupations. 
The beginning of the period is murked by a fall in earn-
ings of all classes, more pronounced for the thi·ee lower p!dd 
groups, and , in the case of Natives, prolonged until 1935/6. 
From 1932/3, or 1935/6 for Natives, the rate of increase for an 
groups was about 5;; , e~though it is noticeable that salaried 
employees seem to have benefitted to a slightly lesser degree. 
It would seem then that up to 1939/41 there was no impo:zttnnt 
redistribution of the National Income, on the basis of income 
( 1) se-e page • 
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per head , since earnings to the upper income groups kept 
pace with those of non-Europeans. 
It was from 1939 that a noticeable change i:a apparent •. 
This is first · seen in the case of non-Europeans and the 
change was considerable; for both Natives and Coloureds and 
.Asiatics the rate of increase rose sharply to appr<l!ximately 
20~ p.a. For Europeans, the change seems to have occurred 
some two years after the declaration of war, and it was by 
no means so sudden. From a rate of increase of just lees 
than 5% p.a. between 1932 and 1941, it rose to about 8 - 10% 
so there seems to be fairly strong evidence of a considerable 
redistribution of income in favour of greater equality of 
earnings during the period, 1939-45. From 1945 to 1950, 
while the increase in earnings of the two European ~·oups 
remained fairly constant, that for non-Europeans v.ras somet 
what checked, and appears to have dropped to a rate compara.-
ble to that of Euro~s. There is, however, a certain tend-
ency in the average earnings of non-Europeans in the employ (1) 
of the s ..... 1. R. & H. during the last few years under reviev; , 
which may point to a further redi str ibut ion of income, fuv-
ourabl~ to non-Europeans - a redistribution on the basis of 
average earnings per person. 
It is however, not sufficient to .show merely. that ~he 
rationcl Income has been redistributed by virtue of a greater 
increase in income per head for the lower income groups than 
for the more higb..ly pai c1 employees, since it mi g.ht be that 
the total income accruing to any group has not moved in sym-
pat~~ with the average income within that ~·oup. It is ess-
ential then, that we consider what changes there have been 
in the composition and ·occupation of the working population 
of the Union. 
The first thing that strikes any investigator in tbis 
field is t h e considerable increase in the number of non-Euro-
peans, natives in particular, residing in urban areas. Between 
(l) See Table 3, page 2.1.f4-
/1921 
1921 and 1946 the nu@ber of 1~·at1ves, classified as urban in 
the population census, rose from 587,"100 to 1,810,500, viz. 
an increase of almost 210%, while the percentage increase (1) 
in the case of Europeans was 105, for Asiatics 300, and 
for Co10ureds 118. This rural-urban movement is, of course, 
the outcome of the economic law that labour will find its 
most l'ewarding occupation, but in South .Africa it should also 
be borne in mind, that a large proportion of natives classi-
fied as urban, exe in fact migrant workers whose movement is 
greatly dependant upon the income derived from the Reserves 
themselves. 
In the manufucturing industry the nw.o.ber of wage earning 
Europeans increased by 12Z~ between 1930 and 1948 whereas in 
the same period employment of nutives rose by 240~ and Colour-
eds by almost as much. It should be noted however, that the 
increase in the case of salaried European employees was 237~<7 ' 
far in excess of that for wage earning Europeans, the reason 
being primarily that non-Europeans v.rere filling certain of 
the semi·skilled positions and performing tasks formerly the 
( 2) 
preserves of the ~uropea.n wage earner. The number of Euro-
pean salaried employees was still only 25p of wage earning 
Europeans so that the si~nificance of the fact that total 
earnings of the former increased by so much more than the 
latter, in spite of a greater increase in average wages than 
salaries, should not be overemphasised. \~at is far more im-
portant is the fact that not only are non- Europeans receiving 
so much more per head in the way of earnings in the manufac-
turing industry, but also that the number of those affected by 
this tncrease in income has been more than tl·ebled. In short, 
bgt only has income been diverted to the non-Europeans on the 
basis of average earnings, but the degree to which the total 
(1) 
( 2) 
J1sia.tics classified as urban numbered only 201,800, so 
while the percentage increase was greatest, the actual 
figure is insignificant when compared witb Uati ves. 
See Table 10, page 2'+7 • 
/redistribution 
v 
redistribution has in fact occurred is greatly increased by 
the greater rise in the number of non-Europeans employed, 
resulting in an increase of 6507" in the total earnings of 
non-Europeans com~aren with 56~v and 494fo for salaries and 
( 1} 
wages paid to ~uropeans, respectively. 
'I'he same trends aJ."e evident in the case of the s. A. R. & 
H. The increase in average wage of the non-Europeans combined 
with a 100% rise in number employed., results in the phenome .. 
nal jump of ?96% in total earnings of non-European: employees, 
whereas both classes of Europeans register increases of less 
( 2) 
than 30 O'}o. 
In mining, it has already been seen that average eaJ.•n ... 
ings of non-Eufopeans did not rise to the same extent as Euro-
peans benefitted; in the analysis of the labour force t~~ 
( 3) 
number of Europeans rose by more than did non-Europeans, so 
the combined effect must be that income has been redistr.mbuted 
in favour of the former. But, here we must note that the com-
position of the non-European force, predominantly migrant as 
it is, has gradually changed so that now more than half are 
from non-Union sources. There has been a growtng tendency a-
mong migrant workers to neglect the mines in favour of other 
2/fO. 
occupations where wages are higher and the work less strenuous. 
Thus, the trend here, a1 though the opposite to that experien-
ced in t he manufacturing industry and the E.A.R. & H., will not 
concern us overmuch since income accruing to other than Union 
nationals is not included in the :rrational Income figures. 
Finally, as regards the other occupations, the best fig-
-( ures available are those showing occupations of wol'king native. 
males from the population censuses. This source shows tm.t be-
tween 1936 and 1946 the greatest increase was in respectof Com-
( 4) 
merce and Finance and then the manufacturing industry. When 
(1) See Table 11, p~e Zlf7 • ( 2) See Table 12, page ~4-7 . 
( 3) See Table 13, page 2~<-7 . 
( 4) See Table 14, page .Z"fS . 
/the 
the figures are compared with the l8io increase in total native 
population during the same period, it is obvious that ~here 
has been considerable diversion from farming and mining to 
other and more remunerative occupations. Further, when com-
pared with the increases in similar occupations of the other 
racial groups , it is clear that in the case of natives, more 
so than any of the others, there has been a marked redistri~ 
( 5) 
bution of the population. 
In the absence of more conclusive evidence it is interest-
ing to consider the data referring to theFanufacturing more 
closely. Although the increase in native males employed in 
this occupation was greater than for other between 1936 and 
1946, the writer considers that he is justified in considering 
the comparative increases in wages and employment for Europeans 
and non-Europeans in industry as indicative of the general 
trend for all occupations, other than farming and mining It is 
not suggested that the absolute increase in employment of any 
race would be the same in all occupations as in manufacturing, 
nor that because average wages rose by 130% for natives in the 
manufacturing industry, they must have done the same in each· 
and all other occupations. All that is claimed he1•e is that 
the movement of total e~~nings of different groups must have 
been very similar in most occupations. On this assumption we 
can see how the rate of increase differed during certain per-
iods in the yea1·s 1930-48. 
Di vj.ding the period into 6 sub- periods of three years 
each and considering the percentage increase in total earnings, 
which will reflect the combined effect of changes in wages and 
numbers employed, for the different racial groups , certain im-
portant facts stand out trnrnediately. 
( 2) 
Firstly, there seems no doubt that in the period 1930-33, 
there could have been no redistrioution of the National Income 
favourable to the lower income groups. When considering the 
(1) see Table 15, page ltfg 
( 2) See Table 16, page )4f8 
/problem 
problem purely from the income per head aspect, the concl u-
sion arrived at was that it seemed likely that no re-distri-
bution had taken place, but now it is ev:ident that there was 
a distj.nct tendency in favour of the Europeans, and within 
this racial group to the salaried earners. However, this was 
completely reversed in the second period when the greatest 
increase in income accrued to the group whose average level of 
income was by far the lowest of the five 'and was almost twice 
as much as the increase recorded for sa.l~·ied Europeans. The 
periods 1936-39 and 1945-48 do not seem to exhibit any marked 
redistribution in favour of either upper or lower income 
groups but the six years inbetween show a definite tendency 
favourable to the non-Europeans. Especially was this so in the 
first three ye~·s of the war period when all three non-Euro-
pean groups show increases which are more th&1 twice those of 
the Europeans while the rather sudden rise in the case of 
European sa.larj.ed employees from 27;,o to 60% ts to be accounted 
for by the la.r ~e increase in the nur;rj.ber employed, relative to 
the other ~uropean group. 
Summing up then, there are three periods which exhibit 
a redistribu.tion of the Hationa.l Income in favour of the 
lower income groups, the six years 1939-45 being of mujor im-
portnnce; one, the first, in which the tendency appears to be 
the reverse and the remaining two in which it is impossible 
to a.rri ve at any definite conclusion. 
Table 1. 
Remuneration of Employees as a percentage of total income 
produced in certain industries, 1929/30 - 1948/9. 
Y.~e~ar~--~'~M~a~~~facturing ~29/30 60.4 
' s.~.R. & H. ' _Minin~ ·-----rr~----,---4~8~.~5--, 
61.5 40.7 
61.5 48.9 
64.0 43.1 
89.4 55.4 
89.2 60.2 
( 
' 
1933/4 59.5 
1937/8 59.1 
.. 1941/2 55.8 
1945/6 63.9 
__ 1~9_4~8~)_9 ________ ~6~3~~~-------
Source Report of the Industrial Legislation Commission 
of Enquiry. U.G. 62 • 1951. Table 35, pp 38. 
Table 2 (A). 
Classification of workers of each race according to skill. 
' Skilled 1 Semi-Skilled ' Unskilled 
-.---r-·--.- -~ . %-
' Europeans 1 81.8 16.1 2.1 
' Natives 4. 2 12. 3 83.5 
1 Asiatics 32.5 31.7 35.8 
1 Coloureds 14.5 ' 30.2 55.3 
' All Races 34~--r----~1~6~.~8-----~---4~8~.~5~--~ ... ___ .. _______  _
Table 2. i B). 
Percentage each Race constitutes of Class or Skill. 
' Skilled 1 Semi-skilled 1 Unskilled •'TOtal ' 
---;-- J'o --,-- /o - ·--.·- - %--;- % 
1 Europeans ' 83.8 33.8 1.5 ' 35.4 ' 
Natlves 5.8 34.2 80.8 ' 47.0' 
Asiatics 5.6 11.2 4.5 6.0 ' 
' Coloureds ' 4. 8 20.8 13. 2 11.6 ' 
Note. These figures were obtained from .those industries, 
trades or undertakings in respect of which wage de-
terminations, for all skills, were made during the 
period 193'7-48. 
Source: Report of the Industrial Legislation Commission 
of Enquiry. U.G. 62- 1951 Table 28. 
Year 
1929-30 
1930- 31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
1938-39 
1939-4U 
1940-41 
1941-42 
1942-43 
1943-44 
1944-45 
1945-46 
1946-47 
1947-48 
1948-49 
1949-50 
~ 
Source 
Manufacturing. 
Salary \ lage 
IviANUF AC Till-\ IN G, 
aVERAGE aNNUaL SaLARIES aND ·:/AGES ( 
South African Rai: 
and HarbotU' s 
Salary WagE 
Europeans Europeans Natives ii.Siatics Coloureds Europeans Europeans E1 
363.7 22lo0 44o3 62.0 88.8 357.2 220.6 
358.2 218.3 
353.3 200.7 
325.9 183.9 39.8 53.1 73.3 329.2 182.7 
332.6 190o2 39.7 54.7 75.7 332.3 194.9 
335.4 202.9 41.0 56.4 78.7 329.8 202.8 
338.7 211.8 42.2 59.2 79.2 327.2 210.1 
349.0 216.5 44.2 62.8 82.5 327.6 214.7 
356oO 226.9 45.5 65.5 86.3 33 5.3 224.7 
366.5 228.9 46.3 68.4 86.2 348.6 238.7 
380.8 234.8 47.3 69.7 87.4 356.8 238.7 
392.7 247.9 50.4 77o1 92.3 315.0 237.8 
426.2 283.4 59.3 91.8 112.5 289.1 251.1 
463.4 307.5 69.9 109.7 125.4 310.7 268 .3 
497.5 323.5 79.9 128.8 134.9 351.0 295.1 
540.1 340.7 91.0 144.6 149.5 378.4 329.2 
562.9 355.4 95.4 154.3 157.8 456.2 361.9 
597.1 379.8 00 " 166.6 166.5 531.6 416.0 / .; 0 c.. 
612.9 413.8 103.3 174 .0 177.2 568.4 427.7 
-
615.3 459.5 
631.8 481.1 
• Report of the Industrial Legislation Coramission of Enquiry U.G • 62/~ 
• 
r.tillLE 3. 
) . A.rl. & H. AND MINING. 
)F EMPLOY:G.c;S ACCORDING TO RACE 1922/30-1949/50. 
Average Ytage Average 'f age of 
Lways As .l?ercentage Non-Europeans as 
Mining of Average Percentage of that 
Salary 
(Europeans) 
of Europeans. 
~ Salaries and \/ages Manufacturing S.1LR o& H. 
Non- Non- Manuf- S.A.R. Non-1ropeans Europeans Europeans acturing & H. Natives Asia tics Coloureds Europeans 
t1-5. 8 300.6 29.1 60.8 61.8 20.0 28.1 40.2 20o7 
45.2 309.0 29.5 60.9 20 . 7 
44.6 327.3 30.5 56.8 22.2 
38.1 311.7 29.7 56.4 55.5 21.6 28.9 39o9 20.9 . 
36.0 323.0 29.9 57.2 58.7 20.9 28,8 39.8 18.5 
34.2 341.1 30.5 60.5 61.5 20.2 27.8 38.8 16. 9 
34.5 354.5 31.7 62.5 64.2 19.9 28.0 37.4 16.4 
38.5 368.7 32.3 62.0 65.5 20o4 29.0 38.1 18.0 
40o3 378.3 32.9 63.7 67.0 20.1 28.9 38.0 17.9 
40.4 383.7 33.2 62.5 68.5 20.2 29.9 37.7 16o9 
40.5 391.6 33.4 61.7 66.9 20.1 29.7 37.2 17.0 
45o5 406.1 33.7 63.1 75.5 20.3 31.1 37.2 19.1 
50.4 422.8 34.1 66.5 86.9 20.9 32.4 39.7 20.1 
59.6 434.4 35.1 66.4 86.4 22.7 35.7 40o8 22.2 
76.3 451.1 40.5 65.0 84.1 24.7 30 8 41.7 25.9 / . 
91.3 478.6 42.5 63.1 87.0 26.7 42.4 43.9 27.7 
')7.3 527.5 43.0 63.1 79.3 26.8 43.4 44.4 26o9 102.2 554.7 43.5 63.6 78.3 26.1 43.9 43.8 24.6 111.4 587.7 45.3 67.5 75.2 25.0 42.0 42.8 26.0 l23o 5 649.4 46.9 74.7 26.9 136.5 712.0 51.2 76.1 28.4 
)1 pp 44. 
'1 
' 
Table 3 ( i) • 
Average earnings of employees of Local .Authorities, 1929/30-
1947/8. 
' Year 
' Average annual remuneration .-Average other ' 
-=~----4p~e~r~p~e~r~s~o~n~~~--~---' as percentage ' 
' :&uro:Qea.n _, _,_;o:;..t.;.:;ll£t: ___ ,~.....2.L~uro~ean. 
£ £ ' % 
1929/30 ' 238.0 42.4 ' 17.79 
1930/1 233.2 42.1 18.06 
1931/2 235.2 41.8 17.?8 
1932/3 210.1 43.4 20.59 
1933/4 236.6 40.4 1?.15 
1934/5 232.7 38.7 16.64 
1935/6 245.0 37.4 15.30 
1936/7 252.3 40.7 16.14 
193?/8 262.1 40.? 15.49 
' 1938/9 267.7 42.9 16.02 
' 1939/40 
1940/1 235.2 47.6 
1941/2 ' 254.9 51.4 
1942/3 270.8 66.9 
1943/4 242.1 54.4 
1944/5 324.1 79.3 
1945/6 ' 386.5 88.3 
19 4 6/7 ' 39 6. 0 8 7 • 7 
194?L8~----~4~5~3~.5~--------~9~7~.8~-----· 
Source Union Year Books ~Tos. 12 - 25. 
Table 4. 
20.24 
20.1? 
24.?0 
22.47 
24.47 
22.82 
22.16 
21.56 
Distribution of working population araong certain occupations, 
1946. 
1 1 Manufacturing s.A.R. & H. i- Minfngri) 
I Europeans 138,537 74,859 53,557 
I' 
' Natives 259,582 62,968 442,5?8 
' Asiatics 1?, 564 611 601 
' Coloureds 621 582__ ~J606 2~?24 --_,_T~o~t~a-l~--------~4~~g~£5~·------~1~4~8~1~0~4~4~.----~4~9~9~·~4~6~o ____ ___ 
1 Total working ' Percentage of working population 1 
Population ' engaged in I.[a.nufa.cturing, s. A.R. '' 
' & H. and :1ining. 
' Europeans 58'§'7fsr-·--;- ·--- 3o:-r-· ---r 
' Natives 4,943,585 15.5 
' Asiatics 79,1?0 23.8 
' Coloureds 1 348 , 769 21. 5 
' Total -r--6,259L?.Q5-- 18.Q_ _______ _ 
(1) Includes ~uarrying 
Source : U.G. 62 - 1951. 
Ta.bl e 5. 
Average weekly earnings of unskil1 ed na.ti ve 1 a.bourers i ·n nine 
Urban areas , 19 29 - 4?. 
Year ' 1929 ' 1930 ' 1931 ' 1932 ' 1933 ' 1934 ' 1935 1 1936 ' 
Wag~·, 19/-= 1 197[' -~~·=19Ll ~-1~l2~f972' 1978r-i•·-2§721 
I 193? I 1938 I l939 I 1940 I 1941 I 1942 I 1943. I 1944 I 1945 I 
' 2o/8 .' 21/5 ' 221- ' 23~~1 ' ~QL4~-~U11 1 4o~_!__~U3 ' 
' 1946 ' 1947 ' 
' 42/9 ' 44/2 ' 
Source Official Union Year Books Nos. 12 ... 25 . 
2/f:r. 
Table 6. 
Percentage increase in wages to domestic servants, 1940-44. 
Centre J.Jf.ale Female .All 
' Cape Town 33 38 37 
-, 
1 Durban 32 38 35 
1 Pretoria 23 31 29 
' J ohannesbu~· ~ 32 30 ---~0 
Source . Race Re1a.t ions Handbook. . 
"Labour" by s . v. d. Borst pp 135 .• 
.Table 7. 
Percentage increase in ~.iinimum-Wage Rates granted by the 
Wage Board. 
' Shop Assistant, 
Town 1 and clerical em-
1 Labourer b· Period 1 
1 over 18 1 
years ;el.2.~~~-.-,---llale ~ Fen-;;;.n;:;;;al;;;..e.:;.__.,... . ___ ._,.. ____ ..,.. 
36 
26 
48 ' 1.1. 40- 1 
50 1 31 • ? • 4 7 1 
38 
67 
Source : Race Relations :Iandbook. 11 La.bour 11 pp 136. 
Table 8. 
( 1) 
Distribution of those engaged in farming by Races , 1946. 
' Europear 1 Asiatic Coloured Native Totru. ' ~,-=~1~6~7~~8~2~2~,~~1~3~.~6~9~l~~~--~9~?~.~4~5~3~_~?J139~2~ ' 2,418,~8~ 
(1) Includes fishinc. 
Source : u. G. 62 - 1951 as adjusted, see page 6, note 3. 
Table 9. 
Native farm wages, per adult labourer , 1928/9 - 1 948/9. 
-:---::-::--:---=Ar=-:e:'::-a;;;.:;. =--,_...,~.,.._-.,..._ Year 1 To~ W aiJ'e 1 
1 Maize : N.E. O.F.S. 1928~-2o.? -~---;-
1 b.aize_;___N. W!.._..Q_±S. 1947_L8 35~ _ 
1 Wheat : ~almesbury 1929/30 1 43.2 1 
1 Wheat : lvw.lmesburl 1948/9 78.2 
1 Tobacco : Transvaal 1928/9 25.3 
1 Tobacco _:_Tr~_svaal _:_.J:_948L~--- ~ 46.7 
Source : Official YeaJ.· Books, ros. 12 and 25. 
Table 10. 
Number of employees in the !.[anufacturing Industry, 000 1 s. 
1 Year 1 EuroEea.n ___ , Nat ives ' Asiatics 1 Coloured ' 
-:--':"'!:"~--:-' Sal ar j_ ed 'Vag~ Ea.rg_~-- -·~' _, --~---=-----:----=~ 
' 1930 ' 12.0 73. 2 ' 90.5 9.5 27.2~ 
' 1933 13.0 68.5 74.4 8.2 22.2 
' 1936 18 . 2 103. 4 131 . 7 '10.7 30.9 
' 1939 
1942 24.6 118.6 198.9 16 . 2 48 . 2 
1945 31.1 128.1 245.5 17 . 5 58 . 7 
' 1948 40 . 4 162. 2 307.6 18 . 0 74.5 --~~------~~---------
Source : Industrial Censuses. 
Table 11. 
Total ii]arnings in the _ .. ~anufacturing Industry, £000 1 s . 
' Year ' ~rope an -Nat'i ves_i_'Asia.tics ' Coloured 
---Salaries ' wa~es ' 
' 
1930 3, 743 
' 
11 , 306 3 , 612 578 2,224 
' 
1933 4 , 221 ' 12, 602 2 , 962 437 1 , 630 
' 1936 6 , 175 ' 21 ' 970 5 , 563 635 2, 463 
' 
1939 I 8 ,-263 
' 
26,422 
' 
7,225 884 3, 223 
' 1942 ' 10,509 I 33, 603 
0 11,802 1 , 492 5 , 443 
' 1 945 ' 16,797 46 , 635 22 , 338 2 , 529 8,77? 
' 
1948 ' 24 1 761 6'Z_,118 311775 3 ;a 132 1£a..gQ!.~ 
Source . Industl~i a.l Censuses. . 
Table 12. 
Number of employees in the S. A.R. & H. and total earnings. 
Employees 000 1 s ~ ~ Earnings~O 
1 European ' Non- European ' European ' Non-
' Year 'Salaried' Wage 'Salaries Wages' :cl:uropeans ' 
' ' Earners ' ' ' 
1930 ' 10 48 41 ·-~ 3 , 572 10, 523 1 1 , 882--, 
1933' 9 41 27 2 , 799 7 , 454 1 1 , 032 1 
' 19 3 6 11 55 55 3 , 7 2 2 12, 3 59 ' 2, 213 
I 1939 1 4 63 54 I 4,163 16 , 044 1 2 , 712 
1942 1 7 69 63 ' 6,381 2?, 748 ' 5,752 
1 945 19 79 84 1 10,743 33, 874 ' 9 , 993 
1 1948_~ 22 82 83 f 13,683 ~9 I 401 I 11 , 28_2__!.. 
Does not include a small number of non- Europeans earning 
salaries. 
Table 13. 
Number of persons engaged in 1.:ining , 000 1 s. 
' Yem· t l93o 11933 \ l936 _Ll~39 }1942 Jl945 Jl948 l 
' Europeans t 36 . 7 35 . ? \ 4?.1 } 55.01 57 . 71 53.2 \ 52. 21 
~-European~6.3 299 . 0 {394.3 425 . 1 ! 473 . 4 ( 424~405.2 
Source : U.G. 62/51 Table 26. 
Table 14. 
Working Native . :ales classified according to occupational 
Classes, 1936 and 1946, 000 1 s. 
occupat~nal Group I 1936 1946 Per~entage In- 1 
Increase 
1 Farming 
' Mining 
':;»tanufacturing 
'Transport and Communication 
'Commerce and Finance 
' Professions , Domestic service I 
' etc. 
1_, 437 I 
393 ' 
210 I 
90 ' 
7 ' 
131 I 
Source: U.G. 62/51 Table 20. 
Table 15. 
1 , 469 I 
427 I 
368 I 
116 ' 
12 I 
197 I 
2 . 2 
8.6 
75.0 
29.0 
86.2 
51.3 
Percentage change in working population of Europeans and Asiatics 
and Coloureds by o c cu ,at i onal Cl asses, 19 36'"' 46. 
~--~o~c_c~ational Group 
1 Farming 
1 E~ro;eea.n ' 
7.4 I 
' Mining 
'I~ranufacturing 
' Transport and Communication 
'Commerce and Finance 
'Professions, Domestic Service ' 
14.1 1 
43.1 I 
57 . 5 I 
17.7 I 
Asiatics and Coloureds' 
2.8 
63.7 
22.1 
19.0 
1 etc. 15.0 ' 8.6 ~--------------------~~~ ------~----~~------~----
Source : Population Censuses. 
Table 16. 
Percentage increase in totaJ. earnings of different groups of 
employees in the manufactu1·ing industry, 1930-48. 
Period I _ Euro12eans I Coloureds I .Asiatics I Nati vee 
I Salaries '_Wages ' 
I 1930-33 I 13 I 11 ' 27 24 18 
' 
1933-36 46 74 51 46 90 
I 1936-39 34 20 31 39 30 
t 19 39-42 27 27 70 69 63 
I 1942-45 60 30 61 · 70 89 
t 1945-48 48 54 50 24 42 
·- - ---'" 
Chaptel· 10. 
EXPENDITURE AUD THE N.hTIONiiL I!TCOUE 
In the present chapter we will be concerned with the 
relationship between the expenditure on the specific com-
modities which have been considered throughout this study, 
and the national Income. .As we found when discussing t he 
rela.tionsbip between physical consumption and the population, 
this can be approached from two standpoints; we could pursue 
a factual examination of the mo vement of the two qua.nt ities 
over a period of time which will not necessarily produce any 
measurement of correlation bet veen them as the expenditure 
wj.ll of course be affected by many factors other than the 
( . 
growth of in 1 the national Income, or we could attempt to iso-
\._ .... .~~ 
late the affects of the changing Ji!'ational Income on the ex-
penditure on the products, in other words establish a. definite 
statistical relationship between the two which can be used 
in estimating the movement in one with a given change in the 
other . 
The second ~pproach would be by far the better since we 
have already examined the effects of changes in the popula,-
tion on physical consumption, the effects of a redistribution 
in the ~ra.tj.ona.l Income in our study of budgeta.l'Y surveys and 
the ideal would be to follow these up by producing a factual 
measurement for each pair of quantities. Thus we might say 
that physical consumption will increase by the same per cen-
tage as population increases, other quanti t ies remaining un-
that expenditure 
changed/Will rise by 80% of the increase in National Income 
with no redistribution of t hat :i.Tational Income and so on. 
The Whole success of this method of approaching the problem 
however, depends on the ability to calculate some fairly 
accurate measure of the income elasticity of demand, which is 
in fact isolating the income effect on expenditure, I n order 
to do so it is essential to have considerable detailed s t at-
istical evidence regarding the expenditure of different income 
/groups 
groups within the community. From various studies for 
other countries it is obvious t:1at for most foodctuffs 
and for food in general, the income elasticity of demand 
is a decreasing function of income , i.e. with equal pro-
portionate increases in income from the lower to upper 
limits of the range in incomes, the proportionate increases 
in expenditure on any parti cul al' comr.1odi ty will tend to fall. 
In South Africa however , it is impossible to calculate the 
income elasticity of demand by means of the budgetary sur-
vey for any income group other than those Europeans covered 
by the 1936 inquiry into expenditure, discussed in Chapter 
8 above. The cal culation of tnis el <!sticity measurement 
for other income ·groups is absolutely impossible on the 
basis of statistical data available so the writer has been 
forced , much against his intentions, to dismiss an attempt 
to isolate the income effect fr om this.stage of t~~dis­
cussion and has therefore .relegated it, mainly in order to 
show in what respects the deficiencies in data affect the 
position, to the. ~ppendix at the end of this chapter. 
There is another method by which the income elasticity 
of demand for the whole community might be calculated,. viz. 
by examining the historical relationship between total ex-
penditure on certain items and the :rational Income, but this . 
assumes that it is possi ble t o isolate other factors first. 
Among these factors would be the increase in po~lation, 
changes in tastes, the redist ribution of the Nat i onal I ncome , 
the movement of the population 'between defined areas , m im-
portant factor in South .Africa where the food consumpt:bn 
pattern of non-Europeans in rural areas differs appredably 
from that of those residing in Native Reserves , and the 
l~ngth of urbanisation which also has an important influence 
on the composition of the diet. In view of the complex 
nature of these factors and the paucity of s'\iatistical evi-
, dence concerning most of them, the writer does not fe~l 
that any furt.b.er examination of the problem along such lines 
/would 
wpuld be fruitful and would not be likely to produce re-
sults which. could be accepted ~s anything but rough esti-
mates of the situation. He cannot consider that any con-
clusions based upon such very doubtful "facts" ~ould be of 
any material consequence and might easily be interpreted 
too literally by others, if not by himself. 
As a result of these difficulties the writer has come 
to the conclusion that the only <iiscussion which mi6ht be at 
all revealing and yet at the same time remain basi cally in 
line with the facts and not a vast number of suppositionsJ 
would be to examine the changes in expenditui·e on the speci-
f~c foodstuffs in connection with the National Income without 
attempting to ~·rive at any statistical measurement of the 
relationship. He will therefore merely show how expenditure 
on these commodities has moved in the twenty years unde1· re-
view, attempting to explain the reasons for any significant 
features arisinp, from such an exa.rr:ination. In this dis-
cussion there will be repeated reference to Chaptel"S 8 and 9 
so that the summaries at the end. of tbose chapters on pages 
220 and .2'ft respectively are most important in this re-
spect. Changes in the population other than ite redistri-
bution between different areas, will not be considered ~s 
the only figures avail able e.J."e estlma.tes in whose compil a--
t ion u constant rate of growth has 'been assumed, and which 
t herefore would not e.ffect t:be position to any significe ..nt 
degree. 
In Graph 8 is shewn on a semi-logarithmic sc~e the in~ 
crease in Tiational Income during the twenty yeal'S under re-
view. It is drawn on the semi-logaritbmic scale in order to 
sho\'r more clearly t he changes in its rate of increase (or 
decrease) and so a constant rate of increase is portr~ed 
by a straight line. The decline in the years 1930/1 and. 
1931/2 was one of approximately 9~.· per annum while it 
/recovered 
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recovered fairly rapidly until 1936/7 L'tfter which there 
was a definite check in the -rate of increase. kt the time 
it was considered by many tr.tat the world was heading :fior 
another severe decline in business activity and the sharp 
drop in the 1•ate of increase _of the ~~e.tione~ Income from a 
steady lli~ p. a. during 1934/5 -1936/? to. one of 2/-o between 
1936/? and 193?/8 served to increase these expectations. 
It however, recovered slightly in the following year pro-
bably due to the international situation and the purchasing 
of certain strategic raw materials, apd from then onwro·ds 
until the end of the peri-bd under d.iscussion a steady in-
crease was recorded. with minor declines in the years 1944/5 
and 1945/6 owing- to an understandable relaxation after the 
war perj.od, and again in 1948/9. 
So much for the 1'-iatj.ona.J.. Income as it was but what of 
its distribution during this period.. once again in view of 
. the lack of statistical data and the inability on the part 
of tbe wrl t er to calculate measurements reflecting the dif-
ferences in income elasticities between different income 
groups, means that it is impossible ·to show clearly the 
effect which the amount of redistribution of the Income 
coul~ be expected to have on the demand function for the 
specific commodities. V:e took, in Chapter 9, the total 
earnings of the different l'acia.J. groups, also dividing 
Europe~ns into salaried and wage earners, in the manufa.cturirg 
industry as indicative of the t~end in the redistribut~an 
of the NationaJ. Income, and doing so again it is obvious 
that in the first tbree years the effect of the redistribu-
tion would have been similar had the National Income it self 
fo.llen to greater extent tb.a.n it ~-:1.cturu.ly did.. The actual 
fall was in the first two years abou.t 97; .:9• a. c.nd then it 
rose in 1932/3 by 8/~, so the average fall over the three 
ye~i.rs wa6 approximately 5io p. a. .Applying the redistribution 
in favour of the upper income groups, the effect would be 
the same had the National Income decreb.,~ed by sey 8-lo%. p. a. 
/It was 
It was decided in Chapter 9 that in the following three 
years there was a redistribution in favour of the non-
European groups and the wage earning European employees so 
that the influence would be the sarae as a greater increase 
in tbe l!atj.on 1'l Income, say from the/increase of about 11% 
1 '· 
p. a, to 14/o, while in the third thr~c year period the con-
clusion arrived. at was t.b.at no redistribution of any signi-
ficunce was apparent so that the inc1·ease in the Hatj.onal 
Income would require no adjustment. The WW.." period was the 
one in which the trend in redistribution favouring tb~ non-
European groups i'!as most notlceable a.nd as such the adjust-
ment required to tbe ~:ational Income figures in order to ehow 
the effect of this trend towards greater equality in incomes 
as a factor in the purchase of foodstuffs, must be quite con-
siderable especially in the first three years of the war. 
During this period the actual increase was in the region of 
10% p.·a. and when account is taken of the very sj.gnificant 
' 
redistribution the incre""se ..:1i~ht be estimated at as much as 
20,; while in the next three yea~·s the adjusted. increase could 
be considered as approximately 14%. 
These estimates must not be taken as intending to show 
anything factual yet the conclusj.on must be that the most 
significant income changes likely to affect the expenditure 
on foodstuffs, where redistribution on income is important in 
view of the fairly wide differences in income elasticities 
between different income groups , occurred in the period 1939~ 
42 a.nd then 1933-36 and 1942-45. The first three years under · 
discussion showed a marked fall i.n income while between 1936 
and 1939 there was an impo1·tant check in the increase which 
could not be materially altered by any redistribution of 
that Income. In the last three or fcur years under review 
there appears to have been a slight slowing down in the rate 
of !t;nc1·ease of Income which would become even more significant 
when it is taken into account tbat the trend in redistribu-
tj.on appears to have favoured the upper income groups, til.t 
/least 
least as far e.s the di visj.on between Europeans and non-
Europeans is concerned. 
Having considered the actual rise in the rational In-
come and the influence of changing trends in the dlstribu-
tion of that Income likely to affect the demand functions 
for the foodstuffs taken for exa.min;;,.tion in this study, we 
can now p1·oceed to exariline the value of consumption of there 
cornmo<iities and their relationship to the nati onal Income. 
These relationships have been graphically presented in 
the two accompanying graphs, the first, Graph 9, showin~ on 
a semi-logarithmic scale, since we are inter~sted in the 
rates of growth and not so much t.he actual level of the value 
of consumption, t he value of consumption of the various food-
stuffs over the twenty yea:r period, 1930-49. At this stage, 
and before we proceed to exarrdne the ~·aphs , it is very nee-
essa.:ry to say smmethin.g of the general principles employed 
in the valuation of t he physi cal consumption of these commo-
di ties. 
It has been geneJ~ally assumed that processed products 
can be valued at a retail price obt~ined from the Office of 
Census and Statistics and which in actual fact refers to 
' 
~-~ 
sales made[the nine most important urban areas . This imme-
n 
diat(;ly introduces difficulties for there is eve1·y po ssi bi-
lity tbat prices will differ between the smaller and the 
larger tovn.1s due for instance to a factor which will receive 
more detailed attention below viz. the fact that in lm:ger 
urban centres there is the probability that the retail price 
will contain a higher percentage of peyment for more ccmplex 
marketing se1·vices than in the peri-urban areas. As far as 
possible these retail prices have been taken for an average 
of the qualities sold but in certain instances such as butter 
and mealie meal it has been impossi ble to adjust the figures 
obtained from· t he Office of Census and statistics in orcler 
to weight them according to grades other than 1st cret.wel'Y 
and No. l refined respectively; in other cases as for bread 
/and 
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and wheaten flour and meal, the \"Tl'iter has made an attempt 
" 
to adjust the v~ue figures in order to take into account 
the fact that the retail price in certain years referre d 
to the better grades only. Vfuile these adjusted figares 
will be nearer the actual expenditure on the commodities in 
question the degree to which the estimates agree or disagree 
is impossible to state. on the other hand if these figures 
Hre used in an attempt to draw concmusions from their move-
ment and not their actual ~nount, the adjustment is ~ecided 
improvement &s it means that the figures are comparable. 
But if these difficulties are at all imp.Dr.t a.nt , those re-. 
lating to the valuation of the products , unprocessed., con-
sumed on the farms and in the Reserves are enormous. 
Broadly speaking, the practice has been to value this 
consumption at the wholesale price level with no account be-
ing made for transport costs which will be the main canee 
• 
YJor any differences between wholesale and producers' pices. 
In certain cases the determine.tion of wholesale prices have 
not been very difficult as for whole maize in whose case 
figurew are published in the Official Year Books , whereas in 
others there has been no difficulty at all since consumption 
of the "rawn product is impossible Ol' sufficiently insignifi-
cant to be disregarded. This applies to wheat e~d sugar. 
In other instances , however notably as far as the .meats and 
butte1· and milk are concerned, the difficulties were consid-
erable. From a study of the relationship between retail 
prices for the different types of meat and the producers ' 
prices, the retail prices were rather arbitrarily reduced 
although adjustment vras made for the apparent increase in the 
share of the retail price accruing to producers in the later 
years under consio.eration. The value of consumption of farm 
butter was calculated on the basis of certain information 
obtained from the Office of Census and Statistj.cs who warned 
the writer of their probable inaccuracies, ~md so he has 
decided to confine his attention, in what foll ows , to consum:rr 
tion of Cl .. eamery butter alone. In view of the insignifi canoe 
of the production of farm cheese this has been completely 
neglected. As far as fresh mi1k is conce1·ned, t.he w1·iter 
has already acknowledged the doubtful purpose of their in-
elusion owing to the fact that they are purely estimates, 
and the ~aluation of rural consumption at the arbitrarily 
chosen price of 50/o of the retail price recorded in the nine 
urban centres, only serves to detract further from their 
(1) 
significance in the following discussion. 
Reverting t.o Graph 9, the most striking feature is the 
app~·ent close correlation between the value of consumption 
of the various commodities and the National Income. On first 
sie::ht there appears no exception to the general increase in 
the value consumed in very mu ch the same trend as the rise 
in National Income. Iy is apparent that the value of con-
sumption of the "fresh meats" is by far the greatest of the 
indi vidual foodstuffs under review and that the cereals and 
sugar are more important t han the protective foodstuffs like 
butter ru1d cheese although fresh milk occupies a rela~ely 
important role. It is notabme however, that the increase in 
value of consumption is greater in such products as butter, 
cheese a.nd miJ.k and in fact it is only fol' these th1·ee foods 
that the percentage increase over the twenty years exceeded 
the percentage increase in the National Income ac the follow-
ing fieures show. These percentage increases are merely rough 
guides as to the trend in the case of each product and do not 
necessarily equal the exact percentage increase calculated 
from the figures contained in the .Appendices to this chapter. 
National Income 
Butter 
Cheese 
Milk 
Bacon and Ham 
Me aJ. 1 e :wre a.l 
Beef, veal, mutton and lamb 
Percentage Increase 
1930-49 
230 
260 
260 
250 
220 
210 
190 
( 1) The percentage cho-sen is not quite so m·bi tl·ary a.s it 
might appe~· from the text for examination of the retail 
and p:oducers' prices, wher e available , revealed 50~ to 
be fa~rly accurate. 17o account has been taken of any im-
provement in the producers' share. 
Sugar 
Pork 
Bread 
Flour 
Maize 
x For 11 years 1938-49. 
z For the period 1930-47. 
Percentage Increase 
1930-49 
160 
150 X 
60 
30 
10 z 
Apart from the figures for mealie meal and sugar, both of 
which axe on the high side, these results are very much what 
was to be expected bearing in mind the expenditure pa~erns 
descl'i bed in Chapter 8. 1Tothing more will be said at this 
stage in comment on these figures but in order to ex~~ine 
more closely the trends in regard to each specific comraodity 
Gra.ph 10 has been constructed to show the percentage of :~at-
ionul Income spent on each commoQity. The effect of the fig-
ures give n above in this Graph is such that only the three 
commodities the percentage increase in the consumption of 
which exceeds the percent~~be incl·ee..se in lTationa.l Income, 
Vlill show any rise at all. 
( 1) 
In the case of freuh meat there was a significant 
decline .in the percentage of the National Income devoted to 
their consumption from 1930 until 1935. In view of the fall-
ing Income tl.tis is rather surprising as it was to be expect-
ed that the income elastici ~y of demand for meat~ would rise 
as income fell, and t herefore that the percentage of ~;ational 
Income 11 spentt1 on consumption would rise. The expl<.mation 
must lie in the fact that at the same time there was the ten-
dency for incomes among the poorer classes to fall to a 
greater extent than the richer noted above , together with the 
fact that it is hi ghly probable, yet at the same time diffi-
cult to verify, that the urbanisation of non-Europeans would 
have been checked during the depression years. The importanoo 
of this rural-urban movement of the population on food con-
sumption is very consiQerable as was stressed in Chapter 8 
(1) Tbe group beef, veal, mutton and lamb will hereafter be 
referred to as "fresh meat"· 
/especially 
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especially insofar as the purchase of meat is concerned and 
any check to the movement is likely to account for a lower 
expenditure because (a) 1·ural Natives consume a smaller 
physical volume per .head and (b) the price at which urban 
consumption is valued is much hj.gher than the producers' 
price. From 1934/5 there was a slight increase in the per-
' 
centage which then in 1937;B showed a very marked rise. This 
is significant considerine that the tendency in regard to the 
Nation;J. Income was to decline in the years 1937/8 and 1938/9 
and there furthermore appeared little reason to suppose that 
Income was redistributed in favour of the lower income groups 
to any marked degree. It is possible that the explanation 
might lie in the fact that the periods covered by the calcu-
la.tj.on of the National Income and that for the valuation of 
the physical consumption are not necessarily the same, but 
there is also another factor which might be the cause of 
this state of affairs, Consumption habits are notoriously slc.w 
to change ~ how often has this fact necessitated the theore~ 
tics.l economist to stress the import<111ce of "in the long l•un" 
- and it is very probable tb.at there will be certain time lag 
between the rise in Income and the resulting rise in the ex-
penditure on some specific item, especituly foodstuffs. Thus 
it could be argued that in the period 1933/4 - 1936/7 the 
rate of increase in the ~;ational Income was very considel·able 
and was increased in terms of its effect on consumption by a 
tendency towards greater equality of income, but the value of 
consumption of fresh meat does not appear to have felt the 
stimulus from an increasing Income until 1934/5, i.e.· two 
years after the decline in the Uational Income had been 
checked, and furthermore the check in the rate of increase of 
the ~ational Income in 19~?/8 was not transmitted to expendi~ 
ture habits un;..;il the following year when there was a notice-
able drop in the percentage of Income devoted to consumption 
of meats, a decline which persisted into 1939/40 altha~gh by 
then the National Income had recovered, stimulated by the 
/war. 
wa~r. On the fac~ of it then there appears to be consider-
able weight to such an argument. 
From 1940/1 onwards the increase in the proportion of 
( 1) 
Income spent on meat is remarkable and must be accounted 
for by the very significant redistribution of the :rational 
Income in favour of the lower income groups added to the 
/ 
demands of the military which are likely to have l~d to a 
net increase in demand insofar as the non-European troops 
were better fed in tbe army than in civilian life, and the 
( 2) 
consequent bidding up of prices on, local markets. Fl"om 
the peak in 1942/3 the percentage fell just as suddenly as 
it had risen but the reason for this can hro·dly be attribu-
ted to any natural consequences of economic factors - it 
ce.n only be due to the introduction of control over retail 
and producers' prices while at the same time any increase in 
demand which would have occurred following the "pegging11 of 
prices could not be met, which in turn meant the necessity 
for the introduction of quotas and all the other rest~~ctive 
measures indicative of a situation where the pricing mech-
anism is not permitted to allocate the available supplies. 
This introduces a. problem which is most difficult to over-
come but thewri ter has made an adjustment to the actual val-
ue of consumption on a similar basis as that in which the 
physical consumption was adjusted to show the effect of rat-
ioning. Asswning that approximately 80~ of the demand at 
current prices was available for consumption in urban areas 
( L e. ~laughterings in abattoirs) during the years 1945/6 
to 1948/9 , the total value of consumption in those yea1•s and 
its percentage of the Hati onal Income becomes as follows: 
(l)The term "spent" is used in this context to include the 
value of consumption of meats, and henceforth of other 
comma di ties, en the farms and which have not necessarily 
been purchased. 
(2)The enormous rise in meat prices has already been exam-
ined in Chapter 5, page l 'f6 y , and was largely instl'U-
mental in the introduction of wider control to the meat 
industry. 
/1945/6 
£00C 1 s % 
19.45/6 42,540 6.0? 
1946/? 44,430 6.05 
194?/8 47' 420 5.88 
1948/9 49,710 5.94 
On this basis of calculation, it is obvious that the per-
centa.ge of Uational Income spent on fresh meats would pave 
remained fairly constant at the 1942/3 leveJ. although, as 
pointed out in the footnotes to .A.Ppendix E , page 270 , 
there is reason to suppose that the value of rural consump-
tion is substantially .understated in the later years under 
review when the producers ' share in the retail price showed 
a marked increase. Taking this factor into account the 
percentage would therefore show a slight increase, again co-
n-elating very closely to the check noted in the tendency to-
wards greater eq~.ality in incomes. 
Generally very simil~~ tendencies as those described 
above sxe discernable in the case of pork; a. similar fall 
in 1938/9 but the next decline did not occur until 1945/6 
owing to t he very se~ere shortage in supplies at ruling 
price levels and it is to be expected that adjustment of 
the value of consumption figures would produce similar: 
results as shewn above except that the writer tends to think 
that instead of the line tending towards a position paral.lel 
to the horizontal axis , it would continue to increase reflec~ 
ing the increased demand for pork to replace mutton which, 
as described in Chapter 5 , was in very short supply from 
( 1) 
1943 onwards. As a foodstuff demanded by the richer sec~ 
tions of the community, in substitution for mutton, the in-
crease in the value consumed in the 1 ater years is not sur-
prising while fresh meat even when adjusted remained fairly 
( 1) In fact according to va.riou s sources it appeaJ.• s 1:1-at a • 
shortage of pork developed from 1942/3 onwards which 
would have the effect of further increasing the percen-
tage of Income spent on pork in that and the following 
two years. The percentage figures for the period 1945/6 
- 1948/9 would be as follows when adjusted on the same 
basis as in Appendix .D on page lb9 • 
1945/6 .42% 
1946/,? .44~ 
1947'/%8 .4or 1948 9 .54~ 
constant, in view of the fact that the trend in redistri-
but:i.on of the n ational. Income appears to have been slightly 
in favour of the upper income v.·oups during that period. 
~ !ealie Meal is aJ.so a very important item in the nation's 
diet although its importance is mainly derive.d from the fact 
that it is the staple '-o ocl of the :..:ati ve population and not 
through any predilection for it on the part of the European 
community. As such it is obvious that its position insofar 
as the percentage of ·Income spent on it is concerned will de-
pend mainly on the economic conditions of one section of the 
community •. Furthermore it cannot be considered apart from 
the consumption of whole maize which is be;l.ng gradually sub-
stituted for by the more ref:i.ned. product. As staple food-
stu~£s it is to be expected that t he decline in the share of 
the :rational Income devoted to the purchase of these two com-
modi ties in the period 1930-32 would not be very consiO.erable, 
certainlY. not as considerable as for meat, and the fact that 
it declined at all must be explained by the tendency f~r the 
redistribution of the National Income to be in favour if the 
upper income groups. The writer has already questioned the 
( 1) 
accuracy of the statistics as regards maize and meal.ie meal; 
so he would st1·ess that the l'elatively wide fluctuations in 
both cases must be accounted for by this and also the fact 
that in the case of maize itself t he &aluation a~wholesale 
as 
prices is not strictly correct/much of the maize consumed in 
whole form does not reach the market. The value of consump-
tion is therefore far too greatly affected by the actual 
physical product ion under the methods used in its cal cul at ion. 
From about 1933/4 to 1940/1 it appem· s that the perceaa.ge of 
Income spent on me alie meal remained fairly constant the main 
factor presumably being the movement bf Na.ti vee from rural to 
urban areas as there is no e vidence that the :rational Income 
was being diverted favourably to t~~s class. At the same tine 
howeve2• , in the case of whoie maize there was a not ab:e declir.e 
(1) See Chapter 7, page 187 • 
/which 
which allowing fo~ the substitution between the two, reveals 
that the combined maize group was experiencing a decline. 1\tf 
From 1940/1 onwards there is a definite increase in tlae pro-
portion of the National Income . spent on mealie meal once ar-
gain illustrating a 1 e.g between the actual increase in in-
comes, since 1939-45 was the period in which there was most 
definite evidence that incomes of non-Europeans were rising 
faster than were incomes of the upper income groups, and this 
tendency continues until 1948/J9 with a slight decline in 
1945/6 vrhen it was necessary to impose restrictions on the 
human consumption of maize and maize pl'Oducts. Besides the 
effect of redistribution of the Income in favour of those 
.:Zb'J.. 
groups in whose diets mealie meal wa.s the foundation, the con-
tinued drift to the towns must have exerted a strong influe-
nee on the increasing expenditure on mealie meal and the con-
tinued substitution of the meal f or maize in the whole form. 
The case of sugar is also very much dependant upon the 
economic conditions of the Nati ves whose fondness for this 
conrnodity is to be noted in most surveys on non-European fam-
ily expenditure. · This urbanisation also has a very important 
bearing on the value of this pr oduct consumed since it is one 
of the most significant differences between the diets of urban 
and rural Nat'd. ves that the former consume far more sugar than 
the latter. Unfortunately there is no ·means of determining 
l 
just in what periods this urban "drift'' was most important, 
but it would seem justifiable to accept that there must be 
some correl~tion bet~een it and industrial activity and also 
between it and climatic conditions within the Reserves . e spec~ 
ially insofar as migratory labour is concerned. As regards 
the percentage of the National Income devoted to the cnnsump-
tion of sugar, from 1931/2 to 1936/? there was a marked de-
cline to be explained by the factors mentioned above fo r the 
other specific foodstuffs, and very important i n the opinion 
of the writer, the relatively high price of sugar, which 
undoubtedly led to other products such as condensed milk 
/being 
(1) 
being substi tutcd for it, just as on the other hand its 
relatively stable price when others were rising after the 
war must have encouraged its consumption in substitution for 
other foodstuffs and thereby partly accounting for the very 
marked rise in the percentage of Income spent on sugar . I n 
those years. Between these extrcmeties, the percentage re-
mained fairly constant. 
The most important fact as far as the wheaten group of 
foodstuffs. is concerned is the difference between their be-
haviour and that of mealie meal. ~ereas bread, flour and 
mea.J.. form the cereal foundation of the Europeans' diet, meal-
ic meal is primarily limited, insofar as human consumption 
is concerned, to non-Europeans. The writer feels th~ it is 
indicative of the improvement in the economic circumstances 
of the non-European that the value of mealie meal conrumed 
expressed as a percentage of the l7ational Inco!l'l.e showed a 
marked rise from 1940/1 onwards while in the case of bread 
and even more so for f lour and meal the percentage has been 
falling steadily since 1930. There are of course factors 
such as t he e;eneral 1 evel of Eur opeap' s incomes having a.l-
ready reached that level where the consumption of bread has 
become saturated notwithstanding the fact that the 1936 in-
quiry into expenditure by ~uropeans revealed the substitution 
of bread for flour and meal to be very important as income 
rises. This is discernible in the Graph for the value of 
bread consumed, much lower than that of floUr ·and meal in 
1930, in fact exceeded it in 1949. Then too, the urbanisa-
tion in the case of Europeans was not so significant as for 
(1) Index retail prices for sugar 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
193'7 ( ffi ~1r e s &haa· €H1) 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
and condensed miJ.k. 
Sugar Condensed Milk 
100 100 
97 93 
95 89 
92 86 
92 86 
90 84 
88 81 
89 81 
91 93 
96 
105 
105 
105 
88 
93 
97 
107 
111 
111 
figures supplied by the Office of Census and Statistics 
the non-Europeans, nor the differences between the consump-
tion habits of Europeans on farms and in urban areas oo im-
portant as far as wheaten products are concerned. The slight 
rj.se from about 1942/3 and maintained throughout the war 
period, is probably due to the increasing tendency for long 
urbanised N'ati ves to replace mealie meal with br·ead and other 
wheaten products in their di·et s. 
Finally as regards butter and cheese , two producta al-
most exclusive to the European section of the community, the 
main feature was, as mentioned above, the fact that t:he in-
cre~se in value consumed was more than for any of the other 
pl·oducts consi o.ered. ~raking b\l tter as repl'esenta.ti ve bf 
both, be caus~ the movements are bet tel·· defined, following 
the decline in the depression ye~·s , a decline which can be 
seen from Graph 9 to be greater relative to the actual· lev-
~ 
el of consumption than the other colThnodities, the percen-
ta.ge of the. National Income spent on butter soon recov<n·ed , 
e-t:h.cr them i~ is }3rel3a~lg that the 1933/4 and 1934/5 ii gtu e-s 
e-eu-M=be evened ott'6 '6e ebt ~in e;httex '!'eflee'bion ef . tae ae•-
t-l:it:.bl. ;,; ise . · There is further proof of the 1 ag in consur.llpti on 
habi ts in the slight decline in 1938/9 but that in 1941/2 
and from 1943/4 onwards is to be explained in the shortage 
of supplies and control over prices. The extent to which the 
percentage of ITational Income spent on butter would have in-
creased had there been sufficient to meet the demand at the 
current price levels, is estimated in the following figures 
where adjustment has been made to the value of consur.llption 
on the basis of data published by tfle Division of Dairying 
and quoted in Appendix 
1943/4 
1944/5 
1945/6 
1946/7 
194? /8 
1948/9 
R , of ~~ 
Value of 
Consumption 
5,2?0 
6,4?0 
?,070 
8,040 
?,600 
8 , 2?0 
Chapter • .3 . 
Percent age of 
National Income 
.85 
.98 
1.01 
1.10 
.94 
.~9 
It is obvious that the percentage vrould have increased stead-
ily a.nd the writer submits, right up until 1949 for there 
/is 
is no reason to· suppose that the demand for butter would (1) 
suddenly tail off in the conditions which p1•evail ed • 
.As far as the general position is concerned, the 
writer considers that the main points brought out in this 
chapter have been the impossibility of any attempt to iso-
late "the effects of specific factors on the expenditure on 
food from the 
nature of the 
data ava~Ji\abiJ.ity, the very interdependent 
·, I 
\ 
factors here considered, the apparent lag of 
approximately 1 yeaJ.' in consumption habits a nd finally the 
very great importance of trends in the incomes of different 
sections of the co~~unity on the demand functions. 
(1) It is very likely t hat the degree of rationing in the 
last two seasons under review has been understated in 
the published statistics. 
Year 
1929 .... 30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
1938-39 
1939-40 
19L!C-~l 
1941-42 
19£1-2-43 
1943-4~ 
1944-45 
1945-46 
1946-47 
1947-48 
1948-49 
d. 
He tail 
Bread 
per lbo 
A 
3.762 
3o695 
3o624 
') :)('I c:' 
.J•J/./ 
3.419 
3.398 
3o372 
3.396 
3o 518 
3o 522 
3.527 
3.174 
3.033 
3.048 
3oll2 
3.323 
3.110 
3.227 
3o285 
3.634 
Qill!§U!viP'r ION OF 1friE~~TEN PRODUC '£S IN SOU'l'H AFRIC.n . 
Price 
Flour 
Uo pel .. lb. 
B 
3.222 
3.132 
3.035 
2.918 
2.921 
2.902 
2.868 
2.872 
3o094 
3.163 
3.182 
2.479 
2.847 
3.075 
3.219 
3.261 
3.158 
3.260 
3.290 
Value of \41lea ten Products 
conslL."'led 
Bread 
£000 
3,810 
3,150 
3,49C 
3,610 
3,910 
4,200 
4,510 
4, 570 
4,750 
4,870 
5,310 
6,170 
6,630 
7,210 
7,150 
7,780 
7,830 
10 ,390 
Flour 
£000 
5,730 
4,860 
5,220 
5,230 
5,400 
5,450 
6,230 
6,250 
6,510 
5 ,o5o 
6,740 
7,560 
7,670 
7,940 
5,980 
7,400 
7,430 
Adjusted 
Bread Flour 
.cooo £000 
c D 
3,740 5,020 
3,080 4,280 
3,420 4,570 
3,540 4,570 
3,830 4,720 
4,120 4,770 
4,420 
4,480 5,450 
4,650 5,490 
4,870 5,730 
5,310 5 ,o5o 
6,170 6,740 
6,630 7,560 
7,210 7,670 
7,150 7,940 
7,780 5,980 
7,830 7,400 
10,390 7,430 
Notes : A From the Office of Census and Statistics and refer to the calendar year : they have been compiled as follows:-
From 1930 to 1940 for white loaf, first grade. 
From 1941 to 1945 for the standard loaf. 
For 1946 and 1947 adjustment has been I'lade for the reduction in the loaf from 32oz to 29oz. 
From November, 1948 an average of·white and brown. 
B From the Office of Census and Statistics and refer to the calendar year: they have beencompiled as follows:-
From 1930-40 for o~dinary white in 25lb quantities. 
For 1941 for both 10 and 25lb quantitie3o 
From 1942 to 1947 for No. 1 unsifted meal, per lb in loose quantities. 
For 1948 and ·1949 for bread flour in 25 lb quantities. 
C The adjustment has been made for the period 1930-40 in order to make a~lowance for tne fact th~t i~ t~~ rst~il 
pric8 o~l:r ·::~-.. :!.tc bread i ~ i ncluded. .an analys ix of the sales of bread in· 1948/49 has revealed that the 
amount of brown brea d sold is about 101~ of the sales of white and it would appear t.l1.& t the price of brown; 
when not subsidized, is approximately 15-20% lower than that of white bread. The value of consumption ~~s the-
refore beer: rec.uced by 2~.., over this periodo 
D The adjustment has been made for the period 1930-41 to make allowance fo :. .. the lO'.ver ·retail price of neal. 
During this period t he production of meal amounted to approximately 6o~; of the total production of ?neal and 
flour and a stud-:,• of their _prices reveals that that of meal is about 80~~. of that of flour. The adjustment has 
therefore been made at 12~~ · 
A PP£"'o'x _a 
CONSlJ1'fiPTION OF MAIZE .ti.ND ff&lLIE MEn.L D~ SOUTH .aFRICA. 
Mealie :Meal Wholesale Retail Value of Consumption 
price of price of 
Production Imports Exports Cm~sumption maize mea lie Ma ize Mea lie Total 
Year Indus- Direct meal Meal 
trial do 
OOOlbs OOOlbs OOOlbs OOOlbs OOOlbs s.d. per lb. £000 £000 £000 
.ll.. B c D E F 
1929-30 1,107,020 821 153,079 4,336 950,430 10 2.81 1.428 2,830 5,650 8,480 
1930-31 10 2.22 1.330 
1931-32 10 2o22 1.269 
1932-33 1,061,304 1,547 96,943 3,682 962,230 10 5.91 1.253 2,330 5,020 7,350 
1933-34 1,122,204 1,984 202,077 5,458 916,650 13 11.28 1.419 4,350 5,420 9, 770 
1934-35 1,258,642 3,902 296,636 6,014 959,890 10 5.69 1.249 2,470 4,990 7,460 
1935-36 1,157,700 5,070 36,048 7,174 1,118,450 15 3.09 1.427 4,080 6,650 10 '730 
1936-37 1,309,998 5,080 436,870 7,358 870 ,850 13 11o 63 1.433 3 ,830 5,200 9,030 
1937-38 1,384,638 6,814 166,646 7,774 1,217,030 12 10.27 1.365 2,720 6,920 9,650 
1938-39 1,569,212 5,386 368,166 7,692 1,198,740 12 4.97 1.360 2,360 6,790 9,160 
1939-40 1,545,964 5,088 172,010 7,084 1,371,960 12 11.45 1.336 2,900 7,640 10 '540 
1940-41 1,494,028 8,418 72,292 5,568 1,424,590 13 10.40 1.279 3,470 7,590 11,060 
1941-42 1 '73 5,218 256 26,844 6,796 1' 701,830 15 9.65 1.462 2,930 10,370 13,300 
1942-43 1,527,690 790 26,976 2,980 1,498 '520 17 8.84 1.583 4,860 9,880 14,740 
1943-44 1,751,998 1,442 33,564 5,688 1,718,190 18 9o45 1 .602 3,000 11,470 14,470 
1944-45 1,931,754 5,776 24,607 4,192 1,908,730 19 5o82 l o635 2,290 13 ,ooo 15,300 
1945-46 1,894,512 3,648 21,478 4,716 1,871,970 20 5.08 1.708 4,050 13,320 17,370 
1946-47 2,014,680 1,091 58' 543 10,334 1,946,890 21 7.95 lo737 3,060 14,090 17,150 
1947-48 2,374,430 38 81,787 11,656 2,281,030 22 4.20 lo744 16,580 
1948-49 2,455,410 18 23,801 9,962 2,421,650 22 6o05 1. 736 17,520 
Notes A From Industrial Censuses. 
B Refer to calendar year. 
c Refer to Calendar years and include re-exnorts. 
D From Industrial Censuses. 
E For flat white mealies per 200lb bag; obtained from the Official Year Books. 
F From the Office of Census and Statistics and relates to the calendar year . For years 1930-7 and 1939-42 
for quantities of 25 1bs, otherwise per 1b, loose. 
Year 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
1938-39 
1939-40 
1940-41 
1941-42 
1942-43 
1943-44 
1944-45 
1945-46 
1946-47 
1947-48 
1948-49 
Retail 
price 
d. 
per 1b. 
a 
22.419 
20o 787 
18o666 
20.030 
19.795 
17o998 
17o935 
18.563 
19.294 
19.298 
19.299 
19.743 
21.378 
21.969 
22o489 
24 .. 281 
27.074 
28.502 
29.682 
30.000 
CONS1JMPTION OF BUTTER 1..ND CHLESE: IN SOUTH AFRIC.d.. 
Ordinary 
£000 
1,710 
1,6oo 
1,030 
1,400 
1,660 
1,550 
1,890 
2,100 
2,360 
2,270 
2,660 
3,360 
3,310 
4,400 
4,360 
4,290 
4,050 
4 ,ooo 
6,800 
6,440 
Butter 
Value of Consumption 
Subsidized Total 
£000 Creamery 
£000 
B 
1,710 
1,6co 
1,030 
1,400 
1,660 
1,550 
7 1,900 
18 2,120 
65 2,430 
111 2,380 
139 2,800 
140 3 , 500 
135 3,450 
134 4,5~0 124 4,4 0 
119 4,400 
107 4,160 
94 4,100 
47 6,840 
7 6,450 
Farm 
£000 
c 
860 
810 
840 
840 
810 
1,220 
Retail 
price 
do 
per 1b. 
D 
17.817 
16.190 
15.389 
15.651 
17.222 
l5o702 
15.057 
15.946 
16.810 
l6.43D 
15.754 
l5o8l7 
17.350 
18.306 
19.007 
19.894 
21.461 
22.020 
22.267 
23o572 
Notes : A From t~e Office of Census and Statistics and refers to first grade, creamery. 
B Butter distributed under the State-aided Scheme has been valued at the following prices :-
1935/6 9d. per 1bo 
1936/7 7.5d. per lb. 
1937/8 6do per lb. 
1938/9 6.67d. per lb. 
1939/49 8d. per lbo 
Cheese 
Value of 
consumption 
£000 
450 
560 
460 
340 
510 
500 
570 
560 
660 
610 
700 
890 
1,090 
1,320 
1,250 
1,140 
1,350 
1,530 
1,900 
1,640 
C Farm butter has been valued at the following prices which are based on data collected from the Office of 
Census and Statistics and other sources : -
1929/30 18.304 d. per lbo 
1933/4 16.245 d. per lb. 
1934/5 14ol79 d. per lb. 
1935/6 13.392 d. per lb. 
1936/7 14.924 d. per lb. 
1945/6 29.452 d. oer lb. 
D From the Office of Census and.Statistics. 
Year 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
1938-39 
1939-40 
1940-41 
1941-42 
1942-43 
1943-44 
1944-45 
1945-46 
1946-47 
1947-48 
1948-49 
Beef, Veal, 
Urban Price 
Consumption (per lb) 
OOOlbs pence 
A B 
347,600 7.665 
330,000 6<.833 
348 ,ooo 7.699 
3~2,400 7.746 
3 7,300 7.722 
4-33 '900 7.900 
440 ,Boo 8.680 
434,400 8.695 
472 '200 8.749 
517,100 9.195 
549,100 10.981 
580,400 12.077 
482 ,ooo 12.043 
523,300 11.873 
605,500 11.689 
646,000 11.877 
636,200 12.653 
661,800 12.834 
A ?7:> S/lfj),~ £. 
CONSU11IPTION OF ME.aTS IN 
Mutton, Lamb and Goats 1 meat 
Value of Value of 
Consumption 
(Urban) 
Consumption 
(Rural) 
£ 1 000 £'000 
c 
11,100 2,490 
9,400 2,180 
11,190 2,450 
10,730 2,520 
12,460 2,510 
14,280 2,530 
15,910 2,890 
15,730 2,840 
17,210 2,840 
19,810 3,540 
25,120. 4,620 
29,210 5,090 
24,190 4,750 
25,890 4,770 
29,490 5,680 
31,970 4,730 
33,540 5,520 
35,390 5,510 
SOUTH aFRICA , 1930-49. 
Pork Bacon & Ham 
Price Value of Price Value of 
(per lbo) Consumption (per lb.) Consumption 
Total (Urban) 
£ 1000 pence £ 1 000 pence £ 1000 
D J; F G 
13,590 22o377 730 
11,580 16.887 470 
13,640 22.305 700 
13,250 21.580 670 
14,970 20.576 690 
16,810 20.178 700 
18,800 10.761 590 20.140 810 
18,570 10.878 490 20.523 800 
20,050 11.041 760 20.611 950 
23,350 11.321 900 21.031 1,290 
29,740 13.184 1,390 23.708 1,900 
34,300 16.780 1,460 25.341 2,180 
28,940 18.339 1,810 25.949 1,950 
30,660 17-949 2,240 27.273 2,060 
35,170 17.776 1,790 28.629 1,850 
36,700 17.828 1,630 32.746 2,130 
39,060 18.468 2,320 32.990 2,440 
40,900 19.276 3,530 32.214 2,430 
Notes : A. This is slaughterings at abattoirs plus imports, less exports and meats used industrially. 
B. Estimated from prices of beef and mutton obtained from the Office of Census and Statistics weigtled 
according to the quantities of each meat produced from slaughterings at abattoirs. 
C. Rural consumption has been valued at 5o~:~ of the retail consumer price during the period 1929/30 to 1939/40 
and subsequently at 55. An analysis of the consumer and producer prices has revealed that since about 1940 
the portion of the retail price received by the producer has increased, and the value of conswaption is 
therefore likely to be understated in the last few years under review. It would appear that the producer's 
share is greater in the case of mutton (about 80 in 1949) than beef (55-60). 
D. From the Office of Census and Statistics. 
E. No prices are available for the years before 1938 and owing to inadequate data, slaughterings and consumption 
of pork on farms and in ~he Reserves have not been taken into account. There is little reason to suppose 
that the value of this consumption would behave very differently from that of beef etc. conswaed in rural 
areas apart from the fact that the price of pork appears to have increased to a greater extent than those 
of beef and mutton eEpecially in the later years under review when the shortage of maize caused a general 
scarcity of pork in urban areas. (In 1946-7 the value of the lO,OOO,OOOlbs of pigs' meat consumed on 
European farms valued at 11.63d. per lb, a figure obtained from the Division of Economics and Markets, 
would be approximately £500 ,ooo, compared Ni. th a bout £340 ,ooo in 1936-7). 
F. From the Office of Census and Statistics. 
G. This only refers to the consumption of bacon and ham produced in factories and does not include the products 
made and consumed on farms. Up until 1934 no combined price for bacon and ham was produced and so separate 
prices for each product have been used and weighted in the proportion of 5 : 1. 
I 
J 
CONSUMPTION OF SUGAR IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1930/49. 
Price of Value of Consumption 
white sugar' White 1 Gbvernment ' Total 
Year (per lb.) ' 
1929/30 
1930/1 
1931/2 
1932/3 
1933/4 
1934/5 
1935/6 
' 1936/7 
r 1 937/8 
1938/9 
1939/40 
1940/1 
1941/2 
1942/3 
1943/4 
1944/5 
1945/6 
1946/.7 
1937/8 
1948/9 
pence 
A 
3.835 
3.7?5 
3.646 
3.560 
3.497 
3t 483 
3.407 
3. 362 
3,432 
3.433 
3.427 
5.441 
3,487 
3.491 
3.495 
3.515 
3.572 
3.768 
4.049 
4.050 
I £000 
5,590 I 
5,120 I 
4, 930 I 
4,840 ' 
5,140 I 
5,430 
5,290 
5,170 ' 
5,180 
5,150 
4,840 
5, 4:60 
5,800 I 
7, 030 ' . 
6 J 210 t 
6,720 ' 
6,110 ' 
6,480 t 
8, 310 ' 
10,570 ' 
£000 
B 
... 
690 
930 
1,360 
1,640 
1,850 
2,260 
3,010 
3,140 
3, 290 
.3,180 
3,060 
3,480 
3, 780 
£000 I 
5,590' 
5,120 1 
4~ 930 1 
·
1 4,840 1 
I 5,140 1 
5,430 1 
5, 290 1 
5,850 1 
6,120 I 
6 J 510) 
6,480 1 
? J 310' 
8,060 1 
' 10,040 1 
9,340 1 
10,010 1 
9, 290 I 
9,540 1 
I 11,790 1 
I 14,360 1 
Notes : A. From the Office of Census and Statistics, ad-
justed to conform to the seasonal year of 1st 
May ~ 30th April. 
B. The consumption of 2nd Grade au gar had been 
valued as follows:-
1936/? .. 1946/? 
194?/8 
1948/9 
2.5d per lb. 
2.625d per lb. 
2.?5d per lb. 
APPENDIX F'. 
l'l 
The wri te1• set out on this research with the int~ion 
of attempting at some stage to isolate the income effect on 
the increase in the value of consumption of the foodst~ffs 
which have been taken as the subject of the study. This is 
an extremely important point as it could be most helpful in 
sugeesting lines along which future food policy could be 
followed baaed on certain assumptions as to the behaviour. 
of certain factors such as t he increase in the lTational In-
come, distribution of that Income, the urbanisation of the 
population and so on. It was not long before it was reali-
sed that with the data at his disposal, it would be imposs-
ible for the writer to arrive at any definite conclusions 
and while this has meant that the discussion could notvery 
well be incorporated in the body of this study, it has been 
decided to present the que stion here, if only to stress the 
need for more complete knowledge of the fact in certain 
directions. 
The best means of isolating the income effect over a 
period of time is to calcul!:l.te the income elasticity of de-
mand for the products concerned. The method employed: ~ere 
is that used by Allen .and Bowley in their work "Family Expend! 
iture" and is based upon a budgetary survey at a given date 
and applying the results to a gi ven period of time cr.rer:· the 
whole popuJ.at ion. From the study of family expenditure on 
certain items in relation to the changing income levaa, some 
measure for the relationship between the two is found and 
called k, which will be the actual increase in expenditure on 
any given item divided by tb.e increase i!l income. Q,Uite ob-
viously it is more than possible that there will be se~eral 
statistical measurements t'£ k for any one commod.i ty Etiialce it 
would be diffi cult to conceive of a case where the expenditu1~ 
on any pa.rti cula.r item plotted <:J.gainst income would pr.oduce 
a straight line over the whole range of incomes foun~in the 
/population. 
population. To obtain one fig'J.re for k it is therefore nee-
essary to draw some stl~ht line which most closely follows 
the trend in the relationship b~tween the tvm factors. 
The income elasticity of demand for any particular fal!l-
ily will be the rate at which expenditure on some product 
rises with income (i.e. k) divided by the fraction of the 
income of that fwaily devoted to the purchase of the pro-
duct (w) . Substituting the com.::nunity for the family , the 
income elasticity of demand fol' comraodi ty x will be equal to 
k 
w where k is measurement of the line representing the re-
lationship between expenditure on x and income over t he· com-
munity as a whole and W is the fraction of National Income 
spent on x. 
we have di-scussed consumption ha.bi ts and budgeteJ.-y su1· ... 
veys in bouth Africa in Chapter 8 "Food and Expenditure" but 
while we can arrive at some fairly accurate value for k for 
Europeans between £125 and £600 per annum in 1936 from the 
survey of expenditure by European families in that year, the 
:paucj_ty of reliable and l'eprcsentati ve data relating to food 
27~. 
expenditure by non-EUropeans has resulted in the writer's in-
tention being not fully fulfilled and the relegation of this 
discussion to an Appendix. 
In Graph. 11 is shown the expenditure on certain foodstuffs 
plotted agatnst income as was revealed in the European Inquiry 
of 1936. In all cases except flour and meal it was possible 
to arrive at some rough trend thus enabling the product~on 
of straight lines but for flour und meal this was impossible · 
so that two values from k will have to be used. w' is calcu-
lated from the value of consumption figures given in Chapter 
10 and from these two quantities an ' income elasticity of de-
mand has been calculated for the nine commodities in which we 
are interested, applicable to the particular economic, social 
·and racial group covered by the Inqu±ry. The values of k, 
w' and n (the income elas ticity of demand) are as follows: 
/Meat 
k w' n 
!.teat .033 .0455 • ?35 
Butter .020 • CDJD,58 3;.474 
Cheese • 005 .0018 2.895 
Fresh I.Ulk ~036 • 016 2.250 
Sugar • 003 .0175 .165 
Me ali e I,1e al .0007 • 0225 .031 
Bread .022 .011 2.000 
Flour and meal -. 019. 
• 014 -1.357 
-.006 
-
.489 
Bread, flour and meal .010 .025 . • 398 
Next on Graph l2 is plotted, the relationship between the 
actual value of consumption of the nine foodstuffs and the 
National Income on a double logaritmaic sc&le in order to re-
duce the dispersion to manageable proportions. Then fnom the 
position in 1935-6 in each case has been drawn a linevhich re-
fleets the relationship between total expenditure and ~rational 
Income had the increase in income been the only factor to be 
taken into account, were the income elasticities of. de~ the 
sar.ae for .ill persons in South .tJ.frica as the group covered by 
the 1936 Inquiry and had price relationships remained the s<.We 
as in 1936,. Since the first assumption is highly improbable; 
in view of the conclusions arrived at in Chapter 8 , it is de-
finitely untrue , the importance of the figures for income 
elasticities and hence the dotted lines , is immediately reduced 
vVhile it is impo ssi bl e to come to any conclusions rel at• 
ing to measurement of the difference between the slopes of the 
two lines in each graph, there are nevertheless several inter-
eating features which deserve comment . 
In the first instance it is only in the case of 'Buttter.,-
tfuee.se , fresh milk and bread that the actual value of consu::a.p-
tion has increased less than it wouJ. <i have done had the assump--
tions outlined above been satisfied. It is obviously the 
fact that income elasticities are not the same for all pa·sons 
that causes the main divergence between t lle lines and it there-
fore means that, neglecting changes in price relationships, 
the income el~stj_ctty for persons other than that group cov-
ered by the 193S Inquiry, must have been on th~ average less 
in the case of butter , cheese, milk and bread and more in the 
case of the other products. 
/The 
:?J). 
The most significant divergences occur for mealie meal 
which is little consumed by ~uropeans and is the staple food-
stuff of the increasinc number of non-:ct:uropeans resident in 
urban ~·eas, and sugar where in addition to the fact that the 
income eJ. asti city would. appear to be greater for non-Eu:t·opeans , 
the constant ptice of sugar at a time when most other prices 
were increasing, must have stimulated consumption quite con-
siderably. The expensive nature o~ the protective foodstuffs 
(i.e. butter, cheese and fresh milk) results in their being 
little demanded by the non- J..Juropea.n POlJUla.tion in whose case 
the increase in income ,.as greatest. The position as rggards 
I 
bread requires further comment since it is· usua.lly a commodity 
for '':hich it is accepted that the elasticity of demand de-
creases as income risesl It would appear, bearing in mind 
what has been said on the sul)j ect in Chapter 8, that the sig-
nificance of bread in the diet of the urban non-Bur9pean was 
not as great as in the case of Buroperu1s and of course in 
rural areas the staple is · crushed and whole maize. ~'he income 
el asti city of 2, 000 in the case of J:tiuropeans is therefore ba.l-
anced by the predominance of maize products in the diet of 
the non-European. 
~~-hile much of the significance of this discussion is un-
doubtedly lost by the absence of any conclusi vemess, the 
attainment of which would in the circumstances, be foolhaJ.•dy 
to attempt, the writer believes that it is necessro·y if only 
to · show how important it is to obtain far more empirical 
evidence pertaining to the expendj. ture ha.bi t s of non-Europeans, 
both urban and rural. 
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Having shown the most important respects in which the 
consumption of food varied between the di-fferent groups of 
consumers, it was then necessary to examine the distribution 
of the l"Ta tional Income among those groups and any changes 
therein during the relevant period. Quite obviously as soon 
as one inti•oduces groups in place of the whole community, 
it is necessary to continue with such a distinction and the 
discussion on the distribution of the National Income was 
therefore vitally necessary, just as that, cursory though it 
\las, on the division of the total population arnong the groups. 
~hat did this discussion lead to; what is the present 
food Ai tuation in South Africa ; how is it likely to develop 
in the future? These are obviously the questions which need 
examination at this, the final stage of the argument. 
As to the r_:>osition at the end of the period Lmder 
reviev"'J, physical consumption at cur·rent prices in almost all 
i s 
cases exceeded V'.'hat was being produced locally. Th ::_ posi-
tion in regard to the dairy products and neats was, ho~ever, 
only possible under ~on~itions of rationing, i . e . where the 
pricing me-chanism was replar. e~~ by physical restJ.'iction of 
consu~ption as the means of distributing t be available 
supplies. In the 1 9LJ P/L~ 9 season only 6q,: of cheese and 
appl'oxj_ ;_JJat ely 8Q-:~ of butter and fresh 1neats v1ere available 
to meet the level of demand at the th er. existing price l evels, 
and as we now know the posit~0n in resrect of sucar guickly 
dete:t•iorated . In this case, hoiieVEr; the long term prospects 
do not ap9ear so distressinG for that i~dustry is in the 
t bro es of an import ant caGJi tal expansion 9roe;ra;-nme fo llowi nc; 
a long period of restricteC: a.creac;e of cane. But the 9roblem 
does not end here for if it did it would be a comparatively 
simple matter to allow prices to reach that level at which 
they would settle ~nder conditions of a free ~arket. 
functions and the first section of the discussion was pri-
marily concerned with the production side of the "pair of 
scissors". There can be no doubt that wartime ·conditions 
did seriously hamper production through its effect on the 
machinery available for agricultural purposes and on ferti-
lizers which in the modern farming organization must occupy 
an ever increasing important place as less virgin land 
remains and as farming becomes ever more intensive. Impor-
tant as these factors undoubtedly were, it is the demand 
function with which the writer, as an economist, is most 
concerned and so from the description of the development 
of the present situation, the discussion beca·ne concerned 
primarily with the consumption side of the problem. 
1'wo 
Here the writer was concerned with broad factors of 
major importance in the demand function for foodstuffs viz. 
the population and level of National Income. The findings 
point to the fact that population exerted a very minor 
influence on the consumption of the various foodstuffs 
although in view of the considerable interest taken in con-
temporary thou ght in nutritional problems, the relationship 
between consumption and popula.tion must remain of consider-
able importance. It is interesting to note here that the 
conclusions and gloomy predictions of Malthus based upon the 
relationship between the supply of foodstuffs and the level 
of population are quite possible, and from the present study 
even more ·than possible, when one con s id ers the relationship 
between production and the level of real National I ncome, 
which in turn depends upon money incomes and the prices of 
commodities consumed. Finding that the level of population 
appeared to hav e exerted little influence upon the demand 
function, the other factor remained and Section 0 was there-
for concerned with the relationshiQ between food and income. 
27h. 
~77. 
In this discussion several extremely important con.clu-
sions stand out. The first is the important need to bear in 
mind the essential diff'erences in consumer habits between the 
diff'erent racial groups within the South Af'rican community. 
These groups, the two extra~es being the European section 
and those Natives resident in the Reserves, are indeed 
living at different levels of civilization and theref'ore the 
importance of differences in consumption habits cannot, in 
the writer's opinion, be exaggerated. Somewhere between ~he 
extremes, slowly climbing the ladder of civilization, are 
those Natives who have foresaken their original existence 
for the European urban co~munities, attracted by higher 
wages, by the urge of' adventure, by the need to supplement 
income from within the Reserves, and who therefore must be 
considered as a third broad group lil{ely to exert an 
inf'luence on the aggregate demand function. 
The first task was then to examine the relationship 
betw een the level of' family income and expenditure on the 
foodstuffs under review, for the di ff'erent 11 social" groups. 
As is inevitable ir. any empirical study, there is s. con-
tinual stru~~le to discover statistics either to bridge a 
gap in the argument or to verify suppositions, but it was 
in this part of the discussion viz. Chapter 8 that the 
greatest deficiency in evidence was found. It was possible 
to obtain fairly adequate statistical data as to the pattern 
of expenditure by Europeans on foodstuffs but evidence re-
garding non-Europeans, both urban and rural, was woefully 
.inadequate so much so that one of the mai n aims of the study 
had to be dropped. This was to discover some functional 
relationshi9 between the National Income and expenditure on 
the food i te~ns , i.e. to calculate the income elasticity of' 
demand. 
Having shown the most important respects in which the 
consumption of food var ied between the di-fferent groups of 
consumers, it was then necessary to examine the distribution 
of the i'~ational Income among those groups and any changes 
therein during the relevant period. Quite obviously as soon 
as one introduces groups i n place of the whole community, 
it is necessary to continue with such a distinction and th e 
discussion on the distribution of the National Income was 
therefore vitally necessary, just as that, cursory though it 
was, on the division of the total popule.tion amo ng the groups. 
What did this discussion lead to ; what is the pres en t 
food Bituation in South Africa ; how i s it likely to develop 
in the future? These are obviously the ques tions whi ch need 
examination at this, the final stage of the argument. 
As to the Qosj_tion at the end of the periocl ,_md er 
review, physical consumption at current prices in almost all 
i s 
.. 
cases exceeded v.rhat was being produced locally . rr h• posi-
tion in reesrd to ti1e dairy pr oducts s.nc'l nea.ts was, ho•7ever·, 
only poAsible under ~on~jtioDs of rat ioning, i. e . where t he 
pricing mech an ism was repla~e~~ by physical restL'iction of 
con su~p tion as the me an s of distributing the available 
supl)lies. I n th e 19LJA/Lt9 season on ly 6Q~ of ch e ese and 
approximately 8q~ of butter and fr esh me~ts wer e availabl e 
to meet the level of de~nan d a t the t h on exis ting pr·ic e l evels, 
and as we now know tte posi t 50n in res0ec t of sugar quickly 
deteriorated. In this case, ho~ever, the long term prospects 
do not appear so distressing for that industry is in the 
ttlroes of an important ca9ital exQansi on programme followinG 
a long period of restricted acrea0e of cane . But the problem 
does not end here for if it did it would be a comp arativ el y 
simpl e matter to allow prices to reach that level at which 
they wo uld settle under conditions of a free market. 
The vast ~ajority of the population in the Unin~ are 
suffering from malnutrition in some degree or another. From 
the standpoint of an adequate and balanced diet for everyone 
in the country, the supplies produced locally are g~eatly 
deficient as far as the meat group is concerned and grossly 
inadequate in the case of d2iry produce. From an economic. 
point of view malnutrition is synonomous with poverty so that 
it became obvious that an answer to this particular problem 
vtonlo lie in greater equality of incomes for it is unques-
tionable that the relaU.ve difference in earnings between 
skilled and unskilled crades is greater in this country than 
in any other with ~hose level of civilization we would compare 
our own. On the other band, were we to encourage greater 
equality of incomes, and bearing in mind the fact that the 
income elasticity of demand for most products is less than 
unity, it would lead to an inevi "4able increase in demand for 
food and in the long run especially for those foods in which 
the position at t~e moment is worst viz. dairy prod~ce and 
meats,· since in the present circucstances the distribution of 
the population over the income range is heavily loaded at 
the lower groups ~~ ~e mcome Jed/e . 
How is the position likely to develop in the future with 
-
no .conscious interference in either more widespread subsidi-
zation and rationing or an encouragement of greater equality 
in earnings? 
On the demand side, assuming a continued increase in 
the National Inco:ne, it is probable that it will become more 
and more diverted to the poorer and non-European sections of 
the population for it is one of the most noticeable features 
of a developing economy that the difference between the rates 
of reward for different grades of labour becomes less. (1 ) At 
( 1 ) It is possible, however, that even were the National 
Income not to rise at the same rate, this redi stri bu ti on 
of income would occur. 
the same time it is reasonable to expect a continued move-
ment of people from the rural to the urban areas which too 
bas been accepted as s "law" of economic development, where 
the economy has been without undue interference. vie have 
already seen what the results of such developments would be 
on the demand for foodstuffs, for they have been the main 
factors operating behind the enormous increase in consumption 
in recent years. The effect will probably be more irnmediate 
t 
on the demand for meat and sugar, slighly delayed on wheat 
II 
and maize products since we have noticed that the substitution 
of wheaten for maize products is dependent upon the length of 
urbanization, and much delayed in the case of dairy products 
for which the non-European would appear to have acquired 
little appreciation due of course to their expensive nature. 
That is not to say that the increase in demand for these more 
expensive foodstuffs is likely to tail off for it is unlikely 
that real incomes of the less well-to-do Europeans who them-
selves certainly do not receive sufficient, will not rise and 
especj.ally in view of the f9.ct "b-eQ-~ue-e of their protective 
value and the greater importance to be attached to propgganda 
in the nutrition field. In short, there would appear no 
reason to suppose that the factors which have in the past 
ConftiTue /o-
CBUSed the increase in consumption, will not do so given ,. 
unfettered economic development. The writer obviously cannot 
predict actions by the State likely to influence the position. 
It is interesting to note here that the natural conse-
guence of the continued operation of the redistribution of 
income and population described above would appear to be a 
reduction in the human consumption of maize and in turn greater 
utilization as stockfe~d. The importance of maize as the 
base upon which much of the country's agriculture is based 
has been stressed in the body of the text, and it is there-
fore probable that such would ultimately lead to higher 
production of meats and dairy products. It would, however, 
at the same time lead to an increased demand f or wheaten 
products in which South Africa is far from self-sufficient 
and would therefore require far greater importation of that 
cornmodi ty. 
If there appears in the above paragraph some feeling 
of optimism as regards the production of those foodstuffs of 
which the position at the moment is least encouraging, it is 
soon dispelled when the writer recalls what was said in 
Chapter 6. While it is true that at present the agricultural 
potential of the Union is far from exhausted, there would 
appear wei ghty arguments in support of the contention that 
in the long run South Africa will not be able to continue 
to produce even at the present level unless drastic action 
is taken to revise agricul tura.l practices throughout the 
country. Once again the thought occurs; is it in the ;;jfeyesh o/;ffe 
country as a whole to permit the continuation of a practice 
whereby some of the most fertile of the country's land is 
farmed by an agriculturally backward people in a backward, 
wasteful and from a long run point of view, an extremely 
dis as t ~ro us manner. ( 1 ) 
\ 
Finally an observation on Malthus and the applicability 
of his views on population to co nditions within this country. 
There can be little doubt that the Native Reserves are 
examples of a stagnant economy where to earn sufficient income 
to exist, male members of the family are forced to sell their 
one asset - labour, for a certain part of the year. If one 
accepts the view of certain medical men, one of whom has been 
quoted in this study, ( 2) that the adult population is in fact 
(1 ) The author is not blind to the fact that any change would 
involv~ a complete reversal of policy, social and economic, 
and therefore does not feel that any. further discussion 
here, is warranted . 
( 2) Dr F.W. Fox, see Chapter 7, page l9b . 
a privileged few, privileged by virtue of their greater 
health and thereby able to live through the critical years 
of infancy, then there is every reason to accept the fact 
that at the moment the po9ulation of the Union is itself 
in part, a function of the food supplies and income. 
The present food situation is serious, of this there 
can be no doubt; the future appears likely to become even 
worse unless drastic action is taken and a complete reversal 
of accepted policies occurs; yet, however serious the 
appearances are, as long as the facts of the problem are 
appreciated, it need not be insoluble. The intention of 
this study has been to present the fact and as far as 
possible to produce lines along which food policies can be 
formulated, but becaus ~ the policies cannot be in conflict 
with the general policy for the economic and social develop-
ment of the country, the writer has deliberately refrained 
from making concrete policy recommendations. 
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